B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber Crash Video

Most SOPs I am familiar with for heavy aircraft tell you to keep
flying if a Master Caution illuminates on takeoff AFTER 80-100 knots.
After 80-100 knots, hi speed aborts are done for Fires, Engine
Failures, Windshear and if the PIC believes the airplane will not
fly.
This crew had no idications to warrant an abort. After a certain
threshold they are biased to continue and that is what they did,
similar to Comair 5191. Blaming the pilots does not "un-crash" this
aircraft. There are system issues to be corrected here. I'm glad they
survived.
For a very good read on time compressed decision making and concurrent
task management, get a copy of "The Limits of Expertise: Rethinking
Pilot Error and the Causes of Airline Accidents" by Dismukes, Berman
and Loukopoulos
http://www.amazon.com/Limits-Experti.../dp/0754649652

Fly Smart
Kent
www.signalcharlie.net

On Jun 8, 9:51*am, Clark wrote:
Most SOPs I am familiar with for heavy aircraft tell you to keep
flying if a Master Caution illuminates on takeoff AFTER 80-100 knots.
After 80-100 knots, hi speed aborts are done for Fires, Engine
Failures, Windshear and if the PIC believes the airplane will not
fly.

Hmm....I think this sends the wrong signal to aspiring pilots (no pun
intended).

When I was reading the Risk Management section of my Jeppesen book, it
specifically states that one of the major reasons that accidents
happens is that pilots choose to ignore the warning signs.

If you are saying that a high-speed abort would have done more damage
(to the aircraft) than to continue to fly, that's one thing. But if
you are saying that it is ok for $1.4 billion machine to continue to
takeoff simple becase it is more convenient than aborting...???

I am sure that if I were to go to my flight instructor, and tell him
that, from now on, if any warning lights come on in his sub-$400,000
aircraft, I will use my own judgement during an abortable take off to
decide whether the warning is serious enough to abort, he'd shriek.

This crew had no idications to warrant an abort. After a certain
threshold they are biased to continue and that is what they did,
similar to Comair 5191. Blaming the pilots does not "un-crash" this
aircraft. There are system issues to be corrected here. I'm glad they
survived.

Blame has to be placed somewhere, or shared, right? If blame is not
placed, it starts to give the impression that no one is at fault, at
least not the pilots.

Let's look at it another way. Let us suppose that no warnings existed
at all in the B-2 Spirit, that everything looked normal right before
ejection. There would be a thorough investigation, meeting rooms
filled with technologists and top brass, and once the cause were
found, someone would suggest...

"How hard is it to add a warning light so that if moisture clogs the
system, the computer at least tells the pilots that something is
wrong? Can you do that?" They engineers would probably say yes.
"Would you pilots find that useful?" Again, the pilots would probably
say yes.

For a very good read on time compressed decision making and concurrent
task management, get a copy of "The Limits of Expertise: Rethinking
Pilot Error and the Causes of Airline Accidents" by Dismukes, Berman
and Loukopouloshttp://www.amazon.com/Limits-Expertise-Rethinking-Airline-Accidents/d...

Fly Smart

By managing risk better?

One way to look at is...if they had aborted, the plane would still be
here, and some engineer would have figured out the error in true vs
indicated speed, and noted that pilots would have attempted rotation
at a speed that might have resulted in a crash, and pilots would have
been lauded for their attitude toward risk management...in the $1.4
billion aircraft.

Also, given that it's a B-2, and not a $40,000 Tomahawk, I would think
one would have a slightly higher expectation of pilot's attitude
toward risk management...or not.

If it seems that I am nit-picking at this topic, I am. The more I
read, the more I am discovering that vast majority of crashes, if one
looks only at the facts, has to do with some erroneous decision that
human made somewhere, not the machine itself. A year ago, before I
started all this, I would have expected it to be entirely the other
way around, the idea being that, the pilot would know that if they do
something really stupid, death is a possibility. Some of the errors
that pilots make are....ahem...plane silly.

Making mistakes is ok, as no one is perfect. The problem, I think,
becomes systemic when the community as a whole develops tendency to
reject blame. That is what I, a student pilot, see each time I open a
magazine, or read online material.

-Le Chaud Lapin-

"Maxwell" luv2^fly99@cox.^net wrote in news:JHO2k.4739$t07.4088
@newsfe22.lga:


"Bertie the Bunyip" wrote in message
...

Nope. Never flew one. I know enough to know he's not qualified to say
why Mary Jane fell off her tricycle, though.



I would seriously doubt it, unless you caused it. But then you would lie
about it.




Oh no! The k00k is caling me a liar again! My rep!

Bwawahwhahwhahwhahhahhahhahha!



Bertie

Clark wrote in
:

Most SOPs I am familiar with for heavy aircraft tell you to keep
flying if a Master Caution illuminates on takeoff AFTER 80-100 knots.
After 80-100 knots, hi speed aborts are done for Fires, Engine
Failures, Windshear and if the PIC believes the airplane will not
fly.
This crew had no idications to warrant an abort. After a certain
threshold they are biased to continue and that is what they did,
similar to Comair 5191. Blaming the pilots does not "un-crash" this
aircraft. There are system issues to be corrected here. I'm glad they
survived.

Exactly, though you're whislting in the wind here trying to explain that to
them.. However, we usually have the proviso attached to all briefs that
we'll still abandon up to V1 for aything that makes the airplane unflyable.
Instrument failure ins't that big a dal if you'r VMC in most airplanes, but
I have no idea how reliant the flight control systems in that thing are on
the sensors. My guess would be that the reliance would be considerable,
though. This is one in which a lot of clear answers wont be forthcoming for
some considerable time, though. I can't imagine the USAF would want any
weaknesses that aircraft has discussed in public. You might see exactly
what happened on the discovery channel in 2058.

For a very good read on time compressed decision making and concurrent
task management, get a copy of "The Limits of Expertise: Rethinking
Pilot Error and the Causes of Airline Accidents" by Dismukes, Berman
and Loukopoulos
http://www.amazon.com/Limits-Experti...-Accidents/dp/
0754649652

Hmmm, thnk i might get that..
Bertie

Le Chaud Lapin wrote in
:

On Jun 8, 9:51*am, Clark wrote:
Most SOPs I am familiar with for heavy aircraft tell you to keep
flying if a Master Caution illuminates on takeoff AFTER 80-100 knots.
After 80-100 knots, hi speed aborts are done for Fires, Engine
Failures, Windshear and if the PIC believes the airplane will not
fly.

Hmm....I think this sends the wrong signal to aspiring pilots (no pun
intended).

When I was reading the Risk Management section of my Jeppesen book, it
specifically states that one of the major reasons that accidents
happens is that pilots choose to ignore the warning signs.

If you are saying that a high-speed abort would have done more damage
(to the aircraft) than to continue to fly, that's one thing. But if
you are saying that it is ok for $1.4 billion machine to continue to
takeoff simple becase it is more convenient than aborting...???

I am sure that if I were to go to my flight instructor, and tell him
that, from now on, if any warning lights come on in his sub-$400,000
aircraft, I will use my own judgement during an abortable take off to
decide whether the warning is serious enough to abort, he'd shriek.

This crew had no idications to warrant an abort. After a certain
threshold they are biased to continue and that is what they did,
similar to Comair 5191. Blaming the pilots does not "un-crash" this
aircraft. There are system issues to be corrected here. I'm glad they
survived.

Blame has to be placed somewhere, or shared, right? If blame is not
placed, it starts to give the impression that no one is at fault, at
least not the pilots.

Let's look at it another way. Let us suppose that no warnings existed
at all in the B-2 Spirit, that everything looked normal right before
ejection. There would be a thorough investigation, meeting rooms
filled with technologists and top brass, and once the cause were
found, someone would suggest...

"How hard is it to add a warning light so that if moisture clogs the
system, the computer at least tells the pilots that something is
wrong? Can you do that?" They engineers would probably say yes.
"Would you pilots find that useful?" Again, the pilots would probably
say yes.

For a very good read on time compressed decision making and
concurrent task management, get a copy of "The Limits of Expertise:
Rethinking Pilot Error and the Causes of Airline Accidents" by
Dismukes, Berman and
Loukopouloshttp://www.amazon.com/Limits-Expertise-Rethinking-Airline-
A
ccidents/d...

Fly Smart

By managing risk better?

One way to look at is...if they had aborted, the plane would still be
here,

Thats the point, you do not know that, fjukkwit.


Bertie

On Sun, 08 Jun 2008 09:14:15 -0500, Big John
wrote in :

----clip----

The $1.4 billion aircraft crashed just off the left side of the
runway and exploded. It was the first-ever B-2 crash and followed
75,000 hours of loss-free service. Link and Grieve both suffered
injuries during ejection, with Grieve suffering compression
fractures to his spine.


************************************************* ********

I ejected in 1968 and got a compression fracture.

I'm sorry to hear that. What was the cause of your decision to eject?

Seat was one of the
original seats first used in Jets. It used a 37 mm shell for energy
and the 'g' forces peaked just after firing with the high 'G' causing
the back damage.

Current seats have longer application of thrust and peak 'G' on pilot
is much less (smooth ride).

I'm surprised one of the pilots got a compression fracture unless it
was ground contact.

Big John

It would seem, that being strapped into the seat could result in just
that sort of injury on landing if the pilot doesn't have the option of
jettisoning the seat before landing.

Perhaps the injured pilot's age and weight figured into the cause of
his injury.

Does anyone wear those thick-soled wedgies with the pneumatic void in
the soles to cushion impact anymore?

The current ACES II seats are zero/zero (will get a good chute with zero
forward velocity and zero altitude). It is generally felt that the parachute
landing and wrong body position cause the compression fractures, not the
ejection itself. The seat senses the actual altitude and attitude, and this
determines when it separates, although manual separation is also an option.

You're not supposed to land on your feet, regardless.

On Sun, 8 Jun 2008 14:04:35 -0500, "Viperdoc"
wrote in
:

The current ACES II seats are zero/zero (will get a good chute with zero
forward velocity and zero altitude).

What more could a guy ask? Interesting information.

It is generally felt that the parachute landing and wrong body position
cause the compression fractures, not the ejection itself.

I would think the injured pilot might be able to provide some input
about that. Have you ever examined any of the pilots who sustained
these types of injuries? But, I would expect that there have already
been some studies done on the issue.

Are the fractures generally in the nature of cracks, or are there
incidences of crushed bone fractures also? Wouldn't there be ruptured
disk injuries in addition to the fractures? I suppose it runs the
gamut. Of course, it still beats the alternative.

The seat senses the actual altitude and attitude, and this
determines when it separates, although manual separation is also an option.


So the seat separates from the 'chute at a programmed point. No sense
sizing the 'chute to carry the weight of the seat in addition to the
pilot.

You're not supposed to land on your feet, regardless.


What are you supposed to land on?

I was taught to hit with my feet, knees bent, and roll to dissipate
some of the impact energy laterally, but fortunately, I've never found
it necessary to try it.

I have seen several skydivers make standup or running touchdowns, but
I would expect their 'chutes to be significantly different from those
issued by the military.


This sure looks like a lot of fun:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-sLE-jeBOm0

The round military chutes do not provide a lot of control, and at least in
the F-16 also deploy the survival kit as well as a fully inflated raft,
which trail below the pilot. This is a lot of weight, and there is a max
weight limit in flyers, mostly to insure the ejection seat will clear the
tail.

The chute is nowhere near as steerable as a square, so a good PLF is
necessary to avoid injury, and yes, I have seen at least one guy with a
compression fracture after an ejection. It still beats the alternatives. I
would not in any way classify it as fun.

On Sun, 08 Jun 2008 18:41:01 GMT, Larry Dighera
wrote:

On Sun, 08 Jun 2008 09:14:15 -0500, Big John
wrote in :

----clip----

The $1.4 billion aircraft crashed just off the left side of the
runway and exploded. It was the first-ever B-2 crash and followed
75,000 hours of loss-free service. Link and Grieve both suffered
injuries during ejection, with Grieve suffering compression
fractures to his spine.


************************************************ *********

I ejected in 1968 and got a compression fracture.

I'm sorry to hear that. What was the cause of your decision to eject?

Seat was one of the
original seats first used in Jets. It used a 37 mm shell for energy
and the 'g' forces peaked just after firing with the high 'G' causing
the back damage.

Current seats have longer application of thrust and peak 'G' on pilot
is much less (smooth ride).

I'm surprised one of the pilots got a compression fracture unless it
was ground contact.

Big John

It would seem, that being strapped into the seat could result in just
that sort of injury on landing if the pilot doesn't have the option of
jettisoning the seat before landing.

Perhaps the injured pilot's age and weight figured into the cause of
his injury.

Does anyone wear those thick-soled wedgies with the pneumatic void in
the soles to cushion impact anymore?


*********************************************
Have told the story several times here on RAP.

Bottom line was no gas in a snow storm over
Greenland. Not hard to make a decision under those conditions.

Big John