Co-pilot error caused AA 587 crash

"nobody" wrote in message
...
Stefan wrote:
FBW system, rather the opposite: The pilot had shut down the computers
surveillance system, because the computer wouldn't have allowed him to
fly his dangerous maneuvre!

No, this was a demo of its computer systems capabilities, they woudln't
have
shut it down.

Secondly, the big red button isn't to override the computer, it is the
"override the other pilot" button. (eg: to decide who is controlling the
plane
when both pilots are wanking their joystick at the same time)

Does one button take precedence over the other ie:Pilot vs Co-pilot? What
happens if both are banging on the button simoultanously?

On airbus planes, because they have a joystick with no feedback, one pilot
really deson't feel what the other pilot is trying to do. And one can
override
the other by pressing the button, at which point his joystick takes
control.

When it launched its 777, it was Boeing that bragged about its pilots
being
able to break the flight enveloppe by pulling really hard on the yoke, and
that was marketed as a big advantage over Airbus cockpits where pilots
couldn't break the limits.

Pulling Gs isn't really the issue, it is preventing a stall. And that is
where
the computer is far more accurate than a human and this is where engine
thrust
does not follow immediatly a pilot's command (it takes time for engines to
increase or reduce thrust). You can't start to climb as soon as you raise
engine thrust is your speed is so low that you are borderline stall at
level flight.

Had this been a Boeing plane, the pilot would have heard an alarm and felt
his
yoke vibrate indicating he was about to stall the aircraft, and he then
could
either have continued to try to climb and stall (falling down on trees),
or
tried to level and pickup speed before climbing, giving the same result as
the Airbus.

What is not known about that particular indcident is whether then then
current
software of the A320 would have warned the pilot that his command to climb
could not be executed due to stall conditions, or whether the pilot was
lost
wondering why the plane didn't respond to his command to climb.

The above would make a big difference if the pilot had not yet applied
more
thrust to engines. The stall warning might have triggered an automatic
reflex
by the human pilot to increase thrust. On the other hand, the pilot should
have known that at current very slow airspeed, he could not climb out and
would need to increase thrust.

Translation: Many potential "If's" without answers.
Ralph Nesbitt
Professional FD/CFR/ARFF Type

"Stefan" wrote in message
...
nobody wrote:

No, this was a demo of its computer systems capabilities, they woudln't
have
shut it down.

No. The pilot wanted to display his new toy low and slow to the public.
To achieve this, he ignored even the most basic safety rules and basic
airmanship.

The fact that there is still so much myth with this case was caused by
the French authorities, who handled the accident as a state affair,
because it concerned Airbus. France and Airbus at that time ... a story
for itself. With this behaviour they prepared the ground for many rumors
and deep misbelief in the eventual results of the investigation.

Secondly, the big red button isn't to ...

Obviously you didn't understand me: I wasn't talking of any real button.
I just pointed out that the computer system can be oversteered by the
pilot at any time.

Stefan

Wasn't there a criminal prosecution of the crew that was eventually droped
because it came out there was "Political Pressure" involved to place blame
on the crew instead of the gouvernment for allowing the A/C with guests to
be flown during an airshow demonstration combined with questionable computer
programing by Airbus.
Ralph Nesbitt
Professional FD/CFR/ARFF Type

"nobody" wrote in message
...
Morgans wrote:
Seems to me that Airbus is, if not criminally responsible, morally and
legally responsible.

Then Boeing would also be guilty because the NTSB, very early in the
investigation, found that Boeing planes were also liable to lose tailfin
upon
misused of rudder during flight.

Also early on, it had been revealed that AA stood out amongst all other
airlines with regards to rudder usage while in flight (training issue).
If
the rest of airlines told pilots not to use Rudder to such an extent, then
AA
stands out.

Airbus insists it has sent warnings about misused of rudder while in
flight.
The question is whether a maufacturer (Airbus , Boeing etc) needs to
approve
an airline's training programme for a specific plane. If so, the Airbus
could
be held responsible for not forcing AA to change training to avoid misused
of
Rudder. But if Airbus did not need to approve AA's training programme,
then
why should it be held responsible ?

Seems to me if Airbus or any other manufacturer was aware AA was training
it's pilots to fly/operate its products in a manner it was not engineered to
be operated the manufacturer would be responsible for saying so "LOUD &
CLEAR" in a manner that could not be construed as ambiguous.
Ralph Nesbitt
Professional FD/CFR/ARFF Type

(1aircraftQAguy) wrote in message . com...
Bertie the Bunyip XZXZ@XZXZ.,XZXZX wrote in message .74.13...
Well Fjukwit?

Berti e

Okay,

I'm sorry I spanked you on the A300 rudder limiter issue.

What a BURN!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

1aircraftQAguy wrote:

The A300 is FBW, an Airbus crash in Paris... so much for the educated
infos in this group.

No, the A300 isn't FBW .........

It's a well known fact that readers will detect irony much more seldom
than writers like to use it.

Stefan

Ralph Nesbitt wrote:

Wasn't there a criminal prosecution of the crew that was eventually droped
....

I don't remember anymore. At some point it became difficult to tell
facts from rumour.

Stefan

Yeh...

Painting "OVER" their logo, and the big red letters "Air
Canada" stretching along the length of the fuse...

Like with a roller & house paint! (!)

Obvious and sickening...

Offical press... "It's not our aircraft anymore" (insurance
company owns it...

Yeah... right..

Dave


On Wed, 27 Oct 2004 23:54:57 GMT, devil wrote:

On Wed, 27 Oct 2004 23:53:13 +0000, Dave wrote:

Hence the "skidoo " story, - the track of the A/C was
continuous along the snow...

Add to this some really bonehead PR work by Air Canada..

Oh... thats another story... sorry...

Painting their logo?

Reminded me of a crash in Brazil where they did that too.

Sorry Sylvia,

My bad, I apologise, it was not my intent... I quoted the
article pattern incorrectly.

The actual author of the words was "nobody" (as near as I can
determine). My server is missing a couple of posts in this thread, but
I do not offer that as an excuse..

Sorry...

(Dave hangs head and is shuffling feet)

Please reply so I will know you have seen this....

Dave




On Thu, 28 Oct 2004 09:57:21 +1000, Sylvia Else
wrote:

Dave, please take a bit more care not to make it look as if I said
something that someone else said.

OK...

So according to the TSB report, did the stall occour before
the 1st impact (on the rny and the nose gear failing) or before the
2nd impact after climbing again?

The Emergency crews indicated the next day, and it was still
visible) , the skidoo track was continuous from the rny to the
trees... although the engine thrust could have made the track as
well, it was not as well defined the following day, in daylight....

Although I can stand corrected, as my info is from the guys
on the response crew (known to me) the following day, I have not seen
the whole report...

(Fredericton is my home base airport)

Thanks!


Dave


On Wed, 27 Oct 2004 21:00:13 -0400, nobody wrote:

Dave wrote:
Coming out of a very low (legal) ceiling, the rny was not
directly under the a/c, and the crew tried to correct laterally and
doing so, the decent rate increased. They started the go around to
late, the AC slammed down on the rny hard, the nose gear ripping the
control functions as it rammed vertically up through the floor
above.

The TSB report clearly stated that the pilots initiated a go around WITHOUT
LANDING, with airspeed that would have required landing before speed was high
enough to climb again. Upon starting to climb again, the skidoo did regain
some altitude before stalling, after which it fell to the ground where its
recessive skidoo genes became dominant again.

One problem is that the flight director had not been programmed to handle such
a situation, neither had Bombardier foreseen/simulated situations such as
those. While the FO (PIC) was trying to climb according to normal climb rates
provided by the flight director, the captain did not realise that the newbie
co-pilot wasn't aware of the very low airspeed.

Dave wrote:

Sorry Sylvia,

My bad, I apologise, it was not my intent... I quoted the
article pattern incorrectly.

The actual author of the words was "nobody" (as near as I can
determine). My server is missing a couple of posts in this thread, but
I do not offer that as an excuse..

Sorry...

(Dave hangs head and is shuffling feet)

No worries.

I've done it myself too, to my shame.

Sylvia.