Area bombing is not a dirty word.

"Bill Phillips" wrote in message
...
The impact the CBO had
prior to 1944 was to draw manpower to defend Germany from the front.
Every
guy
manning a AAA piece or fueling a fighter would have been carrying a
Mauser-98
on either the eastern or western front if it wasn't for the CBO.

Just like all the effort being put into bombing as not available to
help
the
allied armies.

Nor could it have been, at least not effectively (see below). At least
they
kept the Luftwaffe largely in check while also makiong the POL and
transportation situations within Germany a nightmare (all three of which
were very good things for the "allied armies").

Also the flack units could and did turn their guns on ground
targets in the later stages of the war.

Great. Imagine how much MORE succesful they would have been had they not
had
to concentrate all of those resources on defending the homeland and
instead
had been putting them on more mobile armored platforms.


How long would a Kar-98 carrying soldier last if the allies put all
that
effort into the battlefield?'

And pray tell just HOW would you put all of that effort "onto the
battlefield"? We know that level bombing was of mixed, at best, tactical
value when applied "to the battlefield" (witness COBRA). The allied
ground
forces in France in late 1944 were about as big as you could manage
given
logistics constraints (and no, having all of the bombers play transport
would not have appreciably changed that picture), so you would not have
been
reorienting the bombing resources into the ground fight very easily.
Sounds
like your plan is not very workable. OTOH, having the CBO ongoing
prevented
what was left of the Luftwaffe in late 44 from being able to effectively
focus on supporting their own ground forces opposing the oncoming allied
ground juggernaut. It did indeed make the POL situation a critical one
for
German forces, including those on the ground facing Ike's troops. I just
can't see how we could have substantially improved upon the situation by
reorienting the resources applied to the CBO--as Buffdrvr points out, we
could have better *focused* them to be more effective, given the benefit
of
hindsight, but in the end the combined weight of *all* of the resources
brought to bear, from the CBO to the ground soldiers and TACAIR, working
simultaneously to apply pressure to the Germans from all directions and
forcing them to try to defend *everywhere* versus concentrating solely
upon
the ground equation, was the optimal solution to be had.

It depends on when you divert the resources.

Once you have built bombers you are restricted in what you can do with
them.

However change early enough and you can build almost anything instead,
such
as a tank that could take on Tigers and Panthers 1 to 1. Note: resources
are
a quality issue as well as a quantity one, better equipment could have
actually reduced the logistic burden by achieving a given effect with less
equipment.

Then you would have had to scrap the entire US military production strategy,
which was based upon getting a LOT of "good enough" stuff produced as
opposed to the German approach of building a few really good items--we know
which side lost, so I would side with the winning strategy.


Even if it was put into air power then it could have won the battle of the
Atlantic earlier

That is not assured. merely tossing a few hundred more aircraft over the
ocean was not going to stop the German subs; it took a combination of
aircraft and emerging technology (i.e., small radars capable of seeing the
surfaced little buggers). Then you would have had to factor in that the
germans, not being subjected to any kind of CBO, would have produced even *m
ore* boats ata faster pace, and trained them more effectively since there
was not the additional effect on their POL supplies, not to mention the fact
that all of those flak crews and resources would have been reprogrammed to
face your other threats, and their Luftwaffe would have been better able to
support operations on *both* fronts, etc, ad nauseum.

and some more CAS and air transport would have been useful
for the advance across Europe. For example a little more air power would
have turned Operation Market Garden into a victory.

No freakin' way. The weather shut out air support almost altogether during a
critical window of that operation, and a few more C-47's would NOT have
affected the outcome at Arnhem.

Brooks


Much the same is true of the German efforts.

In my view fuel as a poor third reason.


According to interviews with Albert Kesselring, fuel shortages severely limited
training and was, according to him, the leading cause of eventually losing air
superiority over their own country.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

On 05 Jan 2004 22:59:12 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:


According to interviews with Albert Kesselring, fuel shortages severely limited
training and was, according to him, the leading cause of eventually losing air
superiority over their own country.

Even if Germany had all the oil it ever needed there was no way for
Germany to deploy enough pilots to take on the combined air forces of
US, UK and USSR.


Drax
remove NOSPAM for reply

"BUFDRVR" wrote in message
...
In my view fuel as a poor third reason.


According to interviews with Albert Kesselring, fuel shortages severely
limited
training and was, according to him, the leading cause of eventually losing
air
superiority over their own country.


One thing that the German high command is excellent at is finding excuses
for their failures.

One of the reasons WW2 happened was that they successfully convinced the
German people that they had been on the verge of winning WW1 when the
politicians "stabbed then in the back."

So what do you expect him to say:

A) Our failure to train enough pilots early in the war meant that we got
into a vicious circle of: pilot shortage leading to, shorter training
leading to, higher casualties leading to, pilot shortage.

B) We were winning when we ran out of fuel, due to circumstances beyond my
control.

Subject: Area bombing is not a dirty word.
From: "Bill Phillips"
Date: 1/16/04 12:12 PM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:


"BUFDRVR" wrote in message
...
In my view fuel as a poor third reason.


According to interviews with Albert Kesselring, fuel shortages severely
limited
training and was, according to him, the leading cause of eventually losing
air
superiority over their own country.


One thing that the German high command is excellent at is finding excuses
for their failures.

One of the reasons WW2 happened was that they successfully convinced the
German people that they had been on the verge of winning WW1 when the
politicians "stabbed then in the back."

So what do you expect him to say:

A) Our failure to train enough pilots early in the war meant that we got
into a vicious circle of: pilot shortage leading to, shorter training
leading to, higher casualties leading to, pilot shortage.

B) We were winning when we ran out of fuel, due to circumstances beyond my
control.



When France surrendered and collaborated it sure looked that way. Children in
France today are taught in schools that France defeated Germany with the "help"
of the allies. How French.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

On 01 Jan 2004 20:33:57 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:


Every guy manning a AAA piece or fueling a fighter would have been carrying a Mauser-98
on either the eastern or western front if it wasn't for the CBO.

As the war progressed, the AA personnel was largely comprised of
people unfit for the front: high school teenagers, girls, WW1
veterans, Soviet POWs etc.

Against this bottom of the barrel opponents, Allies used the flower of
their manhood.

The only reason CBO could have been sustained is that Soviet Union
provided the Red Army to take the main burden of the war.


Drax
remove NOSPAM for reply

Subject: Area bombing is not a dirty word.
From: (Drazen Kramaric)
Date: 1/9/04 4:08 AM Pacific

As the war progressed, the AA personnel was largely comprised of
people unfit for the front: high school teenagers, girls, WW1
veterans, Soviet POWs etc.

They were called the FLAK KINDER and were mostly young men of high school age.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

From: "Bill Phillips"



I did a quick search on Germany+war+production.

This is the first hit I got:

http://www.usaaf.net/surveys/eto/ebs4.htm

It indicates that German Industry has so much slack in it that bombing had
little effect.

Psychologically bombing may have been counter productive, it made us appear
inhuman and therefore caused the Germans to fight longer and harder.

True Germany was crumbling at the end but that was as a result of many
effects.

IMHO the only useful thing bombers did was draw the Luftwaffe out so that
the P51s could shoot them down.


In my opinion a great many strategic bombing missions were a waste of men and
aircraft.

1) The bombing of London had already proved the population would NOT be
demoralized yet the Allies seemed to think the Germans would cave.

2) Formating missions could take as long as 2 hours during which time the
Germans would be alerted by radar. I have always wondered if 1 or 2 Forts or
Lancs could sneak in at night and hit the target at dawn. Both bombers had good
accuracy at 5 kilofeet giving a good chance of taking out the target.

3) Targets kept changing prorities. If the bombing missions were planned to
knock out a system or production of a specific item such as ball bearings or
oil and continued until that system or product was brought to a stop they could
then go on to the next priority. Speer said a follow up to the Schweinfurt raid
would have seriously hurt ball bearing production to the point of affecting the
war effort. However the next bombing missions were elsewhere.

You can see where I am going with this. I wonder how many airmen would have
lived if the Allies changed their methods. I wonder how much shorther the war
would have been if oil production and distribution alone were the sole primary
targets early in the war. Secondary targets would be airfields and flack.

Dan, U. S. Air Force, retired

Subject: Area bombing is not a dirty word.
From: (B2431)
Date: 1/1/04 1:42 PM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:

From: "Bill Phillips"



I did a quick search on Germany+war+production.

This is the first hit I got:

http://www.usaaf.net/surveys/eto/ebs4.htm

It indicates that German Industry has so much slack in it that bombing had
little effect.

Psychologically bombing may have been counter productive, it made us appear
inhuman and therefore caused the Germans to fight longer and harder.

True Germany was crumbling at the end but that was as a result of many
effects.

IMHO the only useful thing bombers did was draw the Luftwaffe out so that
the P51s could shoot them down.


In my opinion a great many strategic bombing missions were a waste of men and
aircraft.

1) The bombing of London had already proved the population would NOT be
demoralized yet the Allies seemed to think the Germans would cave.

2) Formating missions could take as long as 2 hours during which time the
Germans would be alerted by radar. I have always wondered if 1 or 2 Forts or
Lancs could sneak in at night and hit the target at dawn. Both bombers had
good
accuracy at 5 kilofeet giving a good chance of taking out the target.

3) Targets kept changing prorities. If the bombing missions were planned to
knock out a system or production of a specific item such as ball bearings or
oil and continued until that system or product was brought to a stop they
could
then go on to the next priority. Speer said a follow up to the Schweinfurt
raid
would have seriously hurt ball bearing production to the point of affecting
the
war effort. However the next bombing missions were elsewhere.

You can see where I am going with this. I wonder how many airmen would have
lived if the Allies changed their methods. I wonder how much shorther the war
would have been if oil production and distribution alone were the sole
primary
targets early in the war. Secondary targets would be airfields and flack.

Dan, U. S. Air Force, retired


Hindsight is always 20-20. The bottom line is we beat the *******s and left
Germany a smoking, smoldering, burning ruin. Not bad for a bunch of 19 year old
kids vs the supermen. Before talking about all we did wrong, just consider all
that we did right. And we did a lot more right than we did wrong.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

From: (ArtKramr)


Hindsight is always 20-20. The bottom line is we beat the *******s and left
Germany a smoking, smoldering, burning ruin. Not bad for a bunch of 19 year
old
kids vs the supermen. Before talking about all we did wrong, just consider
all
that we did right. And we did a lot more right than we did wrong.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer


Agreed.

Dan, U. S. Air Force, retired