F-35, not F-22, to Protect U.S. Airspace

On Jan 31, 7:32*am, Mike wrote:
Homeland Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Management of Air
Sovereignty Alert Operations to Protect U.S. Airspace
GAO-09-184, January 27, 2009http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09184.pdf

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entitled 'Homeland Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Management of
Air
Sovereignty Alert Operations to Protect U.S. Airspace' which was
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Report to Congressional Requesters:

United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:

January 2009:

Homeland Defense:

Actions Needed to Improve Management of Air Sovereignty Alert
Operations to Protect U.S. Airspace:

GAO-09-184:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-09-184, a report to congressional requesters.

Why GAO Did This Study:

According to U.S. intelligence, the threat to U.S airspace remains.
The
North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is to defend U.S.
air
space and the U.S. Air Force has 18 sites in the United States that
conduct air sovereignty alert (ASA) operations. ASA operations
support
fighter aircraft in conducting homeland air defense operations. GAO
examined the extent to which (1) NORAD has adopted a risk-based
management approach to determine ASA operational requirements; (2)
the
Air Force has implemented ASA operations as a steady-state mission in
accordance with Department of Defense (DOD), NORAD, and Air Force
directives and guidance; (3) the Air Force assesses the readiness of
units conducting ASA operations; and (4) the Air Force faces
challenges
in sustaining ASA operations for the future and what plans, if any,
it
has to address such challenges. GAO reviewed relevant ASA guidance,
directives, and planning documents; and interviewed DOD officials,
including the commanders of all 18 ASA sites.

What GAO Found:

Responding to individual requests from DOD, NORAD has done some
assessments to determine ASA operational requirements. NORAD has not
adopted a risk-based approach to determining ASA requirements,
including routine risk assessments. Although GAO previously reported
on
the benefits to organizations that routinely do risk assessments to
determine program requirements, NORAD does not conduct such
assessments
because DOD does not require NORAD to do so. However, such
assessments
could enhance NORAD’s ability to determine and apply the appropriate
levels and types of units, personnel, and aircraft for the ASA
mission.

The Air Force has not implemented ASA operations in accordance with
DOD, NORAD, and Air Force directives and guidance, which instruct the
Air Force to establish ASA as a steady-state (ongoing and indefinite)
mission. The Air Force has not implemented the 140 actions it
identified to establish ASA as a steady-state mission, which included
integrating ASA operations into the Air Force’s planning,
programming,
and funding cycle. The Air Force has instead been focused on other
priorities, such as overseas military operations. While implementing
ASA as a steady-state mission would not solve all of the challenges
the
units must address, it would help them mitigate some of the
challenges
associated with conducting both their ASA and warfighting missions.

NORAD has partially assessed the readiness of ASA units; however the
Air Force has not evaluated personnel, training, and quantity and
quality of equipment. Readiness measures are designed to ensure that
DOD forces are properly trained, equipped, and prepared to conduct
their assigned missions. For example, while NORAD evaluated the
extent
to which aircraft were maintained for ASA operations and the units’
ability to respond to an alert and to locate and intercept aircraft,
it
did not evaluate training. Because the Air Force has not implemented
ASA as a steady-state mission or formally assigned the mission to the
units, it does not assess ASA readiness. By assessing the readiness
of
units that consistently conduct ASA operations, DOD would be better
assured that these units are organized, trained, and equipped to
perform ASA operations.

The Air Force faces two challenges to sustaining its ASA capabilities
over the long term—(1) replacing or extending the service life of
aging
fighter aircraft and (2) replacing ASA units with equipment and
trained
personnel when they deploy. For example, if aircraft are not replaced
by 2020, 11 of the 18 current air sovereignty alert sites could be
without aircraft. The Air Force has not developed plans to mitigate
these challenges because it has been focused on other priorities.
Plans
would provide the Air Force information that could assist it in
ensuring the long-term sustainability of ASA operations and the
capability of ASA units to protect U.S. airspace.

What GAO Recommends:

GAO recommends that DOD conduct routine risk assessments, implement
ASA
as a steady-state mission, and develop plans to address future
challenges. DOD agreed with some and partially agreed with other
recommendations. GAO clarified the recommendations based on DOD
comments on a draft of this report.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click
on
[hyperlink,http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-09-184]. For more
information, contact Davi M. D'Agostino at (202) 512-5431 or
.

[End of section]

Contents:

Letter:

Results in Brief:

Background:

NORAD Has Assessed ASA Operational Requirements but Not on a Routine
Basis as Part of a Risk-Based Management Approach:

The Air Force Has Not Implemented ASA Operations as a Steady-State
Mission in Accordance with NORAD, DOD, and Air Force Directives and
Guidance:

Readiness of Units Performing ASA Operations is Partially Assessed by
NORAD and PACOM but Not by the Air Force:

ASA Operations Face Significant Challenges to Long-Term
Sustainability,
but the Air Force Has Not Developed Plans to Mitigate These
Challenges:

Conclusion:

Recommendations for Executive Action:

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements:

Related GAO Products:

Tables:

Table 1: A Five-Phase Risk-Based Management Framework:

Table 2: DOD Commands and Organizations That We Visited During This
Review:

Table 3: ASA Units That We Contacted During Our Structured
Interviews:

Figures:

Figure 1: F-15s on Alert at Portland, Oregon ASA Site:

Figure 2: F-16 on Alert at Atlantic City, New Jersey ASA Site:

Figure 3: Locations of the 18 Steady-State ASA Sites in the United
States as of October 2008:

Figure 4: Differences Between ASA Operations and Homeland Defense Air
Missions:

Figure 5: Factors Identified by ASA Unit Commanders as Moderately or
Greatly Impacting Units' Ability to Conduct ASA Operations:

Figure 6: Projected Number of Current ASA Sites with and without
Viable
Aircraft to Conduct ASA Operations between Fiscal Years 2008 and 2032
based on current F-22 and F-35 Fielding Schedules:

Abbreviations:

AFB: Air Force Base:

ANG: Air National Guard:

ANGB: Air National Guard Base:

ANGS: Air National Guard Station:

ASA: Air Sovereignty Alert:

DOD: Department of Defense:

EXORD: Execution Order:

NGB/ANG: National Guard Bureau/Air National Guard:

NORAD: North American Aerospace Defense Command:

NORTHCOM: U.S. Northern Command:

PACOM: U.S. Pacific Command:

[End of section]

United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:

January 27, 2009:

The Honorable Patrick Leahy:
United States Senate:

The Honorable Christopher S. Bond:
United States Senate:

The Honorable Gene Taylor:
House of Representatives:

The Honorable Frank A. LoBiondo:
House of Representatives:

In the hours after the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the North
American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) [Footnote 1] engaged in
efforts to defend the air sovereignty of the United States against a
new type of air attack--one that was initiated from within our own
borders. Although federal agencies responsible for protecting
domestic
airspace have taken measures to deter such attacks, the National
Strategy for Aviation Security, issued in March 2007, recognizes that
air attacks are still a threat to the United States and its people.
[Footnote 2] U.S. intelligence agencies have also stated that the
threat to U.S air sovereignty remains.

The commander of NORAD is charged with the missions of aerospace
warning and aerospace control for North America.[Footnote 3] To
accomplish these missions, NORAD has fully fueled, fully armed
aircraft
and trained personnel on alert 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, at 18
air sovereignty alert (ASA) sites across the United States. The Air
Force provides NORAD with personnel and equipment for these
operations
including fighter aircraft, which include F-15 and F-16 aircraft as
shown in figures 1 and 2.

Figure ...

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Thanks for the extensive data.