Frontline documentary on the problems with regionals

On Feb 13, 8:19*am, Mxsmanic wrote:
An interesting PBS Frontline documentary on how the business models of the
major airlines are throwing away safety ...


I don't think I'd go that far, but I would agree that the beancounters
at the major airlines seem to have found a way to "cash in" some of
their exemplary safety record for a little more profit by
subcontracting some of their flights to the (cheaper) regional
airlines. Especially since, according to the documentary, they are
not liable when things go wrong with their subcontractors. (Is this
true?). It looks like they get away with it because their customers
aren't aware that the subcontractor is a totally independent entity,
and that it might not have the same attention to safety that the major
carrier does.

The accident itself is still a mystery to me. I only saw the first
half of the show, but that part made it look like the crew made some
very fundamental errors; not maintaining airspeed, and a very strange
response to the stall. Has there been any other analysis (made
public) that explains the captain pulling back on the stick during the
stall?

FlyCherokee writes:

The accident itself is still a mystery to me. I only saw the first
half of the show, but that part made it look like the crew made some
very fundamental errors; not maintaining airspeed, and a very strange
response to the stall. Has there been any other analysis (made
public) that explains the captain pulling back on the stick during the
stall?

During the last hearing held by the NTSB, that agency made it clear that pilot
incompetence and lack of experience were the probable causes of the accident.
The pilots made multiple serious mistakes that accumulated until a crash
occurred. They failed to maintain a sterile cockpit, they reacted improperly
to the problems they experienced again and again, etc. A competent flight deck
crew would have easily avoided the crash, and could have dealt with the
problems successfully even if they were somehow allowed to occur.

Overall the NTSB was very hard on the pilots. The aircraft was fine, and
weather does not appear to have been a factor.

If you watch the NTSB animation you can see many mistakes being made, even if
you're not familiar with the specific aircraft in question.

On Feb 13, 3:43*pm, FlyCherokee wrote:
On Feb 13, 8:19*am, Mxsmanic wrote:

The accident itself is still a mystery to me. I only saw the first
half of the show, but that part made it look like the crew made some
very fundamental errors; not maintaining airspeed, and a very strange
response to the stall. *Has there been any other analysis (made
public) that explains the captain pulling back on the stick during the
stall?

As I was watching the special and they described how the captain
reacted to the stall warning I couldn't help wonder if he attended the
same tailplane icing course I did. His reaction was text book correct
for a tailplane stall in icing conditions (pull back, not push
forward). He may have believed his problem was ice, not an typical
stall scenario.

-Robert

"Robert M. Gary" wrote:

FlyCherokee wrote:

The accident itself is still a mystery to me. I only saw the first
half of the show, but that part made it look like the crew made some
very fundamental errors; not maintaining airspeed, and a very strange
response to the stall. *Has there been any other analysis (made
public) that explains the captain pulling back on the stick during the
stall?

As I was watching the special and they described how the captain
reacted to the stall warning I couldn't help wonder if he attended the
same tailplane icing course I did. His reaction was text book correct
for a tailplane stall in icing conditions (pull back, not push
forward). He may have believed his problem was ice, not an typical
stall scenario.

In the NTSB presentations at the public hearing, they noted that Colgan
Air presented a video on tailplane icing in their training courses. The
NTSB went on to note that the Dash 8 is not susceptible to tailplane
stalls in icing, nor are any other current Part 121 aircraft.

The thirteenth conclusion in their summary was:

13 - It is unlikely that the captain was deliberately attempting to
perform a tailplane stall recovery.

So for whatever reason, they don't share your view on the subject.

http://www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/2010/AAR1001.htm

"James Robinson" wrote

In the NTSB presentations at the public hearing, they noted that Colgan
Air presented a video on tailplane icing in their training courses. The
NTSB went on to note that the Dash 8 is not susceptible to tailplane
stalls in icing, nor are any other current Part 121 aircraft.

The thirteenth conclusion in their summary was:

13 - It is unlikely that the captain was deliberately attempting to
perform a tailplane stall recovery.

I seem to recall something about the captain responded to a suspected
tailplane stall by taking the action that was appropriate to the specific
type of aircraft he had _previously_ been flying, from which he had only
recently changed to the type he was flying in the accident. The pilots were
not attentive to their airspeed in the final moments of the flight, which
probably was the largest contributor to the cause of the accident, as I
recall.
--
Jim in NC

"Morgans" wrote:


"James Robinson" wrote

In the NTSB presentations at the public hearing, they noted that
Colgan Air presented a video on tailplane icing in their training
courses. The NTSB went on to note that the Dash 8 is not susceptible
to tailplane stalls in icing, nor are any other current Part 121
aircraft.

The thirteenth conclusion in their summary was:

13 - It is unlikely that the captain was deliberately attempting to
perform a tailplane stall recovery.

I seem to recall something about the captain responded to a suspected
tailplane stall by taking the action that was appropriate to the
specific type of aircraft he had _previously_ been flying, from which
he had only recently changed to the type he was flying in the
accident. The pilots were not attentive to their airspeed in the final
moments of the flight, which probably was the largest contributor to
the cause of the accident, as I recall.

Yes, there was much discussion on various forums and blogs about how the
captain had previously flown Saabs, which were subject to tailplane
stalls. The NTSB would have know that, so it is interesting that they
express such a strong conviction that he was not trying to recover from
such a stall. They must have their reasons, but I suppose we will have
to wait for their final report to see what they are.

(I didn't listen to the NTSB hearing, so I don't know if they expanded on
their reasoning during the discussions.)

"Morgans" wrote in message
...

"James Robinson" wrote

In the NTSB presentations at the public hearing, they noted that Colgan
Air presented a video on tailplane icing in their training courses. The
NTSB went on to note that the Dash 8 is not susceptible to tailplane
stalls in icing, nor are any other current Part 121 aircraft.

The thirteenth conclusion in their summary was:

13 - It is unlikely that the captain was deliberately attempting to
perform a tailplane stall recovery.

I seem to recall something about the captain responded to a suspected
tailplane stall by taking the action that was appropriate to the specific
type of aircraft he had _previously_ been flying, from which he had only
recently changed to the type he was flying in the accident. The pilots
were not attentive to their airspeed in the final moments of the flight,
which probably was the largest contributor to the cause of the accident,
as I recall.
--
Jim in NC

My recollection is the same.

Actually, the appearance that they were "chasing the airspeed" suggests some
interesting possiblilities. My personal suspicion is that fatigue played a
major role in the poor airspeed control which fed the accident sequence; and
I have yet to decide whether (or how) that possibility might influence any
future flying decisions as an airline passenger.

Peter

Morgans writes:

I seem to recall something about the captain responded to a suspected
tailplane stall by taking the action that was appropriate to the specific
type of aircraft he had _previously_ been flying ...

The action for a tailplane stall would have been the same. For a tailplane
stall, you pull back on the yoke.

On Feb 17, 5:02*pm, "Robert M. Gary" wrote:
As I was watching the special and they described how the captain
reacted to the stall warning I couldn't help wonder if he attended the
same tailplane icing course I did. His reaction was text book correct
for a tailplane stall in icing conditions (pull back, not push
forward). He may have believed his problem was ice, not an typical
stall scenario.

-Robert

Now that's very interesting, I hadn't heard that before. If your
suspicion is true, it would be a much more reasonable explanation for
his behavior than gross incompetence.

John

FlyCherokee wrote:

On Feb 17, 5:02*pm, "Robert M. Gary" wrote:

As I was watching the special and they described how the captain
reacted to the stall warning I couldn't help wonder if he attended the
same tailplane icing course I did. His reaction was text book correct
for a tailplane stall in icing conditions (pull back, not push
forward). He may have believed his problem was ice, not an typical
stall scenario.

-Robert

Now that's very interesting, I hadn't heard that before. If your
suspicion is true, it would be a much more reasonable explanation for
his behavior than gross incompetence.

The NTSB had a long enough list of things that were done wrong to seriously
question both pilots' competence. Just read the presentations on crew
response and pilot professionalism on the following NTSB web page:

http://www.ntsb.gov/events/2010/Clar...sentations.htm

They are short slide presentations, but are full of things that simply
weren't done properly.