THE DEADLY RAILROAD BRIDGES

"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
...
On Mon, 2 Feb 2004 21:08:04 -0000, "Jim Doyle"
wrote:

Couldn't they find a better/safer way to take out bridges? Loss rates
like
that must've been very hard to sustain. Did they soften-up the AA with
fighter strafes, or would that give the game away too easily?

Jim D


Bridges are among the most difficult targets for manual bombing. They
are narrow, usually in a constricted area, always heavily defended.
Art's experience in WW II is typical of the very same things we
experienced in Vietnam. The Bac Giang and Bac Ninh bridges on the NE
railroad out of Hanoi claimed a lot of airplanes and the Dragon Jaw
bridge at Thanh Hoa is the stuff of legends.

The major contribution of the Azon guided bomb during WWII was its use
against bridges in the CBI theater; ISTR reading where they were used to
drop some 27 bridges in that region during the last year of the war. It
still took some 500 (IIRC) total Azons to do that, however. I believe B-24's
were the aircraft conducting that particular campaign.

Brooks


The Doumer Bridge raids in '67 and again in '72 were similarly
hazardous.

The only thing that has changed the equation is the advent of, first,
LGB and now GPS weapons with stand-off capability.

Defense suppression is a rewarding job, but it ain't no puss game.

"Soften up the AA with fighter strafes".... First rule is never duel
with a gun bigger than your own.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

Subject: THE DEADLY RAILROAD BRIDGES
From: Ed Rasimus
Date: 2/2/04 1:55 PM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:

On Mon, 2 Feb 2004 21:08:04 -0000, "Jim Doyle"
wrote:

Couldn't they find a better/safer way to take out bridges? Loss rates like
that must've been very hard to sustain. Did they soften-up the AA with
fighter strafes, or would that give the game away too easily?

Jim D


Bridges are among the most difficult targets for manual bombing. They
are narrow, usually in a constricted area, always heavily defended.
Art's experience in WW II is typical of the very same things we
experienced in Vietnam. The Bac Giang and Bac Ninh bridges on the NE
railroad out of Hanoi claimed a lot of airplanes and the Dragon Jaw
bridge at Thanh Hoa is the stuff of legends.

The Doumer Bridge raids in '67 and again in '72 were similarly
hazardous.

The only thing that has changed the equation is the advent of, first,
LGB and now GPS weapons with stand-off capability.

Defense suppression is a rewarding job, but it ain't no puss game.

"Soften up the AA with fighter strafes".... First rule is never duel
with a gun bigger than your own.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

If the bridge was weak enough they would send in P-47's with 500 pounders siung
under their wings. They did a good job but took horrible losses. Often worse
than we did. Poor brave *******s.



Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Ed Rasimus wrote:

"Soften up the AA with fighter strafes".... First rule is never duel
with a gun bigger than your own.

Just cuirous, how do divebombers get around this rule? (e.g: Stukas
and SBD Dauntlesses in WW2, Skyraiders in Southeast Asia and
Warthogs in Southwest Asia).

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

"Mike Marron" wrote in message
...
Ed Rasimus wrote:

"Soften up the AA with fighter strafes".... First rule is never duel
with a gun bigger than your own.

Just cuirous, how do divebombers get around this rule? (e.g: Stukas
and SBD Dauntlesses in WW2, Skyraiders in Southeast Asia and
Warthogs in Southwest Asia).

I believe courage is the major factor.

The CO

On Wed, 4 Feb 2004 09:28:54 +1030, "The CO"
wrote:


"Mike Marron" wrote in message
.. .
Ed Rasimus wrote:

"Soften up the AA with fighter strafes".... First rule is never duel
with a gun bigger than your own.

Just cuirous, how do divebombers get around this rule? (e.g: Stukas
and SBD Dauntlesses in WW2, Skyraiders in Southeast Asia and
Warthogs in Southwest Asia).

I believe courage is the major factor.

The CO

Courage is good and foolishness ranks a close second. Luck helps as
well. Throw in a bit of "big sky" theory and you get to do it
occasionally.

Virtually all tactical aircraft in SEA were "dive bombers". Skyraiders
worked close and were decidedly slow. They didn't regularly work big
gun areas, but occasionally in the Sandy (SAR) role were forced to.

I recount in When Thunder Rolled, an attack in which the 85mm
projectiles could be seen in flight, coming straight up the dive bomb
pass like glowing red footballs. There were also instances of losing
sight of the remainder of a tactical spread formation because of so
much air bursting flak between us.

Bottom line is that a stable, large caliber, high-rate-of-fire ground
gun is more likely to be successful at hitting its target than a
mobile, smaller caliber, fast-mover strafing. Change the weapon to a
string of half a dozen mk-82s or better yet, a quartet of CBU-52 and
the odds shift in favor of the airplane.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

Subject: THE DEADLY RAILROAD BRIDGES
From: "Jim Doyle"
Date: 2/2/04 1:08 PM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:


"ArtKramr" wrote in message
...
Two Bad Days Over the Deadly RR Bridges


Railroad bridges were brutally defended. Knock out a RR bridge and you
have cut
transport for possibly hundreds of miles . And while repairing track took
only
a few hours. rebulding a RR bridge over a river or chasm might take weeks.
We
had some of our heaviest losses over these bridges. On the 13th of
February
1945 we attacked the RR Bridge at Euskirchen. We lost two aircraft over
the
target. We lost Yeager and his crew and Williams (one chute seen to open)
and
his crew. The very next day we hit the Engers RR bridge and we lost 5
aircraft
over the target. Brennen,Holms, Jones, Nelson and Meppen and crews were
lost
but three chutes were seen you open. Two bridges,two days, seven crews
lost. A
lot of empty bunks at the 344th. And the war was almost over. What a time
to
die.
Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer


Couldn't they find a better/safer way to take out bridges? Loss rates like
that must've been very hard to sustain. Did they soften-up the AA with
fighter strafes, or would that give the game away too easily?

Jim D



Some bridges had to be taken out no matter the the cost. This bridge was used
to resupply German forces attacking Omah beach. Our losses were the price we
paid to protect the attacking infantry. Go to my website and see, "DEATH OF A
BRIDGE". Look at the two photos carefully. Very carefuly Then read the caption
at the bottom of the page. Results like this are the sort of attacks I lived
for. Made my day.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

In article ,
(ArtKramr) wrote:

Some bridges had to be taken out no matter the the cost. This bridge was used
to resupply German forces attacking Omah beach. Our losses were the price we
paid to protect the attacking infantry. Go to my website and see, "DEATH OF A
BRIDGE". Look at the two photos carefully. Very carefuly Then read the caption
at the bottom of the page. Results like this are the sort of attacks I lived
for. Made my day.

Art,

How much did the Air Corps briefers tell you about the purpose behind
the selection of a particular target? Did most aircrew members have a
good understanding of target selection so that most/all targets were
chosen for obvious reasons? Did all the aircrew go to the pre-flight
breif or just pilots/BNs? Different briefs for different crew positions?

Ed, et al,

I agreed with the 1000 mile standoff. I sometimes roll around different
alternatives of how we could get the AGM-130 to fly to the full range of
the weapon data link. In Bosinia, I hear that a major problem was that
many targets were close to national borders and the ROE prevented
release of the weapons until closer than was preferred.

I like to understand how the weapons I work on are employed and how they
impact the battle. By taking out a bridge or command center you take
the enemies ability to put troops/equipment at the right place at the
right time.

--
Dana Miller

Subject: THE DEADLY RAILROAD BRIDGES
From: Dana Miller
Date: 2/4/04 7:51 PM

How much did the Air Corps briefers tell you about the purpose behind
the selection of a particular target? Did most aircrew members have a
good understanding of target selection so that most/all targets were
chosen for obvious reasons? Did all the aircrew go to the pre-flight
breif or just pilots/BNs? Different briefs for different crew positions?

Ed, et al,


They told us only what we had to know,sometimes almost nothing, Some things we
only learned after the mission such as the time we hit the bridge at Arnhem.
They were careful not to give us information of use to the enemy in case we
were shot down and captured. In most cases what we knew, so did the enemy.

Pre flight breifings included only pilots, copilots and bombardier navigators.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

On Thu, 05 Feb 2004 03:51:01 GMT, Dana Miller
wrote:

How much did the Air Corps briefers tell you about the purpose behind
the selection of a particular target? Did most aircrew members have a
good understanding of target selection so that most/all targets were
chosen for obvious reasons? Did all the aircrew go to the pre-flight
breif or just pilots/BNs? Different briefs for different crew positions?

Ed, et al,

In the North Vietnam campaigns, the ROE were spelled out, so there was
an overall framework for operations. Before you flew your first
mission, you had to read and pass a test on the ROE. Big issue was
prohibited areas and buffer zones, such as the China border. Also
questions of allowable targets--no dams, dikes, hospitals, schools,
etc. At some periods no airfields or SAM sites until they fired. That
changed later in the war.

Large package briefings for Pack VI strikes has all tactical aircrews
present--F-4, F-105 with nosegunners and back-seaters. The EB-66,
EC-121, tankers, recce briefed elsewhere. Several bases participated
so there were briefings and timing sequences involved at all
locations.

Typically, you assembled half an hour before mass brief to review
maps, prepare line-up cards, get code-words for the day. Mass brief
covered weather, intel, operations sequence, SAR plan. Then break up
into four-ship flight briefing by flight lead for tactics,
ingress/egress formations, emergency handling. Finally break to
individual airplane crew where front and back seater coordinate their
duties.

Targets were pretty familiar and the objectives were obvious. Cut
railroad bridges, interdict supplies, destroy POL, etc. No great
strategies involved. Small area, limited number of targets.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

Were the bridges successfully interdicted?