Get-Home-Itis, Arrogance, or What?

This accident was posted on the newsgroups right after it happened. Now
published on the NTSB website, which gives us more info than the 6pm news.

My thoughts and prayers go out to the family left behind, but with that
said.....How can you throw everything you learned in Flight Training about
Weather, out the window. I also considered a subject line of: Just how many
G's does it take to rip the wings off a C-150? What a shame.
************************************************** ********************************************
NTSB Identification: NYC06FA215
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Monday, September 04, 2006 in Penhook, VA
Aircraft: Cessna 150G, registration: N2932J
Injuries: 2 Fatal.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors.
Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been
completed.

On September 4, 2006, at 1132 eastern daylight time, a Cessna 150G, N2932J,
was destroyed when it impacted trees and terrain following an inflight
breakup near Penhook, Virginia. The certificated private pilot and passenger
were fatally injured. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and no
flight plan was filed for the flight, which departed Smith Mountain Lake
Airport (W91), Monetna, Virginia, about 1120, destined for Florence Regional
Airport (FLO), Florence, South Carolina. The personal flight was conducted
under 14 CFR Part 91.

According to preliminary air traffic control (ATC) communication and radar
data obtained from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the pilot
contacted Roanoke approach control about 1120, and requested visual flight
rules (VFR) flight following services. Shortly thereafter, the airplane was
radar identified about 2 nautical miles south of Smith Mountain Lake
Airport.

The airplane tracked generally southbound, until about 1130, when the pilot
asked the controller for a radar vector. When queried about the request, the
pilot responded, "we're kinda lost in some fog here." The controller then
asked the pilot to state his present heading, to which the pilot replied, "I
can't tell, I think we're upside-down." The controller instructed the pilot
to turn right, and 18 seconds later advised the pilot to stop his turn.
During this time the airplane had completed a left turn to a northeasterly
track, and its altitude varied between 4,500 and 4,700 feet. About 10
seconds later, at 1132, the pilot stated, "we can't see, we can't see, we
can't see," and ten seconds later transmitted something unintelligible. The
controller advised the pilot to stay calm, that he was at an altitude of
4,500 feet, and that he should not climb or descend the airplane. No further
transmissions were received from the pilot, and radar contact was lost
shortly thereafter.

A witness, located near the accident site, reported that he heard "a loud
pop." When he looked up, he saw the airplane descend into the woods, and
then saw the wings of the airplane "floating" down to the ground.

Another witness described that she heard the airplane, and that it sounded
like "it was landing in the back yard." She stepped outside and saw the
wings of the airplane "twirling in the air," before they impacted the
ground, but did not see the rest of the airplane.

The accident occurred during the hours of daylight at 36 degrees 56 minutes
north latitude, 74 degrees 36 minutes west longitude.

All major components of the airplane were accounted for at the scene, except
for a portion of the right side doorpost, which was not recovered. The
wreckage path was oriented on a heading about 080 degrees magnetic, and was
about 3,500 feet long. The wings had separated from the fuselage, and were
found along the wreckage path, along with numerous other small pieces from
the airplane. The left and right wings separated near the wing root, and a
portion of the cabin roof and both the fore and aft carry-through spars
remained attached to the left wing. Examination of both wings revealed
signatures consistent with an in-flight separation in the positive, or
upward, direction. All of the fracture surfaces examined on both wings, and
their respective wing struts, were consistent with overload.

Flight control continuity was confirmed to all control surfaces. The
horizontal stabilizer, elevator, and trim tab were bent upward about 45
degrees near their mid-span. Measurement of the flap actuator revealed an
indication consistent with the flaps being in the up position, and the
elevator trim tab was in the 10-degree tab up position.

Fuel similar in color to automotive fuel was found in both wing fuel tanks,
and in the carburetor. The fuel selector handle was found in the on
position. The engine crankshaft was rotated by hand at the propeller, which
remained attached, and valvetrain continuity was confirmed. Compression was
obtained on all cylinders, except for cylinder number 3, which was dislodged
from the crankcase. The impact damaged magneto leads were cut from the
magnetos, and rotation of both magnetos produced spark on all towers. The
spark plugs exhibited normal wear, and their electrodes were black in color.

The weather conditions reported at Roanoke Regional Airport (ROA), about 26
nautical miles northwest of the accident site, at 1154, included winds from
150 degrees at 6 knots, 3 statute miles visibility in light rain and mist,
scattered clouds at 500 feet, an overcast ceiling at 700 feet, temperature
63 degrees Fahrenheit, dewpoint 59 degrees Fahrenheit, and an altimeter
setting of 30.20 inches of mercury.

The weather conditions reported at Lynchburg Regional Airport (LYH), about
30 nautical miles northeast of the accident site, at 1126, included variable
winds at 3 knots, 2 statute miles visibility in heavy rain and mist, few
clouds at 1,100 feet, an overcast ceiling at 2,600 feet, temperature 63
degrees Fahrenheit, dewpoint 59 degrees Fahrenheit, and an altimeter setting
of 30.19 inches of mercury.

An AIRMET for IFR conditions was issued about 1 1/2 hours before the
accident airplane departed. It warned of occasional ceilings below 1,000
feet, and visibilities below 3 statute miles due to clouds, precipitation,
mist, and fog, with the conditions ending between 1100 and 1400. An AIRMET
for mountain obscuration was also issued at the same time that warned of
similar conditions continuing beyond 1600 through 2200.

A preliminary review of flight service station data revealed that the pilot
did not contact any flight service stations or the Direct User Access
Terminal System (DUATS) to obtain a weather briefing, or file a flight plan,
prior to the accident flight.

The pilot held a private pilot certificate with a rating for airplane single
engine land, which was issued on June 17, 2006. His most recent FAA third
class medical certificate was issued on February 16, 2006. He did not hold
an instrument rating.
Index for Sep2006 | Index of months

Get your IFR ticket folks and fly like you've been trained. That's just
a terrible story.

KC


Ron Snipes wrote:
This accident was posted on the newsgroups right after it happened. Now
published on the NTSB website, which gives us more info than the 6pm news.

My thoughts and prayers go out to the family left behind, but with that
said.....How can you throw everything you learned in Flight Training about
Weather, out the window. I also considered a subject line of: Just how many
G's does it take to rip the wings off a C-150? What a shame.

"Ron Snipes" wrote:
Accident occurred Monday, September 04, 2006 in Penhook, VA
....
The pilot held a private pilot certificate with a rating for airplane
single engine land, which was issued on June 17, 2006. His most recent
FAA third class medical certificate was issued on February 16, 2006.
He did not hold an instrument rating.

Looks like around four months to get the certificate and a fatal mistake in
judgment two and a half months later. :-(

"Jim Logajan" wrote in message
.. .
"Ron Snipes" wrote:
Accident occurred Monday, September 04, 2006 in Penhook, VA
...
The pilot held a private pilot certificate with a rating for airplane
single engine land, which was issued on June 17, 2006. His most recent
FAA third class medical certificate was issued on February 16, 2006.
He did not hold an instrument rating.

Looks like around four months to get the certificate and a fatal mistake
in
judgment two and a half months later. :-(

And not just a mistake in judgment. He also lacked the skill to keep his
plane upright under instrument conditions, which all private pilots are
supposed to be trained to do.

--Gary

Besides, being carbureted, a 150 will quit after only a few seconds
inverted. The NTSB should also look at the quality and quantity of the
simulated IMC time during his training.

Viperdoc wrote:
Besides, being carbureted, a 150 will quit after only a few seconds
inverted. The NTSB should also look at the quality and quantity of the
simulated IMC time during his training.



The basic instrument flight instruction part of PP training is
really not sufficient, nor is it intended to be for sustained
flight into IMC. Especially when at the same time trying to
communicate with ATC, manage NAV radios and so forth.... that
is what the instrument rating trains you to do.

"ktbr" wrote in message
...
Viperdoc wrote:
Besides, being carbureted, a 150 will quit after only a few seconds
inverted. The NTSB should also look at the quality and quantity of the
simulated IMC time during his training.

The basic instrument flight instruction part of PP training is
really not sufficient, nor is it intended to be for sustained
flight into IMC. Especially when at the same time trying to
communicate with ATC, manage NAV radios and so forth.... that
is what the instrument rating trains you to do.

I disagree. The PP instrument training really should suffice to keep you
upright in clouds for long enough to reach VMC if there's any within range.
The instrument rating, in addition, teaches you to reliably maintain a
precise heading and altitude, perform approaches to the minima (and with a
partial panel), and understand the IFR system (planning, filing, lost comm
procedures, and other regulations).

--Gary

"ktbr" == ktbr writes:

ktbr Viperdoc wrote:
Besides, being carbureted, a 150 will quit after only a few
seconds inverted. The NTSB should also look at the quality and
quantity of the simulated IMC time during his training.

ktbr The basic instrument flight instruction part of PP training
ktbr is really not sufficient, nor is it intended to be for
ktbr sustained flight into IMC.

Quite so. As those who have flown solo in IMC know, there is a huge
psychological difference between flying with a hood in sunshine and an
instructor and knowing what you are about to do, and blundering into
IMC with no warning and only yourself to get out of it. The hood
training for the PP can never really prepare one for the case of
blundering into IMC. Which is why on occasion I may chase a cloud and
wander a bit too close. Not every VFR pilot needs the IFR rating, but
every pilot does need some exposure to real IMC. Do it with an
instructor and learn to live another day.

--
Look, if you don't like my parties, you can leave in a huff. If that's
too soon, leave in a minute and a huff. If you can't find that, you
can leave in a taxi.
Groucho Marx

Viperdoc wrote:
Besides, being carbureted, a 150 will quit after only a few seconds
inverted.

I'm thinking in such a situation that the negative G required to kill
the engine would be pre-empted by pilot's need to pull the wings off.

Does anyone, ever, kill an engine that way when mistakenly entering IMC?

"Ron Snipes" wrote in message
news:uCHQg.157$b23.82@dukeread07...
"I can't tell, I think we're upside-down."

This gives me a horrible feeling in the pit of my stomach.