Persian Tomcats in service

There's a very interesting article in the current issue of Combat Aircraft,
Vol 7, No. 6. It's by Tom Cooper and Liam F. Devlin and titled "Iran: A
Formidable Opponent?"

The article is about Iran's current air force capabilities, specifically
focusing on the Tomcats in Iranian service (it is in keeping with the
issue's focus on the retirement of the Tomcat from USN service; several
other magazines are doing similar Tomcat farewell issues).

According to the authors, the Tomcat remains in frontline Iranian service
and in sizeable numbers. The authors claim that in late 2003 a USAF E-3
Sentry tracked 16--yes, SIXTEEN--Iranian Tomcats flying in formation. This
was the largest number spotted at one time since 1997, when nine were
tracked over the southern Persian Gulf by the US Navy.

The article is somewhat defensive in tone. The authors claim that although
Western sources report that the Tomcat is barely operable, this is untrue.
The Iranians have put a lot of effort into maintaining and even rebuilding
their Tomcats and Phantoms, and they may have as many as 65 Phantoms in
service. It said that the US has decided that the Tomcat is barely operable
because it no longer operates on the borders, but only deep inside Iran.
But they claim that this is actually because the Iranians are trying to
preserve their assets and keep their most powerful fighter farther from
potential harm.

They also make a number of other claims, including that the CIA may have
acquired or inspected a Russian MiG-31 in 1997, and that the Russians
offered 22 secondhand MiG-31 aircraft to the Iranians, who turned them down.
(The CIA reportedly sought to buy these aircraft rather than let the
Iranians get them.) The article also claims that the Russians offered
Su-27s, Su-30s, and MiG-29s to the Iranians, but the Iranians are wary of
buying Russian aircraft because the terms are bad. For instance, the
Russians do not allow license building of their jet engines. Simply put,
the Russians won't give the Iranians enough independence and the Iranians
don't want to get stuck in a position of weakness when it comes to acquiring
spare parts for their aircraft.

There's a lot of amazing stuff in the article and it would be fascinating if
true. But one objection that I've heard others make about Cooper and his
other co-writer Farzad Bishop is that it is impossible to independently
confirm their information. They might conduct a lot of interviews with
Iranian pilots and ex-pat Iranians, but we don't know how carefully they
check their information. (This article by Cooper and Devlin concedes that
fewer Iranians have left the country since the mid-1990s, so it is harder to
speak to Iranians outside the country.)

Personally, the one thing I'm dubious about is the claim that Western
intelligence agencies do not have a good understanding of just how active
the Iranian F-14s are. If they turn on their radars, then the US intel
assets in the Persian Gulf will detect them. In addition, satellite photos
should also indicate how many F-14s are operable. Sure, the Iranians must
keep a lot of them in hangars, but occasionally they will move them around
airfields and they can be counted. In fact, somebody with a credit card
could order up commercial images of Iranian airfields and check for
themselves. So I don't buy the claim that US intel officials think that
_virtually no_ F-14s or their AWG-9 radars are still operating. My
suspicion is that the authors are responding to misinformed trash talking in
the aviation press, not to what US intel actually believes about Iranian
capabilities.

All that said, the one thing that establishes credibility for Cooper and
Devlin (as well as Cooper and Bishop in their books on the Iranian F-4s and
F-14s) is the impressive array of photos that they have collected. These
include aerial refueling shots of F-4s and Su-24s, as well as formation
shots of F-5s and other aircraft, and a very cool grainy image of an F-14 at
extremely low altitude over the Gulf. That aircraft is in the current
blue/gray paint scheme. They also have a photo of an F-14 with an ATM-54A
training round alongside, photographed in April 2004. That raises an
interesting point--if the Iranians no longer can operate the AIM-54 Phoenix,
then why would they be carrying around training rounds? Clearly they retain
some kind of AIM-54 Phoenix capability.



D

Follow the money!

To begin with, the Shah bought plenty of spare parts. Two AVCAL's (each
consisting of one year's estimated usage of spare parts based on flight
hours) were required to be delivered concurrent with the first IIAF
F-14. That allowed plenty of time for copying and improvement.

Second, the USN lied to Congress that 70% of inflight malfunctions would
be repairable at the Organizational or Intermediate Maintenance levels,
without resort to the slow, highly expensive Depot or Contractor levels.

Third, Congress dictated the use of a myriad of small-business
minority-setaside contractors to provide bit-and-piece components for
production and spare parts. Many were totally inept, dishonest, or both.

For instance: A red or green lens for the nav lights cost $18,000;
Hughes used a special transistor in the AWG-9 Radar that was not
manufactured, but selected for its special characteristics from bulk
quantities of a common type of transistor used in GM auto seat belt
controllers. The yield rate for usable transistors was about 1 in 2,700
tested. Guess what happened when GM dropped that seat-belt design.

Fleet introduction was a real zoo, with the production line, the IIAF
and current fleet usage all in competition for the same non-existent
parts.

The IIAF logistics and maintenance guys, all graduates of the USAF
Palace Log training track, got a real snicker out of that one, and
contracted with French companies to provide outyear support.

To make a long story short, the guts of any nearly system-ready F-14 in
Iran's current inventory bear no resemblance to what was in them in
1975. The sons of the Frenchmen who provided logistics and engineering
to the Shah in the 1970's are providing them to Iran today, along with
the Russians. The flying pack of internal rat**** that USN maintainers
put up with for years long since went the way of the Wing Flap Glove
Vane Controller System.

By the way, another old giggle: When the first F-14 landed at Point
Mugu, the canopy warped so badly in the sunshine that it couldn't be
closed until it was taken into the hangar and cooled down. Everyone was
going nuts about what the Iranians would say when they found out (lots
of our oil dollars riding on this deal, guys). The Iranians were
totally unconcerned; their hangers were underground and a canopy would
never be opened in the sun. Point is, these airframes have been stored
and maintained in conditions superior to most museums. The original
hangar and support facilities were designed by the French, also.

OK, it's time for one of you aero types to explain the history of the
Wing Flap Glove Vanes, and where they went.

Rick




DDAY wrote:
There's a very interesting article in the current issue of Combat Aircraft,
Vol 7, No. 6. It's by Tom Cooper and Liam F. Devlin and titled "Iran: A
Formidable Opponent?"

The article is about Iran's current air force capabilities, specifically
focusing on the Tomcats in Iranian service (it is in keeping with the
issue's focus on the retirement of the Tomcat from USN service; several
other magazines are doing similar Tomcat farewell issues).

According to the authors, the Tomcat remains in frontline Iranian service
and in sizeable numbers. The authors claim that in late 2003 a USAF E-3
Sentry tracked 16--yes, SIXTEEN--Iranian Tomcats flying in formation. This
was the largest number spotted at one time since 1997, when nine were
tracked over the southern Persian Gulf by the US Navy.

The article is somewhat defensive in tone. The authors claim that although
Western sources report that the Tomcat is barely operable, this is untrue.
The Iranians have put a lot of effort into maintaining and even rebuilding
their Tomcats and Phantoms, and they may have as many as 65 Phantoms in
service. It said that the US has decided that the Tomcat is barely operable
because it no longer operates on the borders, but only deep inside Iran.
But they claim that this is actually because the Iranians are trying to
preserve their assets and keep their most powerful fighter farther from
potential harm.
snip
*** Posted via a free Usenet account from http://www.teranews.com ***

Don't know the current status of Iranian F-14 readiness but can vouch for
Iranian pilots being a bit better than camel jockeys. I personally saw then
fly three Iranian Air Force Boeing 747s in military parade formation at a
flight demonstration for the Shah in the mid 1970s.

That said, my guess is they would fare no better against our Air Force, Navy
and Marine aviators than did the Iraqis. It's probably more a matter of
motivation than skill.

Crown prince Raza, the Shah's son, claims the young people in Iran,
including the Revolutionary Guard, are ready to revolt against the murderous
mullahs if they can get some support from us western nations. Certainly that
would be better all round than our invading yet another middle east country!

WDA

end

"DDAY" wrote in message
k.net...
There's a very interesting article in the current issue of Combat
Aircraft,
Vol 7, No. 6. It's by Tom Cooper and Liam F. Devlin and titled "Iran: A
Formidable Opponent?"

The article is about Iran's current air force capabilities, specifically
focusing on the Tomcats in Iranian service (it is in keeping with the
issue's focus on the retirement of the Tomcat from USN service; several
other magazines are doing similar Tomcat farewell issues).

According to the authors, the Tomcat remains in frontline Iranian service
and in sizeable numbers. The authors claim that in late 2003 a USAF E-3
Sentry tracked 16--yes, SIXTEEN--Iranian Tomcats flying in formation.
This
was the largest number spotted at one time since 1997, when nine were
tracked over the southern Persian Gulf by the US Navy.

The article is somewhat defensive in tone. The authors claim that
although
Western sources report that the Tomcat is barely operable, this is untrue.
The Iranians have put a lot of effort into maintaining and even rebuilding
their Tomcats and Phantoms, and they may have as many as 65 Phantoms in
service. It said that the US has decided that the Tomcat is barely
operable
because it no longer operates on the borders, but only deep inside Iran.
But they claim that this is actually because the Iranians are trying to
preserve their assets and keep their most powerful fighter farther from
potential harm.

They also make a number of other claims, including that the CIA may have
acquired or inspected a Russian MiG-31 in 1997, and that the Russians
offered 22 secondhand MiG-31 aircraft to the Iranians, who turned them
down.
(The CIA reportedly sought to buy these aircraft rather than let the
Iranians get them.) The article also claims that the Russians offered
Su-27s, Su-30s, and MiG-29s to the Iranians, but the Iranians are wary of
buying Russian aircraft because the terms are bad. For instance, the
Russians do not allow license building of their jet engines. Simply put,
the Russians won't give the Iranians enough independence and the Iranians
don't want to get stuck in a position of weakness when it comes to
acquiring
spare parts for their aircraft.

There's a lot of amazing stuff in the article and it would be fascinating
if
true. But one objection that I've heard others make about Cooper and his
other co-writer Farzad Bishop is that it is impossible to independently
confirm their information. They might conduct a lot of interviews with
Iranian pilots and ex-pat Iranians, but we don't know how carefully they
check their information. (This article by Cooper and Devlin concedes that
fewer Iranians have left the country since the mid-1990s, so it is harder
to
speak to Iranians outside the country.)

Personally, the one thing I'm dubious about is the claim that Western
intelligence agencies do not have a good understanding of just how active
the Iranian F-14s are. If they turn on their radars, then the US intel
assets in the Persian Gulf will detect them. In addition, satellite
photos
should also indicate how many F-14s are operable. Sure, the Iranians must
keep a lot of them in hangars, but occasionally they will move them around
airfields and they can be counted. In fact, somebody with a credit card
could order up commercial images of Iranian airfields and check for
themselves. So I don't buy the claim that US intel officials think that
_virtually no_ F-14s or their AWG-9 radars are still operating. My
suspicion is that the authors are responding to misinformed trash talking
in
the aviation press, not to what US intel actually believes about Iranian
capabilities.

All that said, the one thing that establishes credibility for Cooper and
Devlin (as well as Cooper and Bishop in their books on the Iranian F-4s
and
F-14s) is the impressive array of photos that they have collected. These
include aerial refueling shots of F-4s and Su-24s, as well as formation
shots of F-5s and other aircraft, and a very cool grainy image of an F-14
at
extremely low altitude over the Gulf. That aircraft is in the current
blue/gray paint scheme. They also have a photo of an F-14 with an ATM-54A
training round alongside, photographed in April 2004. That raises an
interesting point--if the Iranians no longer can operate the AIM-54
Phoenix,
then why would they be carrying around training rounds? Clearly they
retain
some kind of AIM-54 Phoenix capability.



D

In article , "W. D. Allen"
wrote:

Crown prince Raza, the Shah's son, claims the young people in Iran,
including the Revolutionary Guard, are ready to revolt against the murderous
mullahs if they can get some support from us western nations. Certainly that
would be better all round than our invading yet another middle east country!

Yeah, but the problem with guys who have vested interests is that they tend
to drink their own bathwater.

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

On Wed, 03 May 2006 14:23:20 -0700, (Harry
Andreas) wrote:

In article , "W. D. Allen"
wrote:

Crown prince Raza, the Shah's son, claims the young people in Iran,
including the Revolutionary Guard, are ready to revolt against the murderous
mullahs if they can get some support from us western nations. Certainly that
would be better all round than our invading yet another middle east country!

Yeah, but the problem with guys who have vested interests is that they tend
to drink their own bathwater.

Isn't this the son of the same guy who never saw it coming?

Like father, like son?

I was an instructor at NAS Corpus when the Iranian revolution took
place. You could tell who was on what side becaus the Shah's guys
wore name tags that said "IIN" (Iranian Imperial Navy) and the other
guys wore tags that said "INN" (Iranian National Navy). The IIN guys
seemed to outnumber the INN guys, but not by much.

Maybe among the more Western oriented youth there is a desire to
replace the Mullahs, but I wonder how deep it runs.

Bill Kambic
Haras Lucero, Kingston, TN
Mangalarga Marchador: Uma Raça, Uma Paixão

To make the long story short, it is quite ironic that US Navy got rid
of Tomcats just in time when they could face foreign F-14s in battle
;-)))

DDAY wrote:
There's a very interesting article in the current issue of Combat Aircraft,
Vol 7, No. 6. It's by Tom Cooper and Liam F. Devlin and titled "Iran: A
Formidable Opponent?"

The article is about Iran's current air force capabilities, specifically
focusing on the Tomcats in Iranian service (it is in keeping with the
issue's focus on the retirement of the Tomcat from USN service; several
other magazines are doing similar Tomcat farewell issues).

According to the authors, the Tomcat remains in frontline Iranian service
and in sizeable numbers. The authors claim that in late 2003 a USAF E-3
Sentry tracked 16--yes, SIXTEEN--Iranian Tomcats flying in formation. This
was the largest number spotted at one time since 1997, when nine were
tracked over the southern Persian Gulf by the US Navy.

The article is somewhat defensive in tone. The authors claim that although
Western sources report that the Tomcat is barely operable, this is untrue.
The Iranians have put a lot of effort into maintaining and even rebuilding
their Tomcats and Phantoms, and they may have as many as 65 Phantoms in
service. It said that the US has decided that the Tomcat is barely operable
because it no longer operates on the borders, but only deep inside Iran.
But they claim that this is actually because the Iranians are trying to
preserve their assets and keep their most powerful fighter farther from
potential harm.

They also make a number of other claims, including that the CIA may have
acquired or inspected a Russian MiG-31 in 1997, and that the Russians
offered 22 secondhand MiG-31 aircraft to the Iranians, who turned them down.
(The CIA reportedly sought to buy these aircraft rather than let the
Iranians get them.) The article also claims that the Russians offered
Su-27s, Su-30s, and MiG-29s to the Iranians, but the Iranians are wary of
buying Russian aircraft because the terms are bad. For instance, the
Russians do not allow license building of their jet engines. Simply put,
the Russians won't give the Iranians enough independence and the Iranians
don't want to get stuck in a position of weakness when it comes to acquiring
spare parts for their aircraft.

There's a lot of amazing stuff in the article and it would be fascinating if
true. But one objection that I've heard others make about Cooper and his
other co-writer Farzad Bishop is that it is impossible to independently
confirm their information. They might conduct a lot of interviews with
Iranian pilots and ex-pat Iranians, but we don't know how carefully they
check their information. (This article by Cooper and Devlin concedes that
fewer Iranians have left the country since the mid-1990s, so it is harder to
speak to Iranians outside the country.)

Personally, the one thing I'm dubious about is the claim that Western
intelligence agencies do not have a good understanding of just how active
the Iranian F-14s are. If they turn on their radars, then the US intel
assets in the Persian Gulf will detect them. In addition, satellite photos
should also indicate how many F-14s are operable. Sure, the Iranians must
keep a lot of them in hangars, but occasionally they will move them around
airfields and they can be counted. In fact, somebody with a credit card
could order up commercial images of Iranian airfields and check for
themselves. So I don't buy the claim that US intel officials think that
_virtually no_ F-14s or their AWG-9 radars are still operating. My
suspicion is that the authors are responding to misinformed trash talking in
the aviation press, not to what US intel actually believes about Iranian
capabilities.

All that said, the one thing that establishes credibility for Cooper and
Devlin (as well as Cooper and Bishop in their books on the Iranian F-4s and
F-14s) is the impressive array of photos that they have collected. These
include aerial refueling shots of F-4s and Su-24s, as well as formation
shots of F-5s and other aircraft, and a very cool grainy image of an F-14 at
extremely low altitude over the Gulf. That aircraft is in the current
blue/gray paint scheme. They also have a photo of an F-14 with an ATM-54A
training round alongside, photographed in April 2004. That raises an
interesting point--if the Iranians no longer can operate the AIM-54 Phoenix,
then why would they be carrying around training rounds? Clearly they retain
some kind of AIM-54 Phoenix capability.



D

Cooper, Bishop and Devlin have provided credible artiles on the status
of the IRIAF coupled with an warning that those who ignore the
capabilities will be doomed to failure against the Iranians.

The article implies that there are 44 operational Tomcats instead of 28
operational and 29 inoperational as cited by US intelligence sources.
But it was Cooper and Bishop in their 2003 book on the Iraq/Iran war
that stated the original assertion of 28/29 as of F-14's.

The Iranians are willing to invest thousands of man hours in rebuilding
their F-4's and F-14 fleets in an effort to prolong their operational
life. That is because they are not able to buy US made aircraft and
foreign aircraft with US made parts incorporated in them. That is why
they are willing tlo spend all that time and money on refurbishing an
aging aircraft ready for the junk pile to zero hour status.

For the US to attack Iranian military bases with IRIAF fighters sitting
on the tarmac, they would have to expend 300 plus cruise missiles and
then wait another 18 months for new build stocks of cruise missiles to
come from the manufacturer to replenish their supplies. There is no
guarantee that they would be able to destroy all the active Iranian
aircraft as the Iranians would commingle the active aircraft with the
inactive ones in an effort to compel the US to have to destroy all the
aircraft on the base in order to ensure that the fleet of F-4's and
F-14's were no longer a threat thereafter.

Even if we achieved air superority over the Iranians, we will still
have a slog of a battle with the ground elements as they resort to
IED's and suicide bombers against American convoys. And that would add
to the general operational strain our military is under with wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan.

To achieve air superority would require that we accept the loss of a
few aircraft, including fighter planes and a few prized bombers of B-1
and B-2 vintage. Since we have only 21 B-2's, we cannot lose afford to
lose even one or two as that would add immensely to our long term
attrition rate for that aircraft and we would not have sufficient
numbers of B-2's for a future conflict.

It was surprising that the Pentagon and Iran made a secret agreement
with each other not to allow their aircraft to attack each other's
aircraft in cross border skirmishes. THis helped reduce tension to an
extent. Being a deep reader of Early Bird as that is the first thing I
read when I come to the office, I never saw any such agreement made
with the Iranians by the Pentagon.

If the Pentagon could talk with the Iranians, then President Bush
should follow the UN Secretary General's advice to talk with the
Iranians as it would go a long way toward reducing tensions and then
create a downward spiral in the price of oil.

It was great to hear one Iranian general tell the world that the
opinion of another general who said that Iran would strike Israel in
the event of an American attack on their country was his own personal
opinion and not that of the Iranian military That went a long way
toward assuring Americans that Iran maintains a good command and
control structure over its military like we do.

So, the ball is in the President's court and we will see what he will
do. I believe that an agreable deal can be made between both countries
on the nuclear matter in exchange for the United States to promise an
non-aggression pact against Iran and for Iran will do the same to the
United States. This will go a long way toward reducing fear of
terrorism and to help shorten the long war against terrorism that we
are fighting. It would not be surprising to see both countries resume
diplomatic relations.

Onc more curious tidbit. Did the CIA get the 22 Mig-31's from the
Russians under their dummy arms buying corporation?

James K. Goodwin

----------
In article .com,
wrote:

Cooper, Bishop and Devlin have provided credible artiles on the status
of the IRIAF coupled with an warning that those who ignore the
capabilities will be doomed to failure against the Iranians.

That is a useful warning. They delve into things like the training and the
political control of the pilots. Iran had a very well-trained air force in
the 1970s, but a lot of the pilots were imprisoned or controlled by the new
regime. As this article notes, the survivors from those days are now all
reaching retirement.


The article implies that there are 44 operational Tomcats instead of 28
operational and 29 inoperational as cited by US intelligence sources.
But it was Cooper and Bishop in their 2003 book on the Iraq/Iran war
that stated the original assertion of 28/29 as of F-14's.

I saw a post by Cooper last year where he said that he has better
information than he did for that book.

My only concern is that we don't get a good sense of how reliable their
information is, or how careful they are checking it.


life. That is because they are not able to buy US made aircraft and
foreign aircraft with US made parts incorporated in them. That is why

There must be a huge aftermarket inventory on Phantom parts. But what is
interesting in this article is that they actually provide a motive for
keeping the American aircraft--they don't like the terms that the Russians
have offered.


For the US to attack Iranian military bases with IRIAF fighters sitting
on the tarmac, they would have to expend 300 plus cruise missiles and
then wait another 18 months for new build stocks of cruise missiles to
come from the manufacturer to replenish their supplies. There is no

The US Tomahawk inventory is well over 2000 missiles, so expending 300 is
not crippling.


To achieve air superority would require that we accept the loss of a
few aircraft, including fighter planes and a few prized bombers of B-1
and B-2 vintage. Since we have only 21 B-2's, we cannot lose afford to
lose even one or two as that would add immensely to our long term
attrition rate for that aircraft and we would not have sufficient
numbers of B-2's for a future conflict.

I don't think that either assertion is true. There's no reason to believe
that the B-2 would be vulnerable. And we have already operated them for
over a decade without a single loss.

So, the ball is in the President's court and we will see what he will
do. I believe that an agreable deal can be made between both countries
on the nuclear matter in exchange for the United States to promise an
non-aggression pact against Iran and for Iran will do the same to the
United States.

Iran doesn't want a bomb to protect them from the US. They want a bomb to
make them a major power, and to use on Israel.


Onc more curious tidbit. Did the CIA get the 22 Mig-31's from the
Russians under their dummy arms buying corporation?

The article implies that they did not, that the CIA was primarily interested
in preventing them from going to Iran, but when the Iranians lost interest,
so did the CIA.



D

interesting artical...i think it will be good practice
for collitition (sp?) forces, to engage and practice
"their art".... remember, the f14 is over 30 yrs old...

I'm not an expert in naval hardware as many others are. My expertise lies in
policy, admin, and personnel issues. However, I believe we need to keep in
mind that this aircraft was built with 1960's technology.

Yea....they might have been upgraded...and the Iranians sent many guys my
age to western engineering schools (I knew quite a number in college...good
students too!!) But many a Tomcat was defeated by an aggressor squadron A-4
and F-5 flown by a well trained and seasoned pilot. How well trained are
Iranian pilots and how adept are they in fighting the aircraft?

In my mind the biggest concern would be their long range air-air missile
capability. What is it? What are our counter measures? It's easy to awe
civilians and observers. What I'm curious is what our aviators were
thinking. Was it "uh oh!" or "those poor paisons will be dead if they fly
against us"?