F2A2-American Zero?

I have been looking over the performance data on the A6M2. Although
examination of the A6M2 showed that we could have built a fighter like the
zero but sacrificed performance for pilot/plane protection overall
performance considering all factors. The F2A3 was not, being built for
extreme long range without drop tanks, a long range scout/fighter with
additional internal protection to increase survivability.. Unfortunately it
got caught in a tactical situation that was impossible for its limited
purpose. it having already been relegated to 2nd class fighter use for the
Marines pending additional supplies of F4F's.. However, had the F2A3's
escorted bombers to the Japanese carriers as I think was originally
envisioned at Midway, they might have proved at least adequate with the
overstreched Zeros concentrating on the bombers.
I wonder if we were right in not continuing to produce more F2A2's
(possibly with drop tanks). I wonder if they might have taken out more
Japanese planes earlier, further eroding the limited Japanese pilot pool .
Brewster production problems have been to some extent distorted. Up
to WWII they produced as many F2A's as did Gruman F4F's, although far more
Brewsters went to foreign customers.

IMO, aggressive US pilots would have preferred performance to
protection? There has been some data that US pilots would have preferred
F2A2's over the F4F3. By producting heavily "armored" fighters did we
severely limited the opportunity of our early WWII pilots to inflict heavy
fighter loses on the enemy?