Third Military-Civil MAC Jan. 18, 2005

On Sun, 13 Feb 2005 02:11:24 GMT, "Steven P. McNicoll"
wrote in
. net::


"Larry Dighera" wrote in message
.. .

ATC was found by the NTSB to be contributory to the cause of this MAC.


Well, that doesn't make it so.

Yes. I've noticed. :-(

What ATC error contributed to this accident?

A conflict alert activated (10 times) 30 seconds before being radioed
to the Cessna pilot by ATC.

The NTSB brief says "ATC's lack of awareness that there was more than one
F-16 aircraft in the formation flight, which reduced the ATC controllers
ability to detect and resolve the conflict that resulted in the collision."
I'll wager the controller understands very well that EVERY formation flight
has more than one aircraft in it, although the NTSB may not.


I agree. Below is more information:


This interview was reported in the Naples News March 7, 2001:

The Air Force said there were two main causes of the accident:
Olivier and Kreuder failed to "see and avoid" each other in time
to prevent the collision, and Tampa air traffic controllers failed
to transmit a safety alert to Olivier when their radar system
showed the two aircraft were in danger of colliding.

Thirty seconds before the collision, there was a radar alert to
controllers that was not passed on to the Cessna, Scott said,
adding that controllers refused to be interviewed by the military.

(I believe that Parker's decision to descend into terminal airspace at
~400 knots without benefit of the required ATC clearance nor radio
contact was the primary cause, despite Scott's failure to find it
contributory.)


Here's another Naples News article, that contains more details of
ATC's failure to issue a warning:

Probe reports trainee was at radar screen during air collision

Saturday, August 11, 2001

Associated Press

BRADENTON — A trainee was at the radar screen when an Air Force
jet collided with a private plane in November, said a Federal
Aviation Administration report made public Friday.

The Sarasota Herald-Tribune reported that documents obtained from
the agency said the trainee was at the screen at a Tampa air
control tower at the same time controllers in Miami were trying to
warn the pilots off their collision course.

[...]

Two Air Force pilots were flying 480 mph — 180 mph faster than
federal and Air Force guidelines allow in that urban area — on a
practice bombing run to rural Avon Park.

[...]

The FAA documents said the trainer for the unidentified novice
controller was on the telephone to the Miami controllers at the
time of the collision over Manatee County.

The FAA's report includes signed statements by the trainer and
trainee assigned to Tampa's south satellite, known as "S" position
on Nov. 16.

The two F-16s over Manatee County were designated Ninja 1 and
Ninja 2.

"I was working the 'S' position. The traffic was moderate to
heavy. I took the automated hand-off on Ninja 1. My trainee
plugged in, to train, at about this time," wrote air traffic
controller Mark Allen.

Miami controllers had directed the F-16s to an outdated radio
frequency and they were unable to initiate contact with Tampa.

"I answered a phone call from MIA regarding Ninja 1's altitude. I
saw a fast moving target, southbound, and figured it was Ninja. I
pointed to the radar scope and told my trainee to issue traffic to
N829 (Olivier)," he continued.

"I saw the fast moving target and N829 merge. When N829 did not
respond, I took the position from the trainee," Allen wrote.

The trainee, whose name has not been released, wrote that when
Miami controllers called, he "didn't know what they were talking
about."

After hearing a "Mayday" call, he wrote he was ordered to leave
the controls.

According to Allen's report, Miami controllers or an Air Force
radar man telephoned to ask for the proper Tampa frequency. By
that time, it was too late to save Olivier.

The FAA report details the contact between controllers in Miami
and Tampa in the moments before and after the crash.

"Can you tell me what the altitude is on that Ninja 1? I lost the
target on him," asked one Miami controller.

"Ahh. Hang on. I see him down at 2,000 (feet)," responded the
Tampa trainee.

Nine seconds later, the trainee attempted to make a radio call to
Olivier: "Traffic off your left side. Ahh. Two thousand."

There was no response. After Allen took back the controls and made
three more attempts to contact Olivier, Ninja 1 sent out a
distress signal.

Ten minutes after the crash, the Air Force pilots and Tampa
controllers were still trying to figure out what happened, the
report shows.



This appeared in the Naples News March 9, 2001:

Associated Press

An Air Force investigation released earlier this week partially
blames its own pilots and air traffic controllers. The Air Force
said that air traffic controllers had time to move the Cessna out
of the way when they received a 30-second warning that the
aircraft were on a collision course.


And from Air Force News Archive March 7, 2001:

Command releases F-16 accident report

03/07/01 - LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, Va. (AFPN) -- Air Combat
Command investigators have determined the cause of a midair
collision between an F-16 Fighting Falcon and a Cessna 172 near
Bradenton, Fla., on Nov. 16. They believe a critical combination
of avionics anomalies, procedural errors and individual mistakes
-- on the ground and in the air -- led to the accident.

Second, Tampa air traffic controllers failed to transmit a safety
alert to Cessna 829 when their radar system generated "conflict
alert" warnings, indicating that two aircraft were in danger of a
collision. Investigators determined that if the controllers had
issued a safety alert to the Cessna when the first conflict alert
began, it is likely the pilot would have had time to maneuver to
avoid the collision.


And finally from the NTSB accident brief:

A conflict alert between the lead F-16 and the Cessna activated 10
times between 15:47:39 and 15:48:03. The developmental controller
stated that he heard an alarm, but could not recall where it was.
The controller providing the instruction did not recall if he saw
or heard a conflict alert, and no conflict alert was issued. ...
The developmental controller informed the Cessna pilot at 15:48:09
that he had traffic off his left side, but received no response.



Oh, and then there's is this:

Published on March 8, 2001, Sarasota Herald-Tribune (FL)

1 controller on leave, 1 back on job

One of the two air traffic controllers at Tampa Approach
responsible for communicating with the F-16s and the Cessna that
collided over south Manatee County is on leave. The other is back
at work.

The Federal Aviation Administration, which oversees civilian
control towers, will not release the controllers' names or
information about why one of them is on leave. The FAA cited
employee privacy laws. FAA officials would say only that the leave
for one employee began after the crash that ...