STOVL and CTOL from big decks - deconflicting ?

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
. ..
John R Weiss wrote:

"Guy Alcala" wrote...

When you come to a F-18 / F-35 STOVL loadout, there could be a LOT of
F-18
tankers supporting 1+30 cycles for the F-35, or the cycle times will
be
reduced
to 1+15 or less.

Don't see why. The F-35B will have considerably more internal fuel
than an
F-18A-D
with similar weight, a single engine and no need for 3-5,000 lb. of
recovery
fuel
reserve. Marine profile mission radius (KPP) is 450nm from a 550' STO
(590nm
for
the USAF F-35A mission profile; 600nm for the USN F-35C mission
profile), with
a VL
bringback of .2 x 1k JDAMs and a pair of AIM-120s, plus reserve fuel.

What are the comparative thrust and specific fuel consumptions of the 2
airplanes' powerplants?

Fuel burn for F35 in landing configuration is said to be close to double
that of the AV-8.


Actual thrust numbers, SFC, BPR, pressure ratio etc. are all still
unavailable for
the F135 and 136; basic layout (turbine and compressor stages) is about
all that you
can find. P&W & GE both just say "40,000 lb. thrust class." I've seen
somewhere
(but can't find it) that Rolls-Royce mentioned ca. 34,000 lb. dry, 56,000
lb. wet
for the F136, but that may include the lift fan. The F136 is based on the
F120
design, and IIRR that engine was variable-cycle. The use of the lift fan
eliminates
the Harrier problem of needing a very high bpr to generate sufficient lift
for VTOL,
screwing the SFC in throttled back cruise or at high CAS.

As to the F-18A-D, off the top of my head F404-400s were rated at about
10,800 lb.
mil (or maybe that was the internal fuel), 16,000 lb. A/B, with the -402
boosted to
17,600 lb. max. A/B.

What will the fuel burn be for a typical approach and
vertical landing for the F-35?

Considering how low it was for the Harrier, with the F-35B being easier to
control,
it should be minimal. Harrier transition and landing takes a minute (or
two at the
outside), with max. fuel burn (wet) of 220 lb./minute for the -406, and
presumably a
bit more for the -408. The F-35B probably has between 50 and 100% more
power in the
hover, with a newer engine design and using an optimized lift fan plus a
less-optimized core engine, so you can make your own estimates.

Why will there be a significantly lesser fuel reserve requirement?

Boarding rates are very high -- Unless somebody takes their own waveoff,
"foul deck" usually means the jet is held in the hover abeam the intended
landing spot until the spot is cleared.


Because there's no little need for multiple looks at the deck -- no
bolters, no
fouled decks. Enough fuel for one go-around seems to be about the max
required, at
least in wartime. Peacetime requirements will undoubtedly be greater, but
still
considerably less.

Will the
bingo fuel requirement be less for a STOVL airplane than a CTOL
airplane?

Are you referring to bingo fuel to the beach, or mission bingo? You have
little
need for the former. In Sherman Baldwin's book "Ironclaw," he describes
the Midway
trying to get a single F-18 back on board at night just prior to DS, while
they were
running at 30 knots or so, directly towards Iranian territorial waters.
IIRR they
tanked the guy a couple of times, and spent an hour getting him aboard.
Just about
the time they were going to have to bingo him because they had to change
course to
stay out of Iranian waters, they got him aboard. None of that would have
been
necessary if he'd been flying a STOVL a/c. The Midway could have been
cruising
along at any speed above steerage way, and he would have recovered on the
first
pass.

For mission bingo, it has been less for Harriers. As John Shinal alluded
to, during
the Falklands war, the CO of 801 Squadron told his pilots that if they
landed back
on board with more than 800 lb. of fuel from a CAP mission, he'd "put his
boot up
their arse." Average fuel at land on seems to have been under that, in
the 600 lb.
range, with several landings with 400 lb., and in at least one case, when
the
visibility was perhaps 50 feet in fog and the pilot in question made one
missed
approach and then had the carrier shine a spotlight straight up,
descending
vertically next to it and landing on without ever seeing the deck or the
island (or
they him), 200 lb. Flight ops had already been shut down prior to his
recovery.

Over Bosnia, USN F-18s were originally operating with 5,000 lb. landing
reserves,
subsequently cut to 3,500 lb. to increase weapons bringback. Even being
really
generous, it's hard to see why an F-35B would need more than 2,000 lb.
landing
reserve. Night landings, even Case III, just aren't the same
white-knuckle affair
that they are when you have to trap.

I disagree with that last sentence Guy. Because Harriers use NVGs for
shipboard takeoffs and landings, STOVL Night Case I is dramatically
easier -- when conditions are conducive to NVG ops. Night Case III around
any ship is a white knuckler regardless of what you're flying. It is no
different in the AV-8 -- in addition to all that wonderful glideslope and
course control, you get to manually control a progressive deceleration to a
hover. It is THE most difficult thing to do in the Harrier -- bar nothing.
The F35 should change that due to automated systems that shift some of the
cockpit tasking to the machine.


The F/A-18 hasn't met fuel specs yet, to my knowledge. The A/B/C/D
never met
the original requirements, and the C/D specs were "adjusted" so much
from the
original requirements that it is almost impossible to make an
apple-apple
comparison.

The F-18E/F supposedly meets the original F-18A spec. The threshold
radius for the
F-35B is greater than that.

So far, I believe the combination of cost and performance requirements
for the
F-35 are hopelessly optimistic...

Aren't they all? But they are paying a lot more attention to cost
ceilings on the
program than they've done in the past; that is indeed one of the prime
drivers.
We'll just have to see how the performance falls out.

Guy

Frijoles wrote:

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
. ..
John R Weiss wrote:

What are the comparative thrust and specific fuel consumptions of the 2
airplanes' powerplants?

Fuel burn for F35 in landing configuration is said to be close to double
that of the AV-8.

About what I expected, given the difference in thrust and a/c weight. Internal
fuel is roughly double as well.

snip

Over Bosnia, USN F-18s were originally operating with 5,000 lb. landing
reserves,
subsequently cut to 3,500 lb. to increase weapons bringback. Even being
really
generous, it's hard to see why an F-35B would need more than 2,000 lb.
landing
reserve. Night landings, even Case III, just aren't the same
white-knuckle affair
that they are when you have to trap.

I disagree with that last sentence Guy. Because Harriers use NVGs for
shipboard takeoffs and landings, STOVL Night Case I is dramatically
easier -- when conditions are conducive to NVG ops.

I take it the Marines finally cleared them for use in takeoffs and landings?
ISTR reading that the Marines were prohibited from using NVGs during
takeoff/landing initially, owing to the need to remove them in a hurry if an
ejection was required (due to the moment arm on the head). IIRR the Brits got
around this by designing some contraption that yanked the NVGs off the helmet
when the ejection sequence started, while the USMC were limited (at the time) to
unclipping them manually and tossing them on the floor out of the way. Did the
USMC buy the same/similar device as the RAF?

Night Case III around
any ship is a white knuckler regardless of what you're flying.

Poor choice of words on my part. I agree that it still can be tense, but the
nagging worry that "I might not be able to get back on board at all" doesn't
seem to be there, from the pilot accounts I've read. If they can see the ship,
pilot attitude seems to be that they will land on (possibly with some damage,
but it beats taking a swim in the dark).

It is no
different in the AV-8 -- in addition to all that wonderful glideslope and
course control, you get to manually control a progressive deceleration to a
hover. It is THE most difficult thing to do in the Harrier -- bar nothing.

Along that line, here's an account of a Case III night landing during Exercise
Alloy Express off Norway in January 1982, by Sharkey Ward, CO of 801 Sq. during
the Falklands (and prior to that Sea Harrier project officer in the MoD, and
then CO of the IFTU squadron and the HQ squadron), from his book "Sea Harrier
over the Falklands":

"[He'd been asked by the Air Boss to fly in conditions that had long since
caused the Nimitz to shut down flight ops, early in the SHAR's career while the
operational limits were still being expanded] . . . 'The problem, Sir,' heavy
emphasis on the 'Sir' even though Dusty and I were on first-name terms when off
duty, 'is as follows: the deck is pitching 7 degrees and our theoretical
Boscombe Down limit is 2 degrees; the ship is rolling like a pig; she is heaving
up and down about 30 feet; the cloud base is reported to be 200 feet but looks
worse to me; tops are reported to be in excess of 38,000 feet with no gaps; and
last but not least we are talking about night flying! We have never operated
before with such a combination of out of limit factors, and I don't wish to push
our luck without good reason.' There would be no 'enemy' aircraft launching
from shore to attack the fleet that night (the land-based RAF team who were
playing at being 'orange forces' or Russians would never dream of taking off in
such weather just to play with the navy) - so why bash your head against a brick
wall if you don't need to. Night flying was fine when there was something to
do. But sitting in a cramped cockpit on your tod, looking at a set of flight
instruments and a blank radar screen for an hour and a half in thick clag with
no one to play with, seemed pointless' . . . .

"As Dusty -- or 'Wings', as all Commanders (Air) are habitually known, continued
to insist on 801 Squadron flying in spite of the conditions, I gave in
ungracefully and agreed that I and only I would fly. It was definitely too
dicey for some of the more junior pilots, and although Ian Mortimer could easily
handle it, one jet airborne on such a ****ty night was less risky than two. . .
.. [skip takeoff and cruise]

"I returned an hour and a half later to carry out the land-on in atrocious
conditions. There was no horizon at all. The rain on the windscreen caused a
distracting deformation of the ship's usually welcoming lights, and I could feel
the heavy buffeting from the gale force winds. Invincible was rolling, weaving,
pitching and heaving and, as she was my only source of visual reference, this
made the land-on task more onerous. At least it was a bit of a challenge and
added spice to what had otherwise been a totally boring flight! Swearing under
my breath at Wings and the world, I stabilised the aircraft over the deck
amidships as best I could. The superstructure of the ship's island was only a
matter of feet to the right and, as the ship rolled heavily to port, the huge
wall of grey metal seemed to approach ominously close to the wing tip.
Maintaining a steady hover was more like flying in formation on an unwilling
leader, so eventually I took pot luck, selected a firm rate of descent and
waited for the heavier than usual touchdown as the deck came up to meet me. A
jarring thud and I was there."

And here's what would be a waveoff and into the drink from fuel exhaustion (if
no tanker was available) in a CTOL a/c, same source:

"It was a lovely night but black as the ace of spades, with no horizon.
Although I had plenty of fuel to allow for a second approach, my weight on this
first approach was marginal . . . . [Note, they were just past Ascension Island
on their way south to the Falklands, and it was very hot. On his first approach
the a/c wouldn't maintain height in the hover despite full throttle and water
injection, so he went around and made a second approach] My fuel was fine, but
not really enough to take it round a further time. I turned in towards the
glide slope from downwind and was in good voice contact with the Air Direction
Officer, Tony Walker. On my first approach I had switched off my radar when
close to the ship and was now relying on ranges to go to the deck being given by
my controller. My Number Two that night was Alan Curtis, and I could see his
aircraft coming down behind a third aircraft. I suggested feeding in behind
Alan.

"As can very easily happen, a slight misunderstanding then occurred. In the
ship, Tony assumed, with good reason, that I had elected to feed myself in
visually for approach and touchdown. In the air, I was of the same mind but was
expecting some ranges to go to be passed to me (judging the distance to a deck
by night is not easy when the deck lights are the only references you have . . .
Tony must have presumed that my radar was still on line and so he switched
frequency to talk to the next a/c coming down the slope. This left me on the
same frequency as Alan, who was now approaching the hover ahead of me. Robin
Kent was in Flyco talking Alan down, so I couldn't get a word in edgewise.

"Not having a clue how far it was to the ship, I did realise that I was high on
the prescribed glideslope, adjusted for that, and felt a little uneasy.
Suddenly I realized that I could see the spray being kicked up from the surface
by Alan's jet, and I then knew I was too close and too fast. I was still doing
130 knots with 60 deg. of nozzle and, as Alan's a/c suddenly loomed large before
me I had to take evasive and corrective action. I jinked left to miss Alan's
jet and slammed the nozzles to the full braking stop position. My fuel state
was about 700 lb. -- not enough to go round again if there were any more
****-ups!

"I cruised on past the ship decelerating as I went and ended up in the hover
very wide and very high and with no visual references at all. It was a black
night with no horizon, the ship was back over my right shoulder and the velocity
vector symbol in my HUD had disappeared from view. I was completely in limbo,
not knowing whether I was going up or down, fighting harder than ever before to
control the a/c and expecting to crash at any moment. For what seemed about 30
seconds I was in serious trouble and on the point of ejecting from the a/c. But
then the ship cottoned on to the fact that something was wrong and took action.

"Brian Prendergast acted before speaking. He switched on the flight-deck
floodlighting, then called 'You're high!' At last I could see the ship and gain
some perspective. Robin Kent then transmitted: 'You are very high.' In the a/c
I immediately felt more comfortable. I kept my eyes on the floodlit deck by
craning my head around to the right and throttled back to bring the jet down to
a realistic hover height. Now I had to get back to the deck from my position
ahead of the ship, and used a little braking stop nozzle to start me moving
backards. Nothing seemed to happen. I was making no progress and fuel was
running low. I selected full braking stop and, as I started to move backwards
alongside the ship, I suddenly got heavy rudder tramping. The rudder peddles
were trying to thrash left and right against my feet. That meant I was doing
about 40 knots backwards! It was a most unnerving experience and I couldn't
really understand what was going on. Soon, however, I was in a position to
return the nozzles to the hover stop, stabilize alongside and carry out a normal
deck landing. I then found out that there was a wind over deck of more than 10
knots from the stern. No one had passed this critical information to me, which
is why I had found it so difficult reversing to the correct hover position.

"After a safe touchdown and whilst still in the cockpit, unstrapping, I was
cursing Wings and the world in general. I was definitely going to have
someone's guts for garters, blah, blah, blah! But by the time I had cooled off
walking down the flight-deck my sense of humour had returned. I said nothing to
Wings beyond pleasantries, amd told Tony that none of it was his fault. Then I
went down to the bar, where the ever-present and understanding Senior Pilot
[Squadron XO in the USN. Robin Kent] listened to my story over a couple of
pints."

Note, the SHAR pilots didn't have NVGs at the time, and by all accounts I've
read the first gen. Harriers were much more of a handfull in the hover and
transition than the second generation Harrier IIs.

The F35 should change that due to automated systems that shift some of the
cockpit tasking to the machine.

I expect that will be the case. I assume they plan to use the FLIR for approach
and landing?

Guy

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
. ..
Frijoles wrote:

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
. ..
John R Weiss wrote:

What are the comparative thrust and specific fuel consumptions of
the 2
airplanes' powerplants?

Fuel burn for F35 in landing configuration is said to be close to double
that of the AV-8.

About what I expected, given the difference in thrust and a/c weight.
Internal
fuel is roughly double as well.

snip

Over Bosnia, USN F-18s were originally operating with 5,000 lb.
landing
reserves,
subsequently cut to 3,500 lb. to increase weapons bringback. Even
being
really
generous, it's hard to see why an F-35B would need more than 2,000 lb.
landing
reserve. Night landings, even Case III, just aren't the same
white-knuckle affair
that they are when you have to trap.

I disagree with that last sentence Guy. Because Harriers use NVGs for
shipboard takeoffs and landings, STOVL Night Case I is dramatically
easier -- when conditions are conducive to NVG ops.

I take it the Marines finally cleared them for use in takeoffs and
landings?

Around the ship, since late 1998. Forgot when they became routine for shore
ops.

ISTR reading that the Marines were prohibited from using NVGs during
takeoff/landing initially, owing to the need to remove them in a hurry if
an
ejection was required (due to the moment arm on the head). IIRR the Brits
got
around this by designing some contraption that yanked the NVGs off the
helmet
when the ejection sequence started, while the USMC were limited (at the
time) to
unclipping them manually and tossing them on the floor out of the way.
Did the
USMC buy the same/similar device as the RAF?

No, they did not buy those devices, nor anything similar.

Night Case III around
any ship is a white knuckler regardless of what you're flying.

Poor choice of words on my part. I agree that it still can be tense, but
the
nagging worry that "I might not be able to get back on board at all"
doesn't
seem to be there, from the pilot accounts I've read. If they can see the
ship,
pilot attitude seems to be that they will land on (possibly with some
damage,
but it beats taking a swim in the dark).

That may be a matter of opinion. If you can get to the hover abeam the
ship, you're golden. Getting to that hover is the trick -- i.e.managing the
transition from wing-borne to engine-borne flight over water at night in IMC
or in VMC with no peripheral cues is a handful for even the most experienced
players.


It is no
different in the AV-8 -- in addition to all that wonderful glideslope
and
course control, you get to manually control a progressive deceleration
to a
hover. It is THE most difficult thing to do in the Harrier -- bar
nothing.

Along that line, here's an account of a Case III night landing during
Exercise
Alloy Express off Norway in January 1982, by Sharkey Ward, CO of 801 Sq.
during
the Falklands (and prior to that Sea Harrier project officer in the MoD,
and
then CO of the IFTU squadron and the HQ squadron), from his book "Sea
Harrier
over the Falklands":

"[He'd been asked by the Air Boss to fly in conditions that had long since
caused the Nimitz to shut down flight ops, early in the SHAR's career
while the
operational limits were still being expanded] . . . 'The problem, Sir,'
heavy
emphasis on the 'Sir' even though Dusty and I were on first-name terms
when off
duty, 'is as follows: the deck is pitching 7 degrees and our theoretical
Boscombe Down limit is 2 degrees; the ship is rolling like a pig; she is
heaving
up and down about 30 feet; the cloud base is reported to be 200 feet but
looks
worse to me; tops are reported to be in excess of 38,000 feet with no
gaps; and
last but not least we are talking about night flying! We have never
operated
before with such a combination of out of limit factors, and I don't wish
to push
our luck without good reason.' There would be no 'enemy' aircraft
launching
from shore to attack the fleet that night (the land-based RAF team who
were
playing at being 'orange forces' or Russians would never dream of taking
off in
such weather just to play with the navy) - so why bash your head against a
brick
wall if you don't need to. Night flying was fine when there was something
to
do. But sitting in a cramped cockpit on your tod, looking at a set of
flight
instruments and a blank radar screen for an hour and a half in thick clag
with
no one to play with, seemed pointless' . . . .

"As Dusty -- or 'Wings', as all Commanders (Air) are habitually known,
continued
to insist on 801 Squadron flying in spite of the conditions, I gave in
ungracefully and agreed that I and only I would fly. It was definitely
too
dicey for some of the more junior pilots, and although Ian Mortimer could
easily
handle it, one jet airborne on such a ****ty night was less risky than
two. . .
. [skip takeoff and cruise]

"I returned an hour and a half later to carry out the land-on in atrocious
conditions. There was no horizon at all. The rain on the windscreen
caused a
distracting deformation of the ship's usually welcoming lights, and I
could feel
the heavy buffeting from the gale force winds. Invincible was rolling,
weaving,
pitching and heaving and, as she was my only source of visual reference,
this
made the land-on task more onerous. At least it was a bit of a challenge
and
added spice to what had otherwise been a totally boring flight! Swearing
under
my breath at Wings and the world, I stabilised the aircraft over the deck
amidships as best I could. The superstructure of the ship's island was
only a
matter of feet to the right and, as the ship rolled heavily to port, the
huge
wall of grey metal seemed to approach ominously close to the wing tip.
Maintaining a steady hover was more like flying in formation on an
unwilling
leader, so eventually I took pot luck, selected a firm rate of descent and
waited for the heavier than usual touchdown as the deck came up to meet
me. A
jarring thud and I was there."

And here's what would be a waveoff and into the drink from fuel exhaustion
(if
no tanker was available) in a CTOL a/c, same source:

"It was a lovely night but black as the ace of spades, with no horizon.
Although I had plenty of fuel to allow for a second approach, my weight on
this
first approach was marginal . . . . [Note, they were just past Ascension
Island
on their way south to the Falklands, and it was very hot. On his first
approach
the a/c wouldn't maintain height in the hover despite full throttle and
water
injection, so he went around and made a second approach] My fuel was
fine, but
not really enough to take it round a further time. I turned in towards
the
glide slope from downwind and was in good voice contact with the Air
Direction
Officer, Tony Walker. On my first approach I had switched off my radar
when
close to the ship and was now relying on ranges to go to the deck being
given by
my controller. My Number Two that night was Alan Curtis, and I could see
his
aircraft coming down behind a third aircraft. I suggested feeding in
behind
Alan.

"As can very easily happen, a slight misunderstanding then occurred. In
the
ship, Tony assumed, with good reason, that I had elected to feed myself in
visually for approach and touchdown. In the air, I was of the same mind
but was
expecting some ranges to go to be passed to me (judging the distance to a
deck
by night is not easy when the deck lights are the only references you have
.. . .
Tony must have presumed that my radar was still on line and so he switched
frequency to talk to the next a/c coming down the slope. This left me on
the
same frequency as Alan, who was now approaching the hover ahead of me.
Robin
Kent was in Flyco talking Alan down, so I couldn't get a word in edgewise.

"Not having a clue how far it was to the ship, I did realise that I was
high on
the prescribed glideslope, adjusted for that, and felt a little uneasy.
Suddenly I realized that I could see the spray being kicked up from the
surface
by Alan's jet, and I then knew I was too close and too fast. I was still
doing
130 knots with 60 deg. of nozzle and, as Alan's a/c suddenly loomed large
before
me I had to take evasive and corrective action. I jinked left to miss
Alan's
jet and slammed the nozzles to the full braking stop position. My fuel
state
was about 700 lb. -- not enough to go round again if there were any more
****-ups!

"I cruised on past the ship decelerating as I went and ended up in the
hover
very wide and very high and with no visual references at all. It was a
black
night with no horizon, the ship was back over my right shoulder and the
velocity
vector symbol in my HUD had disappeared from view. I was completely in
limbo,
not knowing whether I was going up or down, fighting harder than ever
before to
control the a/c and expecting to crash at any moment. For what seemed
about 30
seconds I was in serious trouble and on the point of ejecting from the
a/c. But
then the ship cottoned on to the fact that something was wrong and took
action.

"Brian Prendergast acted before speaking. He switched on the flight-deck
floodlighting, then called 'You're high!' At last I could see the ship
and gain
some perspective. Robin Kent then transmitted: 'You are very high.' In
the a/c
I immediately felt more comfortable. I kept my eyes on the floodlit deck
by
craning my head around to the right and throttled back to bring the jet
down to
a realistic hover height. Now I had to get back to the deck from my
position
ahead of the ship, and used a little braking stop nozzle to start me
moving
backards. Nothing seemed to happen. I was making no progress and fuel
was
running low. I selected full braking stop and, as I started to move
backwards
alongside the ship, I suddenly got heavy rudder tramping. The rudder
peddles
were trying to thrash left and right against my feet. That meant I was
doing
about 40 knots backwards! It was a most unnerving experience and I
couldn't
really understand what was going on. Soon, however, I was in a position
to
return the nozzles to the hover stop, stabilize alongside and carry out a
normal
deck landing. I then found out that there was a wind over deck of more
than 10
knots from the stern. No one had passed this critical information to me,
which
is why I had found it so difficult reversing to the correct hover
position.

"After a safe touchdown and whilst still in the cockpit, unstrapping, I
was
cursing Wings and the world in general. I was definitely going to have
someone's guts for garters, blah, blah, blah! But by the time I had
cooled off
walking down the flight-deck my sense of humour had returned. I said
nothing to
Wings beyond pleasantries, amd told Tony that none of it was his fault.
Then I
went down to the bar, where the ever-present and understanding Senior
Pilot
[Squadron XO in the USN. Robin Kent] listened to my story over a couple
of
pints."

Note, the SHAR pilots didn't have NVGs at the time, and by all accounts
I've
read the first gen. Harriers were much more of a handfull in the hover and
transition than the second generation Harrier IIs.

IMO, the handling differences between the two jets are sometimes
mischaracterized. Both aircraft are very honest. Workloads in the hover
are very similar, except the first Harriers have neutral static stability in
yaw below about 60kts -- a not-so-insignificant difference for transition
flight. The first Harriers also have a much "lighter" control feel. Due
to the stronger stability augmentation on the H II, it is slightly more
forgiving of inattention to sideslip generation in transition flight, and
protects the less experienced pilot as he (or she) ventures near the edges
of the envelope. However, due to the different wing and its associated
high-lift devices, at higher winds over the deck and while using the
aft-most spots on the ship, you have to pay more attention to roll
excursions.


The F35 should change that due to automated systems that shift some of
the
cockpit tasking to the machine.

I expect that will be the case. I assume they plan to use the FLIR for
approach
and landing?

Don't know, but pilots usually find a way to use whatever works best.


Guy

Frijoles wrote:

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
. ..
Frijoles wrote:

snip

Poor choice of words on my part. I agree that it still can be tense, but
the
nagging worry that "I might not be able to get back on board at all"
doesn't
seem to be there, from the pilot accounts I've read. If they can see the
ship,
pilot attitude seems to be that they will land on (possibly with some
damage,
but it beats taking a swim in the dark).

That may be a matter of opinion. If you can get to the hover abeam the
ship, you're golden. Getting to that hover is the trick -- i.e.managing the
transition from wing-borne to engine-borne flight over water at night in IMC
or in VMC with no peripheral cues is a handful for even the most experienced
players.

Okay, thanks for the clarification.

snip accounts of two night landings

Note, the SHAR pilots didn't have NVGs at the time, and by all accounts
I've
read the first gen. Harriers were much more of a handfull in the hover and
transition than the second generation Harrier IIs.

IMO, the handling differences between the two jets are sometimes
mischaracterized. Both aircraft are very honest. Workloads in the hover
are very similar, except the first Harriers have neutral static stability in
yaw below about 60kts -- a not-so-insignificant difference for transition
flight. The first Harriers also have a much "lighter" control feel.

I've seen it described as being more of a sportscar feel vs. a sedan, i.e. more
responsive, and some experienced pilots preferred it.

Due
to the stronger stability augmentation on the H II, it is slightly more
forgiving of inattention to sideslip generation in transition flight, and
protects the less experienced pilot as he (or she) ventures near the edges
of the envelope.

This would be the area where yaw-induced intake momentum drag rears its ugly
head, especially in the first generation a/c?

However, due to the different wing and its associated
high-lift devices, at higher winds over the deck and while using the
aft-most spots on the ship, you have to pay more attention to roll
excursions.

I suspect FBW will take care of that sort of thing in the F-35B. Of course,
development to get the software to that point can be prolonged, as the MV-22 has
been demonstrating. They seem to have gotten the uncommanded roll in the hover
half over the deck and half not, and on the deck behind a helo, tamed at last.

Any idea how the throttle logic is being implemented? AvLeak had an article a
couple of years ago on the different approaches being pursued by Boeing and
LockMart. IIRR one of them was planning for the throttle to control RoD
directly in the hover, as opposed to controlling thrust directly. So, with the
throttle in a hover position (with the computer providing whatever thrust is
needed to achieve that), pulling the throttle back x amount would command say 3
fps RoD, y amount 5 fps, pushing it forward from neutral z amount would command
2 fps ascent, etc.

ISTR the other company was planning to use it to control hover height, but my
memory of the article is very hazy.

Guy

Lotsa snip
IMO, the handling differences between the two jets are sometimes
mischaracterized. Both aircraft are very honest. Workloads in the
hover
are very similar, except the first Harriers have neutral static
stability in
yaw below about 60kts -- a not-so-insignificant difference for
transition
flight. The first Harriers also have a much "lighter" control feel.

I've seen it described as being more of a sportscar feel vs. a sedan, i.e.
more
responsive, and some experienced pilots preferred it.

I've not heard that characterization but its a good one. However, in spite
of the heavier stick forces, in conventional flight the H II is generally a
much more maneuverable aircraft.


Due
to the stronger stability augmentation on the H II, it is slightly more
forgiving of inattention to sideslip generation in transition flight,
and
protects the less experienced pilot as he (or she) ventures near the
edges
of the envelope.

This would be the area where yaw-induced intake momentum drag rears its
ugly
head, especially in the first generation a/c?

Intake momentum drag is a factor, but usually pilot action (overly
aggressive roll inputs) or inaction (don't center the vane) are usually the
biggest contributors to sideslip issues. Biggest change for most jet guys
is learning to use their feet for something other than brakes and nosewheel
steering. Particularly important factor in the first jet since the static
margin in yaw is less than the H II.


However, due to the different wing and its associated
high-lift devices, at higher winds over the deck and while using the
aft-most spots on the ship, you have to pay more attention to roll
excursions.

I suspect FBW will take care of that sort of thing in the F-35B. Of
course,
development to get the software to that point can be prolonged, as the
MV-22 has
been demonstrating. They seem to have gotten the uncommanded roll in the
hover
half over the deck and half not, and on the deck behind a helo, tamed at
last.

Any idea how the throttle logic is being implemented? AvLeak had an
article a
couple of years ago on the different approaches being pursued by Boeing
and
LockMart. IIRR one of them was planning for the throttle to control RoD
directly in the hover, as opposed to controlling thrust directly. So,
with the
throttle in a hover position (with the computer providing whatever thrust
is
needed to achieve that), pulling the throttle back x amount would command
say 3
fps RoD, y amount 5 fps, pushing it forward from neutral z amount would
command
2 fps ascent, etc.

Not sure what LM uses. I thought the Boeing arrangement was TOO automated,
but that was based on very limited exposure in the sim. I know both went
through many iterations.

ISTR the other company was planning to use it to control hover height, but
my
memory of the article is very hazy.

Guy

"Frijoles" wrote:

Lotsa snip

lotsa more snip

flight. The first Harriers also have a much "lighter" control feel.

I've seen it described as being more of a sportscar feel vs. a sedan, i.e. more
responsive, and some experienced pilots preferred it.

I've not heard that characterization but its a good one. However, in spite
of the heavier stick forces, in conventional flight the H II is generally a
much more maneuverable aircraft.

Due to the stronger stability augmentation on the H II, it is slightly more
forgiving of inattention to sideslip generation in transition flight, and
protects the less experienced pilot as he (or she) ventures near the edges
of the envelope.

This would be the area where yaw-induced intake momentum drag rears its ugly
head, especially in the first generation a/c?

Intake momentum drag is a factor, but usually pilot action (overly
aggressive roll inputs) or inaction (don't center the vane) are usually the
biggest contributors to sideslip issues. Biggest change for most jet guys
is learning to use their feet for something other than brakes and nosewheel
steering. Particularly important factor in the first jet since the static
margin in yaw is less than the H II.

Just a note of thanks, Frijoles, from an old, broken down Ops
pogue who retired out of VMA-231 before they got the "B". I've
been watching your exchanges with Guy like a hawk, since there've
been precious few "B" pilots posting here - like you're maybe the
second or third. [Not many AV-8A pilots either, for that matter.
Fighter jocks by the score, both shade of blue, but since they
can't hover ...]
--
OJ III
[Email sent to Yahoo addy is burned before reading.
Lower and crunch the sig and you'll net me at comcast]