Area bombing is not a dirty word.

From: "Bill Phillips"



I did a quick search on Germany+war+production.

This is the first hit I got:

http://www.usaaf.net/surveys/eto/ebs4.htm

It indicates that German Industry has so much slack in it that bombing had
little effect.

Psychologically bombing may have been counter productive, it made us appear
inhuman and therefore caused the Germans to fight longer and harder.

True Germany was crumbling at the end but that was as a result of many
effects.

IMHO the only useful thing bombers did was draw the Luftwaffe out so that
the P51s could shoot them down.


In my opinion a great many strategic bombing missions were a waste of men and
aircraft.

1) The bombing of London had already proved the population would NOT be
demoralized yet the Allies seemed to think the Germans would cave.

2) Formating missions could take as long as 2 hours during which time the
Germans would be alerted by radar. I have always wondered if 1 or 2 Forts or
Lancs could sneak in at night and hit the target at dawn. Both bombers had good
accuracy at 5 kilofeet giving a good chance of taking out the target.

3) Targets kept changing prorities. If the bombing missions were planned to
knock out a system or production of a specific item such as ball bearings or
oil and continued until that system or product was brought to a stop they could
then go on to the next priority. Speer said a follow up to the Schweinfurt raid
would have seriously hurt ball bearing production to the point of affecting the
war effort. However the next bombing missions were elsewhere.

You can see where I am going with this. I wonder how many airmen would have
lived if the Allies changed their methods. I wonder how much shorther the war
would have been if oil production and distribution alone were the sole primary
targets early in the war. Secondary targets would be airfields and flack.

Dan, U. S. Air Force, retired

Subject: Area bombing is not a dirty word.
From: (B2431)
Date: 1/1/04 1:42 PM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:

From: "Bill Phillips"



I did a quick search on Germany+war+production.

This is the first hit I got:

http://www.usaaf.net/surveys/eto/ebs4.htm

It indicates that German Industry has so much slack in it that bombing had
little effect.

Psychologically bombing may have been counter productive, it made us appear
inhuman and therefore caused the Germans to fight longer and harder.

True Germany was crumbling at the end but that was as a result of many
effects.

IMHO the only useful thing bombers did was draw the Luftwaffe out so that
the P51s could shoot them down.


In my opinion a great many strategic bombing missions were a waste of men and
aircraft.

1) The bombing of London had already proved the population would NOT be
demoralized yet the Allies seemed to think the Germans would cave.

2) Formating missions could take as long as 2 hours during which time the
Germans would be alerted by radar. I have always wondered if 1 or 2 Forts or
Lancs could sneak in at night and hit the target at dawn. Both bombers had
good
accuracy at 5 kilofeet giving a good chance of taking out the target.

3) Targets kept changing prorities. If the bombing missions were planned to
knock out a system or production of a specific item such as ball bearings or
oil and continued until that system or product was brought to a stop they
could
then go on to the next priority. Speer said a follow up to the Schweinfurt
raid
would have seriously hurt ball bearing production to the point of affecting
the
war effort. However the next bombing missions were elsewhere.

You can see where I am going with this. I wonder how many airmen would have
lived if the Allies changed their methods. I wonder how much shorther the war
would have been if oil production and distribution alone were the sole
primary
targets early in the war. Secondary targets would be airfields and flack.

Dan, U. S. Air Force, retired


Hindsight is always 20-20. The bottom line is we beat the *******s and left
Germany a smoking, smoldering, burning ruin. Not bad for a bunch of 19 year old
kids vs the supermen. Before talking about all we did wrong, just consider all
that we did right. And we did a lot more right than we did wrong.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

"B2431" wrote in message
...

snip

You can see where I am going with this. I wonder how many airmen would
have
lived if the Allies changed their methods. I wonder how much shorther the
war
would have been if oil production and distribution alone were the sole
primary
targets early in the war. Secondary targets would be airfields and flack.

I think you'd have to toss transportation into the mix right after the
petroleum industry. IMO the biggest positive effects of the combined bombing
offensive were in the end (1) tying up German manpower and resources in the
defense effort, (2) drastic reduction in German petroleum production
(belated effort, but still effective in the end), and (3) making
transportation even less effective (given the impact of #2) through
disruption of their rail and (less so) road nets, and severely disrupting
transport capability during the critical period leading to and immediately
after D-Day. As to airfields--I doubt there was as much value for the
heavies in that arena, as any flat cow pasture could serve as a fighter
strip in those days (and often did), making the finding of them a bit
difficult. Flak is a non-starter, at least for the level bombers, as the
bombing accuracy of the day just could not ensure taking out individual flak
positions--when your CEP is approaching a mile or more, SEAD just is not a
realistic mission, especilayy when viewed against other targets that could
be effectively engaged (industrial).

Brooks


Dan, U. S. Air Force, retired

On 01 Jan 2004 21:42:41 GMT, (B2431) wrote:

3) Targets kept changing prorities. If the bombing missions were planned to
knock out a system or production of a specific item such as ball bearings or
oil and continued until that system or product was brought to a stop they could
then go on to the next priority. Speer said a follow up to the Schweinfurt raid
would have seriously hurt ball bearing production to the point of affecting the
war effort. However the next bombing missions were elsewhere.

This was a necessity as the repair capacity of the Germans was
rather high. Two raids on a German Coal to Oil conversion plant
dropped production to zero; 29 days later it was back up to 75% of
normal capacity. After being hit again they were back up to 51% of
capacity in 11 days and expecting to be at 80% two days later. Hit
again and it was at 35% of capacity in 5 days; the Germans were just
too good at fixing the capacity to hope it would be out for good
without just hititng it constantly and ignoring other plants at 100%
capacity.

You can see where I am going with this. I wonder how many airmen would have
lived if the Allies changed their methods. I wonder how much shorther the war
would have been if oil production and distribution alone were the sole primary
targets early in the war. Secondary targets would be airfields and flack.

The problem with this is that we couldn't hit all their oil
production and distribution early in the war. Few if any, escorts
would have been available for nearly all the targets that we could
hit. We would keep hitting the same half of the production capacity
that was already at zero production.

--
"The most merciful thing in the world, I think, is the inability
of the human mind to correlate all its contents." - H.P. Lovecraft

Bill Phillips wrote in message ...

I did a quick search on Germany+war+production.

This is the first hit I got:

http://www.usaaf.net/surveys/eto/ebs4.htm

It indicates that German Industry has so much slack in it that bombing had
little effect.

This is correct to mid 1944, the bombers could not compete with
Speer undoing the inefficiencies in the German economy. It was
also a fact the effect of the bombers helped Speer push through
the changes. The main effect of the bombing was military, the
cost of the air raid warning and protection system, the deployment
of so many fighters and flak guns in Germany, the losses to the day
fighters in particular in early 1944.

The Air Forces are left with "production would have gone up further"
rather than "production went down" until mid 1944, not very convincing.


One reason the average Luftwaffe day fighter had no performance
improvement between early 1942 and mid 1944 was the need
for numbers. The day fighters went from being generally superior
to generally inferior to the allied day fighters.

Psychologically bombing may have been counter productive, it made us appear
inhuman and therefore caused the Germans to fight longer and harder.

The "morale" issue is complicated, yes at times it made people more
productive, in others less, similar for "fighting attitude".

True Germany was crumbling at the end but that was as a result of many
effects.

The combination of loss of resources and the bombing. It took around
9 months for iron ore to end up as steel in a weapon, similar for other
raw materials, so much of the production loss in late 1944 seems to
be mainly bombing. However this bombing includes the effects of the
medium, light and fighter bombers on the German transport system,
not just the heavies.

The other thing to note is the halfway point for the 8th Air Force bombs
dropped on Germany is around mid November 1944, (less than 1/3 had
been dropped by the end of August 1944), Bomber Command mid point
was around early October 1944 it was very end loaded campaign.

The amount of tonnage and the speed of delivery meant the final months
of the war the bombing was more effective, overloading the air raid repair
abilities.

IMHO the only useful thing bombers did was draw the Luftwaffe out so that
the P51s could shoot them down.


The loss of oil products helped, the lack of nitrogen and methanol
meant the Germans had to use more and more inert fillings in
shells. The need to defend Germany left less and less to control the
airspace over the armies or run bombing operations in the allied rear.

No one had ever tried this type of bombing before, and the Germans
did not volunteer raid reports, so it took a long time to learn what
worked.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

Subject: Area bombing is not a dirty word.
From: "Geoffrey Sinclair"
Date: 1/1/04 8:27 PM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:

lso a fact the effect of the bombers helped Speer push through
the changes. The main effect of the bombing was military, the
cost of the air raid warning and protection system, the deployment
of so many fighters and flak guns in Germany, the losses to the day
fighters in particular in early 1944.

Don't forget the bridges, marshalling yards, rail facilities, ammo dumps, fuel
dumps. food supplies, dams, canals.road junctions that we detroyed.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

"ArtKramr" wrote in message
...
60 years of hindsight with some revisionism thrown in have obscured
the
original intent of attacking an enemy from the air.

Revision comes form the latin and it means "to look at again". It is
not about spining the truth. It is about ascertaining it more
accruately. In its true form it has nothing to do with 'obscuring'
anything. Admitedly both history and historical revisionsim can
become part of ideological warfare.

Looking at history 50 year later is actualy now regarded as a good way
to look at it becuase you can be free of some of the passions and
propaganda that prevent it being looked at evenly and critically

I only flew one (of 50)
mission
over cloud cover using GEE.

What is "GEE" is it radar ground mapping or a system of beacons?


We didn't call it area bombing. We didn't call it
blind bombing. Those are words are now used to stake out an agenda
against
bombing in general. We flew the mission because it had to be flown
and GEE was
the only way to get it done. And there was a war on. A very nasty
unpleasant
war.

At the begining of the war the Luftwaffe and RAAF would only attack
military targets: RAF airfields for instance. There was a moral and
ethical code withing the aircrew, armed forces and populations
themselves that prevented this. I mean on both sides. Gradualy
accidents happened these were hyped or exaggerated to justify
reprisals and pretty soon the principles of avoiding civilian targets
was evaded.

Pretty soon methods of bombing which by their nature involved large
civilian casualties.

Finaly it seems that military targets were often only token and most
casualties were civilian.

It was surely a a matter of expediency: relatively accurate low
altitude bombing (as done by B26s or a Stuka) was not acceptable
because aircraft like B17s and Lancasters would suffer unacceptable
losses for one reason or another so cities ended up being flatened and
mainly women and children were burnt or blown to bits. In once case
the RAF bombed the homes of technical workers at penemunde.

In the case of Tokyo and Hamburg about 130,000 in a night civilians
died.

In the case of Nagasaki the atomic bomb landed smack in the middle of
the Catholic area and wiped out 50,000 Japanese Catholics. While the
japanese catholics fought with the Japanese militray (apparently
covents and religious house were always respected for this reason)
they were also a group that suffered some discrimination and were
reluctant to fight.


The name of the game was to go for the enemies throat. Hit him
night and day
in good weather and bad with no let up and no relief. We flew the
missions,
came back, buried our dead and went out again.We always hit a
specific target
that had to be hit. .The idea of having the enemy hit us without our
hitting
back any way we could was unthinkable. It shows weakness and gives
the
inititive to the enemy, and once you have lost the initiative, you
have lost
the war.



Part of war is to discredit the enemy moraly while moraly sancifying
ones own side. The truth is that the enemy is often much closser
morally to us than we are ready to admit.

A mistake or ommision by a German is an atricity or war crime but if
in the case of WW2 and allie is responsble then it is something else.


Here is an Islamic justification of "Collateral Damage"
************************************************
Sa'ab bin Jathamah (may Allah be pleased with him) reported from that
the Prophet was asked about the people in the homes of Mushrikun
(Polytheist) when they are attacked at night and their women and
children are affected, he said: "they are part of them". So, this
Hadith shows that women, children and all those the killing of whom is
forbidden, when they are separate, it is permissible to kill them when
they are mixed up with the fighters and it is not possible to
separate. This is because they had asked the Prophet about the case
which is "attacking at night", in which case it is not possible to
differentiate, and he permitted them because "things may be allowed
when they occur along the way but be forbidden when separate".

Also, Muslim commanders have always used Catapult when fighting the
Kuffar (a kind of weapon that was used in the past when trying to
break into an enemy camp which is fully fortressed - it destroys
whatever it meets by its weight, i.e. something like a catapult -
translator), and it is obvious that a Catapult when applied in a war
does not differentiate between a fighter and others, hence it may
afflict some those so-called 'innocent souls', but that not
withstanding this is an established practice among Muslims in their
wars. Ibn Qudamah may Allah have mercy on him, said: "And it is
permissible to use Catapult because the Prophet may the Salaat and
Salaam be with him used Catapult on the people of Ta'if; and Amr bin
al-As did the same to the people of Alexandria" (Al-Mughniy, vol. 10,
p503). And Ibn al-Qasim said it is permissible to use Catapult against
Kuffar even if children, women and old men and monks are killed
inadvertently, because 'Nikayah' (doing what will weaken the enemy) is
allowed according to the consensus of Ulama. Ibn Rushd said:
"'Nikayah' is permissible according to Ijama' and on any type of
polytheists" (Al-Hashiyah ala' Ar-Raudh, vol. 4, p 271).
*****************************


However I think that "collateral damage" is a term that is not
accurate in some WW2 raids where the civilians were the target instead
of armies.























Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer