Scared of mid-airs

On 07/31/06 11:08, Ed Rasimus wrote:
On Mon, 31 Jul 2006 17:39:09 GMT, Orval Fairbairn
wrote:

In article ,
588 wrote:

Orval al wrote:
In article ,
Ed Rasimus wrote:

(snip)
Or, conversely the numbers of deaths of military pilots due to
mid-airs with GA pilots operating cluelessly in restricted, warning,
prohibited airspace, MOAs and oil burner routes. It's a two-edged
sword, Larry.

IIRC, Ed, only in prohibited airspace can a mil pilot not expect to
encounter a civil VFR.

That is what we have restricted areas for -- not to be done in congested
airspace.


Which is it, Orv?


Both restricted and prohibited airspace are "sterile." Actually,
military aircraft also should not be in *prohibited* airspace, OTW, it
is *restricted* airspace.

MOAs, Warning areas and Oil Burner routes are joint use, so we can
expect anybody to be there legally.

MOAs typically are at altitudes that place them in positive control
airspace. ATC will not provide clearance for GA aircraft through a MOA
that is in use by the military. MOAs that include airspace below
positive control can have VFR aircraft in transit. We used to get them
all the time in the Beak and Talon MOAs east of Holloman.

However, any airspace that permits VFR flight can have aircraft
transitting without ATC clearance in VMC. Aircraft operating under VFR
in VMC are responsible for their own clearance of their flight route.


Actually, *all* aircraft flying in VMC are responsible for "See and Avoid".
This includes aircraft operating under IFR.




Ed Rasimus


--
Mark Hansen, PP-ASEL, Instrument Airplane
Cal Aggie Flying Farmers
Sacramento, CA

On Mon, 31 Jul 2006 12:05:18 -0700, Mark Hansen
wrote:

On 07/31/06 11:08, Ed Rasimus wrote:

However, any airspace that permits VFR flight can have aircraft
transitting without ATC clearance in VMC. Aircraft operating under VFR
in VMC are responsible for their own clearance of their flight route.


Actually, *all* aircraft flying in VMC are responsible for "See and Avoid".
This includes aircraft operating under IFR.


Very true. The caution we used to spend a lot of time impressing on
UPT students in the USAF was the idea that just because you are on an
IFR clearance is NO GUARANTEE that you are going to be provided safe
separation from traffic. Your clearance only clears you from other IFR
aircraft and then only when in controlled airspace. The VFR guy can
run into you at his own whim.

But, the point that we are beating here is that see-and-avoid is the
basic responsibility of all players all of the time. High speed
aircraft have high agility, low speed aircraft have lots of time to
look, but regardless of your speed you keep the front of your airplane
cleared using all of the tools available to you.

I had to dig up this old RAF Air Marshall quote: "Aviation in itself
is not inherently dangerous but like the sea, is terribly unforgiving
of any carelessness, incapacity or neglect."

We had it on the wall in pilot training years ago. I've also seen it
in 'chute shops over the door where you head out to the airplanes. And
in USAF Flying Safety Offices.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

Larry Dighera wrote:
On 31 Jul 2006 09:04:43 -0700, "

As someone vastly more familiar with this issue than I, can you
suggest the appropriate military people (or specific agency and
division) to contact about resolving some of the safety issues you
raised?

You would have to study the entire legal environment of military
operations in US airspace to understand how it works. You need to read
the law, understand how it is applied via regulations and by other
means, and you need to get copies of all of the Letters of Agreement
between the FAA, DOD, and other agencies as to who is allowed to use
what airspace when and who has responsibilities for controlling it.
Only then will you get an idea of who is responsible for what, and at
that time you will find out if you have legal recourse. You will also
need to hunt down all applicable military regulations, SOPs, board
findings, documents, message traffic, etc if you are researching any
specific accident.

Basically you need deep pockets and an attorney who has a deep
background in aviation law and airspace usage. Approaching things from
the standpoint of state law probably won't help.


Or (in your opinion) is it futile to expect to get something
meaningful accomplished with involving my congressional
representatives?

Even with congressional help it will be a long uphill battle to get
anything changed in how US airspace is utilized. Even the NTSB can't
make the FAA change, and DOD has a strong pull when it comes to
airspace matters.


John Hairell )

Orval Fairbairn wrote:
In article ,
588 wrote:

Both restricted and prohibited airspace are "sterile." Actually,
military aircraft also should not be in *prohibited* airspace, OTW, it
is *restricted* airspace.

Legally, restricted and prohibited airspace are not the same things.
Both are examples of special use airspace, and are regulatory in
nature. There shouldn't be any aircraft operating in prohibited
airspace unless they have authorization from the using agency, be they
government or civilian. There can be all sorts of aircraft operating
in restricted airspace, even civilian ones with authorization. You may
also find artillery shells and anti-aircraft missiles in restricted
airspace, amongst many other aerial hazards. Legally I don't think
there's any such thing as "sterile" airspace. For every type of
airspace prohibition there's an exception that allows somebody to
operate there.


MOAs, Warning areas and Oil Burner routes are joint use, so we can
expect anybody to be there legally.

From AIM 3-4-5:

"a. MOAs consist of airspace of defined vertical and lateral limits
established for the purpose of separating certain military training
activities from IFR traffic. Whenever a MOA is being used,
nonparticipating IFR traffic may be cleared through a MOA if IFR
separation can be provided by ATC. Otherwise, ATC will reroute or
restrict nonparticipating IFR traffic."

Note the emphasis on separating military activities from IFR traffic,
not VFR traffic.

Note also that MARSA may be in use on low level training routes and
MOAs and that a military controlling facility that may be using MARSA
may not be able to communicate with civilian aircraft. Also there are
both IFR and VFR low level training routes and procedures differ for
each.


John Hairell )

On Mon, 31 Jul 2006 19:49:59 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote in
::

But, the point that we are beating here is that see-and-avoid is the
basic responsibility of all players all of the time.

That is true with the obvious exception of operations in IMC.

High speed aircraft have high agility, low speed aircraft have lots of time to
look,

Low-speed aircraft have the same amount of time to spot a high-speed
aircraft before colliding with it as the high-speed aircraft has: the
amount of time it takes for the two aircraft to reach each other.
Pilots of high-speed aircraft must look much farther ahead than pilots
of low-speed aircraft..

but regardless of your speed you keep the front of your airplane
cleared using all of the tools available to you.

High-speed aircraft need only scan a much smaller angle of airspace in
front of them than slow speed aircraft.

Ed Rasimus wrote:

[stuff snipped]


MOAs typically are at altitudes that place them in positive control
airspace. ATC will not provide clearance for GA aircraft through a MOA
that is in use by the military.


GA IFR or GA VFR?

AIM 3-4-5:

"a. MOAs consist of airspace of defined vertical and lateral limits
established for the purpose of separating certain military training
activities from IFR traffic. Whenever a MOA is being used,
nonparticipating IFR traffic may be cleared through a MOA if IFR
separation can be provided by ATC. Otherwise, ATC will reroute or
restrict nonparticipating IFR traffic."

"c. Pilots operating under VFR should exercise extreme caution while
flying within a MOA when military activity is being conducted. The
activity status (active/inactive) of MOAs may change frequently.
Therefore, pilots should contact any FSS within 100 miles of the area
to obtain accurate real-time information concerning the MOA hours of
operation. Prior to entering an active MOA, pilots should contact the
controlling agency for traffic advisories."

FAA 7400.8M subpart B:

"A Military Operations Area (MOA) is airspace established outside
positive control area
to separate/segragate certain nonhazardous military activities from IFR
traffic and to identify for VFR traffic where these activities are
conducted."

[rest snipped]

John Hairell )

On 31 Jul 2006 13:28:31 -0700, "
wrote in
.com::

Note also that MARSA may be in use on low level training routes and
MOAs and that a military controlling facility that may be using MARSA
may not be able to communicate with civilian aircraft.

In those cases where they are unable to communicate with civilian
aircraft, how does the military assume responsibility for separation
of aircraft? Do they relay communications through FAA ATC?

Also there are both IFR and VFR low level training routes and procedures
differ for each.

I presume, no separation is provided for flights on low-level IFR
MTRs, while it is provided, or the military takes responsibility for
separation, on IFR MTRs.

On Mon, 31 Jul 2006 07:59:18 -0600, "Jeff Crowell"
wrote in ::

Larry Dighera wrote:
I would have to see examples of hyperbole to be able to find facts
that support those statements.

also Larry Dighera:
You've got to agree, that rocketing through congested
terminal airspace at 500 knots without the required ATC clearance,

If you speak here of the Florida mishap, there's your example--
the CLOSURE rate was near 500 knots, but not the speed of
the USAF aircraft.

Just to assure that we are all both aware, the definition of
'hyperbole' is: extravagant exaggeration.


The USAF Accident Investigation Board's report:

1. "Based on their closure rate of approximately 480 knots," ...

2. "Speeds of up to 450 knots were noted during the
descent."

Based on 1 above, you are the one who has exaggerated the closing
speed by 20 knots, but we are both human after all.

Based on 2 above, I am guilty of exaggerating the top speed the Ninja
flight reached by 50 knots. I don't classify ~11% as _extravagant_
exaggeration; rather it is my poor recollection of an event that
occurred nearly six years ago. In any event, I apologize for my
error, but I do not see how it may have affected the conclusions I
reached.

And since he was not aware that he was in terminal airspace
(per a cite you named), there's a deliberate misstatement
to boot.

The USAF Accident Investigation Board's report:

"Ninja flight’s mistake was in transitioning to the tactical
portion of their flight too early, unaware that they were in
controlled airspace."

That was President, Accident Investigation Board Robin E. Scott's
opinion. It is not fact.

Despite the fact that Parker failed to brief terminal airspace prior
to the flight as regulations require, I personally find it difficult,
if not impossible, to believe Parker was unaware, that the 60 mile
diameter Tampa Class B terminal airspace lay below him at the time he
chose to descend below 10,000' into it.

Immediately prior to that descent, he was attempting to contact ATC
for clearance to enter Tampa Class B airspace, but failed to make
contact, so he continued his descent into Tampa Class B airspace. If
he were unaware he was over the 60 mile diameter terminal airspace,
what reason would he have had to contact Tampa Approach? Surely
Parker could see the busy international airport below him. So, while
my statement is at odds with the AIB report, I believe it is more
accurate.

If you disagree, I welcome your explanation of how a competent pilot
can possibly be unaware of a 60 mile wide swath of congested terminal
airspace (and that doesn't even include the Class C to the south of
the Class B) that is located immediately north of the MTR start point.


I am unable to find any reasonable excuse for what Parker did. It was
a clear day. He was descending into Class B airspace, canceled IFR,
and dove his flight of two into the terminal airspace at twice the
speed limit imposed on all other aircraft in that airspace without ATC
clearance. He may have lost situational awareness, but I find it
impossible to believe he didn't know that continuing his descent would
put him within Class B airspace without a clearance and without
communications with ATC. That's against regulations.

His nav system position error was sufficient that he was not
aware he was entering terminal airspace.

The USAF Accident Investigation Board's report:

"The error was such that following INS steering to a selected
point would place the aircraft 9-11 NM south of the desired
location"

In other words, Parker's INS steering erroneously lead him to believe
he was located 9-11 miles north of his true position, because his
flight was southbound at the time. That means, that Parker could not
have thought he had past terminal airspace, and the AIB report
indicates that he believed he was approaching the MTR start point
prior to his descent below 10,000'. The error works against the
theory that it excuses Parker's decisions.

What about that do you not understand?

You need to re-read that portion of the AIB report dealing with the
INS error that miraculously occurred immediately before his descent.
There was no error earlier in his flight. Read the report, and cite
the portion that contradicts my analysis, if you don't concur.

Or do you simply refuse to believe it because it isn't convenient?

I refuse to believe your analysis of the effect Parker's INS error
had, because it isn't logical. You need to take the time to
OBJECTIVELY re-analyze that portion of the AIB report.

Per the F-16 Dash 1 he was allowed to be at 350 knots at
that altitude, and was traveling only slightly faster at the time
of the collision. What about that statement (from the
accident investigation) do you not understand?

Jeff, I understand that 450 knots within congested terminal airspace
is about one third faster than the 350 knot speed limit you state
above. One third is not 'slightly faster'. It is _significantly_
faster. (The 450 knot figure is quoted from the AIB report at the
beginning of this follow up article.) Perhaps you can provide the
reasoning you used in arriving at your conclusion.

Incidentally, what is the 'F-16 Dash 1'? Is it the aircraft operation
manual, that provides information regarding minimum speeds for various
flight regimes?

Just a question for a fighter pilot, what amount of fuel in
minutes is normally on board when you begin a terminal
penetration? If you have good position and radio contact,
how long does it take to get a tanker hook-up?

Since 9/11, how much fighter cover traffic is in civil
airspace that wasn't there before?[general terms, nothing
classified]

If ATC is slow with a clearance, are you expected to punch
out?



"Larry Dighera" wrote in message
...
| On Mon, 31 Jul 2006 07:59:18 -0600, "Jeff Crowell"
| wrote in
::
|
| Larry Dighera wrote:
| I would have to see examples of hyperbole to be able to
find facts
| that support those statements.
|
| also Larry Dighera:
| You've got to agree, that rocketing through congested
| terminal airspace at 500 knots without the required
ATC clearance,
|
| If you speak here of the Florida mishap, there's your
example--
| the CLOSURE rate was near 500 knots, but not the speed of
| the USAF aircraft.
|
| Just to assure that we are all both aware, the definition
of
| 'hyperbole' is: extravagant exaggeration.
|
|
| The USAF Accident Investigation Board's report:
|
| 1. "Based on their closure rate of approximately 480
knots," ...
|
| 2. "Speeds of up to 450 knots were noted during the
| descent."
|
| Based on 1 above, you are the one who has exaggerated the
closing
| speed by 20 knots, but we are both human after all.
|
| Based on 2 above, I am guilty of exaggerating the top
speed the Ninja
| flight reached by 50 knots. I don't classify ~11% as
_extravagant_
| exaggeration; rather it is my poor recollection of an
event that
| occurred nearly six years ago. In any event, I apologize
for my
| error, but I do not see how it may have affected the
conclusions I
| reached.
|
| And since he was not aware that he was in terminal
airspace
| (per a cite you named), there's a deliberate misstatement
| to boot.
|
| The USAF Accident Investigation Board's report:
|
| "Ninja flight's mistake was in transitioning to the
tactical
| portion of their flight too early, unaware that they
were in
| controlled airspace."
|
| That was President, Accident Investigation Board Robin E.
Scott's
| opinion. It is not fact.
|
| Despite the fact that Parker failed to brief terminal
airspace prior
| to the flight as regulations require, I personally find it
difficult,
| if not impossible, to believe Parker was unaware, that the
60 mile
| diameter Tampa Class B terminal airspace lay below him at
the time he
| chose to descend below 10,000' into it.
|
| Immediately prior to that descent, he was attempting to
contact ATC
| for clearance to enter Tampa Class B airspace, but failed
to make
| contact, so he continued his descent into Tampa Class B
airspace. If
| he were unaware he was over the 60 mile diameter terminal
airspace,
| what reason would he have had to contact Tampa Approach?
Surely
| Parker could see the busy international airport below him.
So, while
| my statement is at odds with the AIB report, I believe it
is more
| accurate.
|
| If you disagree, I welcome your explanation of how a
competent pilot
| can possibly be unaware of a 60 mile wide swath of
congested terminal
| airspace (and that doesn't even include the Class C to the
south of
| the Class B) that is located immediately north of the MTR
start point.
|
|
| I am unable to find any reasonable excuse for what
Parker did. It was
| a clear day. He was descending into Class B airspace,
canceled IFR,
| and dove his flight of two into the terminal airspace
at twice the
| speed limit imposed on all other aircraft in that
airspace without ATC
| clearance. He may have lost situational awareness, but
I find it
| impossible to believe he didn't know that continuing
his descent would
| put him within Class B airspace without a clearance and
without
| communications with ATC. That's against regulations.
|
| His nav system position error was sufficient that he was
not
| aware he was entering terminal airspace.
|
| The USAF Accident Investigation Board's report:
|
| "The error was such that following INS steering to a
selected
| point would place the aircraft 9-11 NM south of the
desired
| location"
|
| In other words, Parker's INS steering erroneously lead him
to believe
| he was located 9-11 miles north of his true position,
because his
| flight was southbound at the time. That means, that
Parker could not
| have thought he had past terminal airspace, and the AIB
report
| indicates that he believed he was approaching the MTR
start point
| prior to his descent below 10,000'. The error works
against the
| theory that it excuses Parker's decisions.
|
| What about that do you not understand?
|
| You need to re-read that portion of the AIB report dealing
with the
| INS error that miraculously occurred immediately before
his descent.
| There was no error earlier in his flight. Read the
report, and cite
| the portion that contradicts my analysis, if you don't
concur.
|
| Or do you simply refuse to believe it because it isn't
convenient?
|
| I refuse to believe your analysis of the effect Parker's
INS error
| had, because it isn't logical. You need to take the time
to
| OBJECTIVELY re-analyze that portion of the AIB report.
|
| Per the F-16 Dash 1 he was allowed to be at 350 knots at
| that altitude, and was traveling only slightly faster at
the time
| of the collision. What about that statement (from the
| accident investigation) do you not understand?
|
| Jeff, I understand that 450 knots within congested
terminal airspace
| is about one third faster than the 350 knot speed limit
you state
| above. One third is not 'slightly faster'. It is
_significantly_
| faster. (The 450 knot figure is quoted from the AIB
report at the
| beginning of this follow up article.) Perhaps you can
provide the
| reasoning you used in arriving at your conclusion.
|
| Incidentally, what is the 'F-16 Dash 1'? Is it the
aircraft operation
| manual, that provides information regarding minimum speeds
for various
| flight regimes?
|

Orval Fairbairn wrote:

Er... what do you mean by "keep a lookout for traffic under IFR"?
Lookout on the radar, surely??

Ramapriya

No -- look out the damned windshield! You can be on a IFR flight plan in
"severe clear" conditions.


Point taken, thanks. The mistake I made was in thinking that IFR = fly
by instruments, with no visibility outside. I know now that that's IMC,
not IFR

Ramapriya