Cirrus SR22 Purchase advice needed.

"Dave Katz" wrote in message
...
I've got about 500 hours in both SR20s and SR22s, so I'll throw out
some real world experience (not that it's worth anything in a
newsgroup, but here goes.)

The folks claiming that they stall without warning

Anyone here make such a claim? Or is this just a straw man argument?

"C J Campbell" writes:

"Dave Katz" wrote in message
...
I've got about 500 hours in both SR20s and SR22s, so I'll throw out
some real world experience (not that it's worth anything in a
newsgroup, but here goes.)

The folks claiming that they stall without warning

Anyone here make such a claim? Or is this just a straw man argument?

I think the claim was something along the lines of "it's flying and
then suddenly it's not flying." I interpreted that as having no
warning in the stall.

As far as the accidents go, simply pointing at statistics and calling
the plane a death trap and saying that they are "falling out of the
sky" isn't supportable by the facts. Of the eight fatal accidents
(not counting the flight test accident) five (and possibly a sixth,
though there isn't much data on the crash in Spain) were CFIT. Hard
to blame these on the plane per se.


"per se"?

Accusing those of us who think the statistics are relevant of hyperbole will
not save any lives, nor win the argument. The fatalities per 100,000 flight
hours stat is a very valid and fair stat.

Once again, you can't take out the "stupidity factor" from one
manufacturer's stats, and not the others.



Ultimately it comes down to whether people do more stupid things in
Cirrus aircraft than in other brands. Statistically it's too early to
tell, and the time-in-type average is very low. Basically, you can
cook the numbers to support your position, regardless. I think it's
probably true that someone who is going to be stupid enough to scud
run at night or in mountainous terrain is probably more likely to die
in a Cirrus than a Cessna because of the speed. It may well be that
pilots feel safer in a Cirrus than in a 25 year old 172 (I know I do,
and it's arguably true, particularly IFR) and perhaps that leads the
marginal ones to take bigger risks. But there is no shortage of
pilots doing dumb things in all manner of aircraft, and dying on a
regular basis. Time will tell.

I believe they are over a million fleet hours, and I am told that is
generally considered the time at which the numbers become valid. It often
seems reasonable that if a design appeals to risk takers, or somehow
promotes risk taking, then we can dismiss the results. In reality, this is
a terrible mistake.

There are so many ways to approach this argument.

One would be that its the fatalities that matter, and if you cannot change
them, then the cause is not important.

Another would be that everyone of us is likely to decide that we are not one
of those idiots. In fact, the ones that are dead likely thought that.

The idea that the feeling of safety causes risk taking is meaningless in the
end. Either the design is safe or it is not. There is almost no practical
way to prove the cause without changing the results. Therefore, the design
is bad until it is found to be performing more safely. If Cirrus implements
a change, and then gets different results, then we can talk again. (the
parachute fix seems to have helped).

If the problem is indeed personality, perhaps they are selling the planes to
the wrong people. I would not necessarily disagree that this is the case
except to point out that they are not changing their sales practices and
other than looking at experience levels what are you going to do anyway.

Cirrus could get some good PR by simply dropping the SRV idea, and requiring
a high level of hours to buy their SR20 and SR22. I don't see this
happening, so I guess we will have a bunch more Thurman Munson Jr.'s.

"Dude" writes:

though there isn't much data on the crash in Spain) were CFIT. Hard
to blame these on the plane per se.


"per se"?

Trying to separate out the "plane is a death trap" argument from the "plane
attracts idiots" argument.


Accusing those of us who think the statistics are relevant of hyperbole will
not save any lives, nor win the argument. The fatalities per 100,000 flight
hours stat is a very valid and fair stat.

And like all statistics it says only what it says, and drawing
conclusions from a statistic (particularly a single one) is very
risky. You have to ask a series of questions: What does the statistic
actually measure? Is the measurement statistically significant? Are
similar statistics comparable, and what do the comparisons mean? What
does the statistic have to say as a predictor for an individual (which
is really what people are concerned with)?

For example, if there's never been a fatality in a DA40, does that
mean that a Cirrus is infinitely more dangerous? If it turns out that
lots of idiots by Cirrus aircraft, does that mean that if you decide
to buy one then you as an individual are more likely to become an
idiot?

The statistics (assuming that they pass significance tests) really
tell you only that something is going on, but they can't tell you
what. This is a red flag to go and actually examine the accident
records and try to make an honest evaluation and decide for yourself
what they mean to you.

Once again, you can't take out the "stupidity factor" from one
manufacturer's stats, and not the others.

I fully agree, and herein lies the heart of the issue. Since there is
no independent "idiots per 100,000 pilots" statistic measured, it's
very difficult to quantitatively describe it. Furthermore, an
anecdotal analysis of GA accidents gives the impression that the
"stupidity factor" overwhelms all other contributors, which implies
that the planes, per se (there's that phrase again) are not a major
part of the problem. So unless the plane causes you to become an
idiot, as an individual thinking of purchasing one the statistics say
almost nothing about how much risk the plane itself poses to you in
particular.

I believe they are over a million fleet hours, and I am told that is
generally considered the time at which the numbers become valid.

This would imply an average of somewhere around 700 hours per
aircraft, which is way off the mark, considering that probably close
to half of the fleet was delivered in the last year. I suspect that
the fleet time is at most probably half of that, but of course we're just
making up numbers since this is never actually measured.

Another would be that everyone of us is likely to decide that we are not one
of those idiots. In fact, the ones that are dead likely thought that.

"Aviation, where all of the children are above average." ;-)

Either the design is safe or it is not.

C'mon, this is patently and obviously not true, unless your measure of
"safe" is "nothing bad ever happens" in which case all designs are
unsafe. Short of pieces coming off, it's almost impossible to measure
safety, except in very specific ways (things like impact tests, though
those are not necessarily predictors of anything useful either) or very
general ways (statistics, which don't tell you much.)

There is almost no practical
way to prove the cause without changing the results. Therefore, the design
is bad until it is found to be performing more safely. If Cirrus implements
a change, and then gets different results, then we can talk again. (the
parachute fix seems to have helped).

I think you're overreaching logically here. Perhaps I can restate it:
if there is a statistically significant difference in (accidents,
fatalities, choose your measure) then there is likely to be some
factor or factors that could be changed to reduce it. It's not just
"design" or training or even marketing; it's also things like low
time-in-type and mission profile (long XCs may be inherently more
risky due to unfamiliar terrain, multiple weather systems, etc.)

I don't see that a design change of the physical airplane will keep
people from doing stupid stuff (I suppose TAWS might reduce CFIT
accidents, but people would scream "crutch," which I agree with to a
point, though I suspect it will be standard in the avionics before
long.)

Cirrus has implemented changes to the training program, and COPA has
provided a number of resources, including recurrent training and
critical decisionmaking seminars, and a number of the insurance
underwriters are raising requirements for time and training. Whether
these changes will reduce the accident rate (or have already) will
take another chunk of time to determine. There are a few data points,
however; the rate of landing accidents (prop strikes, etc.) seem to
have dropped since they got rid of the original training organization
and started stressing speed and landing attitude control more. The
situation is not static by any means.

If the problem is indeed personality, perhaps they are selling the planes to
the wrong people. I would not necessarily disagree that this is the case
except to point out that they are not changing their sales practices and
other than looking at experience levels what are you going to do anyway.

I don't think either of us have any facts as to whether or not Cirrus
is changing their sales practices. And as you note, it's also not
clear how a sales rep is supposed to determine whether a customer is a
"wrong person" or not; they're not psychologists or mind readers, so
short of someone's experience level (or at least how they represent
it, as they're not getting a background investigation) there's not
much to go on, and it's unclear that overall experience levels
correlate with the accidents in any case.

Cirrus could get some good PR by simply dropping the SRV idea, and requiring
a high level of hours to buy their SR20 and SR22. I don't see this
happening, so I guess we will have a bunch more Thurman Munson Jr.'s.

It's unclear that this would actually help. One could make a case
that an SR20 or SRV would be an excellent aircraft in which to take
primary and instrument training, assuming that the pilot understands
that the process will take longer than it would in a 152. Typical
trainers are more forgiving, but after the first ten hours I'd argue
that this is a detriment, as it allows all kinds of bad habits (like
the 50' AGL roundout) to develop. Teaching speed discipline on
landing, and getting early and thorough exposure to the avionics,
could well make them better pilots. There are a fair number of pilots
who bought an SR20 to learn in, and so far as I know, none of them
have come to a tragic end. As such, their statistics look excellent,
for what that's worth.

The SR22 is arguably too much of a handful as a primary trainer,
though a few people have done it. The insurance people are the main
gatekeepers in this case. The number of low-total-time pilots flying
SR22s is probably quite small.

"Dave Katz" wrote in message
...
"Dude" writes:

though there isn't much data on the crash in Spain) were CFIT. Hard
to blame these on the plane per se.


"per se"?

Trying to separate out the "plane is a death trap" argument from the
"plane
attracts idiots" argument.


Accusing those of us who think the statistics are relevant of hyperbole
will
not save any lives, nor win the argument. The fatalities per 100,000
flight
hours stat is a very valid and fair stat.

And like all statistics it says only what it says, and drawing
conclusions from a statistic (particularly a single one) is very
risky. You have to ask a series of questions: What does the statistic
actually measure?

Fatal accidents per 100,000 hours of flight.


Is the measurement statistically significant?

The standard appears to be that the measurement is not valid until 1,000,000
hours are reached.


Are
similar statistics comparable, and what do the comparisons mean?

This stat does paint with a broad brush, but if all you are looking for is a
measure of average safety in average usage by average pilots (that fly that
plane) then the measure is very accurate. Yes, if you compare two models
that are used by vastly different skill levels or in different types of
missions, then you may invalidate the data by means of asking the wrong
question. That is not being done here at all.


What
does the statistic have to say as a predictor for an individual (which
is really what people are concerned with)?


Unless you are one of those people who believes you are above average, then
it means a lot. What makes one person who buys and flies a Cirrus all that
different from another? What about comparing them to other brands of new
airplanes buyers? There is no obvious difference, you will have to propose
one. This is not a picky little nit type of stat. Saying that Cirrus just
attracts idiot pilots is not enough, you need say why. I haven't seen a
good reason yet.

For example, if there's never been a fatality in a DA40, does that
mean that a Cirrus is infinitely more dangerous?

No, too little data on the DA40, and no, infinite would be silly.

If it turns out that
lots of idiots by Cirrus aircraft, does that mean that if you decide
to buy one then you as an individual are more likely to become an
idiot?


NO! my point exactly. They are likely much the same as the Lancair, 182,
DA40, Piper 6, etc. (perhaps in the case of the 40 you get more beginners
as they can get insurance).

The statistics (assuming that they pass significance tests) really
tell you only that something is going on, but they can't tell you
what. This is a red flag to go and actually examine the accident
records and try to make an honest evaluation and decide for yourself
what they mean to you.


That would be true, except that examining the records tell us nothing. You
should rely on the BIG RED FLAG! Seriously. If they had a common thread
that was fixed, I would grant an exceptional case (aka V tail break ups).
Until then, no.

Once again, you can't take out the "stupidity factor" from one
manufacturer's stats, and not the others.

I fully agree, and herein lies the heart of the issue. Since there is
no independent "idiots per 100,000 pilots" statistic measured, it's
very difficult to quantitatively describe it. Furthermore, an
anecdotal analysis of GA accidents gives the impression that the
"stupidity factor" overwhelms all other contributors, which implies
that the planes, per se (there's that phrase again) are not a major
part of the problem. So unless the plane causes you to become an
idiot, as an individual thinking of purchasing one the statistics say
almost nothing about how much risk the plane itself poses to you in
particular.


My point is that the stat is such a large macro that the idiot factor gets
rounded out. As an average idiot, we are all more likely to die flying a
Cirrus, than we are flying a 182. We are all average idiots in this stat.
It is too big to slice apart that way.


I believe they are over a million fleet hours, and I am told that is
generally considered the time at which the numbers become valid.

This would imply an average of somewhere around 700 hours per
aircraft, which is way off the mark, considering that probably close
to half of the fleet was delivered in the last year. I suspect that
the fleet time is at most probably half of that, but of course we're just
making up numbers since this is never actually measured.

Another would be that everyone of us is likely to decide that we are not
one
of those idiots. In fact, the ones that are dead likely thought that.

"Aviation, where all of the children are above average." ;-)

Either the design is safe or it is not.

C'mon, this is patently and obviously not true, unless your measure of
"safe" is "nothing bad ever happens" in which case all designs are
unsafe. Short of pieces coming off, it's almost impossible to measure
safety, except in very specific ways (things like impact tests, though
those are not necessarily predictors of anything useful either) or very
general ways (statistics, which don't tell you much.)


No, all you have to do is set a standard. How much more risk are you
willing to take on your flight to enjoy the Cirrus over the Cessna? If its
double, go for it. In my standard, I find the high fatality rate
unacceptable when compared to the ancient Cessna. It should be better.

There is almost no practical
way to prove the cause without changing the results. Therefore, the
design
is bad until it is found to be performing more safely. If Cirrus
implements
a change, and then gets different results, then we can talk again. (the
parachute fix seems to have helped).

I think you're overreaching logically here. Perhaps I can restate it:
if there is a statistically significant difference in (accidents,
fatalities, choose your measure) then there is likely to be some
factor or factors that could be changed to reduce it. It's not just
"design" or training or even marketing; it's also things like low
time-in-type and mission profile (long XCs may be inherently more
risky due to unfamiliar terrain, multiple weather systems, etc.)

I don't see that a design change of the physical airplane will keep
people from doing stupid stuff (I suppose TAWS might reduce CFIT
accidents, but people would scream "crutch," which I agree with to a
point, though I suspect it will be standard in the avionics before
long.)

Cirrus has implemented changes to the training program, and COPA has
provided a number of resources, including recurrent training and
critical decisionmaking seminars, and a number of the insurance
underwriters are raising requirements for time and training. Whether
these changes will reduce the accident rate (or have already) will
take another chunk of time to determine. There are a few data points,
however; the rate of landing accidents (prop strikes, etc.) seem to
have dropped since they got rid of the original training organization
and started stressing speed and landing attitude control more. The
situation is not static by any means.


Those are all good, but how does that compare with the Cessna which requires
a very small time of dual instruction for familiarity? Diamond? Lancair?
Cirrus gets this level of scrutiny by running around BRAGGING about the safe
design of their plane with a chute. In his interview I recently read, Mr. K
was all about how great his airfoil is. Also, they get this scrutiny because
they have high fatalites.

If the problem is indeed personality, perhaps they are selling the
planes to
the wrong people. I would not necessarily disagree that this is the
case
except to point out that they are not changing their sales practices and
other than looking at experience levels what are you going to do anyway.

I don't think either of us have any facts as to whether or not Cirrus
is changing their sales practices. And as you note, it's also not
clear how a sales rep is supposed to determine whether a customer is a
"wrong person" or not; they're not psychologists or mind readers, so
short of someone's experience level (or at least how they represent
it, as they're not getting a background investigation) there's not
much to go on, and it's unclear that overall experience levels
correlate with the accidents in any case.

Cirrus could get some good PR by simply dropping the SRV idea, and
requiring
a high level of hours to buy their SR20 and SR22. I don't see this
happening, so I guess we will have a bunch more Thurman Munson Jr.'s.

It's unclear that this would actually help. One could make a case
that an SR20 or SRV would be an excellent aircraft in which to take
primary and instrument training, assuming that the pilot understands
that the process will take longer than it would in a 152. Typical
trainers are more forgiving, but after the first ten hours I'd argue
that this is a detriment, as it allows all kinds of bad habits (like
the 50' AGL roundout) to develop. Teaching speed discipline on
landing, and getting early and thorough exposure to the avionics,
could well make them better pilots. There are a fair number of pilots
who bought an SR20 to learn in, and so far as I know, none of them
have come to a tragic end. As such, their statistics look excellent,
for what that's worth.


Well, I think the SRV and SR 20 would be better placed in the hands of more
experienced folk. Since I don't see too many of those folk clamoring for a
VFR only, glass cockpit, nearly 200k plane, I say they are using it to
attract low time pilots. I think the days of students buying a Cirrus heve
been nixxed by the insurers.


The SR22 is arguably too much of a handful as a primary trainer,
though a few people have done it. The insurance people are the main
gatekeepers in this case. The number of low-total-time pilots flying
SR22s is probably quite small.

Arguably? Definitely. You may note the 22 is doing better than the 20 in
the stats. I think this is because, as I have heard from more than one low
time prospective Cirrus buyer, the plane scares them. The 22 must have
higher time pilots at the yoke.

Dude,

This could reduce the stalls, at least on approach.

Oh? So how many have stalled on approach again? Right, none.

It would also reduce
the severe shock cooling they are seeing due to their engine control system.


So you can prove damage through shock cooling? Wow! I know no one else who
can. And where is the connection to the "engine control system"?

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

"Thomas Borchert" wrote in message
...
Dude,

This could reduce the stalls, at least on approach.

Oh? So how many have stalled on approach again? Right, none.

Yet.

Don't get so frigging defensive. My point is that the Cirrus can be hard to
slow to approach speed. It takes more care than many other planes because
it is slick, and you cannot control the pitch of the prop to add drag. If
you had speed breaks you would allow the pilot more options to control
descent given that right now the system that governs the RPM/MP has limited
ability to slow the plane without cutting the throttle.

Bottom line is that if a person has speed breaks, he is less likely to fly
slow because he can shed speed whenever needed.


It would also reduce
the severe shock cooling they are seeing due to their engine control
system.


So you can prove damage through shock cooling? Wow! I know no one else who
can. And where is the connection to the "engine control system"?


Presently, according to some COPA members, there are many people having
excessive engine wear and needing lots of cylinder work early. One
suspected reason is shock cooling due to pilots cutting throttle to get the
plane down without gaining too much speed. The cirrus design simply adds
more penalty to poor vertical planning than most planes, and so the engine
is often asked to pay the price.

Another theory is that the engines are constanlty being run at set rpm's
that may not be the best rpm's or the smoothest. The pilot cannot control
it.

Bottom line, the phony Fadec system isn't really all that good.


--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

In article , Dude wrote:

My point is that the Cirrus can be hard to
slow to approach speed. It takes more care than many other planes because
it is slick, and you cannot control the pitch of the prop to add drag. If
you had speed breaks you would allow the pilot more options to control
descent given that right now the system that governs the RPM/MP has limited
ability to slow the plane without cutting the throttle.

Bottom line is that if a person has speed breaks, he is less likely to fly
slow because he can shed speed whenever needed.

I've flown a Cirrus and while it does land fast compared to say a 182, it
didn't seem to be particularly hard to slow down compared to say a 182RG
with the gear up. They do have flaps, even if they don't have speed brakes,
and you can slip them if you need even more drag.

The thing I don't like about them is they land *fast* compared to something
of similar performance--like a 182RG. I like to at least pretend that if I can
find a nice big parking lot I can put a 182 into it--and I think I could, though
we'd probably hit something on the far end in a hopefully-survivable fashion.
I get the feeling I have to look for a long straight road in a Cirrus.

Mike Beede

Mike Beede wrote:


I've flown a Cirrus and while it does land fast compared to say a 182, it
didn't seem to be particularly hard to slow down compared to say a 182RG
with the gear up.

That's true, but I can drop the gear in my club's 182RG once below 140
(although I avoid doing so until below 120 just to be kind). The gear
doesn't add a *lot* of friction, but there's enough to make a difference.

- Andrew

"Dude" wrote in message
...
[...] If
you had speed breaks you would allow the pilot more options to control
descent given that right now the system that governs the RPM/MP has
limited
ability to slow the plane without cutting the throttle.

How is that different from every other airplane without speed brakes, where
you need to reduce the throttle in order to slow down without changing your
flight path?

Bottom line is that if a person has speed breaks, he is less likely to fly
slow because he can shed speed whenever needed.

Dude, seems to me that by now, you've seen "speed brakes" spelled correctly
often enough that it's time you start doing so yourself.

Bottom line, the phony Fadec system isn't really all that good.

Funny...lots of people find it works just fine. It's not a FADEC, by the
way.

Pete