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#61
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![]() "John Galban" wrote in message oups.com... Exactly. Flying out here in the West it's not uncommon to transit several MOAs in the course of a long XC. I just contact Center on the local frequency and get advisories. They will steer you away from any military activity if the MOA is hot. Only if you're IFR. |
#62
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![]() "Larry Dighera" wrote in message ... Center radar probably can't "see" to as low an altitude as the military radar covering MOAs. I think you'll find more center radar than military radar covering MOAs. And then, there is the issue of whether the military aircraft operating in the MOA are receiving traffic advisories from Center or not. Probably not, but it's generally available to civil aircraft. |
#63
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![]() "Ed Rasimus" wrote in message ... It didn't occur in a MOA, didn't involve supersonic operations, and, the incident is not relevant to the discussion of the proposed changes to airspace in New Mexico were my points. Correct on all points. You are correct, the midair did not take place on an LLN route. Feel better now? Not particularly, as I was already feeling pretty good. You're entering this a bit late. Your additional phrase regarding operational necessity has been discussed in some detail here. Just wanted to make sure you understood the requirements. |
#64
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On Sat, 19 Feb 2005 20:43:01 GMT, "Steven P. McNicoll"
wrote in et:: "Ed Rasimus" wrote in message .. . How does expansion of a MOA for operations above 10,000 feet in New Mexico relate to a mid-air collision in Florida on a low-level training route? The Florida midair did not occur on a low-level training route. He didn't say it did. It occurred in Class C airspace en route to a MTR. |
#65
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![]() "Larry Dighera" wrote in message ... He didn't say it did. No, he did not say the Florida midair occurred on a low-level training route. He implied that it did when he asked, "How does expansion of a MOA for operations above 10,000 feet in New Mexico relate to a mid-air collision in Florida on a low-level training route?" |
#66
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On Sat, 19 Feb 2005 20:58:08 GMT, "Steven P. McNicoll"
wrote in et:: "Larry Dighera" wrote in message .. . When a pilot deliberately descends into congested terminal airspace with the required ATC clearance, it's not an accident; it's reckless endangerment of all the aircraft operating legally within the terminal airspace. If you disagree, please explain how Parker could have _accidentally_ descended into the Class B and C airspace, perform a G Check, and search for the MTR? I don't recall anything in the report that indicated the descent into Class B or Class C airspace was deliberate. That is correct. The UAAF Accident Investigation Bboard's (AIB) report found, that Parker's descent into terminal airspace was a result of his loss of situational awareness, and (erroneously) implied that it was the result of an INS error that mysteriously originated at the time Parker chose to descend into Class B airspace without benefit of the required ATC clearance. As I recall there was a significant navigational error. That is correct also. The AIB report found: Meanwhile, Ninja flight was still in their VFR descent proceeding to the low-level start route point, located just northeast of the Class C airspace [or ~1 NM SSE of Class B airspace]. By this time, Ninja 1’s INS had developed a 9-11 nautical mile (NM) position error that went unnoticed by the pilot. He had experienced no problems with the INS on the first sortie of the day and assumed it was still accurate. He did not crosscheck the INS accuracy with other systems during the medium-altitude portion of the mishap sortie. However, a review of ground radar plots depicting his actual ground track on the first three legs of the sortie revealed no apparent deviations. About the specifics of the INS error, the AIB report found: Ninja 1’s INS was steering him 9-11 NM south of the actual turn point so Manatee Dam [the MTR entry point] was, in reality, several miles to his left. Now, given the flight was on a southerly heading, and the INS error erroneously caused Ninja 1 (Parker) to believe his position was 9-11 NM south of his true position, Please explain how that error caused Parker to believe the MTR entry point was located to the side of his position? He was southbound, and the error erroneously showed his position 9-11 NM south of his true position, not to the side. That AIB report conclusion doesn't make any sense. But it gets worse. The AIB report also mentions Parkers true position at the time he began his descent into Class B airspace to have been: When Ninja 1 cancelled IFR, the flight was well inside the lateral confines of Tampa Class B airspace but still 3,000 ft above its upper limit. ... Ninja 1 entered the Sarasota Class C airspace 9 NM northeast of Sarasota .. Now, given the flight was on a southerly heading, and the INS error erroneously caused Ninja 1 (Parker) to believe his position was 9-11 NM south of his true position, it would have caused him to believe he was north of the northern boundary of Class C airspace. If that is true, please explain how the INS error could have excused his decision to descend into Class B airspace. The NTSB report (MIA01FA028A) found: They [Ninja flight] continued to descend through 5,000 feet about 6 miles north of the entry point to VR-1098. [...] About 1547, the F-16 flight was heading south and descending through 4,300 feet on a converging course with N73829. Radar data indicated that the flight had overshot its intended entry point to VR-1098 and was several miles southwest of the MTR. The flight had also inadvertently [sic] passed through Tampa class B airspace without the required ATC clearance and was about to enter the Sarasota class C airspace without establishing communications with ATC, which is required by Federal regulations. [...] The second jet collided with the civilian airplane and initially continued southbound, according to witness statements. Given Ninja flight's southerly course and the AIB report's conclusion, that the INS error caused Parker to erroneously believe his position was 9-11 NM south of his true positron, while still descending through an altitude of 5,000', Parker would have thought his position to be well past the MTR entry point. But Parker made another error. The AIB report states: ... about the time Ninja flight was descending through 4,000 ft MSL and entering the Class C airspace. Ninja 1 ... switched his navigation system to a ground-attack steering mode. This new mode shifted the steering indications in the HUD, showing a 180-degree bearing for 35 NM to the start route point. This shift in the steering indications was the result of an unintentional cursor slew bias by the pilot. Ninja 1 failed to note this bias, turned the flight south to center up the new steering, and continued looking for the start route ground reference However, regardless of that, while the INS error could have contributed to Parker's loss of SA, it in no way accounts for his decision to descend into Class B airspace without required ATC clearance. There is this additional AIB report information, that may shed some light on the possible cause of Parker's numerous errors: Lieutenant Colonel Parker sustained no injuries from the mishap and did not seek medical attention. He had a normal post-mishap physical examination on 24 November 2000 [8 days subsequent to the day the mishap occurred]. ... Blood and urine samples from Lieutenant Colonel Parker and Captain Kreuder were submitted to the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology for toxicological analysis. Carbon monoxide levels for both pilots were within normal limits. No ethanol was detected in the urine or blood samples. Furthermore, no amphetamines, barbiturates, benzodiazepines, cannabinoids, cocaine, opiates or phencyclidine were detected in the urine samples of either pilot Had fluid samples been analyzed immediately following the mishap, instead of 8 days later, it might not raise such a red flag. I would very much appreciate your analysis of these apparent facts and your replies to the two questions I posed above. Perhaps you can provide a reasonable explanation, that exonerates Parker's decision to descend when into Class B airspace. I cannot. |
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