The start of jet operations in US Navy.

I was reading an interesting paper on China's 'naval dilemma'
(..basically whether to base it's navy on carriers or submarines), and
came across this quote:

'In 1954 alone, in working to master jet aviation off carriers, the U.S.
Navy lost nearly eight hundred aircraft'

Paper: China's aircraft carrier dilemma
By Andrew S Erickson and Andrew R. Wilson

That number seems extremely large to me, can it be that this was
including combat losses?

Frode Hansen wrote:

I was reading an interesting paper on China's 'naval dilemma'
(..basically whether to base it's navy on carriers or submarines), and
came across this quote:

'In 1954 alone, in working to master jet aviation off carriers, the U.S.
Navy lost nearly eight hundred aircraft'

Paper: China's aircraft carrier dilemma
By Andrew S Erickson and Andrew R. Wilson

That number seems extremely large to me, can it be that this was
including combat losses?

Not likely, the Korean War Armistice dates to July 27, 1953. No
"combat losses" in "1954 alone."

I'd be interested in the citation in the footnote that Andrew S
Erickson and Andrew R. Wilson provided in the paper to support
their statement. By 1954, the USN wasn't "working to master jet
aviation off carriers, ..." they had been doing it operationally
for some time by 1954, supporting that war that the Armistice of
July 27, 1953 put on hold for 54 years and counting.

Which is not to say that I don't believe that the Navy didn't
lose 800 jet aircraft during their entire transition of pilots
from prop aircraft to jet aircraft during that entire transition
over a period of several years, whether in land based training or
carrier training - I doubt it, but I'm not going to do the
research to find out how many losses were suffered. I just don't
buy the Erickson/Wilson statement.

[Why do I suspect that the statement isn't supported by a
footnoted/endnoted citation?]

--
OJ III

Ogden Johnson III wrote:
Not likely, the Korean War Armistice dates to July 27, 1953. No
"combat losses" in "1954 alone."

I'd be interested in the citation in the footnote that Andrew S
Erickson and Andrew R. Wilson provided in the paper to support
their statement. By 1954, the USN wasn't "working to master jet
aviation off carriers, ..." they had been doing it operationally
for some time by 1954, supporting that war that the Armistice of
July 27, 1953 put on hold for 54 years and counting.

Which is not to say that I don't believe that the Navy didn't
lose 800 jet aircraft during their entire transition of pilots
from prop aircraft to jet aircraft during that entire transition
over a period of several years, whether in land based training or
carrier training - I doubt it, but I'm not going to do the
research to find out how many losses were suffered. I just don't
buy the Erickson/Wilson statement.

[Why do I suspect that the statement isn't supported by a
footnoted/endnoted citation?]

You just gave me the answer actually, as the footnote included an URL to
an article. So I can answer it myself:

(The quoted article I questioned can be found on p 25 in Naval War
College Review Vol 59 no 4, autumn 2006, also available he
http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/review...s/NWCRAU06.pdf )

Source quoted for the paragraph mentioned is an article by Sandra Erwin
in National Defense Magazine oct 2000:
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.o.../Navy_Aims.htm

There the sentence reads:

....."In 1954, said Dirren, the Navy lost 776 airplanes, an average of
two a day. But even though fewer planes are lost in accidents today, the
cost of naval aircraft has gone up so much that the financial
implications of mishaps are more significant than ever, he explained.
“We lost 22 in 1999. But those 22 airplanes were worth 10 times what the
776 airplanes were worth in 1954,” he said. The A4 Skyhawks were
$240,000 a copy. Today’s premier naval fighter-bomber, the F/A-18E/F,
costs $57 million.

Back in those days, said Dirren, such high rates of mishaps were
acceptable and viewed as “the cost of doing business.”....

The "master jet aviation"-bit seems to be added by Erickson/Wilson to
illustrate the difficulties of carrier operations.
Anyway, I have to assume these are correct numbers.

Frode Hansen wrote:

Ogden Johnson III wrote:

[snips]

[Why do I suspect that the statement isn't supported by a
footnoted/endnoted citation?]

You just gave me the answer actually, as the footnote included an URL to
an article. So I can answer it myself:

(The quoted article I questioned can be found on p 25 in Naval War
College Review Vol 59 no 4, autumn 2006, also available he
http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/review...s/NWCRAU06.pdf )

Source quoted for the paragraph mentioned is an article by Sandra Erwin
in National Defense Magazine oct 2000:
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.o.../Navy_Aims.htm

There the sentence reads:

...."In 1954, said Dirren, the Navy lost 776 airplanes, an average of
two a day. But even though fewer planes are lost in accidents today, the
cost of naval aircraft has gone up so much that the financial
implications of mishaps are more significant than ever, he explained.
“We lost 22 in 1999. But those 22 airplanes were worth 10 times what the
776 airplanes were worth in 1954,” he said. The A4 Skyhawks were
$240,000 a copy. Today’s premier naval fighter-bomber, the F/A-18E/F,
costs $57 million.

Back in those days, said Dirren, such high rates of mishaps were
acceptable and viewed as “the cost of doing business.”....

The "master jet aviation"-bit seems to be added by Erickson/Wilson to
illustrate the difficulties of carrier operations.
Anyway, I have to assume these are correct numbers.

OK, they observed good practice in footnoting. They also engaged
in bad writing, and possibly thinking. Their statement you
quoted said 800 airplanes, jets, lost in carrier operations.
Their footnoted statement said that the Navy lost 776 airplanes.
Absent any breakdown, one has to presume that the 776 figure
includes aircraft of all types, jet and prop, lost in all phases
of Navy flight operations, land-based and carrier-based.

I don't have time to research this, but assuming, for ease of
calculation, for 1954 a breakdown of prop vs jet of 50/50, and
an operational breakdown of 50/50 land-based/carrier-based, the
776 is reduced to 338 jets, and further to 194 carrier-based
jets. Left uncalculated is the number of mishaps in
take-off/landing operations, which would be where "carrier
operations" makes a real difference, and enroute travel,
simulated air-to-air combat, simulated air-to-ground, etc.
operations, in which carrier based vs land based makes no
difference. Fixating on a target and flying too low to recover
from your dive is no different vis-a-vis the type of aircraft you
are flying or where you started your flight and intended to end
your flight. It still kills you and breaks the aircraft.

It was a stretch to convert that to 'In 1954 alone, in working to
master jet aviation off carriers, the U.S. Navy lost nearly eight
hundred aircraft' Misleading at best, outright fudging the
numbers to support your postulation at worst.
--
OJ III

Ogden Johnson III wrote:
[snip]
OK, they observed good practice in footnoting. They also engaged
in bad writing, and possibly thinking. Their statement you
quoted said 800 airplanes, jets, lost in carrier operations.
Their footnoted statement said that the Navy lost 776 airplanes.
Absent any breakdown, one has to presume that the 776 figure
includes aircraft of all types, jet and prop, lost in all phases
of Navy flight operations, land-based and carrier-based.

I don't have time to research this, but assuming, for ease of
calculation, for 1954 a breakdown of prop vs jet of 50/50, and
an operational breakdown of 50/50 land-based/carrier-based, the
776 is reduced to 338 jets, and further to 194 carrier-based
jets. Left uncalculated is the number of mishaps in
take-off/landing operations, which would be where "carrier
operations" makes a real difference, and enroute travel,
simulated air-to-air combat, simulated air-to-ground, etc.
operations, in which carrier based vs land based makes no
difference. Fixating on a target and flying too low to recover
from your dive is no different vis-a-vis the type of aircraft you
are flying or where you started your flight and intended to end
your flight. It still kills you and breaks the aircraft.

It was a stretch to convert that to 'In 1954 alone, in working to
master jet aviation off carriers, the U.S. Navy lost nearly eight
hundred aircraft' Misleading at best, outright fudging the
numbers to support your postulation at worst.

I agree, given the factors used to break the number down are reasonably
in the ballpark. It would be interesting to see how USAF accident loss
rates compared for the same period, also the total no of planes in
operation for the USN in the period.

While I'm at it: ISTR reading that US and France are the only two
carrier operators using steam catapults with success. If true, is this
due to the size of the carriers or some specific technical challenge
involved?

In article , F Hansen
wrote:

Ogden Johnson III wrote:
[snip]
OK, they observed good practice in footnoting. They also engaged
in bad writing, and possibly thinking. Their statement you
quoted said 800 airplanes, jets, lost in carrier operations.
Their footnoted statement said that the Navy lost 776 airplanes.
Absent any breakdown, one has to presume that the 776 figure
includes aircraft of all types, jet and prop, lost in all phases
of Navy flight operations, land-based and carrier-based.

I don't have time to research this, but assuming, for ease of
calculation, for 1954 a breakdown of prop vs jet of 50/50, and
an operational breakdown of 50/50 land-based/carrier-based, the
776 is reduced to 338 jets, and further to 194 carrier-based
jets. Left uncalculated is the number of mishaps in
take-off/landing operations, which would be where "carrier
operations" makes a real difference, and enroute travel,
simulated air-to-air combat, simulated air-to-ground, etc.
operations, in which carrier based vs land based makes no
difference. Fixating on a target and flying too low to recover
from your dive is no different vis-a-vis the type of aircraft you
are flying or where you started your flight and intended to end
your flight. It still kills you and breaks the aircraft.

It was a stretch to convert that to 'In 1954 alone, in working to
master jet aviation off carriers, the U.S. Navy lost nearly eight
hundred aircraft' Misleading at best, outright fudging the
numbers to support your postulation at worst.

I agree, given the factors used to break the number down are reasonably
in the ballpark. It would be interesting to see how USAF accident loss
rates compared for the same period, also the total no of planes in
operation for the USN in the period.

While I'm at it: ISTR reading that US and France are the only two
carrier operators using steam catapults with success. If true, is this
due to the size of the carriers or some specific technical challenge
involved?

The US and France are about the only countries operating navies with
cat-launched aircraft. The Royal Navy ceased that kind of operations
several years ago.

While I'm at it: ISTR reading that US and France are the only two carrier operators using steam catapults with success. If true, is this due to the size of the carriers or some specific technical challenge involved?

Not sure, as I am not a snipe, but ship size would be a definite factor.

Steam cats require beaucoup steam. To operate steam cats and all of the other steam-powered auxiliary equipment - as well as steaming at 30+ knots to assure sufficient wind over the deck and distilling fresh water for the needs of your equipment and the 5,000+ souls who man your carrier - you require a bodacious steam generating capability.

Such capacity needs dictate a rather large ship to host all of this activity. Experience with steam cats also helps greatly. Only the US and France have current steam cat "corporate knowledge" here.

Anyone with better info please step in and enlighten us.


--
Mike Kanze

"Have you ever felt like your patron saint is a man named Murphy?"

- Anonymous

"F Hansen" wrote in message ...
Ogden Johnson III wrote:
[snip]
OK, they observed good practice in footnoting. They also engaged
in bad writing, and possibly thinking. Their statement you
quoted said 800 airplanes, jets, lost in carrier operations.
Their footnoted statement said that the Navy lost 776 airplanes.
Absent any breakdown, one has to presume that the 776 figure
includes aircraft of all types, jet and prop, lost in all phases
of Navy flight operations, land-based and carrier-based.

I don't have time to research this, but assuming, for ease of
calculation, for 1954 a breakdown of prop vs jet of 50/50, and
an operational breakdown of 50/50 land-based/carrier-based, the
776 is reduced to 338 jets, and further to 194 carrier-based
jets. Left uncalculated is the number of mishaps in
take-off/landing operations, which would be where "carrier
operations" makes a real difference, and enroute travel,
simulated air-to-air combat, simulated air-to-ground, etc.
operations, in which carrier based vs land based makes no
difference. Fixating on a target and flying too low to recover
from your dive is no different vis-a-vis the type of aircraft you
are flying or where you started your flight and intended to end
your flight. It still kills you and breaks the aircraft.

It was a stretch to convert that to 'In 1954 alone, in working to
master jet aviation off carriers, the U.S. Navy lost nearly eight
hundred aircraft' Misleading at best, outright fudging the
numbers to support your postulation at worst.

I agree, given the factors used to break the number down are reasonably
in the ballpark. It would be interesting to see how USAF accident loss
rates compared for the same period, also the total no of planes in
operation for the USN in the period.

While I'm at it: ISTR reading that US and France are the only two
carrier operators using steam catapults with success. If true, is this
due to the size of the carriers or some specific technical challenge
involved?

'In 1954 alone, in working to master jet aviation off carriers, the U.S.
Navy lost nearly eight hundred aircraft'


USN started operating jet squadrons from carriers in 1947.

From Quonset Scout (Poop sheet for the NAS), October 27, 1948, Page 3

Quote:

First Jet Aircraft Squadron to Operate on Carrier, VF-171

All Jet Fighter Squadron 171 Housed at NAS Marked a New Era in Naval
Aviation

By John F. Lambert, AMC.

Jets are in the navy to stay!

Have you ever wondered who chills your spine when a formation of
Phantom Jet aircraft streaks the sky past the Station with just a blur
of speed?

It's Fighter Squadron 171, housed here in hangar 2, that holds the
singular honor in Naval Aviation history for being the first jet
squadron to successfully operate from an aircraft carrier.

With a compliment of 24 highly trained jet pilots and a versatile crew
of 102 skilled maintenance men, Fighter Squadron 171 is commanded by
Commander WN Leonard, a World War II pilot who received two Navy
Crosses during the war years.

A new era began for Naval Aviation in July 1947 when VF-171 boarded
the aircraft carrier Saipan. Some doubters said the jet would require
too long a deck run. Others predicted the fiery jet exhaust would
burn crewmen and damage planes parked near them. Aviation experts
weren't so sure that jet aircraft were practical on "flat-tops".

It remained for VF-171 pilots to demonstrate and dispel any doubts
that jets not only could operate in quantity from a flight deck, but
could do it just as easily as any propellered plane.

It seemed that every pilot in the Navy was trying to get assignment to
VF-171 - the Navy's first jet squadron. Not all pilots could meet all
the rigid requirements. Minimum flight time per pilot was set for
1,000 hours in the air and 50 previous carrier landings, before pilots
could fly the "hot-rod".

Pilots and mechanics of fighter squadron 171 began a period of
intensive training and traveling for this thoroughly new type carrier
operation.

Several Phantoms of the new formed squadrons put on the first show, on
the carrier Saipan, being catapulted in rapid order. They came in for
landings. The third plane caught a wire Just as the first was
catapulted for the second time. Eight planes flew the next phase of
the show, making firing runs and then a 500 m.p.h. high speed run
past the ship.

Climax of the jet demonstration was the catapulting of eight Phantoms
and the deck fly-off of eight more in rapid succession. In tight
formation, led by Commander Ralph A. Fuoss, former skipper of VF-171,
the 16 Phantoms made a close pass on the Saipan and headed for Quonset
Point. While making a landing circle, Commander Fuoss' plane lost its
tail section through mid-air collision and he was killed when the
aircraft dived into the bay from 700 feet up. His death was the first
Navy fatality in jets and the only casualty since VF-171 adopted the
high speed jet aircraft.

The Saipan air show given by the Station's most deadly squadron proved
conclusively that carrier and jet aircraft were wedded into a strong
fighting force.

The history of VF-171 is over four years old, and like a strip-teaser
or show girl, it changed names several times.

Officially commissioned 1 April 1944 at NAS Atlantic City, New Jersey,
VF-171 was originally designated VF-82 and commanded by Lieut. Cdr. EW
Hessel as it began a colorful career.

After several months of training exercises and a shakedown cruise
aboard the U.S.S. Bennington, the squadron was ready to meet their
baptism by fire. This was it.

On New Years Day in 1945, the squadron composed of seasoned war
veterans and a majority of new sailors eager for action, left San
Diego to join Admiral Mitscher's powerful Task Force 58.

As part of the fast spearheading task force, squadron 82 moved into
quick action when assigned to make round the clock raids on Tokyo and
adjacent areas. It subsequently supported the Marine invasion of Iwo
Jima and participated in softening-up operations during the bloody
invasion of Okinawa.

After numerous aerial strikes on Kyushu and Kure the squadron
concentrated their hitting power on enemy shipping. The Japanese
Battleship Yamato and smaller supporting ships were destroyed during
this operation.

As the Japanese war drew to a close the battle scarred squadron
returned to Leyte Gulf to board the U.S.S. White Plains for
transportation to Alameda, California and recommissioning in 1945.

Upon recommissioning in August 1945 the squadron was transferred here
in Feb. 1946 to Quonset Point to be part of the U.S.S. Randolph Air
Group. At that time, the squadron was equipped with F4U-4 Corsairs.

On November 15, 1946, while engaged in a Mediterranean cruise,
Fighting Squadron 82 was redesignated VF-17 Able, becoming one of the
four squadrons of Attack Carrier Air Group 17.

With regard to its high record of efficiency, this squadron was one of
the first to receive a full compliment of the finest reciprocating
engine fighters, the F8F Grumman Bearcat.

The first two FH-I "Phantoms" were delivered to the squadron at
Quonset Point on July 24, 1947. They were followed by other new
FH-1's, with an F8F being turned in for each "Phantom" delivered until
the current squadron jet aircraft complement of 24 planes was
attained.

After a period of jet indoctrination and familiarization in the
"Phantom", which is powered by two Westinghouse jet engines, the |
squadron entered its transitional phase of operations. Squadron
pilots j investigated high speed, high altitude flight - singly and in
tactical formation work. Constant studies were made of the best
flight procedures for range and endurance, fuel consumption being high
in all jet aircraft.

In anticipation of the fact that tomorrow's air battles will be fought
at very high altitudes over the top of weather and out of sight of the
earth, much emphasis has been placed on jet instrument flying,
including the Ground Controlled Approach blind landing system, and
radio navigation. In all this work the FH-1 has the admiration of all
VF-171 pilots and the men who keep the Phantom flying.

End Quote

Maybe these guys, Erickson and Wilson, ought to check their history
before setting pen to paper.

Regards,

Rich