More long-range Spitfires and daylight Bomber Command raids, with added nationalistic abuse (was: #1 Jet of World War II)

On Mon, 18 Aug 2003 20:56:13 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

[snip agreed points... err, I mean customary imperialistic Yankee
insults and abuse]

They'd just re-allocate the bases to the relevant groups. Swap a
grass strip for an asphalt one in another Group. I don't think it's a
major issue.

Not quite that simple, if you want to base them close to the U.S. daytime units. Who's going
to use the grass strips 2 Gp. would be giving up? The heavies aren't.

Ironically they did have to operate heavies from grass strips in
1940-42 with all that that suggests in terms of all-weather
operational effectiveness, but in this case 3 Group has a larger
allocation of asphalt runways. They can have some of 5 Group's more
southerly ones as well, if neccessary. In this case we don't have
Harris fulminating about the USAAF getting a disproportionate
allocation of the all-weather base construction program.

Really? I thought it had a better range and bombload, but I'm no
expert.

Slightly (but not significant in a tactical sense) better range, but only 3,000 lb. vs. 4,000
lb. bombload. Going into the Ruhr by day in 1943/early '44 at 10-15,000 feet (vs. the 20,000
feet plus of the heavies) would be a 'really bad idea' (tm).

Yes, but not a hell of a lot worse than the "Daylight Lanc" fantasy, I
mean, operational evaluation platform. I'm certain the B-25 carried
more than 3,000lbs, but maybe only over shorter distances.

I saw it fulfilling a diversionary/supporting role, hitting
airfields and less-heavily defended targets outside the major heavy
Flak belts and giving the Luftwaffe controllers headaches trying to
identify the main raiding force formations. In other words, doing for
the B-24s in 3 Group what the 2nd Bomb Division B-24s did for the
B-17s in the rest of the 8th AF historically at this point.

The mediums were doing what you say, but at shorter ranges, and there was never much doubt by
the Luftwaffe who they were owing to the very different cruise and bombing altitudes.

I still think hitting Schipol and Alkmaar with regular medium strikes
and sequential fighter sweeps before and during B-17/B24 raids being
routed over them is a good idea, and better than trying to do the same
over the Pas de Calais. Put enough B-25 raids below the higher
heavies, with enough fighter support, and the fighters with the best
opportunity for bouncing the heavies escort and forcing them to drop
external tanks will get sucked into their own private war and divert
attention from the main force.

The tactical bombers had to face the Flak when operating over western
Germany in 1945, and it was suvivable given adequate support and
decent planning.

In 1945, when much of the defense was in a state approaching collapse, and where our airpower
was overwhelming.

And when the Flak threat, which is the main issue we both have with
them in 1943-44, was much higher. If they were usable in 1945, their
main threat in regard to operational altitude was less capable in
1943. Obviously, the fighter threat is the real issue in 1943, but
the Luftwaffe could not afford to treat them like a Circus over the
Pas De Calais, and so their ability to concentrate on them and inflict
heavy attrition at their own leisure would be constrained.

And many of the tactical targets they did hit had
substantive flak defence (albeit nowhere near 1943 Ruhr levels, let
alone 1945 Politz levels). Even so, I wouldn't suggest using them as
a deep-penetration strategic force.

Seems we agree on that, then.

I see them hitting targets in Belgium, Holland and on the fringe of
the German Bight and the Ruhr. I think that's credible: the
Luftwaffe in 1943 could have given them a hard time, but only at the
expense of ignoring the heavies which would be right behind them.

Of course, the key difference between a USAAF daylight strategic
bombing effort and an RAF one would be the greater efficiency of the
latter. I mean, once we factor out all those ludicrous PX
requirements for Coca-Cola, ice-cream and signed movie star's
underwear, we should free up about 50% extra import capacity for bombs
and replacement aircraft.....

Ha! And if we could eliminate all the manhours lost/opportunites missed to morning and
afternoon tea/brewing up, we could have won the war in 1944 at the latest;-)

I thought we were resorting to ridiculously hyperbolic stereotypes for
comic effect. I can't see anybody disputing this*. Which reminds me,
time for a large wet.

[* Notice the British war effort defeding tea-production against the
encroaching Japanese prove this: note the tea-producing areas marked
with a *

1941: Malaya - Have it.
1942: Singapore - Can't be bothered
1942: Burma - Knock yourselves out.
1943: Arakan - Yawn.
1944: Imphal & Kohima en route to Assam*: Fight to the death!

also in terms of naval history:

1941: Force Z - You've got working torpedos? Rats.
1942: Java Sea - You've still got those torpedos? Ah well.
1942: Ceylon* - Back, you slant-eyed fiends!]

Next: the impact of Dougout Doug's massive personal consumption on
the coffee supply and the consequent fall of the Phillipines, 1942.

Gavin Bailey

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