What if we ignored N. Africa and the MTO?

Kevin Brooks wrote:

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
. ..
Keith Willshaw wrote:

"Cub Driver" wrote in message
...

Throwing the inexperienced US Army on some West-European
beach,

In 1944, the army might be more experienced, but the troops were not.
The Americans put new troops onto the beach at Omaha, rather than
moving combat-experienced men from Italy or some such place.


The US divisions that landed at Omaha were from the 1st Infantry
Division which HAD taken part in the Torch invasions and
fought in North Africa and Sicily

It was two RLTs from the 1st ID along with an RLT from the 29th ID (plus
the Rangers) who landed in the first wave. Here's General Bradley's
comments on his choice of the 1st ID, from his book "A Soldier's Story":

I don't think so, Guy; the spearhead was only *two* RCT's, the 16th from the
1st ID and the 116th from the 29th ID.

That's what I thought, from remembering the details in Adrian Lewis' "Omaha
Beach: A Flawed Victory" (well worth the read). I was sure on the 16th and
116th, but couldn't remember if the 18th (or 26th) came in at the same time or
subsequently, and blanked completely on the follow-on for the 29th. But I only
had Bradley handy, and he says it was two and one, although I may be
misunderstanding him. He (or more likely an aide) wrote:

"The assault force on Omaha was to make contact with the British on its left
while at the same time establishing a link with Utah on its right. If one
division were to be given both missions, it would have been dispersed across a
25-mile front. And as the follow-up divisions came in, it would have become
necessary to reassemble the 1st Division in one corner of Omaha Beach. To avoid
the traffic snarl that would otherwise have jammed up the beach, I shaped the
Omaha attack force with two regiments from the 1st Division, the third from the
29th. Thus while the 1st Division concentrated to the left of the beachhead,
the 29th would advance to the right. the follow-up division would then come
into the whole between them."

IIRC, Lewis says that the actual assault planning was Gerow's (and Huebner's)
responsibility, so either Bradley is misremembering things, or his definition of
'assault force'and 'attack force' is more expansive than 'first wave'. But then
he leaves out any mention of a second regiment from the 29th in the second wave,
so I don't know what he had in mind. Elsewhere, he mentions that there were
three naval forces in the American sector -- one for each beach, and a third
with the two follow-on divisions, the 2nd for Omaha and the 90th for Utah, so
maybe that's where he draws the line. OTOH, I've just found (pg. 270) where he
mentions the "two assault regiments on Omaha," so clearly there's some confusion
by the author(s).

Ah well, that's what I get for not waiting to post until I could access a source
more dedicated to the subject. In any case, we're agreed that units of both the
1st and 29th participated in the landings, which was the main point in my
original reply to Keith.

The schedule had the next two RCT's
(18th from 1st ID and 115th from the 29th) following at about H+3. And when
you read the accounts of what happened that morning on the beach, it is
quite apparent that there was not a danged bit of difference between the
performance of the previously unblooded 29th troops and those veterans (what
there was of them--ISTR the Big Red One already had picked up its share of
green replacements since its previous efforts).

Sure did. OTOH, they at least had a cadre of combat-experienced troops and
small-unit commanders, which couldn't be said for the 29th. ISTR that the 29th
was very similar to my dad's division*, in that some of the senior commanders
had combat experience, but probably not at the battalion level and below.

(*The 99th, which disembarked in Le Havre in October. He said that the 99th CG,
MG Lauer, had been in North Africa, but that the division was green. Naturally,
he was in no position to know the background and experience of every company and
field grade officer in the infantry regiments, so take his opinion for what it's
worth.)

Furthermore, while it is
true that the these lead elements were all under the command of the 1st ID
HQ, that entity had darned little to do with what happened that morning, and
in fact it was IIRC the 29th ID's ADC, BG Norm Cota, who was instrumental in
getting the stagnated effort moving off the beach proper and up the
Vierville Draw?

Cota seems to have played a part, although just how much of one depends on which
history you read. Some say that it was the small unit leaders that got things
moving, and that Robert Mitchum and the other senior commanders on the beach
were essentially irrelevant. I suspect the truth lies somewhere in the middle,
but take your pick as to which way you lean.

snip

"Had a less experienced division than the 1st Infantry stumbled into this
crack resistance, it might easily have been thrown back into the Channel.
Unjust though it was, my choice of the 1st to spearhead the invasion
probably saved us Omaha Beach and a catastrophe on the landing." [ibid,
pg. 272]

As much as I respect and admire Bradley, the fact is that the above is
after-the-fact window dressing.

I'm not sure what his justification for that would be. Why would he care which
unit performed well? The gist of his remarks (much of which I've left out)
seems to be that he was sorry that he had to use the 1st given their tiredness,
and the troops' felt that it was someone else's turn. He makes no bones about
the fact that their assignment to the landing was bitterly resented by many in
the division. It's kind of surprising to me that he devotes as much space to
his reasons for selecting them as he did. His tone sounds almost apologetic
about having used them, but it's almost as if he wants _them_ to know why he
considered it essential that he did, instead of one of the new, green divisions.



In fact the performance of the 29th ID

troops and their leaders on the beach and as they seized the beachhead was
as much, if not more, responsible for the success gained at Omaha as was the
efforts of their 1st ID counterparts. The proof is in the pudding, as they
say, and the pudding demonstrated that the 29th was indeed just as capable
as the 1st ID was on 6 June 1944.

I'm not sure I agree, although it's been awhile since I read detailed accounts
so my memory may be playing me false. The slaughter of Company A/116th Infantry
during the approach and landing (92% casualties on D-Day IIRR, quite accurately
depicted in "Saving Private Ryan") as well as (IIRR) other units of the regiment
stalling at the water line would seem to indicate otherwise. But I'll have to
refresh my memory of who actually wound up where (as opposed to where they were
supposed to land) and did what before arguing the point.

Guy

On Tue, 2 Dec 2003 18:15:25 -0000, "Keith Willshaw"
wrote:



They also needed to hold the Middle East oil fields and
Suez canal. Allowing the Germans to seize those would
have altered the whole strategic balance. A third Reich
with unlimited oil supplies doesn't bear thinking about.

By the time Third Reich would be able to bring these wells into the
production (repairment, building of tanker fleet), it would have been
too late. Americans would be in fight for real.


This was true of much of the Axis war strategy. The capture of Norway
and Denmark were pyhricc victories as they tied down 20 or more
German divisions to hold down nations that had been effectively giving
them everything they wanted anyway.

If it weren't for German invasion of Norway, British were going to
land sometime in Spring 1940. Germans could not allow for Britain to
sit in Narvik. Troops deployed in Norway were not first class anyway,
most of them were either coast defense troops or 7xx class divisions.
Fighting troops deployed in Norway took part in the war against Soviet
Union.


Drax

On Fri, 05 Dec 2003 00:24:04 +0900, Gernot Hassenpflug wrote:

Cub Driver writes:

Apparently Hitler originally wanted to defend only a small part of
Africa, that is what he should have done.

What you say above is in contradiction to this. He should have left
Africa completely. But hey, that's not what an alliance is about. If
you want to keep it, that is.

The Axis nations seemed not to grasp the notion of alliances. Germany
had a perfectly good ally on its northern flank in the war against
Russia, but instead of supplying materiel to Finland, it *sold* the
stuff. Not only did it sell the Bf-109s--it even charged the Finns for
the aircraft it captured in France and sent north to the FAF, which
was already equipped with numerous foreign aircraft as a result of the
Winter War of 1939-1940.

Ooh, was that the revenge of the Jews? If they can't do anything about
the holocaust quickly, maybe giving advice like that to the Germans
was a form of revenge :-)

As for Japan--better not go into how the Japanese treated the
"liberated" nations of Southeast Asia.

Seeing as they saw those as a source of raw materials and market for
goods, one can take a fair guess! But do you know some details (sorry,
it would take me days, if not weeks, to find something and read
it). In the case of military stuff, what could they give or even sell,
having too few themselves? I am thinking of Manchukuo and Thailand,
among others perhaps, which were equipped with Japanese aircraft. Any
facts on how these ended up there?

No, they saw them as sub-human trash, and treated them as such. Remember the
"rape of Nanking"? The "Bataan Death March"? Manila? etc. The Japanese
behaved like depraved animals.

Al Minyard

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
. ..
Kevin Brooks wrote:

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
. ..
Keith Willshaw wrote:

"Cub Driver" wrote in message
...

Throwing the inexperienced US Army on some West-European
beach,

In 1944, the army might be more experienced, but the troops were
not.
The Americans put new troops onto the beach at Omaha, rather than
moving combat-experienced men from Italy or some such place.


The US divisions that landed at Omaha were from the 1st Infantry
Division which HAD taken part in the Torch invasions and
fought in North Africa and Sicily

It was two RLTs from the 1st ID along with an RLT from the 29th ID
(plus
the Rangers) who landed in the first wave. Here's General Bradley's
comments on his choice of the 1st ID, from his book "A Soldier's
Story":

I don't think so, Guy; the spearhead was only *two* RCT's, the 16th from
the
1st ID and the 116th from the 29th ID.

That's what I thought, from remembering the details in Adrian Lewis'
"Omaha
Beach: A Flawed Victory" (well worth the read). I was sure on the 16th and
116th, but couldn't remember if the 18th (or 26th) came in at the same
time or
subsequently, and blanked completely on the follow-on for the 29th. But I
only
had Bradley handy, and he says it was two and one, although I may be
misunderstanding him. He (or more likely an aide) wrote:

"The assault force on Omaha was to make contact with the British on its
left
while at the same time establishing a link with Utah on its right. If one
division were to be given both missions, it would have been dispersed
across a
25-mile front. And as the follow-up divisions came in, it would have
become
necessary to reassemble the 1st Division in one corner of Omaha Beach. To
avoid
the traffic snarl that would otherwise have jammed up the beach, I shaped
the
Omaha attack force with two regiments from the 1st Division, the third
from the
29th. Thus while the 1st Division concentrated to the left of the
beachhead,
the 29th would advance to the right. the follow-up division would then
come
into the whole between them."

IIRC, Lewis says that the actual assault planning was Gerow's (and
Huebner's)
responsibility, so either Bradley is misremembering things, or his
definition of
'assault force'and 'attack force' is more expansive than 'first wave'.
But then
he leaves out any mention of a second regiment from the 29th in the second
wave,
so I don't know what he had in mind. Elsewhere, he mentions that there
were
three naval forces in the American sector -- one for each beach, and a
third
with the two follow-on divisions, the 2nd for Omaha and the 90th for Utah,
so
maybe that's where he draws the line. OTOH, I've just found (pg. 270)
where he
mentions the "two assault regiments on Omaha," so clearly there's some
confusion
by the author(s).

Ah well, that's what I get for not waiting to post until I could access a
source
more dedicated to the subject. In any case, we're agreed that units of
both the
1st and 29th participated in the landings, which was the main point in my
original reply to Keith.

The schedule had the next two RCT's
(18th from 1st ID and 115th from the 29th) following at about H+3. And
when
you read the accounts of what happened that morning on the beach, it is
quite apparent that there was not a danged bit of difference between the
performance of the previously unblooded 29th troops and those veterans
(what
there was of them--ISTR the Big Red One already had picked up its share
of
green replacements since its previous efforts).

Sure did. OTOH, they at least had a cadre of combat-experienced troops
and
small-unit commanders, which couldn't be said for the 29th. ISTR that the
29th
was very similar to my dad's division*, in that some of the senior
commanders
had combat experience, but probably not at the battalion level and below.

(*The 99th, which disembarked in Le Havre in October. He said that the
99th CG,
MG Lauer, had been in North Africa, but that the division was green.
Naturally,
he was in no position to know the background and experience of every
company and
field grade officer in the infantry regiments, so take his opinion for
what it's
worth.)

Furthermore, while it is
true that the these lead elements were all under the command of the 1st
ID
HQ, that entity had darned little to do with what happened that morning,
and
in fact it was IIRC the 29th ID's ADC, BG Norm Cota, who was
instrumental in
getting the stagnated effort moving off the beach proper and up the
Vierville Draw?

Cota seems to have played a part, although just how much of one depends on
which
history you read. Some say that it was the small unit leaders that got
things
moving, and that Robert Mitchum and the other senior commanders on the
beach
were essentially irrelevant. I suspect the truth lies somewhere in the
middle,
but take your pick as to which way you lean.

snip

"Had a less experienced division than the 1st Infantry stumbled into
this
crack resistance, it might easily have been thrown back into the
Channel.
Unjust though it was, my choice of the 1st to spearhead the invasion
probably saved us Omaha Beach and a catastrophe on the landing."
[ibid,
pg. 272]

As much as I respect and admire Bradley, the fact is that the above is
after-the-fact window dressing.

I'm not sure what his justification for that would be. Why would he care
which
unit performed well?

I don't necessarily think there was some sort of sinister intention
involved. But it is not uncommon for even the most self-effacing of famous
people (and I have always admired Bradley for his relative modesty) to "over
analyze" their own contributions a bit.

The gist of his remarks (much of which I've left out)
seems to be that he was sorry that he had to use the 1st given their
tiredness,
and the troops' felt that it was someone else's turn. He makes no bones
about
the fact that their assignment to the landing was bitterly resented by
many in
the division. It's kind of surprising to me that he devotes as much space
to
his reasons for selecting them as he did. His tone sounds almost
apologetic
about having used them, but it's almost as if he wants _them_ to know why
he
considered it essential that he did, instead of one of the new, green
divisions.

And there may be the reason for that analysis--it justified thrusting those
veteran troops once again "into the breach". I have little doubt that he had
at the time real concerns about assigning completely unblooded units to the
first wave, and this was undoubtedly his reasoning. But what i am pointing
out is a benefit of "Monday morning quarterbacking"--that in fact the 29'ers
did just as well as their 1st ID brethren that morning.




In fact the performance of the 29th ID

troops and their leaders on the beach and as they seized the beachhead
was
as much, if not more, responsible for the success gained at Omaha as was
the
efforts of their 1st ID counterparts. The proof is in the pudding, as
they
say, and the pudding demonstrated that the 29th was indeed just as
capable
as the 1st ID was on 6 June 1944.

I'm not sure I agree, although it's been awhile since I read detailed
accounts
so my memory may be playing me false. The slaughter of Company A/116th
Infantry
during the approach and landing (92% casualties on D-Day IIRR, quite
accurately
depicted in "Saving Private Ryan") as well as (IIRR) other units of the
regiment
stalling at the water line would seem to indicate otherwise.

No, what that indicates is that like the rest of the force, 16th RCT
included, they were the victims of confused close in navigation and
hellacious beachead resistance. You can do a Google on "Omaha Beach" and
come up with a site that indicates that until the 1st ID ADC came trundling
ashore his own 16th RCT troops were sitting tight to cover near Sur de
M---(can't recall the actual name of the draw). In the various articles and
books I have read regarding the assault, there was no apparent difference
between the performance of the two RCT's that morning other than the fate of
where they were landed (and they were often intermixed) and what kind of
opposition was facing that particular stretch of beach. The only reference
to differing performance I found was that later in the day the 29th sector
required additional mopping up due to having to reduce bypassed and cut-off
German defenders, but how much of that was due to inexperience and how much
was due to differing terrain or a different view of what was meant by moving
inland ASAP is unknown. IIRC it was not until after this phase that the 29th
ID assumed actual command of its two RCT's that were ashore (probably about
the same time its third RCT, the 175th, came ashore I'd imagine).

Brooks

But I'll have to
refresh my memory of who actually wound up where (as opposed to where they
were
supposed to land) and did what before arguing the point.

Guy

"Keith Willshaw" wrote in message
...

"ArtKramr" wrote in message
...



And Monte's entire 8th Army would have been in England and could have
been
used in an invasion along with the supporting RAF aircraft The invasion
a
year
earlier was very possible had the MTO and African campaigns not taken
place..



No the 8th army was stopping the German sweeping through Egypt
and Palestine at the time.

Do you think it would have been a good idea to allow them
to take the Suez Canal, Egypy and Tel Aviv ?

Even if you believe that it is a good idea to let the Italians have all that
(not suggesting you do), all you would gain is an 8th Army that had no
combat experience and would likely have the same problems that they ran into
early in the middle east, without the German supply problems to let them
regroup.

"L'acrobat" wrote in message
...


Even if you believe that it is a good idea to let the Italians have all
that
(not suggesting you do), all you would gain is an 8th Army that had no
combat experience and would likely have the same problems that they ran
into
early in the middle east, without the German supply problems to let them
regroup.



A valid point, both the Commonwealth and US Armie learned to fight the
Germans in North Africa and it was those lessons that led
to the evolution of not only the tactics required but the weapons.

The development of fighter bombers, better tanks and anti-tank
guns and mine clearance equipment all came from the north
african campaign

Keith

Emmanuel Gustin wrote:

"ArtKramr" wrote in message
...

What then? The war in central Europe (ETO) could have gotten our full
resouces, D Day would have been a year earlier and the war would have
been
over a lot sooner, German troops in No. Africa and the MTO would have
simply
been isolated and would died on the vine. Why not?

It would have been playing into the German's hands. They had
a strong, experienced fighting force, but their industry was no
match for the growing power of the Allies; they were doomed
to lose a long war but might still be able to win a battle -- if it
came soon enough. The logical strategy for the Allied was to
use their position surrounding the axis forces and their numerical
strength to wound and wear down the beast; then to go in for the
kill. Throwing the inexperienced US Army on some West-European
beach, as Marshall would have wanted to do, would have given
the Germans their one single opportunity to actually win the war;
and they still had the strength to use it.

The American forces were still being built up when the plans
for 'Roundup', as the 1943 invasion was called, were being
discussed in the spring and summer of 1942. There wasn't
a single complete US division in Britain when Marshall and
Hopkins came to London with their invasion plan; the first
units of the 8th AF had not arrived yet. The U-boote were
still slaughtering the naval traffic right off the US coast and
German forces were still advancing in North Africa and
Russia. It was simply a bad time to propose an invasion for
the next year.

But preparations for the 1944 invasion were in fact started at
the end of 1942; the British General Morgan was appointed to
prepare the invasion plan, with the grand title of chief of staff
of the supreme commander (who of course had not been
appointed yet). Together with the joint chiefs of staff in
Washington, Morgan's team did their best -- which involved
planning the shipping of non-existent divisions in non-existent
ships to the enemy shore. Morgan's plan did not survive the
criticism of the commanders who had to execute it, and Overlord
was a much bigger operation, but the general can hardly be blamed
for that.

--
Emmanuel Gustin
Emmanuel.Gustin -rem@ve- skynet dot be
Flying Guns Page: http://users.skynet.be/Emmanuel.Gustin/


Landing craft availability was always a problem. I don't
know if the US had the means to get enough into the ETO for
a 1943 attempt.

Joe


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"L'acrobat" wrote in message
...

"Keith Willshaw" wrote in message
...

"ArtKramr" wrote in message
...



And Monte's entire 8th Army would have been in England and could have
been
used in an invasion along with the supporting RAF aircraft The
invasion
a
year
earlier was very possible had the MTO and African campaigns not taken
place..



No the 8th army was stopping the German sweeping through Egypt
and Palestine at the time.

Do you think it would have been a good idea to allow them
to take the Suez Canal, Egypy and Tel Aviv ?

Even if you believe that it is a good idea to let the Italians have all
that
(not suggesting you do), all you would gain is an 8th Army that had no
combat experience and would likely have the same problems that they ran
into
early in the middle east, without the German supply problems to let them
regroup.


What finally killed the German military machine was lack of oil! If they
(or their Italian allies) had control of the Middle East and the
Mediteranean they would not have had any oil shortages! Also if one assumes
German control of Middle East it would have totally changes the dynamics of
the southern Russian campaigns

David

On Sat, 6 Dec 2003 23:21:57 -0000, "Keith Willshaw"
wrote:


There werent as many available for the follow up
waves however.

In 1944, Allies used around 35 divisions in the period between June
6th, 1944 and August 1st, 1944. Within that period, Allies invaded,
repelled German counterattacks, established a bridgehead, liberated a
major port and on the last day, broke through the German front.

Same number of divisions would have been on Allied disposal if it
weren't for operation Torch.

Allies had enough landing craft to perform Husky in summer 1943 and
Torch in autumn 1942. There were certainly enough craft to land the
five divisions of the first wave and immediate support.


But not the follow up forces

It depends upon what do you call the "follow up" forces. The vessels
used in Torch and Husky (which wouldn't have happened) should have
been enough until the capture of the major port.


The Luftwaffed most certainly did cause casualties in Italy in 1943

In no case Allies suffered prohibitive losses anywhere in the
Mediterranean during 1943. Quite the contrary, it was Luftwaffe that
was taking higher losses and was incapable of preventing Allies from
conducting all sorts of air missions.


That depends on what you mean by success. Sitting in an enclave
under artillery attack isnt typically considered a success

I'd call an establishment of second front in northwest France by
Autumn 1943 a success.


But they did to defeat the German air force in the West
which was much stronger than taht in the med.

In same way, Allied air forces in the West would have been
proportionally stronger if it weren't for redeployment of US air
groups to the Mediterranean. In addition, RAF Fighter Command could
have been utilised.


But not to advance into Germany and win the war which
is the point.

Had Allies established a second front in France by Autumn 1943, they
would have won the war, there is no question about it. It is not
correct to demand the same tempo of advance from 1943 invasion as it
was historically achieved in 1944 because Allies were stronger in 1944
and Germans were weaker. But if Allies liberate Paris in April 1944
that they are definitely ahead of historical schedule.

Allies could afford additional year by spending Soviet lives. There is
little doubt that invading in 1944 was sound political move, I am not
entirely convinced that American and British lives thus saved were
more worth that Soviet ones who were lost in that year when Germans
could deploy the bulk of their ground forces in Russia.


Its a long way fro El Agheila to El Alamein but they managed that

And were stopped. And could not move any further given the historical
level of logistics on their disposal.


Which gives them lots of oil in 1944

By 1944 it doesn't matter any more since Americans are in the theatre
in strength and I don't think a lot of oil automatically means a lot
of tankers or an increased capacity of raphineries or significant
increase of tanks or fighters produced.

Note that captured oil fields in Indonesia never reached the prewar
level of production.


How many German workers do you think were suitable to
provide army replacements in 1943 ?

Enough to cover all sectors previously held by Italians.


Drax
remove NOSPAM for reply

In article ,
"Paul J. Adam" writes:
In message , Paul F Austin
writes
"ArtKramr" wrote
What then? The war in central Europe (ETO) could have gotten our full
resouces, D Day would have been a year earlier and the war would have
been
over a lot sooner, German troops in No. Africa and the MTO would have
simply
been isolated and would died on the vine. Why not?

Mainly because we would have been handed our heads, trying to invade in
mid-1943. The short reason would be that the Sovs wouldn't have whittled
down the Wehrmacht enough at that point to make a Western Front possible.
Also the Brits wouldn't go. Churchill and the Imperial General Staff were
scared stiff of a direct confrontation with the Wehrmacht based on their
experience in 1940.

And at Dieppe in 1942; that experimental raid, while a bloody tactical
failure, probably saved a great many lives in showing just how difficult
opposed amphibious operations really were and what equipment and
training was needed to have a chance at success. Merely throwing brave
troops at the beach and hoping for the best was proved to be a recipe
for disaster.

Well, Dieppe did teach that a compromised operation, launched with no
support by a megalomanaical idiot with no authority to do so, using
untrained troops and inadequate equipment against prepared defences
was a Very Bad Idea.

How Mountbatten (Who ordered the operation without the required
coordination with teh RAF or RN, and without the required approval of
his higher-ups, to the point of lieing to his own staff about it)
managed to survive that fiasco is asonishing. Lesser screwups in the
U.S. had found themselves cahiered (Kimmel and Short), or placed in
charge of the Coastal Defences of Wyoming (Fredenhall).

Mind you, Mountbatten got the job of head of S.O.E. after losing,
what, 2-3 Destroyers that he'd been commanding?

I'd have to say that Dieppe was more an example of failure in Command,
rather than of the difficulty of staging a cross-Channel invasion.

Not that the Allies would have been ready much before 1944 anyway.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster