Friendly Fire Notebook

On 15 Apr 2004 18:34:07 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:

We all do what we are told (please don't confuse me with Kramer this
AM.)

Well, then why the credibility issue with the BUFF crews? Its not like it was
there choice to fly "coconut knocking" sorties vise meaningful sorties up
north.

I avoid these "he said-she said" knockups, but you asked. There was a
conscious pomposity about the BUFF community--one that was ill-founded
as (in those days) it was the absolute bottom of every graduating
class out of UPT that went to SAC. There was an incredible amount of
cross-training going on and a desire to be on the point of the spear
could have been met. (I had several B-47 and B-52 re-quals going
downtown with me in both F-105s and F-4Es.)

It is inevitable that individuals who through no fault of their own
are doing what they are told are going to be looked down upon because
of higher level policy decisions. The various interpretations were
that SAC was "too valuable" or SAC equipment would be compromised or
whatever. SAC remained a specified command and not chopped to PACAF or
7th AF for employment. This very issue is the core of Michel's book,
"Eleven Days of Christmas."

Had SAC been a component of the force waging the war and been employed
in 1966 as they were in Decembe of '72, how many lives could have been
spared?

I remember a while back when you were quoting
Clodfelter to me as a demonstration of the total failure of Linebacker
II.

Ahh, you're miss quoting me, I never said LB II was a "total failure". What I
did say was that the NVN didn't agree to any additional stipulations in Jan
1973 that they hadn't already agreed to in Oct 1972.

Excuse me? If the prisoner release had been agreed to in October (when
Kissinger announced "peace was at hand", why were will still bombing
NVN below 20 degrees N. throughout November? The NVN/VC walked out in
Paris in November when we suspended bombing and refused to sign an
agreement.

All it did was end the war, bring the recalcitrant NVN/VC back to
the bargaining table and get the release of the POWs in six weeks.


Which was going to happen in Nov-Dec 1972 but for the South Vietnamese
governments "refusal" to agree with the Paris Peace Accord. Kissenger played
hardball with Thieu in Jan 73 telling him to go along with Paris or risk being
left completely alone (which, of course, he was anyway). Had Henry played
hardball in Nov 72, there would have been no reason for LB II. LB II showed the
NVN that congress wasn't prepared (yet) to cut off funding for the war, they
agreed to return to sign the already agreed upon truce, all that was left was
for SVN to give the U.S. a thumbs up, which they begrudingly did. The Freedom
Porch operations and Linebacker I did more to the end the war as far as NVN
material destruction then LB II did.

Linebacker I was significantly more effective than Rolling Thunder. We
had better equipment, more experience and more permissive ROE. But,
the damage inflicted by LB II was the decisive factor. Academic
interpretation of the events will not prevail as long as there are a
bunch of us participants still around to speak the truth.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8