French block airlift of British troops to Basra

"Stephen Harding" wrote in message
...

Just like both sides of the
English civil war never doubted they were British.

I would doubt that any of them, with the possible exception of the king,
considered themselves anything but English, Scottish or Irish.

The idea of 'Britain' as a nation wasn't actually around to any extent then.

--
William Black
------------------
On time, on budget, or works;
Pick any two from three

(The Revolution Will Not Be Televised) wrote in message ...

Strange how after they evacuated Boston in March 1776 (less than a
year after Lexington & Concord) they never came back,
and how Howe and
Burgoyne's operations thereafter concentrated on New York, then
Philadelphia. For one who likes to cast aspersions on the knowledge
of others, you don't seem too clued-up yourself.

Another poor ignorant soul in the need for elucidation I see. g
Apologies in advance for what is going to be a rather long post.

The origins of British strategy date back to the summer of 1775
(prior to that they did not have one), when Bill Legge, a.k.a. 2nd
Earl of Dartmouth and Secretary of American Affairs in the Colonial
Office had some discussions with some folks knowledgable (or more
correctly with folks who thought themselves knowledgeable) of affairs
in America. After which, he came up with his grand plan of campaign.
Writing to Thomas Gage about it in August, he suggested that two
armies ought to be assembled. One in Boston, which was to be
reinforced, and the other, and Main, to occupy New York City, which
was to be a piece of cake since it was loyal. The idea then would be
for an advance out of NYC into New England while the other advanced
out of Boston. However, Gage, quite to the reliefe of the North
ministry, then resigned allowing North's hand picked man, William
Howe, to take command. Unfortunately, this precipated a crisis in
command, because Howe was junior to then governor of Canada, General
Guy Carleton who the Cabinet felt (wrongly IMHO) was indespensible in
keeping Canada loyal to the Crown. Carleton would surely resign if
forced to serve under a junior. So the Solomaic decision was reached
to divide the command in North America with Carleton retaining
independent command in Canada, and Howe commanding everything else.
At the time, September of 1775, no trouble was foreseen, because
Canada was never meant to be an active theater.
Upon his confirmation as Commander in Chief in North America (less
Canada-for which read Quebec), Howe requested an alteration to the
strategy laid out by Dartmouth. Howe wanted nothing to do with any
advance out of Boston and the neccessary frontal assaults against what
by then would be a years worth of American fortifications. Note it
was he was on scene commander at Breed's Hill which was the bloodiest
battle of the war for the British in both real terms and in ratio (50
percent casualties). He also did not like the idea of two widely
seperated armies attempting to act in unison with such long external
lines of communication as to be virtually independent. Instead he
suggested removing the army from Boston and landing it in Rhode
Island. That would still serve as a diversion for the main landing at
New York (and thus dividing the American defense) while still being
near enough for each army to cover the other.
Alas, a serious wrinkle had begun even before the ink was ever put to
paper. Back in June, Congress had taken up the issue of "invading"
Canada. The primary purpose was to divert British troops from Boston
to its protection in order for the siege of the latter to be
accomplished more readily. Secondary to this was the "need" to
liberate Canada from British rule, and essentially drive the British
clear off the continent. However, there were qualms about making an
unwanted incursion into a fellow colony, and Congress mandated that
Canadian opinion first be ascertained. The results of these inquiries
were mixed, but generally considered favorable. Generally the reports
were accurate enough in that the bulk of the population of Canada did
wish to boot the British out (they were after all French who mostly
had no love of the Anglos), but the clergy was another matter, and
this made the commander of the New York Department (later Northern
Department), Philip Schuyler whose task it was to carry out the
invasion, a bit wary, but Congress was convinced the clergy would be
less an issue, and while it is (highly) debatable, in the end they may
have been more or less right. At any rate, after an inauspicious
beginning, Schuyler was relieved of the responsibility of commanding
the forces in Canada which was handed over to BG Richard Montgomery,
who with a great deal of energy and enthusiasm (and competance)
undertook the invasion and with one Col. Benedict Arnold commanding an
expedition through Maine, rather easily drove the British out of most
of the populated sections of Canada and besieged Quebec City proper,
and there it all began to go wrong for the British.
When news reached London of Canada's apparent imminent demise, there
was a lot of hand wringing and cursing of Carleton's name and his
incompetance for allowing the Americans so much success. To be fair
to GC, he did only have two very understrength regiments for the
defense of all of Canada, which were much inferior in numbers to the
American forces. It is noteworthy to mention also that few Canadians
rallied to the British cause complicating Carleton's defense. In
fact, a number were enlisting in the Colonial (it was not yet
American) army. Back in London, panic struck, the new Secretary of
American Affairs, Lord George Germain (nee Sackville of
busted-for-cowardice-and-disobedience-of-orders-at-Minden-infame and
who replaced the all-too-friendly-to-Americans Dartmouth in November)
began redirecting a considerable force from Howe to Canada. At the
same time, he diverted another, albight smaller, force from Howe for
the intended occupation of Charleston because of Southern governors'
screams for actions for protection. British officialdom missed the
boat twice. The first clue that the rebellion was not centered in New
England was the invasion of Canada. It being obvious that the army
which did so was not composed of New Englanders (other than a few from
New Hampshire). The second was the need for the diversion (roughly a
reinforced brigade) of troops to the South. The waning forturnes of
Lord Dunmore, now ex(iled) governor of Virginia, ought to have been a
third. However *in spite of* these very obvious and omminous signs,
Germain (a rather clueless lout-British condemnations tending to be
stronger) and even Howe (at that time) behaved as if they were
inconsequential bumps in the road and still believed, as did it near
everyone else (save Carleton who damned the Canadians up and down his
letters official or no). Oh, Howe was miffed to lose five or six
thousand men, and it vastly altered his campaign as now there were too
few troops to form a second army for Rhode Island, though the latter
still remained an objective.
As mentioned, Howe pulled out (precipitacely) in March of '76 after
Henry Knox had drug some former British heavy artillery from
Ticonderoga to the heights overlooking the RN's anchorages in Boston
Harbor. Howe was to have pulled out before the onset of winter, but
had decided, for reasons that are really not clear, to remain, and
I've a sneaking suspicion that he had intended on keeping a garrison
in Boston despite the plan not too. We'll never know, though. At any
rate, Howe went to Halifax for a while to await his reinforcements and
an improvement in his logistics. Meanwhile o'er in Canada, things
began to look up for British fortunes. An attempt to the take the
city by storm on New Years Eve was easily squashed, and most
importantly Montgomery was killed and Arnold wounded. The Canadian
Army, as the United Colonies army was stiled, began to disintegrate.
Namely because the 9 month enlistment period was up. Like Washington
before Boston, the "American" armies had to disband and be rerecruited
at the same time. Luckily, for Washington et all, the British were
too weak everywhere to do much about it. But the situation in Canada
went to the pot real quickly. Washington had a fine head for
organization, and more importantly literally sat on his logistical
base. Canada was now under the ineffectual command of David Wooster
who was little animated, not overly clever, was in a secondary theater
with secondary priorities in a poor province (not a single head of
beef existed anywhere in Canada), and far from his logistical base. A
two man committee sent to Canada to check on things by Congress
convinced Wooster to step aside, and MG John Thomas arrived at the
beginning of May to take his place. Thomas decided, in a council of
war, to abandon the siege and retreat further up Canada, but then the
first ships carrying a regiment detached from Howe at Halifax began
arriving, and Carleton sortied with a couple of companies of his
remaining regulars, and drove in the American pickets. So ended the
"Battle" of Quebec. It did serve, however, to panick Thomas who then
ordered a wholesale withdrawal to Trois Riviers (such a maneuver
would receive a new name during the Korean War). Once arrived,
Thomas said this place sucks too, and fell back on Sorrel. There he
met 3,000 new reinforcements from New England under BG John Thompson.
These fine fellows brought Smallpox with them, and so some of the
regimental commanders began innoculating their regiments thus
rendering them hors-de-combat for the next month or so. Thomas
promptly put a stop to that little bit of non-sense, and then just as
promptly caught smallpox himself and died. Meanwhile the
really-big-British-reinforcement under Gentleman Johnny Burgoyne began
to arrive about Quebec and moved further upstream to the Sorrel (or
Richelieu). Also arriving was John Sullivan with 5,000 fresh
"Continentals" which were cheered by the locals upon their arrival.
Sullivan and Thompson decided to retake Trois Riviers in order to turn
it around, but it went for nought, and the local militia that had been
on "our side" turned coat, now that they were certain the U.C. were
leaving Canada, and turned Thompson over to the British. Sullivan did
not panic though, and took his sweet time in withdrawing making
certain that all his stores, heavy equipment, and sick were safely
away before retiring. That took about a month. Carleton did not
interfere, and let Sullivan go unmolested though the latter was
severly out numbered. Though the "American" army nominally was the
same strength as the British (about 8~9,000 men) smallpox had crippled
it, and in the week after TR it numbered less than 1,500 fit for duty.
This led to new round of condemnations about Carleton in London. The
reason for his inactivity has never been made clear, but I suspect it
was to keep his men well away from Sullivan's pocky troops. Anyways,
I digress.
Coming back somewhat on topic, back at the end of March when that
Committee of Congress (i.e. Maryland delegate Samuel Chase and fellow
Marylander, but not yet delegate, Charles Carrol of Carrolton-who was
Catholic and why he was a member of the committee) recommended
Wooster's replacement, they also recommended that a flotilla of
warships be constructed on Lake Champlain (which is not, as Sen. Leahy
attempted to us convince, one of the Great Lakes). That mission fell
to B. Arnold of sulking-in-Montreal-
and-generally-hating-Wooster's-guts fame. Ooh, good move on Chase's
part, because now Carleton could not move south to crush to the now
renamed Northern Army (and now under the command of one Horatio
"Not-at-the-bridge-but-Granny" Gates-whose command was also
recommended by Chase) until he built himself some boats with guns, and
so away at it through the summer he went. [Meanwhile Chase returned
to Congress, voted for Independence, and damn near got into a fist
fight with one John Adams on said floor of said Congress over some
on-the-record comments Chase made about the sorry-excuse-for-soldiers
that were New Englanders. Sullivan went home, well to Philadelphia,
also screaming his head off at being replaced by a junior, for which
he was awarded a major generalship and command of a division in the
Main Army at New York, where he was promptly captured at the Battle of
Long Island. What happened to Wooster you ask? He went home to
Connecticut, and was killed at the Battle of Compo Hill where he and
Arnold (and a few recruits and some militia) badly molested a British
raiding force under former Gov of NY, George Tryon, who had just
torched Danbury CT.]
Ok, where were we in our story? Oh yes. Well, Howe finally had
gotten underway and landed on Staten Island in July of '76 just in
time to be greated with news of the Declaration of Independence. This
does not seem to have dampened his spirits much, after all, according
to him (and every other British journalist I have ever read) most of
the colonists, especially in New York, were still loyal! So, as peace
commissioner (his big bro Admiral Lord Richard "Black Dick" Howe was
boss commissioner] settled down snug as a bug in Lizzy Loring's. . .
er, on Staten Island, and attempted to negotiate a settlement, and to
await more reinforcements (another division of Hessians was due any
day now). Well, the Hessians finally arrived in August, and Howe was
pretty miffed that he did not get much of a response to his
negotiatin' so he landed his troops on Long Island, routed the
American (note no more quotes) covering forces on the Guanus Heights,
captured, according to him, 1,000 men and John Sullivan, and settled
in for another round of negotiatin'. This time sending Sullivan back
to Congress which august body then sent a mismatched Delegation of
John "we New Englanders is superior" Adams and Ben "Where be the
ladies" Franklin who both essentially told Howe to bugger off with his
schemes of reconcilliation. Howe then decided it was time for another
crack-o-the-whip, and landed on Manhattan at Kip's Bay (a "battle"
left unmentioned in American military annals especially by those who
thought the militia were so great), occupied NYC (then southern tip of
Manhattan) and decided to go over Congress' head, and appeal directly
to the people. What of Carleton? He was still playing at Samuel
Pepys at Isle aux Nois.
After a month of no response, Howe landed his forces on the mainland
of New York and after two week at "oops, we landed at the wrong
place" Throg's Neck, relanded at Pell's point, and allowed, mainly
through inaction, Washington to slip away at White Plains. But n'er
feer the colonists were still mostly loyal! By now, only Fort
Washington had to be dealt with in order to secure New York City,
which it was in short order. Howe then sent a now throughly
disgruntled second in command, i.e. Henry
"But-if-you-only-followed-MY-plan" Clinton to occupy Rhode Island as
required by "The Plan." Clinton did so easily and quite literrally.
He occupied Rhode *Island*, but he was supposed to capture the
mainland capitol of Providence, but. . .well, after Howe hinted at his
displeasure, Clinton went AWOL and returned to "Blighty" muttering
nasty utterances about Howe all the way across the 'Lantic.
Carleton, though, had finally put his ship together, and had stole
down into Lake Champlain, beat the snot out of Arnold and his
land-lubbing army sailors at Valcour Bay, then withdrew back into
Canada because it was too late in the season to capture Ticonderoga
and secure Canada from invasion. That sent the folks in London, led
by Germain, into a frenzy of Carleton damnations, and Lord George, who
you will remember refused a direct order to attack a realling and
routed French army at the Battle of Minden and thus insuring its
escape, made no secret of his displeasure in a nasty [for that era]
letter or two to Carleton, who good King George who did not desire to
lose Carleton, or suffer the embarrassment of his resignation, forced
to retract and apologize with a big fat kiss. Oh Clinton in
Charleston? Why further embarass our British friends with a
discussion of *that* debacle. [Though it would be very on topic for
SMN].
At this point, Washington f**ed the British Plan over again. He did
the unthinkable. Withdrew into New Jersey. Howe dispatched
Cornwallis after him, but halted the latter at Brunswick. Afterall,
it was not in the plan, and so there was no reason to go further.
Washington used the respite to scadaddle across the Delaware, which
despite Clinton's belief to the contrary, was not fordable. At the
same time, a bit of good luck, for the American cause, occurred. An
enterprising cavalry officer by name of Harcourt captured MG Charles
Lee in a inn where he had been a-fornicating away from his command
[Lee was exchanged for MG Richard Prescott who was captured on Rhode
Island in 1777 while a-fornicatin' away from his command].
Several things now more or less occur at once. Howe sends his first
plan of operations for 1777 with a request for 15,000 additional
troops. Shortly thereafter, an aide arrived back from England with
news that he was unlikely to be reinforced for the upcoming campaign.
About that time Howe, at the advice of Cornwallis, and under pressure
from all those loyal citizens, occupied all of New Jersey. At the
same time, Burgoyne was arriving in London having been sent home by
his boss, Carleton, with their own plan for 1777. Howe's original
plan called for the forming of *three* armies. The two "old" armies
of the previous strategy. That is one up the Hudson and east into New
England, the other at Rhode Island, and the third to be formed in New
Jersey to "Faint" against Philadelphia to keep Washington busy. In
addition, troops were needed to garrison New York. Apparently, Howe
had some notion of using the Canadian Army, and his aid apparently
floated this idea as as a trial balloon when he was in London in
October, but that idea was quickly popped. Burgoyne also suggested
(though he did not really mean it) to Germain to bring the army to
New York by sea, but was told that was not possible. Ostensibly
because the required shipping did not exist. That was not all the bad
news that Cuyler brought back with him from London. The reason for no
new reinforcements were simple. Britain was in the grip of a war
scare with regards to France (and to a lesser extant Spain as Portugal
was making noises to Spain about reperations over some late war in
South America), and everything was being concentrated on the Navy.
Early in 1776, several incidents had occurred in the Caribbean with
British warships halting and boarding French merchies in search of
"contraband." Needless to say, that irked the French, and it was
decided to ready a squadron of ships (about six ships of the line and
four frigates) to make a "show of force'" cruise in the Caribbean.
Well, British intelligence, which generally was quite good where
matters French were concerned, soon got wind of the French
preparations, but initially overestimated it (eighteen S-O-L vice
actually five preparing at Brest e.g.), and the First Lord of the
Admiralty, John Montagu Fourth Earl of Sandwich, p***ed his pants, and
began to dog and stalk Freddie North whereever he went badgering him
for an increase in naval funds and an increase in ships. Finally,
after a month and a half, North caved, and an expansion of the RN was
begun. Of course, the French intelligence services, which was every
bit as good as that of the British, soon found out, and after a bit of
head scratching to figure out what John Bull was up to concluded that
they were possibly preparing for war, so began to put their Navy into
shape. Which of course was picked up by British intel and Sandwich of
course s**t his pants, panicked, and seeing he could not budge North
any more stomped all over his head on the way to good King George, and
while at the same time denying in Parliament there was anything to
worry about, and began a general press of seamen all across Britain
(which led to cracked sculls, one RN LT visiting Davy Jones (seems the
sailors of ye olde East India Company did not like the idea of serving
in his majesty's navy), and the threat of imprisonment of Naval
personal by the Lord Mayor of London. North, now fully "converted"
to Sandwich's cause pushed through the next year's estimates granting
a 1 million pound increase in the RN's budget (from 3 to 4 million),
but which left less than a three hundred thousand increase (from 3.1
to 3.4 million) for the Army and the war in America. Howe's request
for 15,000 men alone would have run nearly half a million pounds.
FWIW, nobody in London, neither Germain nor Sandwich ever bothered to
inform the Howe's of the worsening (as they perceived it) relations
with France.
While Howe was dismayed over the least prospects of getting a
reinforcement he was not overly so. The occupation of New Jersey (or
more correctly northern and central) went without a hitch save for the
fact that Washington had all the boats on the delaware removed to the
Pennsylvania shore. As there was no way across until he built some,
and it was deep into December, Howe called off ops for the season.
But made plans, sans reinforcements, of taking Philly in the spring.
After all, look at all those loyalists which his loyalist pals
(primarily Joseph "I-could-never-not-tell-a-lie") told him that
existed. New Jersey was full of loyalists too. Just look at all
those good folk taking the oath of allegiance (and were awarded with
large scale looting and rapine by British forces who, of course,
blamed it all on the Germans). At any rate, Howe's new plan called
for the early crossing and taking of Philadelphia and then moving
North to meet the Canadian (British) Army no doubt that will be coming
south down the (mainly loyal) Hudson. Another campaign (i.e.1778)
would be required for the reduction of New England and the end of the
rebellion. Five days after he wrote that dispatch to Germain,
Washington crossed the Delaware, inflicted nearly 1,500 casualties and
prisoners on the British and maneuvered Howe/Cornwallis out off all of
New Jersey save for the Brunswick-Perth Amboy region. It was at that
point that Howe realized that any victory first required the defeat of
the Continental Main Army, and where Howe finally abandoned the
original New England First strategy once and for all. So he decided
upon Philadelphia as a ruse to lure Washington out in the open to be
crushed by Howe.
Burgoyne arrived with Carleton's modifications of the original
strategy (the modifications being the army based in Canada).
Basically, it called for one or two objectives. One, to pass the
lakes and head for Albany and from there co-operate with Howe against
New England, and the other, to pass the lakes but turn into New
England by way of the Connecticut River. Certainly the latter would
keep the army independent under Carleton. However, this was the end
of '76 and early '77, and feeligs were quite against Carleton and
there was no way Germain (or George III) were about to allow him to
command in the field again, so that was vetoed. Burgoyne picking up
on the anti-Carleton sentiments quickly angled himself the job, to the
point of convincing the "jury" that it was his plan when in reality it
was Carleton's. It also provided Germain with the ideal way of
getting the army from under Carleton's foot and to Howe's. So the
orders were drawn up, for all intents and purposes written by
Burgoyne, for Burgoyne to take the army in Canada (less detachements
left for Canada's defense) to Albany and there "place himself under
General Howe's command." St Leger was to act as a diversion on the
Mohawk, but otherwise go to Albany and put himself under Burgoyne.
Contrary to popular belief, Burgoyne's entire purpose was to transfer
the army from Carleton to Howe, and not as some preconceived notion of
capturing the line of the Hudson and cutting New England off from the
rest of the colonies. Nor was it about the conquering of New York,
because it was believed that the majority of New Yorkers were loyal
and thus would flock to the crown!
The orders were sealed on February 28th, 1777. Three days later,
Germain authorized Howe's offensive against Philadelphia. He did not
bother to inform Howe of anything with regards to Burgoyne, and never
would do so, though in June Howe did receive a copy of Burgoyne's
orders, though he did not understand what they meant.
To sum up. Burgoyne was sent to Albany in order to become part of
Howe's command for an eventual invasion of New England. Little risk
was seen in this move as it was universally believed that New York was
dominated by those loyal to the Crown. Howe went to Philadelphia in
order to defeat Washington and return the the loyalists, who were over
whelming there, to power and to recruit new provincial regiments for
garrisoning, and then to return to the northward for a final invasion
of New England. My point stands. British misconceptions as to the
mood of the populus of its North American colonies mislead its
preceptions of the war, and subsequently to its strategy upon which
British success turned.

Now, what was this about Paine? Never really studied him.

--
Your most obedient and humble servant,

Michael P. Reed

(The Revolution Will Not Be Televised) wrote in message ...

Strange how after they evacuated Boston in March 1776 (less than a
year after Lexington & Concord) they never came back,
and how Howe and
Burgoyne's operations thereafter concentrated on New York, then
Philadelphia. For one who likes to cast aspersions on the knowledge
of others, you don't seem too clued-up yourself.

Another poor ignorant soul in the need for elucidation I see. g
Apologies in advance for what is going to be a rather long post.

The origins of British strategy date back to the summer of 1775
(prior to that they did not have one), when Bill Legge, a.k.a. 2nd
Earl of Dartmouth and Secretary of American Affairs in the Colonial
Office had some discussions with some folks knowledgable (or more
correctly with folks who thought themselves knowledgeable) of affairs
in America. After which, he came up with his grand plan of campaign.
Writing to Thomas Gage about it in August, he suggested that two
armies ought to be assembled. One in Boston, which was to be
reinforced, and the other, and Main, to occupy New York City, which
was to be a piece of cake since it was loyal. The idea then would be
for an advance out of NYC into New England while the other advanced
out of Boston. However, Gage, quite to the reliefe of the North
ministry, then resigned allowing North's hand picked man, William
Howe, to take command. Unfortunately, this precipated a crisis in
command, because Howe was junior to then governor of Canada, General
Guy Carleton who the Cabinet felt (wrongly IMHO) was indespensible in
keeping Canada loyal to the Crown. Carleton would surely resign if
forced to serve under a junior. So the Solomaic decision was reached
to divide the command in North America with Carleton retaining
independent command in Canada, and Howe commanding everything else.
At the time, September of 1775, no trouble was foreseen, because
Canada was never meant to be an active theater.
Upon his confirmation as Commander in Chief in North America (less
Canada-for which read Quebec), Howe requested an alteration to the
strategy laid out by Dartmouth. Howe wanted nothing to do with any
advance out of Boston and the neccessary frontal assaults against what
by then would be a years worth of American fortifications. Note it
was he was on scene commander at Breed's Hill which was the bloodiest
battle of the war for the British in both real terms and in ratio (50
percent casualties). He also did not like the idea of two widely
seperated armies attempting to act in unison with such long external
lines of communication as to be virtually independent. Instead he
suggested removing the army from Boston and landing it in Rhode
Island. That would still serve as a diversion for the main landing at
New York (and thus dividing the American defense) while still being
near enough for each army to cover the other.
Alas, a serious wrinkle had begun even before the ink was ever put to
paper. Back in June, Congress had taken up the issue of "invading"
Canada. The primary purpose was to divert British troops from Boston
to its protection in order for the siege of the latter to be
accomplished more readily. Secondary to this was the "need" to
liberate Canada from British rule, and essentially drive the British
clear off the continent. However, there were qualms about making an
unwanted incursion into a fellow colony, and Congress mandated that
Canadian opinion first be ascertained. The results of these inquiries
were mixed, but generally considered favorable. Generally the reports
were accurate enough in that the bulk of the population of Canada did
wish to boot the British out (they were after all French who mostly
had no love of the Anglos), but the clergy was another matter, and
this made the commander of the New York Department (later Northern
Department), Philip Schuyler whose task it was to carry out the
invasion, a bit wary, but Congress was convinced the clergy would be
less an issue, and while it is (highly) debatable, in the end they may
have been more or less right. At any rate, after an inauspicious
beginning, Schuyler was relieved of the responsibility of commanding
the forces in Canada which was handed over to BG Richard Montgomery,
who with a great deal of energy and enthusiasm (and competance)
undertook the invasion and with one Col. Benedict Arnold commanding an
expedition through Maine, rather easily drove the British out of most
of the populated sections of Canada and besieged Quebec City proper,
and there it all began to go wrong for the British.
When news reached London of Canada's apparent imminent demise, there
was a lot of hand wringing and cursing of Carleton's name and his
incompetance for allowing the Americans so much success. To be fair
to GC, he did only have two very understrength regiments for the
defense of all of Canada, which were much inferior in numbers to the
American forces. It is noteworthy to mention also that few Canadians
rallied to the British cause complicating Carleton's defense. In
fact, a number were enlisting in the Colonial (it was not yet
American) army. Back in London, panic struck, the new Secretary of
American Affairs, Lord George Germain (nee Sackville of
busted-for-cowardice-and-disobedience-of-orders-at-Minden-infame and
who replaced the all-too-friendly-to-Americans Dartmouth in November)
began redirecting a considerable force from Howe to Canada. At the
same time, he diverted another, albight smaller, force from Howe for
the intended occupation of Charleston because of Southern governors'
screams for actions for protection. British officialdom missed the
boat twice. The first clue that the rebellion was not centered in New
England was the invasion of Canada. It being obvious that the army
which did so was not composed of New Englanders (other than a few from
New Hampshire). The second was the need for the diversion (roughly a
reinforced brigade) of troops to the South. The waning forturnes of
Lord Dunmore, now ex(iled) governor of Virginia, ought to have been a
third. However *in spite of* these very obvious and omminous signs,
Germain (a rather clueless lout-British condemnations tending to be
stronger) and even Howe (at that time) behaved as if they were
inconsequential bumps in the road and still believed, as did it near
everyone else (save Carleton who damned the Canadians up and down his
letters official or no). Oh, Howe was miffed to lose five or six
thousand men, and it vastly altered his campaign as now there were too
few troops to form a second army for Rhode Island, though the latter
still remained an objective.
As mentioned, Howe pulled out (precipitacely) in March of '76 after
Henry Knox had drug some former British heavy artillery from
Ticonderoga to the heights overlooking the RN's anchorages in Boston
Harbor. Howe was to have pulled out before the onset of winter, but
had decided, for reasons that are really not clear, to remain, and
I've a sneaking suspicion that he had intended on keeping a garrison
in Boston despite the plan not too. We'll never know, though. At any
rate, Howe went to Halifax for a while to await his reinforcements and
an improvement in his logistics. Meanwhile o'er in Canada, things
began to look up for British fortunes. An attempt to the take the
city by storm on New Years Eve was easily squashed, and most
importantly Montgomery was killed and Arnold wounded. The Canadian
Army, as the United Colonies army was stiled, began to disintegrate.
Namely because the 9 month enlistment period was up. Like Washington
before Boston, the "American" armies had to disband and be rerecruited
at the same time. Luckily, for Washington et all, the British were
too weak everywhere to do much about it. But the situation in Canada
went to the pot real quickly. Washington had a fine head for
organization, and more importantly literally sat on his logistical
base. Canada was now under the ineffectual command of David Wooster
who was little animated, not overly clever, was in a secondary theater
with secondary priorities in a poor province (not a single head of
beef existed anywhere in Canada), and far from his logistical base. A
two man committee sent to Canada to check on things by Congress
convinced Wooster to step aside, and MG John Thomas arrived at the
beginning of May to take his place. Thomas decided, in a council of
war, to abandon the siege and retreat further up Canada, but then the
first ships carrying a regiment detached from Howe at Halifax began
arriving, and Carleton sortied with a couple of companies of his
remaining regulars, and drove in the American pickets. So ended the
"Battle" of Quebec. It did serve, however, to panick Thomas who then
ordered a wholesale withdrawal to Trois Riviers (such a maneuver
would receive a new name during the Korean War). Once arrived,
Thomas said this place sucks too, and fell back on Sorrel. There he
met 3,000 new reinforcements from New England under BG John Thompson.
These fine fellows brought Smallpox with them, and so some of the
regimental commanders began innoculating their regiments thus
rendering them hors-de-combat for the next month or so. Thomas
promptly put a stop to that little bit of non-sense, and then just as
promptly caught smallpox himself and died. Meanwhile the
really-big-British-reinforcement under Gentleman Johnny Burgoyne began
to arrive about Quebec and moved further upstream to the Sorrel (or
Richelieu). Also arriving was John Sullivan with 5,000 fresh
"Continentals" which were cheered by the locals upon their arrival.
Sullivan and Thompson decided to retake Trois Riviers in order to turn
it around, but it went for nought, and the local militia that had been
on "our side" turned coat, now that they were certain the U.C. were
leaving Canada, and turned Thompson over to the British. Sullivan did
not panic though, and took his sweet time in withdrawing making
certain that all his stores, heavy equipment, and sick were safely
away before retiring. That took about a month. Carleton did not
interfere, and let Sullivan go unmolested though the latter was
severly out numbered. Though the "American" army nominally was the
same strength as the British (about 8~9,000 men) smallpox had crippled
it, and in the week after TR it numbered less than 1,500 fit for duty.
This led to new round of condemnations about Carleton in London. The
reason for his inactivity has never been made clear, but I suspect it
was to keep his men well away from Sullivan's pocky troops. Anyways,
I digress.
Coming back somewhat on topic, back at the end of March when that
Committee of Congress (i.e. Maryland delegate Samuel Chase and fellow
Marylander, but not yet delegate, Charles Carrol of Carrolton-who was
Catholic and why he was a member of the committee) recommended
Wooster's replacement, they also recommended that a flotilla of
warships be constructed on Lake Champlain (which is not, as Sen. Leahy
attempted to us convince, one of the Great Lakes). That mission fell
to B. Arnold of sulking-in-Montreal-
and-generally-hating-Wooster's-guts fame. Ooh, good move on Chase's
part, because now Carleton could not move south to crush to the now
renamed Northern Army (and now under the command of one Horatio
"Not-at-the-bridge-but-Granny" Gates-whose command was also
recommended by Chase) until he built himself some boats with guns, and
so away at it through the summer he went. [Meanwhile Chase returned
to Congress, voted for Independence, and damn near got into a fist
fight with one John Adams on said floor of said Congress over some
on-the-record comments Chase made about the sorry-excuse-for-soldiers
that were New Englanders. Sullivan went home, well to Philadelphia,
also screaming his head off at being replaced by a junior, for which
he was awarded a major generalship and command of a division in the
Main Army at New York, where he was promptly captured at the Battle of
Long Island. What happened to Wooster you ask? He went home to
Connecticut, and was killed at the Battle of Compo Hill where he and
Arnold (and a few recruits and some militia) badly molested a British
raiding force under former Gov of NY, George Tryon, who had just
torched Danbury CT.]
Ok, where were we in our story? Oh yes. Well, Howe finally had
gotten underway and landed on Staten Island in July of '76 just in
time to be greated with news of the Declaration of Independence. This
does not seem to have dampened his spirits much, after all, according
to him (and every other British journalist I have ever read) most of
the colonists, especially in New York, were still loyal! So, as peace
commissioner (his big bro Admiral Lord Richard "Black Dick" Howe was
boss commissioner] settled down snug as a bug in Lizzy Loring's. . .
er, on Staten Island, and attempted to negotiate a settlement, and to
await more reinforcements (another division of Hessians was due any
day now). Well, the Hessians finally arrived in August, and Howe was
pretty miffed that he did not get much of a response to his
negotiatin' so he landed his troops on Long Island, routed the
American (note no more quotes) covering forces on the Guanus Heights,
captured, according to him, 1,000 men and John Sullivan, and settled
in for another round of negotiatin'. This time sending Sullivan back
to Congress which august body then sent a mismatched Delegation of
John "we New Englanders is superior" Adams and Ben "Where be the
ladies" Franklin who both essentially told Howe to bugger off with his
schemes of reconcilliation. Howe then decided it was time for another
crack-o-the-whip, and landed on Manhattan at Kip's Bay (a "battle"
left unmentioned in American military annals especially by those who
thought the militia were so great), occupied NYC (then southern tip of
Manhattan) and decided to go over Congress' head, and appeal directly
to the people. What of Carleton? He was still playing at Samuel
Pepys at Isle aux Nois.
After a month of no response, Howe landed his forces on the mainland
of New York and after two week at "oops, we landed at the wrong
place" Throg's Neck, relanded at Pell's point, and allowed, mainly
through inaction, Washington to slip away at White Plains. But n'er
feer the colonists were still mostly loyal! By now, only Fort
Washington had to be dealt with in order to secure New York City,
which it was in short order. Howe then sent a now throughly
disgruntled second in command, i.e. Henry
"But-if-you-only-followed-MY-plan" Clinton to occupy Rhode Island as
required by "The Plan." Clinton did so easily and quite literrally.
He occupied Rhode *Island*, but he was supposed to capture the
mainland capitol of Providence, but. . .well, after Howe hinted at his
displeasure, Clinton went AWOL and returned to "Blighty" muttering
nasty utterances about Howe all the way across the 'Lantic.
Carleton, though, had finally put his ship together, and had stole
down into Lake Champlain, beat the snot out of Arnold and his
land-lubbing army sailors at Valcour Bay, then withdrew back into
Canada because it was too late in the season to capture Ticonderoga
and secure Canada from invasion. That sent the folks in London, led
by Germain, into a frenzy of Carleton damnations, and Lord George, who
you will remember refused a direct order to attack a realling and
routed French army at the Battle of Minden and thus insuring its
escape, made no secret of his displeasure in a nasty [for that era]
letter or two to Carleton, who good King George who did not desire to
lose Carleton, or suffer the embarrassment of his resignation, forced
to retract and apologize with a big fat kiss. Oh Clinton in
Charleston? Why further embarass our British friends with a
discussion of *that* debacle. [Though it would be very on topic for
SMN].
At this point, Washington f**ed the British Plan over again. He did
the unthinkable. Withdrew into New Jersey. Howe dispatched
Cornwallis after him, but halted the latter at Brunswick. Afterall,
it was not in the plan, and so there was no reason to go further.
Washington used the respite to scadaddle across the Delaware, which
despite Clinton's belief to the contrary, was not fordable. At the
same time, a bit of good luck, for the American cause, occurred. An
enterprising cavalry officer by name of Harcourt captured MG Charles
Lee in a inn where he had been a-fornicating away from his command
[Lee was exchanged for MG Richard Prescott who was captured on Rhode
Island in 1777 while a-fornicatin' away from his command].
Several things now more or less occur at once. Howe sends his first
plan of operations for 1777 with a request for 15,000 additional
troops. Shortly thereafter, an aide arrived back from England with
news that he was unlikely to be reinforced for the upcoming campaign.
About that time Howe, at the advice of Cornwallis, and under pressure
from all those loyal citizens, occupied all of New Jersey. At the
same time, Burgoyne was arriving in London having been sent home by
his boss, Carleton, with their own plan for 1777. Howe's original
plan called for the forming of *three* armies. The two "old" armies
of the previous strategy. That is one up the Hudson and east into New
England, the other at Rhode Island, and the third to be formed in New
Jersey to "Faint" against Philadelphia to keep Washington busy. In
addition, troops were needed to garrison New York. Apparently, Howe
had some notion of using the Canadian Army, and his aid apparently
floated this idea as as a trial balloon when he was in London in
October, but that idea was quickly popped. Burgoyne also suggested
(though he did not really mean it) to Germain to bring the army to
New York by sea, but was told that was not possible. Ostensibly
because the required shipping did not exist. That was not all the bad
news that Cuyler brought back with him from London. The reason for no
new reinforcements were simple. Britain was in the grip of a war
scare with regards to France (and to a lesser extant Spain as Portugal
was making noises to Spain about reperations over some late war in
South America), and everything was being concentrated on the Navy.
Early in 1776, several incidents had occurred in the Caribbean with
British warships halting and boarding French merchies in search of
"contraband." Needless to say, that irked the French, and it was
decided to ready a squadron of ships (about six ships of the line and
four frigates) to make a "show of force'" cruise in the Caribbean.
Well, British intelligence, which generally was quite good where
matters French were concerned, soon got wind of the French
preparations, but initially overestimated it (eighteen S-O-L vice
actually five preparing at Brest e.g.), and the First Lord of the
Admiralty, John Montagu Fourth Earl of Sandwich, p***ed his pants, and
began to dog and stalk Freddie North whereever he went badgering him
for an increase in naval funds and an increase in ships. Finally,
after a month and a half, North caved, and an expansion of the RN was
begun. Of course, the French intelligence services, which was every
bit as good as that of the British, soon found out, and after a bit of
head scratching to figure out what John Bull was up to concluded that
they were possibly preparing for war, so began to put their Navy into
shape. Which of course was picked up by British intel and Sandwich of
course s**t his pants, panicked, and seeing he could not budge North
any more stomped all over his head on the way to good King George, and
while at the same time denying in Parliament there was anything to
worry about, and began a general press of seamen all across Britain
(which led to cracked sculls, one RN LT visiting Davy Jones (seems the
sailors of ye olde East India Company did not like the idea of serving
in his majesty's navy), and the threat of imprisonment of Naval
personal by the Lord Mayor of London. North, now fully "converted"
to Sandwich's cause pushed through the next year's estimates granting
a 1 million pound increase in the RN's budget (from 3 to 4 million),
but which left less than a three hundred thousand increase (from 3.1
to 3.4 million) for the Army and the war in America. Howe's request
for 15,000 men alone would have run nearly half a million pounds.
FWIW, nobody in London, neither Germain nor Sandwich ever bothered to
inform the Howe's of the worsening (as they perceived it) relations
with France.
While Howe was dismayed over the least prospects of getting a
reinforcement he was not overly so. The occupation of New Jersey (or
more correctly northern and central) went without a hitch save for the
fact that Washington had all the boats on the delaware removed to the
Pennsylvania shore. As there was no way across until he built some,
and it was deep into December, Howe called off ops for the season.
But made plans, sans reinforcements, of taking Philly in the spring.
After all, look at all those loyalists which his loyalist pals
(primarily Joseph "I-could-never-not-tell-a-lie") told him that
existed. New Jersey was full of loyalists too. Just look at all
those good folk taking the oath of allegiance (and were awarded with
large scale looting and rapine by British forces who, of course,
blamed it all on the Germans). At any rate, Howe's new plan called
for the early crossing and taking of Philadelphia and then moving
North to meet the Canadian (British) Army no doubt that will be coming
south down the (mainly loyal) Hudson. Another campaign (i.e.1778)
would be required for the reduction of New England and the end of the
rebellion. Five days after he wrote that dispatch to Germain,
Washington crossed the Delaware, inflicted nearly 1,500 casualties and
prisoners on the British and maneuvered Howe/Cornwallis out off all of
New Jersey save for the Brunswick-Perth Amboy region. It was at that
point that Howe realized that any victory first required the defeat of
the Continental Main Army, and where Howe finally abandoned the
original New England First strategy once and for all. So he decided
upon Philadelphia as a ruse to lure Washington out in the open to be
crushed by Howe.
Burgoyne arrived with Carleton's modifications of the original
strategy (the modifications being the army based in Canada).
Basically, it called for one or two objectives. One, to pass the
lakes and head for Albany and from there co-operate with Howe against
New England, and the other, to pass the lakes but turn into New
England by way of the Connecticut River. Certainly the latter would
keep the army independent under Carleton. However, this was the end
of '76 and early '77, and feeligs were quite against Carleton and
there was no way Germain (or George III) were about to allow him to
command in the field again, so that was vetoed. Burgoyne picking up
on the anti-Carleton sentiments quickly angled himself the job, to the
point of convincing the "jury" that it was his plan when in reality it
was Carleton's. It also provided Germain with the ideal way of
getting the army from under Carleton's foot and to Howe's. So the
orders were drawn up, for all intents and purposes written by
Burgoyne, for Burgoyne to take the army in Canada (less detachements
left for Canada's defense) to Albany and there "place himself under
General Howe's command." St Leger was to act as a diversion on the
Mohawk, but otherwise go to Albany and put himself under Burgoyne.
Contrary to popular belief, Burgoyne's entire purpose was to transfer
the army from Carleton to Howe, and not as some preconceived notion of
capturing the line of the Hudson and cutting New England off from the
rest of the colonies. Nor was it about the conquering of New York,
because it was believed that the majority of New Yorkers were loyal
and thus would flock to the crown!
The orders were sealed on February 28th, 1777. Three days later,
Germain authorized Howe's offensive against Philadelphia. He did not
bother to inform Howe of anything with regards to Burgoyne, and never
would do so, though in June Howe did receive a copy of Burgoyne's
orders, though he did not understand what they meant.
To sum up. Burgoyne was sent to Albany in order to become part of
Howe's command for an eventual invasion of New England. Little risk
was seen in this move as it was universally believed that New York was
dominated by those loyal to the Crown. Howe went to Philadelphia in
order to defeat Washington and return the the loyalists, who were over
whelming there, to power and to recruit new provincial regiments for
garrisoning, and then to return to the northward for a final invasion
of New England. My point stands. British misconceptions as to the
mood of the populus of its North American colonies mislead its
preceptions of the war, and subsequently to its strategy upon which
British success turned.

Now, what was this about Paine? Never really studied him.

--
Your most obedient and humble servant,

Michael P. Reed

Michael P. Reed muttered....

(vast snippage of truly erudite commentary)

I can vaguely recall having once, four and a half decades ago, having spent
nearly a semester being less well briefed on the first few years of the
Revolution. Pour yourself a bumper of sack, carve off the tenderest slices
from the loin, disjoint a chicken or two and save your strength for a
rewarding knees up among the Loyalist damsels of rural Staten Island.
Other than a paucity of information concerning the inability of British
troops to "live off the land" to the extent envisioned by their masters in
Lun'non, and the necessity of pouring in both supllies and specie, it was a
hell of an effort on your part, at least a solid "A" under the harsh
grading standards that used to apply for such courses, before the modern
era's "dumbing down" and "all pass" doctrines were implelented.

TMO

On 12 Oct 2003 11:34:00 -0700, (Michael P. Reed)
wrote:


Strange how after they evacuated Boston in March 1776 (less than a
year after Lexington & Concord) they never came back,
and how Howe and
Burgoyne's operations thereafter concentrated on New York, then
Philadelphia. For one who likes to cast aspersions on the knowledge
of others, you don't seem too clued-up yourself.

Another poor ignorant soul in the need for elucidation I see. g
Apologies in advance for what is going to be a rather long post.

The origins of British strategy date back to the summer of 1775
(prior to that they did not have one),

On the contrary, I suggest you actually aquaint yourself with Gage's
correspondance with the Northern Department in 1773-75, and the
increase in troop movements to Boston by the War Office which
resulted..

when Bill Legge, a.k.a. 2nd
Earl of Dartmouth and Secretary of American Affairs in the Colonial
Office had some discussions with some folks knowledgable (or more
correctly with folks who thought themselves knowledgeable) of affairs
in America. After which, he came up with his grand plan of campaign.
Writing to Thomas Gage about it in August, he suggested that two
armies ought to be assembled. One in Boston, which was to be
reinforced, and the other, and Main, to occupy New York City, which
was to be a piece of cake since it was loyal.

And this plan was carried out to the point of Howe's force taking New
York while Boston was evacuated.... shurely shome mishtake if the plan
was to occupy Boston? The British made no attempt to return to Boston
after the spring of 1786. So much for it being a central aim of their
strategy.


screams for actions for protection. British officialdom missed the
boat twice. The first clue that the rebellion was not centered in New
England was the invasion of Canada. It being obvious that the army
which did so was not composed of New Englanders (other than a few from
New Hampshire).

And more from Connecticut and New York. Guess where the first of
those states is. Yes, that's right, New England.

As mentioned, Howe pulled out (precipitacely) in March of '76 after
Henry Knox had drug some former British heavy artillery from
Ticonderoga to the heights overlooking the RN's anchorages in Boston
Harbor. Howe was to have pulled out before the onset of winter, but
had decided, for reasons that are really not clear, to remain, and
I've a sneaking suspicion that he had intended on keeping a garrison
in Boston despite the plan not too. We'll never know, though.

But we do know what Howe was recommending to Germain, and we know what
he actually did, and neither of these involved any plan to continue to
occupy Boston. That you prefer to give scope to unfounded speculation
on this point rather than adhere to the evidence of the historical
record is instructive.

[snip long, patronising and turgid exposition]

I would not subject myself to this to begin with if I didn't have some
clue about using responsible primary and secondary sources to form my
opinion. I've no intention of persisting if you want to indulge
yourself by lecturing an imaginary class of five-year olds. You might
also want to diversify your reading of British strategy from sources
which make an effort to understand the context and internal logic
involved. Macksey wouldn't be a bad start, although he's not perfect.


Now, what was this about Paine? Never really studied him.

Shame; you seem to have a good handle on prejudicial
characterisations of British strategy and policy which might be based
on his particular propaganda.

Gavin Bailey

--

Another user rings. "I need more space" he says.
"Well, why not move to Texas?", I ask. - The ******* Operator From Hell

"Michael P. Reed" wrote in message
om...
"Brian Sharrock" wrote in message
...

Mike, a slight background ... although I enjoy the interchange
in this thread current circumstances surrounding my family
involving probate, hospitals, care faciliites etc. mean that I
can only read the newsgroup at five-or-six day intervals ...
after such a passage of time, others have commented on your
positions and the thread has moved on. Please forgive and
and permit me to restrict my -
interrupt -high priority
We interrupt the typing of this message to answer an incomming
call on the line the family uses to alert me to news of my father
in hospital 300 mile away - smn context - he was RN HO in WWII -
.....a bloody robot-marketing-droid-female 'Hi I'm Kim! Press #1
to find out about your holiday in Sunny Florida ..... see you in
Florida!
press #1!' sheesh!
/interrupt -high priority
interjection to aspects
others have skipped.
snip


Of course they then got to write the history and control the
curriculum in all the schools of their colonies and subsequent
possessions ....

A well worn myth. At best its true only for totalitarian regimes.
You have obviously not read much on the American Revolution, its
causes,

your _obviously_ is somewhat overstated, I've read IMHO
reasonably well and actually 'lived through' the 'Bicentennial
celebrations' in 1976 attending several re-enactments in the Carolinas,
visited many of the exhibitions staged during that year, visited the
Smithsonian - all running 'specials' in that year ... and distinctly
remember a long conversation on the Mall (DC) with a full-feathered
'Red Indian' hereinafter referred to as a Native American (NA);
a'standin' outside his dwelling place and bemusedly watching the
Ukranian-American Folk-Dancers (or was it the Hungarian-American
oompah band? - it's so hard to discern with the passage of years!)
Anyway! I addressed the son of the forest;- 'Hail chieftain of the five-
nations! What are you doing so far from the banks of the
Sussequahana (sp)?
'F****d if I know, palefaced Englishman!' sayeth he, 'We got really screwed
by this here lot' he pointed his fighting axe towards the Lincoln Memorial
and slowly swung his arm in a gesture encompassing the White House, the
Washington monument and the palace of congress'critters atop the Hill.
Amen to that, I responded.
We chatted away about places we both knew,
My next destination being upstate New York and he regaled me with
his tales of (RAF) Burtonwood where he'd served during WWII - second half,
after the interval.
'Is the 'Cat and Fiddle' still there? he asked .... I'm sure
you can picure the scene ... if memory serves me right, we couldn't
share a pipe of peace 'cos the Park Police had decalred the Mall a
no-smoking
zone ... 'for your pleasure and safety!'


and eventually produce screen plays such as "The Patriot".


Or Horatio Hornblower? The Sharpe series? Puh-lease, Mr Sharrock,

OK, I take your point but let's examine the two subjects you raised;-
'Horatio Hornblower' series is somewhat heroic rather than historic
.... but it's reasonably based on the record of the era. Many years ago
1978-ish,
I read a book of CS Forrester entitled something like 'How I came to write
the Hornblower series'. I'd borrowed the book from the library so it's not
on my shelves norin the loft.
IIRC, Forrester mentions the glaring 'gap' in the life story
of his hero; he never engages the rebelling colonists in North
America - apparently his publishers said to have included any
such novel in the canon would have killed his sales in USA ...
The Sharpe series ... I enjoy them all and avidly buy them as
they hit the bookshops. The average Sharpe novel has
the hero with a full purse which he loses, then engages the enemy
in a fire-fight which he loses, but wins a woman then engages the
enemy in a bigger fire-fight which he wins, regains a purse but
loses the woman. Repeat with bigger fire-fights in a credible
sequence.
Bernard Cornwell never invents a 'Patriot -style'
incident.
All of the incidents that Sharpe participates in are stated
to have occurred -with the proviso that Sharpe, Harper, et al
are non-historic.
'Sharpe's Havoc' fr'instance is a novel whose narrative finishes
on page 374 -there then follows five and a half
pages of 'Historical Notes' ... 'Sharpe is once again guilty of stealing
another man's thunder ... the tale of ... is true ... The British lost
seventy-seven men ... in the fight at ... Major Dulong of the 31st Leger
....
,,, is true ... the fictional village of .... [names of fire-fights
ommitted
in case folks haven't read the novel yet]
So Sharpe and Harper will march again"

I imagine that a book about 'The Patriot' would finish on Page 6,
then have three-hundred -and seventy pages of Historic Corrections"

Hornblower and Sharpe (novels) are poles apart from the idiocy
and pure propagandising of 'The Patriot'.

Regards
--

Brian Sharrock

Brian Sharrock muttered....


I imagine that a book about 'The Patriot' would finish on Page 6,
then have three-hundred -and seventy pages of Historic Corrections"

Two of the historical figures from whom Mel Gibson's part was drawn were
grandsires (multi-great) of mine. One was a man apparently acutely harsh
to the puir Native Americans, while the other weighed in at a solid 300
pounds, disenabling him in an attempt to walk to a major engagement.
Happily, a substantial mule was available. Nothing of either (aside from
commitment and courage/fool-hardy rashness) is apparent in the screenplay
or the Gibsonian interpretation thereof.

Hornblower and Sharpe (novels) are poles apart from the idiocy
and pure propagandising of 'The Patriot'.

Let me commend to your reading the novels of Kenneth Roberts covering the
American expereience 1755-1800 or so. While hardly bodice rippers,
actually demure by modern lubricious standards, they are well done, if not
a little slanted toward the "American" perspective. _Rabble in Arms_,
first read when I was eight or so, struggling with a real adult novel,
remains quite readable to day, and his descriptions of the travails of
Rogers and his Rangers provide a new and unusual view of the French &
Indian Conflict.

On the Boston issue....Could one interpret Britsh policy toward continued
or re occupation as based upon the concept that Boston unoccupied was no
threat, easily - and cheaply in men and money - guarded/blockaded from the
sea, and likely should other strategies succeed to fall gently into British
hands, the cold harsh mercantilism of the upper classes swallowing up all
those radical revolutionaries?

TMO

"The Revolution Will Not Be Televised" wrote in
message ...
On 12 Oct 2003 11:34:00 -0700, (Michael P. Reed)
wrote:


Strange how after they evacuated Boston in March 1776 (less than a
year after Lexington & Concord) they never came back,
and how Howe and
Burgoyne's operations thereafter concentrated on New York, then
Philadelphia. For one who likes to cast aspersions on the knowledge
of others, you don't seem too clued-up yourself.

Another poor ignorant soul in the need for elucidation I see. g
Apologies in advance for what is going to be a rather long post.

The origins of British strategy date back to the summer of 1775
(prior to that they did not have one),

On the contrary, I suggest you actually aquaint yourself with Gage's
correspondance with the Northern Department in 1773-75, and the
increase in troop movements to Boston by the War Office which
resulted..

Which led directly to the fresh water system in Boston collapsing and much
dysentary.

when Bill Legge, a.k.a. 2nd
Earl of Dartmouth and Secretary of American Affairs in the Colonial
Office had some discussions with some folks knowledgable (or more
correctly with folks who thought themselves knowledgeable) of affairs
in America. After which, he came up with his grand plan of campaign.
Writing to Thomas Gage about it in August, he suggested that two
armies ought to be assembled. One in Boston, which was to be
reinforced, and the other, and Main, to occupy New York City, which
was to be a piece of cake since it was loyal.

And this plan was carried out to the point of Howe's force taking New
York while Boston was evacuated.... shurely shome mishtake if the plan
was to occupy Boston? The British made no attempt to return to Boston
after the spring of 1786. So much for it being a central aim of their
strategy.

The Brits had had enough of Boston's bloody fluxes.

screams for actions for protection. British officialdom missed the
boat twice. The first clue that the rebellion was not centered in New
England was the invasion of Canada. It being obvious that the army
which did so was not composed of New Englanders (other than a few from
New Hampshire).

And more from Connecticut and New York. Guess where the first of
those states is. Yes, that's right, New England.

Connecticut was also very heavily populated compared to the rest of the
Colonies and much more substancial politically than we perceive today.

The Revolution Will Not Be Televised wrote:

On Fri, 10 Oct 2003 05:27:32 -0400, Stephen Harding

It wasn't "offensive myths".

I'll be the judge of that, as my nationality was on the receiving end
of the mythology concerned. I'll let an American judge how offensive
or otherwise a Vietnamese movie portraying Americans as effette,
murderous war criminals might be. If you find the demonisation of
American which passes for popular analysis in Arab and European
culture to be offensive, I can tell you right now I wouldn't be
appearing to patronisingly lecture you about why you shouldn't feel
offended about the inaccuracies and lies this involves, in fact I
would be agreeing with you.

I don't deem anti-Americanism as offensive. I doubt many Americans do.
Disappointing to be certain coming from some sectors, but hardly offensive.

Wonder if anyone was offended by "Dances with Wolves" where every American
except Kev Kostner was a pretty bad fellow doing pretty bad things to
perfectly harmless Indians. Does one go off in a fit of rage because
the Iranians call us "The Great Satan" or NKs "Imperialist Dogs", etc.,etc?

Anyone can be offended if they choose to. In fact, it's now quite popular
to be offended these days. Part of the culture of victimology in general.

There are times to be offended and times to simply not like something and
brush it off as inaccuracies or propaganda or whatever. Getting all bent
out of shape on the content of a Hollywood movie seems a waste of emotion
to me.

But as you say, it's your emotion, so expend it as you see fit.

As I stated, it's a pile of ****, relying on the exploitation of
prejudice to entertain. Strangely enough, being on the sharp end of
that prejudice isn't particularly entertaining for some people.

Oh please! If the Patriot represents the "sharp end" of prejudice against
UK, then consider yourself fortunate you didn't live in the 18/19th centuries
when it more closely matched current anti-American sentiments.

You're not going to give it any points whatsoever are you.

Not after "Braveheart", but then I actually have to live in the
country that Randall Wallace and Mel Gibson liked to inflame
nationalist prejudice in. I am aware of the consequences of it. They
can fly back to Hollywood.

Robin Hood must be a very conflicted movie watching experience for you.
Who to side with? Robin Hood easily makes fools of the English noble
establishment. I suppose having Good King Richard come home to make
things right would be a nice touch, but then, wouldn't that be promotion
of a myth?

Another movie gets the three thumbs down score!

People go to the movies to be entertained, not educated.

It's not a question of education. There's no reason a film which
avoids such gratuitous stereotypes and ahistorical distortions has to
be worthy, dull and boring.

Current Hollywood thinking seems to dictate otherwise. And given Hollywood
is driven by the box office, a lot of movie goers seem to have no real
problem with it.

I see the Patriot as by and large, an action hero type of movie, set in
Revolutionary War times, with a composite character based on some historical
fact, and events [selectively] also out of history. Nothing more. No UK
bashing (surveys have shown consistently over quite a long period of time
that Americans like the British in fact more than the British like Americans).

Don't know Mel Gibson's politics, but I think it would be a rare American
who has absolutely no time or interest or generally good feelings toward
the British (Irish Americans probably excepted for obvious reasons).

If you want
to brush up on the intricacies of Revolutionary War history, even Ken
Burns isn't going to do it fully right. You need to read a lot of books.

It's not a question of the minutae, it's a question about the most
basic and fundamental approach taken. Why did Mel Gibson make a
propaganda movie about a conflict when ended two centuries ago?

As stated above. It wasn't an anti-British "propaganda" movie. It was
an action-hero genre movie set in revolutionary times, requiring no more
believability than "The Terminator" or other films of the genre.

The "Patriot" was simply a *movie*. It wasn't the gumint preparing for
war against the UK by initiating a brainwashing campaign on its citizens,
who will now riot if war is not declared.

It was a movie which was designed to reinforce existing popular
historical mythology about the very origin and definition of the
American state, and what defines you as an American. I'm sick and
tired of that depending upon the demonisation of the other nationality
involved.

Then the action hero genre of film simply isn't for you.


SMH

William Black wrote:

"Stephen Harding" wrote in message

Just like both sides of the
English civil war never doubted they were British.

I would doubt that any of them, with the possible exception of the king,
considered themselves anything but English, Scottish or Irish.

The idea of 'Britain' as a nation wasn't actually around to any extent then.

Yes of course you are correct.

I'm displaying my lack of conciseness in reference to a blur of references
available to people who live in "The British Isles" and Britain in particular.

So many terms to choose from, yet so many mistakes to be made in historical
and geographic context.


SMH