What if we ignored N. Africa and the MTO?

Kevin Brooks wrote:

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
. ..
Keith Willshaw wrote:

"Cub Driver" wrote in message
...

Throwing the inexperienced US Army on some West-European
beach,

In 1944, the army might be more experienced, but the troops were not.
The Americans put new troops onto the beach at Omaha, rather than
moving combat-experienced men from Italy or some such place.


The US divisions that landed at Omaha were from the 1st Infantry
Division which HAD taken part in the Torch invasions and
fought in North Africa and Sicily

It was two RLTs from the 1st ID along with an RLT from the 29th ID (plus
the Rangers) who landed in the first wave. Here's General Bradley's
comments on his choice of the 1st ID, from his book "A Soldier's Story":

I don't think so, Guy; the spearhead was only *two* RCT's, the 16th from the
1st ID and the 116th from the 29th ID.

That's what I thought, from remembering the details in Adrian Lewis' "Omaha
Beach: A Flawed Victory" (well worth the read). I was sure on the 16th and
116th, but couldn't remember if the 18th (or 26th) came in at the same time or
subsequently, and blanked completely on the follow-on for the 29th. But I only
had Bradley handy, and he says it was two and one, although I may be
misunderstanding him. He (or more likely an aide) wrote:

"The assault force on Omaha was to make contact with the British on its left
while at the same time establishing a link with Utah on its right. If one
division were to be given both missions, it would have been dispersed across a
25-mile front. And as the follow-up divisions came in, it would have become
necessary to reassemble the 1st Division in one corner of Omaha Beach. To avoid
the traffic snarl that would otherwise have jammed up the beach, I shaped the
Omaha attack force with two regiments from the 1st Division, the third from the
29th. Thus while the 1st Division concentrated to the left of the beachhead,
the 29th would advance to the right. the follow-up division would then come
into the whole between them."

IIRC, Lewis says that the actual assault planning was Gerow's (and Huebner's)
responsibility, so either Bradley is misremembering things, or his definition of
'assault force'and 'attack force' is more expansive than 'first wave'. But then
he leaves out any mention of a second regiment from the 29th in the second wave,
so I don't know what he had in mind. Elsewhere, he mentions that there were
three naval forces in the American sector -- one for each beach, and a third
with the two follow-on divisions, the 2nd for Omaha and the 90th for Utah, so
maybe that's where he draws the line. OTOH, I've just found (pg. 270) where he
mentions the "two assault regiments on Omaha," so clearly there's some confusion
by the author(s).

Ah well, that's what I get for not waiting to post until I could access a source
more dedicated to the subject. In any case, we're agreed that units of both the
1st and 29th participated in the landings, which was the main point in my
original reply to Keith.

The schedule had the next two RCT's
(18th from 1st ID and 115th from the 29th) following at about H+3. And when
you read the accounts of what happened that morning on the beach, it is
quite apparent that there was not a danged bit of difference between the
performance of the previously unblooded 29th troops and those veterans (what
there was of them--ISTR the Big Red One already had picked up its share of
green replacements since its previous efforts).

Sure did. OTOH, they at least had a cadre of combat-experienced troops and
small-unit commanders, which couldn't be said for the 29th. ISTR that the 29th
was very similar to my dad's division*, in that some of the senior commanders
had combat experience, but probably not at the battalion level and below.

(*The 99th, which disembarked in Le Havre in October. He said that the 99th CG,
MG Lauer, had been in North Africa, but that the division was green. Naturally,
he was in no position to know the background and experience of every company and
field grade officer in the infantry regiments, so take his opinion for what it's
worth.)

Furthermore, while it is
true that the these lead elements were all under the command of the 1st ID
HQ, that entity had darned little to do with what happened that morning, and
in fact it was IIRC the 29th ID's ADC, BG Norm Cota, who was instrumental in
getting the stagnated effort moving off the beach proper and up the
Vierville Draw?

Cota seems to have played a part, although just how much of one depends on which
history you read. Some say that it was the small unit leaders that got things
moving, and that Robert Mitchum and the other senior commanders on the beach
were essentially irrelevant. I suspect the truth lies somewhere in the middle,
but take your pick as to which way you lean.

snip

"Had a less experienced division than the 1st Infantry stumbled into this
crack resistance, it might easily have been thrown back into the Channel.
Unjust though it was, my choice of the 1st to spearhead the invasion
probably saved us Omaha Beach and a catastrophe on the landing." [ibid,
pg. 272]

As much as I respect and admire Bradley, the fact is that the above is
after-the-fact window dressing.

I'm not sure what his justification for that would be. Why would he care which
unit performed well? The gist of his remarks (much of which I've left out)
seems to be that he was sorry that he had to use the 1st given their tiredness,
and the troops' felt that it was someone else's turn. He makes no bones about
the fact that their assignment to the landing was bitterly resented by many in
the division. It's kind of surprising to me that he devotes as much space to
his reasons for selecting them as he did. His tone sounds almost apologetic
about having used them, but it's almost as if he wants _them_ to know why he
considered it essential that he did, instead of one of the new, green divisions.



In fact the performance of the 29th ID

troops and their leaders on the beach and as they seized the beachhead was
as much, if not more, responsible for the success gained at Omaha as was the
efforts of their 1st ID counterparts. The proof is in the pudding, as they
say, and the pudding demonstrated that the 29th was indeed just as capable
as the 1st ID was on 6 June 1944.

I'm not sure I agree, although it's been awhile since I read detailed accounts
so my memory may be playing me false. The slaughter of Company A/116th Infantry
during the approach and landing (92% casualties on D-Day IIRR, quite accurately
depicted in "Saving Private Ryan") as well as (IIRR) other units of the regiment
stalling at the water line would seem to indicate otherwise. But I'll have to
refresh my memory of who actually wound up where (as opposed to where they were
supposed to land) and did what before arguing the point.

Guy