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December 6,1941



 
 
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  #11  
Old November 12th 03, 11:28 AM
Bernardz
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In article , jdupre5762
@aol.com says...
I have often wondered. Given a 24 hour advanced notice that an attack
was eminent in 72 hours or less, what would have been the outcome at
Pearl Harbor? Say on dec 6, Pearl was given intel that an attack would
come anytime in the next 72 hours.


It might well have been worse in some ways. I understand that part of the
Navy's planning was to move the fleet out of the harbor to a different
anchorage that was much deeper. So if some of the ships could have been
torpedoed or sunk by bombs there they might well have been unrecoverable.


Were any of the ships that were recovered worth much anyway?

Most of the effort that went into recovery was done for national pride
to deny the Japanese as much of a victory as possible.


--
People are not apathetic in a bookie shop.

13th saying of Bernard
  #12  
Old November 12th 03, 11:46 AM
Keith Willshaw
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"Bernardz" wrote in message
news:MPG.1a1cc45edfb975c29896ec@news...
In article , jdupre5762
@aol.com says...
I have often wondered. Given a 24 hour advanced notice that an attack
was eminent in 72 hours or less, what would have been the outcome at
Pearl Harbor? Say on dec 6, Pearl was given intel that an attack would
come anytime in the next 72 hours.


It might well have been worse in some ways. I understand that part of

the
Navy's planning was to move the fleet out of the harbor to a different
anchorage that was much deeper. So if some of the ships could have been
torpedoed or sunk by bombs there they might well have been

unrecoverable.

Were any of the ships that were recovered worth much anyway?


Hell yes, they were used throughout the later part of the war.

Most of the effort that went into recovery was done for national pride
to deny the Japanese as much of a victory as possible.


Perhaps but do recall that the ships in the USN line at the battle
of the Surigao Strait, part of the largest naval battle of WW2
was made up of Battleships salvaged from Pearl Harbor.

Revenge was sweet that day.

Keith


  #13  
Old November 12th 03, 11:49 AM
Keith Willshaw
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"Stephen Harding" wrote in message
...
Keith Willshaw wrote:

"BOB URZ" wrote in message

I have often wondered. Given a 24 hour advanced notice that an attack
was eminent in 72 hours or less, what would have been the outcome at
Pearl Harbor? Say on dec 6, Pearl was given intel that an attack would
come anytime in the next 72 hours.

What could have been done differently to affect the outcome?


The USAAF could have been alert with some fighters airbornes
and the rest properly dispersed instead of parked together in the
middle of the field lacking only a neon sign saying 'bomb here'


[...]

The army hearings estimated that if they had been alert between 70 and
80 fighters could have been in the air.


[...]

What (if any) could have been used for night operations?
What would have been the likely outcome of an even plane
dogfight scenario?


Given the quality of Japanese aircraft and especially pilots in Dec 1941,
along with the American P-40 and pilots trained to dogfight, the AAF
wouldn't have done much better in actual A-A combat against the Japanese
than happened with no warning.


The handful of pilots who did get airborne managed to shoot down
a number of enemy aircraft, as many as 11 while losing 4 of their
own number, 3 of whom were shot down by 'friendly' AAA


Perhaps the good part of having no warning was that more pilots lived,
while their aircraft died. Somewhat similar to Navy ships being sunk
in harbor (salvageable; lower loss of crew) versus open water.

It took time for US pilots to learn dogfighting Japanese fighters
wasn't good policy. That would have been unknown on Dec 7.

About the best the AAF could have salvaged with advanced notice and
preparation, was the saving of more aircraft, but I think such notice
would have killed more pilots; a net loss over the total surprise
that actually occurred.


Perhaps they would have learned those lessons a little earlier.

Keith


  #14  
Old November 12th 03, 02:16 PM
Keith Willshaw
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"BobMac" wrote in message
...
Keith Willshaw wrote:



IIRC, part of the commo net consisted of the radar operator running down
the road to a gas station, to beg the use of their phone... Okay,
hindsight's 20/20...


By the time of the attack the radar sets had a phone and reported
sighting the raid to the information room. The problem was there
was no system in place to make use of the fact that a raid had
been spotted or to tell the difference between expected friendly
aircraft and unexpected bad guys.

Keith


  #15  
Old November 12th 03, 02:16 PM
Bill Jameson
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Vicente Vazquez wrote:

"Keith Willshaw" escreveu na mensagem
...
Given the 24 hour warning time, where would you position the
carriers that were out at sea and why? Offensive or defensive?

They were too far way to make an effective counterstrike or defense.


Keith,

Sorry if this is a stupid question, but AFAIK, the Enterprise had some of
its Dauntless (VS-6) on patrol while on her way to Pearl when they were
engaged by jap planes returning to the carriers. One of them (pilot was
Ensign McCarthy, IIRC) was shot down. ...


In "The Big 'E'" by Comdr. Edward P. Stafford, USN; published 1962,
Scouting Six was engaged by the Japanese as they attempted to land at Ford
Island, Pearl Harbor, 8:20-8:35 am 12/7/41.

Bill Jameson
  #17  
Old November 12th 03, 03:09 PM
James Linn
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"Mike1" wrote in message
...

(Resisting "But Roosevelt *did* know urge")

Watched a documentary on Camp X, a place east of Toronto that trained
British, Canadian and later US Intelligence types including SOE, OSS, FBI,
USNMI etc.

One of the functions of the Camp was also as a distant adjunct to Bletchley
Park. They interviewed a female operator who claims that the information
sent to the US officials in regards to Pearl Harbour was sent 8 days
previous to Dec 7, and stated that hostile action imminent, within 8
days(from memory). There was also some prediction that it would have been on
a Sunday.

Take that for whatever its worth. There is no proof that the warning got to
anyone in power.


James Linn


  #18  
Old November 12th 03, 03:35 PM
Keith Willshaw
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"James Linn" wrote in message
...

"Mike1" wrote in message
...

(Resisting "But Roosevelt *did* know urge")

Watched a documentary on Camp X, a place east of Toronto that trained
British, Canadian and later US Intelligence types including SOE, OSS, FBI,
USNMI etc.

One of the functions of the Camp was also as a distant adjunct to

Bletchley
Park. They interviewed a female operator who claims that the information
sent to the US officials in regards to Pearl Harbour was sent 8 days
previous to Dec 7, and stated that hostile action imminent, within 8
days(from memory). There was also some prediction that it would have been

on
a Sunday.

Take that for whatever its worth. There is no proof that the warning got

to
anyone in power.


********

There was no definite signals information pointing to
Pearl Harbor for the simple and adequate reason that
the Japanese never transmitted any. Not only did
the fleet maintain radio silence but fake messages
were transmitted from the region around Japan
to make people belive it was still in home waters.

Furthermore Bletchley Park was NOT reading the
Japanese Naval cipher at the time.

I recommend the book "The Emperors Codes"
by Michael Smith for the true story of British
work on Japanese ciphers and codes.

That said there was an expectation that war with Japan
was imminent and Pearl Harbor in common with
all other commands had been issued a war warning.

Keith


  #19  
Old November 12th 03, 05:03 PM
No Spam!
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BOB URZ wrote:

I have often wondered. Given a 24 hour advanced notice that an attack
was eminent in 72 hours or less, what would have been the outcome at
Pearl Harbor? Say on dec 6, Pearl was given intel that an attack would
come anytime in the next 72 hours.

....snipped...
It would make an interesting movie.....

BOB


Assumption:
- They really believed the warning and took it seriously.

They could have sortied all naval vessels out of Pearl Harbor and
dispersed them out to sea. Perhaps the individual ships would have been
more vulnerable (if they were found), but I don't know if the Japanese,
on finding Pearl empty, had the fuel or the interest in doing an open
ocean search or just going back.

However, because they concentrated on bombing the ships, the critical
repair, maintenance and logistics facilities and stores were left
virtually untouched. If they got to Pearl and found no ships, would they
have seriously hit those other facilities and caused even more damage
than they did?

We also could have had a serious CAP up and assumed the unknown
incomings on radar were hostile instead of just... unknown. What
difference would this have made? Unknown.

More importantly, on a strategic level, if we had known about the attack
in advance, would the US have reacted as strongly and been as committed
to the war? Morale is always a critical (but often overlooked) factor.
Without "a day that will live in infamy", what would have been the US's
reaction? Would we have been as committed?

  #20  
Old November 12th 03, 05:39 PM
Stephen Harding
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Keith Willshaw wrote:

The handful of pilots who did get airborne managed to shoot down
a number of enemy aircraft, as many as 11 while losing 4 of their
own number, 3 of whom were shot down by 'friendly' AAA


I *think* by the time AAF aircraft got airborne, the Japanese Zero escort
had largely separated from its charges, given the surprise of the attack.

If surprise had not been achieved, fighter escort probably would have
stuck with its dive/torpedo bomber assignments. I think attacking P-40s
would have had a much more difficult time.

This assumes a true air battle over Pearl would have played out just
as it did in the SWPA or Central Pacific area a year later. I don't see
why it would not have.

About the best the AAF could have salvaged with advanced notice and
preparation, was the saving of more aircraft, but I think such notice
would have killed more pilots; a net loss over the total surprise
that actually occurred.


Perhaps they would have learned those lessons a little earlier.


They were lessons waiting to be learned. The sooner the better I guess.


SMH
 




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