Skyguide traffic controller killed

"Buff5200" wrote in message
...
Ok, who among you have never had the urge?

Pilots: tell me that you have NEVER, in your life, had the urge to make
a pylon turn around the tower from a Spooky Gunship.

Never. Not that the controller in question would have been sitting in the
tower cab anyway.

I've had controllers that I didn't care for, but life's too short to waste
time worrying about them. They will be out of my life soon enough, and it's
easy enough to humor them (or invoke my rights as pilot in command).

Pete

Dean Wilkinson wrote:

I read the preliminary findings, which included a transcript of the
communications... it was pretty clear.

So the investigation crew are all idiots since they need a year more
than you to understand what was really going on?

Stefan

Today, the police has arrested a suspect. Note: Until now, he's only a
suspect. He didn't confess nor has the police presented any "hard"
evidence.

This suspect is a 48 year old man who has lost his wife, a son and a
daughter in the crash. Very, very tragic. He must be desperate.

On the other hand, in Switzerland, self-justice has an extremely bad
reputation and is never accepted, on no account. If it turns out that he
has done it, he will have to stay the next couple of years in Switzerland.

Stefan

James Robinson wrote in message ...
Dean Wilkinson wrote:

The controller in this case clearly screwed up since he instructed the
Russian jet to descend when the Russian crew told him they had an RA
instructing them to climb.

You might like to wait for the accident report, since that isn't what
the initial review of the CVR and FDR indicated.

Really? I read the initial review, and the CVR transcripts. It
appeared to me that the contoller gave bad advice, and Russian captain
made the mistake of heeding it.

The TCAS system had warned the Russian crew to climb, but just as they
started to comply, the controller instructed the aircraft to descend.
The Russian crew did not first tell the controller that they had an RA
instructing them to climb, so the controller did not override that
alert.

The DHL crew got an instruction to descend from their TCAS, and
announced that they were doing so.

So, given that the DHL crew told the controller that they were
responding to a TCAS RA, the controller KNEW he had an RA on his hands
and that it applied to BOTH aircraft. Remember, the TCAS systems on
both planes communicate with each other over the transponder
frequency, if one had an RA, both had an RA.

The Russians don't appear to have given proper training to their
crews regarding the TCAS system because the crew didn't ignore the
controller like they should have and followed the RA.

Again, you don't know what their training is. The pilot didn't follow
the instructions, but he might have done that on his own, contrary to
his training. There has also been some argument that the controller's
instructions should have priority over those of the on-board system.

Actually, when I worked for Boeing it was pretty clear that the
Russians were installing TCAS to comply with the rules for flying in
European airspace, but that they weren't necessarily adopting the TCAS
philosophy...

Why not wait for the accident report instead of making rash, misinformed
accusations?

It is pretty rash of you to assume that I am misinformed...

Buff5200 wrote:


Pilots: tell me that you have NEVER, in your life, had the urge to make
a pylon turn around the tower from a Spooky Gunship.

Well, I have not, though I've probably made a few of *them* wish they had a
FLAK.

George Patterson
A diplomat is a person who can tell you to go to hell in such a way that
you look forward to the trip.

In rec.aviation.piloting Stefan wrote:
reputation and is never accepted, on no account. If it turns out that he
has done it, he will have to stay the next couple of years in Switzerland.

One might argue that what they call a jail in Switzerland, is considered a
three-star resort in Russia. Can't justify what the guy did (if he did it),
but he's perfectly understandable.

--
HECTOP
PP-ASEL-IA
http://www.maxho.com
maxho_at_maxho.com

That is very rude of you to call the investigation team idiots, I'm
sure that they would not be amused....

The investigators are required to follow a rigorous investigation
process, no matter how clear cut a case may be. That takes a lot of
time.

Stefan wrote in message ...
Dean Wilkinson wrote:

I read the preliminary findings, which included a transcript of the
communications... it was pretty clear.

So the investigation crew are all idiots since they need a year more
than you to understand what was really going on?

Stefan

Dean Wilkinson wrote:

That is very rude of you to call the investigation team idiots,

You obviously missed the question mark and the irony it implied.

The investigators are required to follow a rigorous investigation
process, no matter how clear cut a case may be. That takes a lot of
time.

Hmmm... Wasn't it you that claimed that reading the preliminary finding
was enough to have a full understanding of the case?

Stefan

HECTOP wrote:

One might argue that what they call a jail in Switzerland, is considered a
three-star resort in Russia.

Well, not exactly, you can't check out at your discretion. We just treat
our prisoners as human beings.

Stefan

Dean Wilkinson wrote:

James Robinson wrote:

Dean Wilkinson wrote:

The controller in this case clearly screwed up since he instructed the
Russian jet to descend when the Russian crew told him they had an RA
instructing them to climb.

You might like to wait for the accident report, since that isn't what
the initial review of the CVR and FDR indicated.

Really? I read the initial review, and the CVR transcripts. It
appeared to me that the contoller gave bad advice, and Russian captain
made the mistake of heeding it.

Not exactly. If the controller's advice had been followed in the
absence of TCAS, there likely wouldn't have been a collision, since the
Russian aircraft would have passed under the DHL. The problem was that
TCAS gave the initial RA to ascend just one second before the controller
urgently advised the aircraft to descend. After the controller made a
second urgent request to descend, the Russian crew chose to follow the
controller's instructions rather than TCAS. Meanwhile, the DHL started a
descent to comply with the TCAS RA on their aircraft. Hence both
aircraft descended into a collision.

That was only part of the overall problem, however, since there were
many procedural and technical problems at the control center, which
tends to turn the focus of the investigation on the controller's
employer. The controller was probably put into the position where he
couldn't adequately handle the traffic being offered, which led to his
mistakes.

Beyond that, the sequence of events in your initial post is wrong, based
on the transcripts that were released. The controller did not know the
Russian crew had an RA to climb, and issued his instruction based on the
information he had at hand. The Russian crew received the RA and
controller's instruction at practically the same time, and chose to
follow the controller. Here are a couple of interesting articles that
discuss this issue:

http://www.ainonline.com/issues/08_0...ncollpg16.html
http://www.ainonline.com/issues/09_0...rtcaspg12.html

The TCAS system had warned the Russian crew to climb, but just as they
started to comply, the controller instructed the aircraft to descend.
The Russian crew did not first tell the controller that they had an RA
instructing them to climb, so the controller did not override that
alert.

The DHL crew got an instruction to descend from their TCAS, and
announced that they were doing so.

So, given that the DHL crew told the controller that they were
responding to a TCAS RA, the controller KNEW he had an RA on his hands
and that it applied to BOTH aircraft.

Yes, but the controller only knew after he had issued the descend
instruction to the Russian aircraft. He did not know that either plane
had a TCAS RA up to that point.

I have not seen a report on exactly when the DHL crew supposedly
announced that they were descending to comply with their TCAS RA, but
there is the question of whether the controller heard or understood it.
By the time the DHL aircraft announced he was descending, it was
probably too late for the controller to do anything more. The initial
RA was about 45 seconds before impact, and the Russian plane started to
descend about 15 seconds later, after the controller made a second call.

The Russians don't appear to have given proper training to their
crews regarding the TCAS system because the crew didn't ignore the
controller like they should have and followed the RA.

Again, you don't know what their training is. The pilot didn't follow
the instructions, but he might have done that on his own, contrary to
his training. There has also been some argument that the controller's
instructions should have priority over those of the on-board system.

Actually, when I worked for Boeing it was pretty clear that the
Russians were installing TCAS to comply with the rules for flying in
European airspace, but that they weren't necessarily adopting the TCAS
philosophy...

If you read the second of the two articles cited above, you will see
that while the majority of pilots would follow TCAS, a substantial
percentage would still follow the controller's instructions, or ignore
both when they receive conflicting information. It therefore appears
that the TCAS philosophy was not universally accepted back then. I
wonder if the attitude has changed in the meantime?

Why not wait for the accident report instead of making rash, misinformed
accusations?

It is pretty rash of you to assume that I am misinformed...

You were clearly putting most of the blame on the controller, perhaps
based on an incorrect sequence of events. What other conclusion could I
come to?

There were other things the controller did wrong, such as not giving
separation advice early enough, only notifying one aircraft to take
evasive action, and not notifying the aircraft of where the conflicting
traffic was. As I understand it, he did not, however, knowingly give
instructions to the crews that conflicted with the RAs they each heard.

Given that the cause of the accident was a sequence of events, the
investigators are probably looking at how all of them came together, and
what needs to be done to avoid similar problems in the future. If any
one of the links in the chain of events had been broken, the accident
wouldn't have happened. The controller was not entirely to blame. I'm
not even sure he was mostly to blame. That is what the accident report
should address.