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On Sat, 6 Dec 2003 23:21:57 -0000, "Keith Willshaw"
wrote: There werent as many available for the follow up waves however. In 1944, Allies used around 35 divisions in the period between June 6th, 1944 and August 1st, 1944. Within that period, Allies invaded, repelled German counterattacks, established a bridgehead, liberated a major port and on the last day, broke through the German front. Same number of divisions would have been on Allied disposal if it weren't for operation Torch. Allies had enough landing craft to perform Husky in summer 1943 and Torch in autumn 1942. There were certainly enough craft to land the five divisions of the first wave and immediate support. But not the follow up forces It depends upon what do you call the "follow up" forces. The vessels used in Torch and Husky (which wouldn't have happened) should have been enough until the capture of the major port. The Luftwaffed most certainly did cause casualties in Italy in 1943 In no case Allies suffered prohibitive losses anywhere in the Mediterranean during 1943. Quite the contrary, it was Luftwaffe that was taking higher losses and was incapable of preventing Allies from conducting all sorts of air missions. That depends on what you mean by success. Sitting in an enclave under artillery attack isnt typically considered a success I'd call an establishment of second front in northwest France by Autumn 1943 a success. But they did to defeat the German air force in the West which was much stronger than taht in the med. In same way, Allied air forces in the West would have been proportionally stronger if it weren't for redeployment of US air groups to the Mediterranean. In addition, RAF Fighter Command could have been utilised. But not to advance into Germany and win the war which is the point. Had Allies established a second front in France by Autumn 1943, they would have won the war, there is no question about it. It is not correct to demand the same tempo of advance from 1943 invasion as it was historically achieved in 1944 because Allies were stronger in 1944 and Germans were weaker. But if Allies liberate Paris in April 1944 that they are definitely ahead of historical schedule. Allies could afford additional year by spending Soviet lives. There is little doubt that invading in 1944 was sound political move, I am not entirely convinced that American and British lives thus saved were more worth that Soviet ones who were lost in that year when Germans could deploy the bulk of their ground forces in Russia. Its a long way fro El Agheila to El Alamein but they managed that And were stopped. And could not move any further given the historical level of logistics on their disposal. Which gives them lots of oil in 1944 By 1944 it doesn't matter any more since Americans are in the theatre in strength and I don't think a lot of oil automatically means a lot of tankers or an increased capacity of raphineries or significant increase of tanks or fighters produced. Note that captured oil fields in Indonesia never reached the prewar level of production. How many German workers do you think were suitable to provide army replacements in 1943 ? Enough to cover all sectors previously held by Italians. Drax remove NOSPAM for reply |
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In article , gme6
@cornell.edu says... (ArtKramr) wrote in : What then? The war in central Europe (ETO) could have gotten our full resouces, D Day would have been a year earlier and the war would have been over a lot sooner, German troops in No. Africa and the MTO would have simply been isolated and would died on the vine. Why not? To just list what I see as some reasons (In no particular order): Lack of experience: The invasions of North Africa, Sicily, Salerno, and Anzio were learning experiences for the Allies. There would have likely been a lot of mistakes made without them. Perhaps a better plan might have been rather then fight a war in North Africa do a direct invasion of Sicily from Egypt. As it was North Africa costs the Axis dearly. IIRC about 25% of axis strength. U-boats: The U-boat menace wasn't really under control until mid 1943. This would have added extra difficulties in supplying a large army in mainland Europe (this is one of the reasons that the destruction of the German airforce didn't really get started till 1944). Aircraft: In 1943 the German airforce was more intact than in 1944. The Allies would have been dealing with a significantly stronger Luftwaffe while at the same time lacking some of their better aircraft. Italy (and MTO operations in general): Knocking Italy out of the war was worth a lot to the Allies, both on land and at sea. Germany was forced to devote units to Italy that could have been used elsewhere (like repelling an allied landing), and British navel assets were able to devote their energies to tasks other than trying to counter Italian and German ships (a task which tied up several British capital ships for most of the early war). Isolating the Germans in North Africa would have taken a lot of material, and would have been very difficult. An in-the-war Italy and the need to contest the Germans in the MTO would have still been a big equipment sink (definitely bigger than the Italian sideshow in 1944 was). As it was in 1944, Italy diverted almost a million German troops from more important fronts. It cost the Allies almost as much but they could afford it. Lack of specialized equipment: The Allies had a lot of specialized equipment that played an important part in the D-Day operations. An invasion in 1943 would have most likely lacked things like enough specialized landing craft, the more interesting supply solutions, and specialized tanks. Not as much as you would think. The invasion of Sicily involved more landing crafts then D-Day. -- Intelligence does not imply reason or purpose 17th saying of Bernard |
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![]() "Bernardz" wrote in message news:MPG.1a370ac351885d1d989763@news... In article , gme6 Perhaps a better plan might have been rather then fight a war in North Africa do a direct invasion of Sicily from Egypt. Look at a map, without control of Algeria, Tunisia and Libya your invasion convoy will have to go round the Cape through the Suez Canal and then fight its way through an area where the axis have air bases on both sides of the Med As it was North Africa costs the Axis dearly. IIRC about 25% of axis strength. Hardly a compelling argument for not fighting them there then. U-boats: The U-boat menace wasn't really under control until mid 1943. This would have added extra difficulties in supplying a large army in mainland Europe (this is one of the reasons that the destruction of the German airforce didn't really get started till 1944). Aircraft: In 1943 the German airforce was more intact than in 1944. The Allies would have been dealing with a significantly stronger Luftwaffe while at the same time lacking some of their better aircraft. Italy (and MTO operations in general): Knocking Italy out of the war was worth a lot to the Allies, both on land and at sea. Germany was forced to devote units to Italy that could have been used elsewhere (like repelling an allied landing), and British navel assets were able to devote their energies to tasks other than trying to counter Italian and German ships (a task which tied up several British capital ships for most of the early war). Isolating the Germans in North Africa would have taken a lot of material, and would have been very difficult. An in-the-war Italy and the need to contest the Germans in the MTO would have still been a big equipment sink (definitely bigger than the Italian sideshow in 1944 was). As it was in 1944, Italy diverted almost a million German troops from more important fronts. It cost the Allies almost as much but they could afford it. Lack of specialized equipment: The Allies had a lot of specialized equipment that played an important part in the D-Day operations. An invasion in 1943 would have most likely lacked things like enough specialized landing craft, the more interesting supply solutions, and specialized tanks. Not as much as you would think. The invasion of Sicily involved more landing crafts then D-Day. Operation Husky involved around 3000 ships and landing craft while overlord utilised in excess of 5000. While both invasions involved a similar size assault force, 3 Commonwealth and 2 US divisions the rate of reinforcement in subsequent waves was much higher in Normand which in part was a result of the lessons learned in Sicily. Keith |
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![]() "Bernardz" wrote in message news:MPG.1a375818f316f17f989769@news... In article , says... Perhaps a better plan might have been rather then fight a war in North Africa do a direct invasion of Sicily from Egypt. Look at a map, without control of Algeria, Tunisia and Libya your invasion convoy will have to go round the Cape through the Suez Canal and then fight You probably find that more then enough supplies came as almost all supplies to the army in Egypt came that way anyway. For the British eighth army that's certainly true but the Torch convoys sailed from the US and Britain. The Sicily invasion force staged out of the North African ports its way through an area where the axis have air bases on both sides of the Med Point taken. They probably could have done it but it is risky. As it was North Africa costs the Axis dearly. IIRC about 25% of axis strength. Hardly a compelling argument for not fighting them there then. It is as long as Russia held! From the US and Britain point of view, they needed the war as they showed the world that while Russia was losing so much that they were fighting too. It also enabled them to learn as others have pointed out. They also needed to hold the Middle East oil fields and Suez canal. Allowing the Germans to seize those would have altered the whole strategic balance. A third Reich with unlimited oil supplies doesn't bear thinking about. I would argue from Axis view the whole war in North Africa was an expensive waste. A best all he could do was win in the Suez for awhile. Which the Allies could and did get on without it. This was true of much of the Axis war strategy. The capture of Norway and Denmark were pyhricc victories as they tied down 20 or more German divisions to hold down nations that had been effectively giving them everything they wanted anyway. As a result large numbers of German troops and air force were uselessly stuck at the end of a long supply line carrying large numbers of useless Italians soldiers. Which was bad for them and good for the allies. The effect in some parts of the German military was quite dramatic for example large numbers of German transport planes were diverted and lost over North Africa at a time when they were badly needed in Russia. Apparently Hitler originally wanted to defend only a small part of Africa, that is what he should have done. This was an impractical proposition however. Sooner or later the allies were going to assemble a large force and push them out. Keith |
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![]() As a result large numbers of German troops and air force were uselessly stuck at the end of a long supply line carrying large numbers of useless Italians soldiers. Not entirely useless. At Tunis, the Italians were still fighting the day after the Germans surrendered. all the best -- Dan Ford email: see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com |
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Bernardz writes:
In article , says... As a result large numbers of German troops and air force were uselessly stuck at the end of a long supply line carrying large numbers of useless Italians soldiers. Oops, you've not read the better books then, have you? Ach, I'll leave it to Keith to disembowel you. I don't advise you try this on the sci.military.naval group :-) The effect in some parts of the German military was quite dramatic for example large numbers of German transport planes were diverted and lost over North Africa at a time when they were badly needed in Russia. That is a good point, but hardly subtle. The Germans and everybody else always had too few of these. Apparently Hitler originally wanted to defend only a small part of Africa, that is what he should have done. What you say above is in contradiction to this. He should have left Africa completely. But hey, that's not what an alliance is about. If you want to keep it, that is. -- G Hassenpflug * IJN & JMSDF equipment/history fan |
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![]() "ArtKramr" wrote in message ... What then? The war in central Europe (ETO) could have gotten our full resouces, D Day would have been a year earlier and the war would have been over a lot sooner, German troops in No. Africa and the MTO would have simply been isolated and would died on the vine. Why not? Because the Axis keeps a lot of natural resources available. The Med becomes an axis lake with secure lines of communication to Africa and greatly simplifying that beyond. Heck, with out North African bases there's not even an attack on Ploesti. |
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