Friendly Fire Notebook

Well, perhaps my definition of truck is too narrow. My "understatement" comes
from Robert Pape's "Bombing To Win" (I think, I'm moving and can't find my
copy), IIRC Pape states there was "a hundred or so 2 1/2 Ton trucks" (I'm
paraphrasing). Perhaps there were smaller trucks in use that account for your
personal experience?

I frankly don't care what he states, he and/or his sources are wrong. I
personally saw hundreds of trucks that our intel said were similar to our own 2
1/2 T to 5 T trucks, parked in a marshalling yard just inside the PRC buffer
zone that we were fragged against in LB I. I am pretty sure tht in most cases
the trucks came south in convoys of less than 100 but not always. Dependedoin
where they were, under the junglecanopy or in the open where the trails were
exposed. Specter could "see" through the jungle foliage and that is why it
became a great truck killer. Evidence that the truck convoys moved a lot of
supplies is the passes through hills west of the DMZ, such as Ban Karai and Mu
Gia, and river fords were heavily attacked and defended throughout the war.

There were tanks and SAMs in the south during the April 72 offensive. 100
"duece and a halfs" certainly couldn't haul them south. My flight got targeted
by a slow FAC (c/s Nail IIRC) against a SAM transporter with two missiles on
the trailer that apparently had gotten stuck in a river crossing near the DMZ.
Apparently was real as there were some impressive secondaries. There were
hulks of tanks in that area as well though I never caught any in the open. An
offensive of this scale needed lots and lots of trucks to haul fuel, ammo, and
parts, not to mention halling the tanks themselves..




If it made
little difference then why were the bombers targeted against them in the
first
place?

Because Nixon wanted B-52s over Hanoi. B-52 targeting in Hanoi was sometimes
ridiculous. BUFFs were targeted against Radio Hanoi which consisted of a
small
building and a couple of antenna. 12 B-52s dropped weapons near Radio Hanoi
without ever knocking it off the air. 4 were lost.

Yeah, the nearest bomb missed by 800'. We got it the next day with four LGBs.
I'grant you this one. I always wondered why the bombers even bothered with
that one.



You seem to be building a case that the the only thing that mattered
was having the bombers scatter bombs all over the country side whether they
hit
anything or not

As far as Nixon was concerned, that was true, as long as the civilian
casulties
were kept to a minimum.

The order from the President to just scatter bombs at random away from
inhabited areas sure never made it down to the working level! There were a
lot of energy, lives and materiel expended in actually trying to hit critical
targets. I have a little trouble with the insinuation that it didn't matter if
targets wre hit or not. That might have been true for the bombers; I can't
speak for that. Certainly not for the tactical forces. My three daytime
Linebackers against targets that the bombers missed certainly weren't just to
scatter bombs. That may have been the situation in Cambodia near the bombing
halt, but not in LB.



My own opinion is that the bombers failed miserably until HQ
SAC got its collective head out of its ass, paid some attention to what the
TAC
guys had learned the hard way

True, although I think "failed miserably" is a little too harsh. Night #2 saw
no BUFFs lost and about average bombing accuracy.

Giving the North Vietnamese no rest was an integral part of the plan.

So was blowing away their infrastructure.

That had already been accomplished for the most part by LB I.

You are overlooking the difficulty in blowing away infrastructure in a thrid
world country that has been bombed for years. The NVN were able to
reconstitute pretty quickly. You allude to references that say the materiel
was there in LBII but the NVN weren't able to get it where it was needed to
rearm and reload. That infrastructure was somewhat rebuilt after LBI and hit
again in LB II. The bridges had been partially reopened and the intell was
that they had built up in the interim to greater than LB i levels. Damage from
LB had destroyed much of the LOC infrastructure in the Panhandle but not in the
Red River Delta area. It got hit again and you stated that was the reason why
fewer and fewer missiles were fired on later LB II nights. I Personally don't
buy the argument that the NVN really didn't run out of missiles but if in fact
we did destroy their missile assembly and tranportation infrastructure, then
you are arguing against yourself.



You are making my pointwhen you say the bombers got all the publicity.

And you are making half of mine.

Depends what effect you were looking for...


As in the very first Arc Light in VN, that splintered 400 acres of jungle
killed four monkeys and was hailed as a great psychological victory?

No; as in it doesn't really matter if the Kihn No Vehicle repair yard get
hits
tonight or not, as long as bombs land somewhere near it and the NVN
government
gets a personal, up close viewing.

but you are
making my point that history downplays the role of the fighters in LB II

Like I said, you're making half of mine. All you have to do is admit that the
accuracy of the weapons you dropped wasn't nearly as important as dropping
them
and you and I will be in agreement.


You have got to be kidding! Never having been in SAC I can't speak to the
bomber employment philosophy and that might explain why the bombers missed a
lot of targets. However, for the tactical forces that certainly wasn't the
case by a long shot. I find your statement very startling. I can see how you
can say that the bomber raids were purely political if you in fact feel that
way. It certainly doesn't explain away the use of the laser guided bombs
against critical targets. You paint is as more of a case of the bombers being
sent to Hanoi just to keep the people awake while the tactical forces did the
real work.





BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it
harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"