The LEX crash - A CRM view

If as PNF you notice that the PF has just turned on to the wrong runway
to commence the takeoff roll, are you permitted to alert him (can't see
why not, actually, if lives are likely to be on the line) to it or are
you expected to just shut up and let him make the call? Presume for the
moment that the Capn is PF, which I hear wasn't the case in the LEX
incident...

Ramapriya

wrote:
If as PNF you notice that the PF has just turned on to the wrong runway
to commence the takeoff roll, are you permitted to alert him (can't see
why not, actually, if lives are likely to be on the line) to it or are
you expected to just shut up and let him make the call? Presume for the
moment that the Capn is PF, which I hear wasn't the case in the LEX
incident...

Ramapriya

I would think that CRM (Cockpit (or Crew) Resource Management)
techniques would suggest yes, you should speak up.

Jay B

This publication from the UK CAA explains a bit more about CRM.

regards

S

Sorry - here's the link....


http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/CAP720.PDF

Jay B wrote:
wrote:
If as PNF you notice that the PF has just turned on to the wrong runway
to commence the takeoff roll, are you permitted to alert him (can't see
why not, actually, if lives are likely to be on the line) to it or are
you expected to just shut up and let him make the call? Presume for the
moment that the Capn is PF, which I hear wasn't the case in the LEX
incident...

Ramapriya

I would think that CRM (Cockpit (or Crew) Resource Management)
techniques would suggest yes, you should speak up.

Jay B

I don't care what what CRM says, but if someone is about to kill you,
you should not only speak up, but take physical control of the
situation.

Andrew Sarangan wrote:
I don't care what what CRM says, but if someone is about to kill you,
you should not only speak up, but take physical control of the
situation.

Not exactly what the proponents of CRM would say is proper procedure
but...

Point well taken.

Jay B

"Jay B" wrote:

Andrew Sarangan wrote:
I don't care what what CRM says, but if someone is about to kill you,
you should not only speak up, but take physical control of the
situation.

Not exactly what the proponents of CRM would say is proper procedure
but...

Point well taken.

If a copilot is about to do something that will kill many people a
verbal response...maybe two... is all he gets before any and all
physical means are implemented.

Ron Lee

Jay B wrote:
Not exactly what the proponents of CRM would say is proper procedure
but...

Point well taken.


What bugs me about this whole thing is the stink the media (and some
politicians) made about the single controller issue. IIRC that KY
airport has a handful of operations on the overnight shift - so why
would they need a second controller? Granted, if the controller hadn't
been doing something else he might have caught the mistake but I don't
think this is a glaring deficiency in tower staffing. The other thing
that bothers me is that *both* pilots were oblivious to being on the
wrong runway. When I fly the Pilatus (private charter) the checklist
requires us to set the heading bug on the runway - it's part of the
line-up check. I'm sure Comair has a similar checklist to the one we
use, and I'm amazed something like this could happen.

"Kingfish" wrote in message
ups.com...
What bugs me about this whole thing is the stink the media (and some
politicians) made about the single controller issue. [...]

Just par for the course. As I'm sure you know, the media, politicians, and
general public (who are all too happy to believe whatever the media and
politicians tell them, if it means they avoid actually using their brain)
consistently fail to "get it".

That sort of thing used to bug me. I suppose it still does, at some level.
But mostly I just wind up thinking "oh well, people being stupid, again".

I guess one could analyze this particular situation and try to understand
why the "controller at fault" scenario is so compelling to everyone. Maybe
something about human nature to prefer to blame a person whose life wasn't
at risk. Or maybe it's just the most obvious failure to follow a rule,
making it an "easy out" for people "thinking" (and I use the word loosely)
about the accident. But in the end, it all comes down to the usual "didn't
bother to think about it" that plagues so much of our society.

Pete

"Kingfish" wrote in message
ups.com...

What bugs me about this whole thing is the stink the media (and some
politicians) made about the single controller issue. IIRC that KY
airport has a handful of operations on the overnight shift - so why
would they need a second controller? Granted, if the controller hadn't
been doing something else he might have caught the mistake but I don't
think this is a glaring deficiency in tower staffing. The other thing
that bothers me is that *both* pilots were oblivious to being on the
wrong runway. When I fly the Pilatus (private charter) the checklist
requires us to set the heading bug on the runway - it's part of the
line-up check. I'm sure Comair has a similar checklist to the one we
use, and I'm amazed something like this could happen.


Many assume that had the required second controller been on duty he may have
caught the flight crew's error. Had the two controller policy been followed
the second controller wouldn't have been in the tower cab, he'd have been
working in the TRACON. TRACON's don't have windows.