Greatest Strategic Air Missions?

On Sun, 22 Aug 2004 13:34:00 -0700, "Leadfoot"
wrote:


Thats a campaign, not a mission

Same for Linebacker II.

Some one else posted linebacker II not me. I did consider it and decided it
was a campaign not a mission when I started the thread


I'd think that maybe 11 days might be closer to a battle, but if you
want it to be called campaign, then let's just go with December
18/19th night. One hundred fifty BUFF sorties scheduled and most of
them flown into an area the size of Rhode Island. Accompanied by a
bunch of F-111's against the airfields and followed up with the full
force of all the USAF/USN airplanes in theater the next day, hitting
virtually every worthwhile (and many sub-worthwhile) targets in RP VI
within 24 hours.

Looked pretty impressive from my seat.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
"Phantom Flights, Bangkok Nights"
Both from Smithsonian Books
***www.thunderchief.org

Ed Rasimus wrote:

On Sun, 22 Aug 2004 13:34:00 -0700, "Leadfoot"
wrote:

Thats a campaign, not a mission

Same for Linebacker II.

Some one else posted linebacker II not me. I did consider it and decided it
was a campaign not a mission when I started the thread

I'd think that maybe 11 days might be closer to a battle, but if you
want it to be called campaign, then let's just go with December
18/19th night. One hundred fifty BUFF sorties scheduled and most of
them flown into an area the size of Rhode Island. Accompanied by a
bunch of F-111's against the airfields and followed up with the full
force of all the USAF/USN airplanes in theater the next day, hitting
virtually every worthwhile (and many sub-worthwhile) targets in RP VI
within 24 hours.

Looked pretty impressive from my seat.

No doubt, Ed.

I'd call the whole Linebacker II campaign a strategic success. As I
remember, the North Vietnamese had walked away from the Paris negotiations,
and had to be 'persuaded' to come back. Seems like taking the gloves off
worked.

I don't know how long we could have sustained that level of losses,
specially the BUFFs, but I'm reasonably sure the NV thought we'd go as long
as we had to. If only we'd done it earlier...

| George Ruch
| "Is there life in Clovis after Clovis Man?"

On Mon, 23 Aug 2004 01:28:09 -0600, George Ruch
wrote:

Ed Rasimus wrote:

I'd think that maybe 11 days might be closer to a battle, but if you
want it to be called campaign, then let's just go with December
18/19th night. One hundred fifty BUFF sorties scheduled and most of
them flown into an area the size of Rhode Island. Accompanied by a
bunch of F-111's against the airfields and followed up with the full
force of all the USAF/USN airplanes in theater the next day, hitting
virtually every worthwhile (and many sub-worthwhile) targets in RP VI
within 24 hours.

Looked pretty impressive from my seat.

No doubt, Ed.

I'd call the whole Linebacker II campaign a strategic success. As I
remember, the North Vietnamese had walked away from the Paris negotiations,
and had to be 'persuaded' to come back. Seems like taking the gloves off
worked.

I don't know how long we could have sustained that level of losses,
specially the BUFFs, but I'm reasonably sure the NV thought we'd go as long
as we had to. If only we'd done it earlier...

The loss level dropped abruptly after day six and although several
more BUFFs were lost in the remaining five days, the near total
destruction of the NVN air defense system means that the campaign
could have been sustained until the level of the 1964 LeMay
prescription--"back to the stone age." On day six, I was part of a
Hunter/Killer flight supporting a day strike to Hanoi. We orbited
Bullseye (Hanoi geographic center) for more than 25 minutes at six
thousand feet over a solid undercast--a prescription for almost
certain disaster a week earlier.

The question about how it might have turned out had we done it earlier
is certainly one for extended debate, but that was then and this is
now. The huge difference was that during the period in question, there
was a significant doubt about what would inadvertently trigger
intervention by the Soviets or the PRC and start the slippery slide to
nuclear exchange.

Bottom line for consideration, however, is that the restraint
exercised by the Nixon administration in terminating the campaign
after eleven days when an agreement was reached seems to put into
question the assertions of atrocities, war crimes, carpet-bombing, etc
instituted from the highest levels of command.




Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
"Phantom Flights, Bangkok Nights"
Both from Smithsonian Books
***www.thunderchief.org

Ed Rasimus wrote:

On Mon, 23 Aug 2004 01:28:09 -0600, George Ruch
wrote:

Ed Rasimus wrote:

I'd think that maybe 11 days might be closer to a battle, but if you
want it to be called campaign, [...]

Looked pretty impressive from my seat.

No doubt, Ed.

I'd call the whole Linebacker II campaign a strategic success. As I
remember, the North Vietnamese had walked away from the Paris negotiations,
and had to be 'persuaded' to come back. Seems like taking the gloves off
worked.

I don't know how long we could have sustained that level of losses,
specially the BUFFs, but I'm reasonably sure the NV thought we'd go as long
as we had to. If only we'd done it earlier...

The loss level dropped abruptly after day six and although several
more BUFFs were lost in the remaining five days, the near total
destruction of the NVN air defense system means that the campaign
could have been sustained until the level of the 1964 LeMay
prescription--"back to the stone age."

I was at Takhli at the time - 474AMS pod shop (ALQ-87s). We didn't get
much detail at the time - some of the strike photos, but not much of the
big picture. We lost 6 airplanes - three of them during Linebacker.

On day six, I was part of a
Hunter/Killer flight supporting a day strike to Hanoi. We orbited
Bullseye (Hanoi geographic center) for more than 25 minutes at six
thousand feet over a solid undercast--a prescription for almost
certain disaster a week earlier.

Glad you got back in one piece. That could definitely have ruined your
day.

The question about how it might have turned out had we done it earlier
is certainly one for extended debate, but that was then and this is
now. The huge difference was that during the period in question, there
was a significant doubt about what would inadvertently trigger
intervention by the Soviets or the PRC and start the slippery slide to
nuclear exchange.

Even without that possibility, a heavy bombing campaign would have been a
very sharp dual edged sword. Military necessity vs. major portions of Hanoi
and Haiphong leveled by 'indiscriminate' bombing. The foreign press and
some of our own would have torn the Johnson and Nixon administrations
apart.

Bottom line for consideration, however, is that the restraint
exercised by the Nixon administration in terminating the campaign
after eleven days when an agreement was reached seems to put into
question the assertions of atrocities, war crimes, carpet-bombing, etc
instituted from the highest levels of command.

Good point.

| George Ruch
| "Is there life in Clovis after Clovis Man?"

George Ruch wrote in message . ..

...

I'd call the whole Linebacker II campaign a strategic success. As I
remember, the North Vietnamese had walked away from the Paris negotiations,
and had to be 'persuaded' to come back. Seems like taking the gloves off
worked.


What was the issue in Paris that the NV refused to accept before
Linebacker II, and to which they agreed afterward?

--

FF

Fred the Red Shirt wrote:

What was the issue in Paris that the NV refused to accept before
Linebacker II, and to which they agreed afterward?

None. The only changes to the document signed in January 1973 and the one
agreed upon in October 1972 was some wording.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

(BUFDRVR) wrote in message ...
Fred the Red Shirt wrote:

What was the issue in Paris that the NV refused to accept before
Linebacker II, and to which they agreed afterward?

None. The only changes to the document signed in January 1973 and the one
agreed upon in October 1972 was some wording.


So in 1973 did NV abandon an issue they had been holding out for?
If not, why'd they walk out?

I had thought that the last dividing issue was the presence of NVA
troops in South Vietnam, e.g. the "Parrot's Beak". South Vietnam
refused to sign the treaty unless the the NVA troops withdrew and
NV refused to withdraw them. Ulitmately, South Vietnam relented
and the treaty was signed.

Have I got that wrong?

--

FF

Fred the Red Shirt wrote:

So in 1973 did NV abandon an issue they had been holding out for?

Nope.

If not, why'd they walk out?

There walk out was two fold. First off, the agreement and draft were finalized
in mid-October '72 and arrangements made to sign the document "after
consultations". The NVN were immediately ready, however Kissenger needed to
travel to Saigon to meet with with Nguyen Van Thieu and get his "ok" on the
agreement. The agreement contained several aspects that Theiu thought
unacceptable including no provision to remove NVA forces in SVN. Thieu even
wanted the agreement to include the removal of VC forces from SVN. While Nixon,
Kissenger and Thieu debated and looked at recrafting the agreement, bombing
south of the 20th parallel (on top of NVA forces) continued. Hanoi accused the
U.S. of purposely using the agreement to stall while Saigon regrouped their
ground forces. Meanwhile....back in the U.S. several democratic Senators just
prior to the Thanksgiving break called for a vote on suspending funding for the
war in SE Asia. The idea began to publically be debated and suddenly Hanoi
figured they could get the whole enchillada by *not* signing the agreement and
simply waiting for the U.S. Congress to end the war. So...they announced the
U.S. was stalling, rejected the proposed changes presented by Kissenger and
left. Why did they return? Because the calls in Congress for suspending funding
died down, Nixon bombed them during the Christmas break and no congressmen
publically made a "peep" and because they figured the deal they made in October
was the best they were going to get. Le Duc Tho informed Kissenger on 27
December he was returning to Paris and was ready to sign the original
agreement. Kissenger leaned on Theiu, there was some wording that was changed,
but basically the Peace Accord signed in January 1973 was the one drafted in
October 1972.

I had thought that the last dividing issue was the presence of NVA
troops in South Vietnam, e.g. the "Parrot's Beak". South Vietnam
refused to sign the treaty unless the the NVA troops withdrew and
NV refused to withdraw them. Ulitmately, South Vietnam relented
and the treaty was signed.

For the most part, yes.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

(BUFDRVR) wrote in message ...
Fred the Red Shirt wrote:

So in 1973 did NV abandon an issue they had been holding out for?

Nope.

If not, why'd they walk out?

There walk out was two fold. First off, the agreement and draft were finalized
in mid-October '72 and arrangements made to sign the document "after
consultations". The NVN were immediately ready, however Kissenger needed to
travel to Saigon to meet with with Nguyen Van Thieu and get his "ok" on the
agreement. The agreement contained several aspects that Theiu thought
unacceptable including no provision to remove NVA forces in SVN. Thieu even
wanted the agreement to include the removal of VC forces from SVN. While Nixon,
Kissenger and Thieu debated and looked at recrafting the agreement, bombing
south of the 20th parallel (on top of NVA forces) continued. Hanoi accused the
U.S. of purposely using the agreement to stall while Saigon regrouped their
ground forces. Meanwhile....back in the U.S. several democratic Senators just
prior to the Thanksgiving break called for a vote on suspending funding for the
war in SE Asia. The idea began to publically be debated and suddenly Hanoi
figured they could get the whole enchillada by *not* signing the agreement and
simply waiting for the U.S. Congress to end the war. So...they announced the
U.S. was stalling, rejected the proposed changes presented by Kissenger and
left. Why did they return? Because the calls in Congress for suspending funding
died down, Nixon bombed them during the Christmas break and no congressmen
publically made a "peep" and because they figured the deal they made in October
was the best they were going to get. Le Duc Tho informed Kissenger on 27
December he was returning to Paris and was ready to sign the original
agreement. Kissenger leaned on Theiu, there was some wording that was changed,
but basically the Peace Accord signed in January 1973 was the one drafted in
October 1972.

It would seem that there is no reason to believe the NVN would not
have returned as soon as the SVN agreed to the October, 1972 terms.
IOW, bringing the NVN back to the table by itself accomplished nothing.

Does this not imply that Linebacker II accomplished nothing worthwhile?


I had thought that the last dividing issue was the presence of NVA
troops in South Vietnam, e.g. the "Parrot's Beak". South Vietnam
refused to sign the treaty unless the the NVA troops withdrew and
NV refused to withdraw them. Ulitmately, South Vietnam relented
and the treaty was signed.

For the most part, yes.


--

FF