Naval Air Refueling Needs Deferred in Air Force Tanker Plan

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
. ..
Kevin Brooks wrote:

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
.. .
Sorry for the delayed reply -- it's been a busy week.

Kevin Brooks wrote:

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message

snip, trying to keep the length down to a reasonable level)

In
various conflicts we've had help from Canadian and Spanish
Hornets,
plus
the
RAF, AMI, KDF, RNAF, Luftwaffe etc. They've helped us with
_their_
multi-point
tankers on occasion.

And that help has been appreciated. But that does not really imply
that
we
have to optimize *all* of our aircraft to perform multi-point
refueling
right *now*.

I never said they _all_ had to be optimized right _now_, but I can see
no
reason
not to buy new tankers set up that way from the start, as our need for
drogue
tanking is clearly inceasing (cf. the proposed USAF F-35B buy).

That reason would be (another) delay in delivery. Why do you think it
will
be such a major fiasco if the first forty 767's delivered come in
without
the multi-point capability? IIRC the first contract is projected to
cover
that number of delivereies. Letting a spiral handle the multi-point
capability in the subsequent 60 aircraft is not acceptable?

This assumes we need 767s at all, so I'll try and consolidate the
discussion
below instead of handling everything piecemeal.

snip lead-in re 135 age versus 767

Firstly, "only a few years ago" was before we (again) had to surge
tanker
support for two recent operations--that eats into remaining lifespan
(operating hours for the tanker force being about a third higher
than
they
were pre-9/11).

Yes, an increase from an average utilization of 300 hours/yr. to 435
hrs/year.
Even at the latter rate the KC-135Es have a fatigue lifespan of 82
years
(36,000
hrs., vs. 39,000hrs for the KC-135Rs), and they're just a bit over
halfway
through that.

You are forgetting the corrosion problems with the E models--corrosion
tends
to reduce fatigue life, too, IIRC from my long-ago materials science
classes...

Corrosion is an issue with any a/c -- certainly the KC-135Rs as well,
which
(after all) were 135As before, just as the Es were.

It sounds to me like the only way you are going to get that long
a life from the E's would be if you also replaced some structural
components
(meaning you are going even further than the old R model mods, IIRC).

Why is corrosion and fatigue on the Es supposedly so much more serious
than the
Rs, when they all started out as 135As?

I'd assume they are both going to exhibit corrosion problems, but didn't the
R's go through a significant IRAN as part of their upgrade? The USAF, per
those comments from the three-star last year, seems most concerned with the
E's.



Second, if you are going to replace the engines (and
associated controls), you are talking about a sizeable investment
(witness
the never-ending debate over the wisdom of reengining the B-52's,
C-5's,
etc.) right there. Then you have to remember that the E models have
also
not
undergone other avionics updates due to their age/limited lifespan
remaining, so if you want to keep them around you are going to have
to
do
the whole PACER CRAIG thing, etc. In other words, turn them all into
R
models--which does not sound like a real wise investment.

We don't know that's the case, as we haven't done the assessment.
Indeed,
the
Defense Science Board just came out (see

http://www.airforcetimes.com/story.p...25-2904714.php

with a report that apparently says that upgrading some Es into Pacer
Crag
Rs may
well be the most cost effective solution, while we take a couple of
years
to do
a proper tanker requirements study. We apparently never finished the
one
we
started in 2001, and we're now talking about doing one that will run
from
2004 -
2006. What the DSB has said is that there is no need to imminently
replace the
Es - we've got time to look at our options. If you google on news
and
search

defense science board tanker

you'll come up with several sources that provides sniuppets of detail.
Th
e
actual report isn't available yet on the DSB website, apparently
because
it
hasn't yet been briefed to Congress.

Wait a second--spend *more* money on trying to upgrade E's, while doing
*another* study to determine if/when/how we replace the E's?

What do you mean, _trying_ to upgrade the Es? We know perfectly well how
to
upgrade them -we've got 400+ prototypes in service, after all, with the
R&D all
paid for.

No, no, no--that was not what I meant. My point is that at this point
tossing *more* money into the upgrade of the E models seems a bit
shortsighted, when that same money (along with the savings accrued from
cheaper operating costs) could go towards purchasing new-build airframes. We
did not have that option (or the money to make it happen) available back
when the original R program started--we do now.


That sounds
like a fine...bureaucratic solution? Even the GAO was saying in the
1990's
that the USAF needed to get off its duff and start planning the
replacement
of the KC-135E fleet.

Sure. It didn't say what to replace them with.

Nope. The USAF has said what they want to replace them with--you have no
trust in the USAF?


Studies are great--unfortunately, they have a tendancy
of becoming an ends-unto-themselves. We have a good proposal that the
USAF
has supported--it puts new airframes into the mission much more quickly
than
if we follow the "usual" method of purchasing new aircraft (of course,
you
could use the F/A-22 or F-35 model...which would mean if we started that
new
study right now, we might plan on seeing some new tankers around
what...2015
at best?), and it takes advantage of an existing excess production
capability/inventory at the only US company currently building aircraft
of
that class--sounds like a good plan to me.

Who says we need new airframes _right_ now? As we both agree, buying more
pods
and converting more Rs to carry them is the best solution in the short
term to
the navy/Allies problem, while converting Es to Rs _may_ be the best
solution
for increasing our tanker force in a hurry. Or it may not be, butsince
the USAF
never did an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA), we don't know.

Upgrading to R's does not do a great deal towards "increasing our tanker
force"--it instead is more of a "spend some money now to reduce O&M costs in
the long run, and keep the force from being *reduced* as E models break". Of
course, the 767 option does ptretty much the same thing--albeit with an even
greater reduction in operating costs, and a significantly better possibility
of future upgrades (at what point does it become impractical to keep trying
to modernize a 43 year old airframe?).


It is beyond argument that the E models are the anchormen when it
comes
to
MC rate (about 78% for the E models, versus 82% for the R models,
based
upon
GAO figures for May 2003). Without reengining, and taking them up to
the
R
standard, this MC rate difference will only grow--it drops below 75%
and
I'd
think the USAF leadership will really start to howl. Corrosion
maintenace is
another (growing) concern, and it will eat up more and more money as
we
try
to stretch out the E model's lifespan.

The corrosion problem is apparently under control. See the URL above.
From
what I recall of the GAO report, the O&M costs for the Es was
averaging
$4.6
million a year vs. $3.7 million for the Rs

That is an additional $130 million bucks each *year* in operating cost
(not
exactly chump-change...but even that is a "lowball" figure...). What
would
be the operating cost of the 767? Less than the 135R (two engines versus
four, better fuel economy, more maintenance friendly subsystems, less
likelihood of inspection-and-repair work, more stringent (and more
frequent)
inspections, etc.), that is for sure. So your operating cost per year
differential measured against the 767 is going to be greater. Add in the
cost of bringing those E's to a full PACER CRAIG R model level, and the
cost
is going to be significant, to say the least. Not a wise investment
plan,
IMO. If you managed your personal auto program in this manner, then you

would still be driving (only--no newer cars allowed) a 1960's era car,
and
one which you had paid to drop new engines in, along with paying to
modify
the emissions system to keep it in compliance (like the noise
requirements
the KC-135's face), and here in 2004 you would be saying that instead of
buying a new vehicle, you'd be better off paying to essentially
completely
rebuild the one you have and drop *another* new engine in it, along with
updating the other systems in the dash, maybe a new trannie to be
compatible
with that new engine, etc. I don't think you would endorse such a plan
(I
made the mistake once of trying to extend the life of a noble little
Nissan
pick-up at the 170K point by dropping a *used* engine in it, and that
was
*not* cheap--and I found that within 10K more miles I was *had* to break
down and buy a new vehicle).

If most people maintained their cars the way that the military does its
tankers,
and only drove them 1/10th as much as the average 'driver', then upgading
themwith new componenets might well be the most cost effective solution
for the
long-term. The numbers I have seen quoted for the E to R (plus Pacer
Crag)
conversion vs. new 767 comparison imply that the conversion is indeed the
most
cost-effective option, but without knowing every assumption made I'll
withhold
judgement.

I don't buy that. My personal experience was in the more mundane area of
military trucks (we used various models in the combat engineer units). As a
company commander (late eighties/early nineties) I had dump trucks in my
unit that were manufactured in the late sixties and had pretty low mileage.
Somewhat like the KC-135 fleet, but a bit younger. Guess what? We still had
problems resulting from *age* (sometimes less use is not a *good* thing for
mechanical equipment, especially anything that has hydraulics), and we soon
(not long after I gave up command) faced a "train wreck" in terms of
supportability (the Army found it uneconomical to continue carrying the
spare parts inventory for the oldest trucks)--with no replacements
immediately available. Not unlike the situation facing the KC-135, IMO. If
the military services managed equipment like civilian entities do ( run it
to the point of best return in terms of depreciation, then unload it and buy
new equipment), the KC-135 would have been gone long ago, before corrosion
(among other factors) ever became a serious concern. That would be one
extreme, IMO--the other being what we are doing, in acting as if the KC-135
(or the B-52, for that matter) will be able to fly forever. We stretched the
KC's by doing the R conversion a few years back, when there was no option to
buy new airframes. Now there is an alternative to our continuing to slap
hundred-mile-an-hour tape on old equipment in hopes of keeping it viable
forever, and "carpe diem" would be an advisable course of action IMO. Again,
at what point do you stop tossing money into trying to keep the E models
viable, and instead commit that money to recapitalizing the fleet?


As to corrosion, in March 2003 the USAF's Deputy C/S for
Installations/Logistics testified before Congress: "Within the air
refueling
fleet, the KC-135E-models have experienced the most maintenance and
corrosion problems and are more costly to maintain. With an average
aircraft age of 43 years, the KC-135E fleet is the oldest combat weapon
system in the Air Force inventory. It is also the oldest large fleet of
heavy jet aircraft in aviation history...The second critical measurement
that defines aircraft life is physical age. In this fleet, corrosion is
a
function of age. Accurately predicting the extent of corrosion is
difficult
and this lack of predictability severely limits the ability to
efficiently
sustain aging fleets...the KC-135 is particularly challenging since its
1950s design, materials, and construction did not consider corrosion
prevention measures...The most critical KC-135 tanker metric is age, and
the
most pressing KC-135 problems are corrosion and stress corrosion
cracking-both age related. Stress corrosion cracking is one of the most
difficult structural failures to predict." Are you saying that all of
these
problems have been solved since that date?

Apparently they've been ameliorated to a considerable extent, so that this
is no
longer a driving factor. And again, why is the E's corrosion problem
supposedly
so much worse than the Rs, when they started from exactly the same
airframe?

Again, age and , I suspect, a pretty extensive (and comparitively costly)
IRAN process during the upgrade. Can we conquer the corrosion process in the
E model? No doubt we can--but would it be worth the cost of doing so for a
43 (or more) year old airframe?


snip old ground

One of the things I object to is the assumption, without any analysis,
that the
767 buy is essential (the DSB says it isn't),

Well, the DSB also says the corrosion problem is something we can easily
discount,

Actually, I believe what they said was that the facility responsible for
dealing
with it has learned to handle it so well that they are able to do the work
much
quicker and cheaper than expected. I can't find the quote, unfortunately,
but
I'm still looking.

Hopefully this corrosion revelation came after the LTG quoted above gave his
testimony--a quick google on the subject did not give me any hits on sites
that indicate the corrosion problems are licked.


and has apparently decided that *outsourcing* the tanker mission,
or buying second-hand aircraft, is the way to go. Outsourcing may be
great
for the RAF, etc., but the USAF is another story, IMO. Then there is the
"spend the money on already used aircraft" approach--wonderful! As if
tossing more money down the O&M pit for the E model is not enough, we
should
take the money we have and buy older airframes than we can afford? (And
yes,
we can afford new tankers under the current deal being offered)

They've said that it _may_ be the way to go, and:

"The report by the Defense Science Board says that, contrary to Air Force
claims, corrosion of the aging tanker fleet is "manageable" and several
options exist to refurbish the fleet.

Manageable at what cost?! Ask the DSB members how many of them are driving
even twenty year old cars that they find economical to periodically strip,
inspect, repaint, and replace corroded parts as necessary--I'll bet it won't
be many, if any. That they are proposing outsourcing the tanker role seems
to me to be unrealistic for the USAF, and is indicative of a study probably
done by "experts"--not the flying kind, or the kind that even manage the
fliers, but the other kind (what we used to sarcastically define as, "an
expert is an SOB from out of town with a briefcase". Again, at what point do
you think it is unwise to keep dumping money down the tube in an effort to
keep the 135E viable, versus using that same money to help purchase new
airframes with lower operating costs and greater potential for future
upgrade?


If officials are willing to tolerate increased maintenance costs, "you can
defer major near-term . . . investments" to replace the tanker fleet, the
report said.

Guy, that is a telling statement. I suspect the USAF folks are as afraid of
that statement as I would have been when I was on the green suit
side--because they know that when the money does get short, the first thing
that usually ends up getting cut (or really stre-e-e-e-tched) is usually the
O&M money. Those "increased maintenance costs" (for an aircraft that is
already the most expensive in its class, the E model?) represent an
increased chunk of a finite pool of O&M money. Not to sound like a broken
record, but at what point is enough enough, where you start using that money
to instead buy into newer, less costly (to operate and maintain) airframes?


"There is no compelling material or financial reason to initiate a
replacement program prior to the completion of" a lengthy analysis of
alternatives and other studies, the report said. "

Hooray! "There is no compelling material or financial reason (of course,
you'll have to foget about that whole "increased maintenance costs" part of
what we just said), so like the bureaucrats we be, let's study it...and
study it...and analyze what we studied, and then study it some more...while
you guys keep paying out those "increased maintenance costs" you should be
oh-so-happy to "tolerate", not to mentioon having bitten the bullet and sunk
the requisite funds into belatedly upgrading the E models to R as (if?) you
secure the funding to do so..."?


[Quoted from the Oregonian's Web page, May 13th. Sure will be nice when
we get
access to the actual report, rather than summaries of it flitered through
the
news media]

or that it's the most
cost-effective solution (we don't know). Another thing that worries
me
about
rushing into a 767 buy is that we'll be buying an a/c that is
essentially
out of
production except for the USAF. The KC-135s were bought at the
opposite
extreme. These a/c are going to last us at least 50 years, so spares
are
going
to be a real problem down the road, as the commercial operators are
already
starting to look for replacements. Italy and Japan won't have a
problem,
because they're each only going to buy airframes in the single-digits
so
they'll
be able to buy adequate spares from cannibalised airframes, but the
USAF
is
talking about buying at least 100, possibly with more to come.

The biggest things you have to buy spares for are the avionics (which
are
more plug-and-play than they were in the 135 era), and engine related
systems. There are a lot of 767's that will remain in service in the
civilian sector for decades to come--they will need spares too, and in
the
end they become another source for spares for the KC version. I don't
see
this as a deal-breaker.

Given that airlines are already looking to replace their 767s ( a 20-year
old
design, let's remember) with the next generation, and given that world oil
production is predicted to peak sometime in the 2007 (the pessimists) --
2040
(the optimists) period, considerably improved fuel consumption may well
drive
the mass replacement of older a/c, just as the post 9/11 slump did. It's
definitely an issue.

But you find the improved fuel consumption of the 767 versus the R models,
and especially the E models, to be a non-issue?



When the 767 deal was first mooted, it was really the only
in-production
(US)
a/c in the size class available in the proper time frame. That is no
longer the
case, as the 7E7 will be entering service in 2008 (this is a
commercial
a/c, and
unlike the military, missing production and/or performance guarantees
cost
the
company big bucks). We need to see if it makes more sense to buy 7E7s
at
the
_start_ of their production cycle, rather than 767s at the end of
theirs.
Which
is better suited for the role?

Is the extra M0.05 in cruise a major advantage?

Not likely.

Depends on the specific mission, and more importantly, what percentage of
the
mission spectrum does that particular mission occupy. There are missions
now
where the faster KC-135 is better suited than a KC-767 would be, and
others
where the latter comes out ahead.

Sorry, but I can't buy that the extra five one-hundredths mach is going to
be an issue either way.


Does the higher composite content significantly decrease the corrosion
issues
down the road?

Maybe, but doubtfull, as corrosion awareness was better incorporated
into
the 767 manufacture than it was in the 135.

And will be even more incorporated into the 7E7, especally since (AFAIK)
there
is no corrosion of composites yet known.

But you have been claiming that corrosion is not a problem withthe 135 any
longer--now you want to use corrosion as a deciding point between the 767
and an aircraft that has yet to even fly, much less become available in a
tanker form?


How about the 20% better fuel efficiency?

Sounds good, but then again you have to examine the interval between the
time the 767 would be available and the (elsewhere not mentioned, AFAIK)
7E7
tanker version (expect what, a five or six year period at best before
the
first tanker 7E7 could be available?)...I'll be kind and use a five year
period, at 131 E models costing maybe $2 million each more per year in
operating costs than the 767, that works out to around $1.3 billion in
extra
operating costs? That is a hell of a lot of gas...

Check out how much the KC-767 tankers cost.

You were talking gas, right? OK, lets be more realistic and say that if we
canned the 767 proposal and started from scratch, we'd likely not see a new
tanker enter the inventory until 2011 or so. That would be six years to the
*start* of replacing the E models. Of course, that pretty much forces you
into converting those to R's--GAO estimates the cost for that to be some
$3.6 billion. If we work *really fast* to do that, we can maybe get it done
over about a four year period, so for the last two years of that period up
to 2011 we can use the cheaper O&M cost of the R model ($3.7 million per
year per aircraft) which is (we'll assume, based upon KC-10 operating costs,
which would likely be a bit more than the 767) maybe $1.5 mil per year
greater than the 767 cost. Two years times 131 aircraft times $1.5 mil is
about $400 mil. Of course, we have that earlier period (four years)when the
E's (or the ever decreasing number remaining of them as they undergo upgrade
to R) are still flying as is, and that would add maybe another $600 mil. Say
a billion bucks total versus the operating cost of the 767's (yeah, I know
we would not get all of the 767's delivered in lump sum, but I am trying to
keep this simple and fair as well, so I am not going to figure the post-2011
additional operating cost of the 135R's versus 767 into the mix to try and
keep things even). That is a total of $4.6 billion you have just dumped into
keeping the 135E's flying just until 2011. At $200 mil per 767, that is the
equivalent of some 23 new 767's right there--over half of what the USAF is
asking for in the first lot. If you go the lease route with the first forty
tankers, you could cover a significant part of the overall lease cost with
that money. And you are getting an aircraft that carries more fuel to boot.




Respective runway and
ramp space requirements? PFI vs. military? Etc.

Lose the outsourcing option from the get-go, IMO. Won't work for an
organization with the scope of tanking requirements that the USAF has.

Perhaps yes, perhaps no. Air bridge and training tanking doesn't require
military crewing. It's certainly an option worth looking at for at least
some
tanking requirements, if not all.

I am not crazy about the idea of having a portion of the tanker force
unavailable for use in the T/O (and no, this is not the same as my below
posit regarding using the 767's for these roles--those 767's could just as
well extend to the T/O where they provide full capacity tanking to USAF
assets, even with their (initially) marginal USN tanking support
capability).


snip lead-in, about fewer a/c to provide the same number of drogues

That does not necessarily hold true. If the requirement to provide
hose/drogue capability in-theater is 8that* important in a given
case,
you
send the KC-10's and multi-point 135R's forward, and use the other
aircraft
(i.e., these pre-improvement 767's) to handle the usual airbridge
su[pport
operations into the theater.

I think KC-10s are too important as deployment tankers early on in a
conflict to
use them in the tactical role. After all, that's what we bought them
for,
precisely so we could get to the Middle East from the US non-stop, if
we
were
refused landing/overflight rights. Let's face it - being on good
terms
with
Portugal (Lajes) and Spain (Moron) has become more important to us
than
ever.
Besides, KC-10s take up a lot of space, and need stronger runways than
135s or
767s (don't know how the 7E7 stacks up), which may limit its
deployment
options.

I said, "If the requirement to provide hose/drogue capability in-theater
is
*that* important". We have the capability of providing substantial
hose/drogue capability if we have to--if we really need more, then buy
more
kits for the existing R's. No matter how you cut it, the decision to not
initially provide multi-point capability in the first forty 767's is not
going to be a critical, or even serious, failure in terms of our
operational
capability.

We agree that buying more kits for the Rs and/or modifying more than 45 Rs
to
use them is probably the best idea in the short-term.

So what you really seem to be saying is that
the 767's, even without initial multi-point capability, offer an
improvement
to the current level of support that can be afforded to the USN?

Yes, they do, but the question remains, are 767s rather than upgraded
Es
and
later 7E7s the best way to go; what's the best mix, what % of tankers
need to
do which roles, how will the advent of UCAVs affect the need for
tankers
and the
type mix, what effect will USAF F-35 buys have, etc. This needs to be
properly
studied.

Again with the neverending studies? :-)

What never-ending study? The USAF failed to do such a study in the first
place,
especially an AoA. The latter was predicted to take about 18 months, but
the
head of AQ&L (Wynne) says they'll probably push it and complete it by
December
or so.

I was referring to your DSB folks..."studies" was the term they used. As in
"more than one".


snip lead-in about buying multidrogue capability up front rather than
adding it
later

Whoah there, hoss. If the R&D is being picked up elsewhere (by
virtue of
those foreign sales you mention), that advantage does not go away
because we
dicide not to implement the multi-point system up-front. That R&D
effort
is
still applicable. And you are avoiding the fact that it will slow
the
delivery timeline if we have to go with this optimization up-front.

I'm aware that the R&D will still apply, I'm worried about the
materiel
costs,
which are only going to go up. If we need the capability, then let's
just
buy
it and get the purchase out of the way, instead of paying inflated
prices
later.

Even if it delays entry further, meaning you are also going to be paying
that higher O&M cost for the remaining E's even longer...?

If that allows us to make a better decision for the long term, sure. We
can get
upgraded Es (Pacer Crag Rs) into service faster than we can get 767s.

And pay some $3.6 billion for the privaledge of then having the longest
serving remaining KC-135's committed to an even longer period of service.
IMO, not a wise course of action--only to be used if the 767 deal gets
trashed due to both Boeing's stupid handling of what should have been a done
deal by now and the involvement of politicos-with-axes-to-grind, like
McCain. IMO, if that is the way it plays out, we will see the conversion to
R's, then a mindset of, "What? You want a *new* tanker, after we just sank
all of that money into upgrading those last E models? Maybe next year we
might authorize a *study*..." set in, leaving the USAF in the lurch with an
open-ended KC-135 tanker force, and the BUFF's being replaced before they
are.


If that means we buy a/c at a slower
rate (and more refueling pods), good.

Good? I disagree. So does the USAF, from what I have read.

The DSB doesn't, and Rumsfeld said that he was waiting on a couple of
reports,
including theirs, before making a decision.

I am not as impressed with the summary of the DSB report as you are (but
then again, I tend to weigh the advice of the folks actually tasked to
fly
the missions a bit more than I do the DSB, GAO, etc).

Seeing as how the DSB works for the Pentagon, and Rumsfeld is the guy who
tasked
them to do the study back in February, I put a bit more weight on their
advice
than you do. Especially since opponents of the 767 deal (McCain to
thefront)
believed that the DSB was much too cosy with the military and Boeing (the
DSB
Chairman had to recuse himself because he was also a paid Boeing
consultant and
had been mentioned in internal company e-mails back in Dec.2002/Jan. 2003
as
willing to help push the deal), and fully expected them to support it. I
believe McCain's words were something along the lines of a "fox guarding
the
chickens." So yeah, when even they come out and say they that we've got
time to
do the study and the corrosion is manageable, I'm inclined to believe
them.

Then we will have to agree to disagree on this point.


We plan to be operating from more austere
bases, which tend to be somewhat limited in ramp space, so
anything we
can
do
that limits that is a plus. That was indeed one of the USAF's
arguments
against
the A330 -- that it took up too much ramp space while providing
no
more
refueling stations than the 767. They considered the A330's
somewhat
greater
offload irrelevant for the tactical refueling mission; they were
concerned
with
the number of booms/drogues on station while minimizing the ground
footprint. If
that logic is valid, then buying dual rather than single-point
capability
is
even more valuable as a way of minimizing the ground footprint.
See
below.

In the long run, yes. But is it worth slowing delivery up-front even
further
than it already has been slowed?

According to the DSB, we have the time.

The DSB that claims, contrary to what the USAF LTG testified last year,
that
the corrosion problem is readily in-hand...?

the DSB's claim is based on the USAF unit doing the corrosion controls
data,
let's remember. The situation isn't static, and they've gotten better at
it
since last year.

You left out that whole "tolerate higher maintenance cost" part of the DSB's
corrosion solution--I don't think that is a "minor" part of the equation
here, though the DSB apparently does given the off-hand way they worded that
statement.


And thinks out-sourcing tanker
requirements is a fine idea?

They're saying it's a viable option, it should be looked at in an AoA, and
we've
got the time to do so. No more, no less.

If you "tolerate higher maintenance costs" you have that time.


I am not buying into either, at this point.

Until the AoA is actually done, we have nothing to base a decision on
other than
"because I think so," which IMO is a pretty poor way to spend billions of
dollars.

DSB did not say they *thought* keeping the E models would be more expensive
than what we are already paying--they said we would have to tolerate higher
maintenance costs, period, while the "studies" (plural) take place.


snip

But they oddly don't have a problem with the USMC buying C-130J's to
augment
their current tanker fleet.

Of course not, because a KC-130 (any flavor) clearly isn't a
replacement
for a
jet tanker. It meets USMC needs for a STOL tanker/transport that can
also
refuel helos (AFSOC too), and for countries that also operate C-130s
it's
a
relatively cheap, easy way to get some A/A tanking capability; it's
certainly
better than nothing, as Argentina can attest. But it's a relatively
inefficient
tanker for fast jets, lacking range, speed, cruise altitude, and
offload
capability.

I remain unconvinced that AMC would throw a hissy fit if the USN wanted
to
include a secondary tanking capability to its C-40B's.

More likely, they'd suffer a rupture from laughing at the USN devoting
such a
large proportion of its budget to paying the NRE for so few a/c of such
limited
performance (as tankers).

Then the critical USN "requirement" that led off this thread...must be more
of a "desire" than it is a "requirement".


Personally, I doubt the USAF would have put up a
fight if the USN had said they wanted to incorporate a secondary
refueling
capability in their C-40B's; just as the USN has been strangely
silent
over
the USAF talking about recreating an in-house stand-off jamming
capability.

There is no way in hell that the USN would pay the R&D NRE for a
tanker
mod for
their C-40s, with all their other needs.

Exactly. So the lack of multi-point refuelers must not be such a
critical
one, eh?

Since no one else is even considering buying 737s as tankers, and the navy
is
only buying a few (somewhere between 5 and 8, as best I can tell), the
navy
would have to be nuts to make that kind of investment for so few a/c, even
assuming that they would be reasonable tankers. Given their limited
payload/range and performance, I have my doubts they would be, but it's
moot.

They (C-40A--I goofed with the "B", which is one of the USAF models) are
replacing the C-9 in the USN; from what I gather, the plan is to replace 27
C-9's, and I doubt that 8 C-40's can do that. I read where one of the
military lobbying groups noted that the CNO wants to procure three per year
(unspecified total delivery). I am not sure the 737 would make a superior
tanker, either--my point was more in the line of, "If the USN is *really*
worried about tanking capability for its aircraft, why have they not moved
to increase their own in-house capability beyond buddy tanking and C-130's,
especially when they have recently begun procuring a new dedicated land
based logistics support aircraft?" In other words, this a BIG priority for
them--as long as somebody else is footing the bill, that is. Otherwise, the
priority seems to be somwhere down in the weeds...


fuel to forward bases

As to fuel availability, I was referring to the ready availability
of
the
JP-8 in bulk form--and it won't necessarily be there (always) in the
quantity you want at those "remote" bases you refer to unless we
haul it
in
ourselves.

JP-5 presumably, if they're refueling navy a/c that are operating from
CVs. At
least, that's my understanding, but maybe some of the KC-135 people
here
can
comment.

I thought we had standardized on JP-8 across the force--ISTR this came
up
before, but I can't remember the final outcome.

I believe either here or on s.m.n. someone stated that a/c couldn't be
struck
below if they;d beenfueledwith JP-8, until they had been refueled several
times
with JP-5. For land ops (training) the navy has gone to JP-8.

Regardless, be it JP-5 or
JP-8, you can't count on it being available in a remote operating
location,
in the volume required, unless you plan on being able to haul it in
yourself.

Sure, which is why you'll need a tanker (the ship variety).

Usually meaning by ship. A second ship can haul quite a few
pieces of ordnance, right?

Sure, but getting fuel to an airfield is relatively easy (pipelines);
moving
ordnance tends to require a lot more handling and surface transport.

Lots of trucks available for lease out there in the world, even in a lot
of
"remote" areas (any remote are having a pipeline capability likely has a
decent truck inventory available in the general area)--or you could use
a
transportation company (60 line haul tractors and 120 40-ton trailers)
from
the Army (one of our TC companies that was attached to my old BN HHD did
exactly that to support B-52 operations out of Saudi Arabia during ODS).
If
none of this is doable in your opinion, then IMO you have just shot your
"gotta have multi-point capability" in the foot as well, since it would
mean
that we can't plan on being able to operate the tankers within range of
the
receivers in the first place.

Moving ordnance by truck requires offload from ships and lots of handling
equipment (Ro-Ro helps here), whereas every airfield of adequate size to
handle
a jet tanker will already have a fuel delivery system in place. We'd only
need
(assuming it's not a military field) to supply the fuel, not the delivery
system. Even assuming that the logistic infrastructure exists to move the
ordnance, it's still relatively slow, and requires a lot more
organizational
effort to get things going than just pulling a tanker up to a pipeline
terminal
and starting to pump.

If you are tied to getting basic resources into
the TO, you might as well be "in for a penny, in for a pound". And
yes,
the
use of PGM's has resulted in a drastic reduction in the volume of
ordnance
that has to be transported into the TO (ISTR Franks noting that
during
OEF
we were effectively engaging as many targets per day as we did
during
ODS,
with about 10% of the average daily sortie rate compared to the
earlier
conflict). As we move towards use of the 500 pound JDAM, and even
moreso
the
SDB, the need for ordnance (in terms of volume/weight) will shrivel
even
further.

PGMs certainly help, but the problem is the variety of A/G ordnance
that
may be
required. A/A, there's two types of missiles and gun ammo. A/G, even
with PGMs
there's lots of different kinds, and the usage rates are far higher.

I'd think if we have the ability to provide both categories of support
within the confines of a CVN and supporting TAKO (isn't that the
acronym?)

for the assualt predicated, we also have the ability of transporting the
same quantity of fuel and ammo to an airfield on dry land.

In what time frame, and why would you want to move them again, when the CV
already has the infrastructure in place, lacking only sufficient tankers
to
reach the targets? Down the road, sure we can start to bring in ordnance
for
land-based air, but early in a conflict we've usually got the navy plus
long
range USAF assets.

The increasing
use of PGM's even makes it a realistic option to deliver ordnance to the
base by air--something that was unrealistic in the dumb-bomb age
(witness
the poor ability to do so over The Hump for the B-29's trying to operate
out
of China during WWII).

They certainly allow us to start some level of sustained ops sooner, but
we'll
need ship-transported ordnance quantities if we're having to deal with
major
attacks.

snip

I'd posit that using the basing options we already have in-hand
(Guam,
Diego
Garcia, Fairford, and CONUS), the B-1, B-52, and B-2 can acheive
this
pretty
much anywhere in the world *now*.

In that case, let's dump the fighters altogether ;-)

No, but consider maybe the option of letting the CVN provide only the
fighter and EW support (both requiring less tanking support than if they
had
to provide the complete strike package), and you acheive even greater
tonnage of ordnance delivered per strike, and reduce that hose/drogue
requirement to boot... :-)

Certainly worth looking at, although the navy might object to having to
convert
all their shiny new F-18Fs to F-18Gs already;-)

snip

As I have said a couple of times, I
do
see a use for the CVN's--but barking that they just *have* to have
every
tanker in the USAF at their beck-and-call does not do much to
support
the
argument that they are such a critical resource, does it?

No one (or at least, not I) is claiming that they every USAF tanker
has to
be
available to support the USN, but clearly, an increase is required.
IIRR,
the
GAO report stated we used 150 KC-135s in OAF and OIF; given the large
percentage
of USN/Marine plus allied sorties in both of those ops, having at best
only 40
KC-135s with dual point drogues seems to be inadequate.However, if the
tanker
requirements study says we don't need more, I'll accept it, but the
study
needs
to be _done_.

Then your cheapest, and quickest, solution goes back to merely buying
more
multi-point kits for use by additional 135R's.

And I've already said that I'm in agreement with this, especially so we
can look
at if we even need the KC-767 vs. some other option. We apparently have
33
drogue kits for 45 KC-135Rs, so upping the number of kits to more closely
approximate the KC-135R MC rate, rather than the .73 rate indicated by the
above, should certainly be looked at for starters. Converting some Es to
Rs and
adding the drogue kits at the same time won't take any Rs out of service.

snip

And are getting ready to relocate our NATO-assigned assets further
east,
too, to places like maybe Hungary and Rumania, etc. In the Pacific
we
have
Guam, the ROK bases, Okinawa. Diego Garcia in the IO is the one that
is
truly the most limited in terms of ramp space, but the bases in
the -stans
you mention make it a bit less critical than has been the case in
the
past.

The $64 million question being whether those bases will be available
to us
when
we need them. Last I checked there'll all in muslim countries with
regimes that
are more or less unstable. Given our current unpopularity in the
muslim
world,
I don't think we should count on such bases being available.

Then we adjust, and we have the CVN's as insurance--with those
additional
modified R models, if needed.

Agreed that more Rs is likely the best answer in the short run.

snip

Provided we have sufficient space for all those tanker a/c in
theater,
fine, but
it's still wasteful to use two a/c and crews to do the job of one.
Of
course,
if you're cycling flights of two constantly through the tankers,
no
big
deal,
but gorilla packages are another matter. And we may well need to
help
tank our
allies (assuming we have any). Many of them are buying their own
multi-point
drogue tankers now, which helps both of us if they're along for
the
ride.

That last bit is true. But I think you may be forgetting that during
contingency operations we tend to have to operate a number of tanker
tracks
a long way from the TO (i.e., the Atlantic air-bridge, or a Pacific
version,
depending upon where the TO is), so those 767's could be a major
contributor
without even having to enter the local airspace. The real issue is
how
long
we can drag out the 135E fleet; there are 131 of them remaining in
service
now, with engines that were stripped from old commercial transports
some
fifteen or twenty years ago as an "interim" fix, corrosion concerns,
and
obscelescent avionics. Their MC rate can only really continue to
drop,
which
is why yes, we can replace 131 aircraft with 100 newer aircraft and
come
out
in pretty good shape.

Or it might make sense to upgrade them all to 135R/Pacer Crag; I read
one
quote
somewhere of the cost savings going that route compared to the 767
uy --
AIR
it was a couple of billion dollars over the life of the deal. But
that
all
needs to be studied so we know.

Argh! More study?

No, the same one that the USAF shoud have done back in 2001, but didn't.

Hell, just go ahead and plunk down the money and make them
all R's--we'll continue to pay the higher operating cost (even the R is
going to cost more to operate than the 767) for the next forty
years--unless
wings start falling off, or the operating budget gets cut (not like that
has
not happened, and rather recently (1990's) too), etc. Personally, I
don't
see that as the best option.

I'm sure the operating cost will be higher, but then the purchase cost is
a hell
of a lot lower. Fuel burn between a 135R and a KC-767's probably a wash;
CFM-56s in one and CF6s in the other, with the total thrust higher in the
case
of the CF6s.

Guy