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#1
July 15th 03, 06:59 AM
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"Chris Mark" wrote in message ... rom: Cub Driver look@my they were returning with empty guns? Certainly a possibility. Even if they still had ammo for their cowl guns they might have learned by that time in the war that attacking an alert and ready B-25 formation with 30 cals was pretty pointless. The B-25 turret gunners alone would have outmatched them. The C model had 3/4" steel plate armor across the rear of the radio compartment bulkhead, thus protecting the interior of the fuselage from gunfire from the rear. It would have easily stopped light machinegun fire. Somewhere I've got an account of a B-25-Zero duel. If I find it I'll post pertinent parts. It was written by Hobart Skidmore. He was a combat correspondent who probably saw a lot more of the air war than most air crew. He was always ready to go and went out on night B-17 raids to Rabaul, B-25 and B-26 raids against Lae and Salamaua, C-47 supply drops to Aussie troops on the Kokoda Track, you name it. I heard that many years after the war he began to suffer from nightmares about his war experiences so terrible that they drove him to suicide. Don't know if that is really true. Chris Mark Saburo Sakai the number two Jap Ace was shot up by flying betreen two B-25's as reported in his book "SAMURAI" He spent months recovering and lost the use of one eye. B-25's were treated with respect by the "Zeke's" as reported in the book on B-25's in the Pacific campaign "Warpath across the pacific" A very expensive book ($75) but GREAT photos of the 8 50 cal's in the nose. Larry 
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#2
July 15th 03, 09:14 PM
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"L. P. LePage" wrote:
snip Saburo Sakai the number two Jap Ace was shot up by flying betreen two B-25's as reported in his book "SAMURAI" He spent months recovering and lost the use of one eye. ISTR that Sakai was badly wounded (as above) when he attacked a flight of SBDs which he mistook for Wildcats, near Guadalcanal on August 7th, 1942. No B-25s involved. Guy
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#3
July 16th 03, 04:10 AM
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Guy Alcala writes:
"L. P. LePage" wrote: snip Saburo Sakai the number two Jap Ace was shot up by flying betreen two B-25's as reported in his book "SAMURAI" He spent months recovering and lost the use of one eye. ISTR that Sakai was badly wounded (as above) when he attacked a flight of SBDs which he mistook for Wildcats, near Guadalcanal on August 7th, 1942. No B-25s involved. I thought it said originally said TBFs in the book, but that in retrospect it has emerged that no TBFs were around that day either, so they must have been SBDs. Or was it the other way around? -- G Hassenpflug * IJN & JMSDF equipment/history fan
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#4
July 15th 03, 07:19 PM
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Cub Driver wrote: On 13 Jul 2003 18:13:44 GMT, ost (Chris Mark) wrote: They are intercepted by 6 Zeros which circle them, then fly parallel to them for a few minutes performing slow rolls before departing without making any attempt to attack Wonderful! I wonder how often such things happened? And what would be the reason--that they were off on a mission & couldn't expend ammunition, or they were returning with empty guns? all the best -- Dan Ford email: www.danford.net/letters.htm#9 see the Warbird's Forum at http://www.danford.net/index.htm Vietnam | Flying Tigers | Pacific War | Brewster Buffalo | Piper Cub It would be interesting to know if Saburo Sakai and his unit were the Zeroes involved-Sakai did let a Dutch DC-3 go off Java-he flew alongside for a minute and saw a little girl looking out a cabin window. Sakai then waved to the girl and the flight crew, and then RTB. Posted via www.My-Newsgroups.com - web to news gateway for usenet access!
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#5
July 15th 03, 12:27 AM
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#7
July 15th 03, 03:20 AM
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"Chris Mark" wrote in message ... Little item from my friend doing P-39 research: 7 P-39s escort 7 A-24s on an anti-shipping strike to Buna summer 1942. Flying at 9,000 feet, 3 Zeros going the opposite direction at 11,000 feet spot them and peel off in an attack. In the Summer of 1942, the USAAF was still rather weak on enemy a/c identification. The enemy a/c may or may not have been "Zeros". But in general, IJN fighter pilots are aggressive and believe they have the superior a/c. An attack by smaller forces on a larger one is thus believable. There would be many unanswered questions. Descending dogfight ensues until Zeros break off at 4,000 feet. P-39 pilots make no claims, report no losses among themselves or A-24s, The report as to the integrity of the P-39's formation can be taken as true. However, their report as to possible losses or not among the A-24s must be cross-checked, as they probably lost sight of their charges while engaged with the Zeros. they were unaware of the A-24s' situation whilst engaged with the Zeros. which they catch up to as they make their bomb runs on a convoy of one large and four small vessels escorted by one warship which they identify as a destroyer. Ship identification by USAAF pilots at this stage of the war is still weak. Composition of enemy force should be cross-checked with A-24 pilots and if possible a better description obtained. Often, army pilots identify smallish enemy patrol boats as destroyers or as other types of ships, as a result. Warship could indeed be a subchaser or a small patrol boat. The flight home is uneventful, with no further enemy contact. They confirm one bomb hit on the large ship, which seems to inflict no serious damage, and six broad misses. Damage assessment should be cross-checked with that of A-24 pilots. The A-24 pilots were probably closer to the scene, after all. Report of uneventful rtb will be found to be in conflict with report of the sole surviving undamaged A-24. A-24s do not report any interception by Zeros on the way to the target and mention no dogfight. Not unreasonable given the account received from the P-39 pilots. They could be expected to lose sight of the P-39s and vice-versa assuming a dogfight enroute indeed took place. Report attacking one 1,500 ton-class cargo ship in a convoy of four 100-ton class coastal vessels and one subchaser escort. At this stage of the war, USAAF pilots often overestimated and falsely identified the the size and type of enemy combatants. Further inquiry to pin down a description of each vessel is indicated. AA fire downs one A-24 during the dive. This plane releases its bomb as it spins out of control and crashes into the sea. No parachutes. It's bomb falls far from the convoy. AA fire success suggests the presence of either an enemy combat ship of some size (subchaser or destroyer), or AA armament aboard the "large cargo ship". ID of all enemy ships reported should be considered tentative. Five bombs bracket the large cargo vessel in a close pattern and one strikes the ship amidships. This ship is left on fire, dead in the water, heeled over and in a sinking condition. This report should be handled with care, as it sounds a bit overoptimistic. P-39 report suggests a different outcome. Report of own losses by A-24s and reasons therefor can be taken seriously. As they recover from their dives, the A-24s are hit by Zeros. Two are shot down immediately, crashing in flames into sea. Two more survive long enough to make it to the beach where they crash land and the crews are observed to escape into the bush. A fifth is badly damaged but manages to make it to an emergency strip where it crash lands. Only one returns home. Sure contradicts the P-39 pilot reports in a big way. But the A-24 pilots' account of own losses can be taken seriously. The fates of all seven A-24s are accounted for in the A-24 report. Evidently the P-39 escort was not a close escort and apparently they missed out on a lot of the action. Their escort mission essentially failed, aas combat CAP and withdrawal support apparently were not effected. The next day 4 B-25s go out to bomb the convoy but find no sign of it. Nor do they see any debris or oil slick in the area of the A-24 attack. They were to have a P-39 escort but it never shows up. Not unreasonable for an airborne rendezvous to fail in those days, especially if the escorts and bombers did not operate from the same airfield. Signs of sinkings often do not persist for long in areas were there are swift currents and strong winds. Navigation is also a suspect area for USAAF pilots while over the ocean. The B-25 pilots actually may not have been examining the location they believed they were. They are intercepted by 6 Zeros which circle them, then fly parallel to them for a few minutes performing slow rolls before departing without making any attempt to attack. The B-25s sweep up the Buna coast until they spot 6 beached barges being unloaded. They bomb and strafe these, destroying them and the cargo offloaded onto the beach. It would be difficult to draw any conclusions from the behavior of the enemy a/c. Claims for damage or destruction must be cautiously evaluated, especially in light of what is reported below. Attempt should be made to pin down the timing of the attack. They report moderate AA fire, with one B-25 being holed several times and the bombardier and co-pilot wounded. There is no fighter opposition. Some attempt should be made to assess provenance of the AA fire. Land-based or ship-based? The 6 P-39s dispatched as escorts report the B-25s are not at the rendevous point so they proceed on a sweep of the Buna coastal area, discover Japanese unloading 5 barges and strafe them, leaving all burning. They also strafe supplies stacked on the beach and tents observed under trees just inland from the beach, making repeated passes until expending all their ammunition. There is no anti-aircraft fire. Missed rendezvous is unremarkable. Their damage claim essentially duplicates that of the B-25s. They do not report AA opposition, however, which is a bit surprising, given the damage reported taken by one B-25. Attempt should be made to ascertain the timing of the attack on the barges, etc., and to comapre that with B-25s' account. (The barges might have been "beached" as a result of an earlier attack by the P-39s. Signs of an earlier attack might not be visible by the time the B-25s arrived. And AA could perhaps have been belatedly arranged, in response to an earlier P-39 attack.) As they are departing they observe 9 Zeros patrolling the beach at 6,000 feet but these make no aggressive moves and maintain altitude. Lucky for them, as they report that they had shot off all their ammo. Number of enemy a/c reported must be treated with caution. How did the P-39 pilots miss spotting them prior to committing to strafing runs and vice versa? Is it possible these enemy a/c were the same spotted by the B-25s, Zeros which closed the range but did not attack? If you were an intelligence officer evaluating these reports, what would you make of them? I'b be a bit confused, to say the least. But I'd make an attempt anyway to compare and contrast the reports so as to come to some reasonable synthesis of the reports. Clearly, the pilots need more emphasis on properly effecting rendezvous as well as on overwater navigation. They should also be coached to take note of and possibly record any occurrences during their mission, such as time and place of spotting or engaging enemy a/c, time and place of bombing or strafing attacks, sources of enemy AA, and ship identifications of all kinds. They sould be counseled to be conservative in assessing the damage they've inflicted on the enemy. Doing all of this would add to their situational awareness (and of course help the Intel officer do his job better).
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#8
July 16th 03, 05:22 PM
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From: "Yann D" ya
Cowl guns ok, but the zero 21 also had 2x20mm wing guns So the truth must be elsewhere Probably is. I was thinking maybe the Zeros had expended their 20mm but still had ammo for their light machineguns and decided it wasn't worth wasting on bombers when their might be US fighters around that they would have to deal with and which might be hurt by that light weaponry. Just idle speculation. Chris Mark
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#9
July 19th 03, 10:03 PM
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From: "Yann D"
I just remember Saburo Sakai wrote in his book (Samurai) that he did aerobatics overhead an US base just for fun. An the AA guns didn't fire at them either... If this is in reference to the Moresby area in early 1942, AA guns didn't fire because there weren't any. Some 90mm would have settled his hash. A little bit of fun in the middle of all this violence maybe.. Chris Mark
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#10
July 22nd 03, 05:09 AM
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ost (Chris Mark) wrote in message ...
From: "Yann D" I just remember Saburo Sakai wrote in his book (Samurai) that he did aerobatics overhead an US base just for fun. An the AA guns didn't fire at them either... If this is in reference to the Moresby area in early 1942, AA guns didn't fire because there weren't any. Some 90mm would have settled his hash. I doubt that - the heavy AA guns were only really effective against aircraft flying a steady and predictable course, like bombers. A fighter doing aerobatics would reduce the gunners to a nervous breakdown  Tony Williams: Military gun and ammunition website and Discussion forum
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