No More New Fighter Aircraft Types?

"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
...
On Mon, 12 Apr 2004 17:36:33 +0100, ess (phil
hunt) wrote:


An air superiority system needs high thrust/weight ratio, high
manueverability, reasonable range, short response time etc. It also
needs a sensor suite that can find, sort and allocate weapons to the
enemy. Ideally it should have longer reach than the enemy platform and
possess sufficient stealth to allow first-look/first-shot.

The sensor suite for US operations is increasingly space based with Global
capability. A reliable airborn weapons platform with data link capability
is what is needed. The USAF airplane procurement cycle is too slow and
bogged down with politics to produce tech advantages in individual manned
airborn equipments. The expendature of $60 billion for space based sensor
systems as part of the missile defense (ABM) is the required direction for
Pentagon systems and the fighter mafia will only miss the boat again in
ignoring the facts. The F-22 being a prime example of USAF not adjusting to
USAF requirements in acquisition. Military tech no longer exists in a
vacuum.

ess (phil hunt) wrote:

On Mon, 12 Apr 2004 08:58:55 -0600, Ed Rasimus
wrote:

No thanks. Air dominance and ground attack seem to work best with
dedicated air frames in a hi/lo mix

Wny? Why not standardise on one fighter?

A few months back, I was talking to a guy who was asking the "why not
one fighter plane" question (F-22 vs. F-35), until I pointed out that he
had a car *and* a pickup truck in his garage, with a motorcycle for
weekends...

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

"Thomas Schoene" wrote in message link.net...
"In the year 2054, the entire defense budget will purchase just one
aircraft. This aircraft will have to be shared by the Air Force and Navy
3-1/2 days each per week except for leap year, when it will be made
available to the Marines for the extra day."

Of course, many of these so-called laws were actually intended to point out
the fallaciousness of simple extrapolation of statistical data.


Unfortunately, operating costs are spiraling so out of control that
there is a sad ring of truth to this hyperbole (AvWeek Apr 5)...
Some potential candidates to be defense secretary in a John Kerry
administration are already waving off the opportunity. "Think of the
the nightmare any secretary is going to have," says a likely
contender. "We are looking at a defense budget this year that is
almost the same as Reagan had in 1985 in real purchasing power. But
look how much less we get. Reagan was buying 700,000 more people in
uniform, 912 combat aircraft compared with 100-150 this year, 900
tanks compared with none, 600 Bradley APCs compared with none, 27
ships compared with 11. It reflects how shockingly large operating
costs have become."

"Emmanuel Gustin" wrote in message
...
"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
...

A good example. But, it also is an example of drawing conclusions when
comparing apples to oranges. Certainly Sweden has a history of
developing, producing and operating exceptional aircraft, but the
neutrality of Sweden means that the aircraft are by definition going
to be defensive in purpose and home-based in operation.

Of course a fighter for the US will have to meet more
requirements than one for Sweden. But assume, for the moment,
that it has to be five times as complex and expensive -- I think
that is enough for a whole lot more requirements. That should
still well within budget for a middle-sized country, and certainly
affordable for the USA, if managed well.

Somehow I have the feeling that the F/A-22 is also going to
be defensive in purpose and home-based in operation. With
a force of probably less than 200 operational aircraft, few
will be available for operations outside the 'homeland'.

Why would that be? If the preeminent air-breathing threat to the homeland is
missappropriated airliners, homemade cruise-missiles, etc., why do you have
to have the top-of-the-line, fights-outnumbered-and-wins "silver bullet"
aircraft solely committed to homeland defense? I'd think the later block
F-16's that will be flying for many years to come with the ANG (not to
mention the likely trickle-down of F-15C's to replace the current ANG F-15A
MSIPs) would be more than capable of handling that requirement.


The F/A-22 is heading the way of the CF-105 Arrow -- an
impressive achievement of technology, but too expensive to
be a justifiable purchase.

Only of course if we plan on turning our other cheek in the event we have to
face a serious air/IADS threat in some currently unforseen contingency (the
ones that usually arise to bite you in the ass) over the next fifteen or so
years. One situation arising that requires us to have a world-beater of the
F/A-22 caliber in our pocket is all it takes to make it a "justifiable
purchase".

The USAF needs a fighter that it
can afford to buy at least 500 of, ideally 1000; so that the
development costs can be spread over a sensible production
run. And so that after 30+ years of service and associated
attrition, it still will still have a decent force.

That would be nice, but it appears that *nobody* has that kind of cash
around; ISTR that earlier projected Eurofighter Typhoon production estimates
have been reduced over the years, and that is a cheaper (and yes, less
capable) platform than the F/A-22. How do you quantify a "decent force"? I'd
think that a force that allows maybe seven squadrons in a "silver bullet"
role over the next fifteen years, ramping down if necessary to four or five
squadrons after that (due to attrition), would be A-OK, given that by then
we will doubtless have newer means of handling some of the problems (i.e.,
UCAV's, even better ISR systems, more lethal weaponry to mount on the
remaining aircraft, etc.) that the F/A-22 is to handle.


Your suggest sounds a lot like TFX--the horrendous "one size fits all"
development projection that got the US the F-111.

Actually, I wanted to suggest a procument cycle more like the
F-4... A large shipboard interceptor that proved to be good
enough, with modifications, for a very wide range of roles.

But then you are missing out completely on what the F/A-22 promises to
deliver as it matures--not a "good enough" platform, but a "much better than
anything it will have to face" platform. Your solution is grounded in the
old mass-is-everything paradigm--OTOH, transformation is all about busting
paradigms and leveraging our strengths against our weaknesses. Smaller, much
more capable forces taking using our "high ground" of information
management, ISR, agile decisionmaking, and precision engagement to overcome
new and evolving threats, rather than trying to reinvent the old "3:1 combat
power ratio means we have to win here" Lanchesterian construct.


I think that a good naval fighter design, not too small but not
too large either, has enough ruggedness, capability and stretch
into it to meet most roles that can be reasonable asssigned to
a fighter. Of course "one size fits all" won't work, so you will
need other designs as well; but with less demands on them these
can be much simpler and more optimized for specific tasks.

It can be argued that your approach has yet to be truly successful. The F-4
is not really a great example--it was an adequate aircraft for the USAF, but
it was not what they really wanted (as evidenced by the start of R&D towards
the F-15 while the F-4 was still filling out the active component force and
well before the first Phantoms made it to the ANG/USAFR).


Besides, any fighter needs to be designed to be adaptable to
other roles, and given the lengthy lifecycle for the next generation
of fighters, the designer always will have to make sure that the
basic design can be modified and updated a few times.

True, which is why spiral development seems to make sense--get the basic
system into service, then refine its capabilities as it serves.


While a free-market capitalist business model might be successful with
the phase/stage/substage sequence, when you throw in the political
posturing, competition for budget dollars, mis-information campaigns
and general pacifism of nearly 50% of the American electorate, you
really get a screwed up program.

I am slightly skeptical about the ability of the 'free-market capitalist
business model' to develop good combat aircraft on its own. It really
needs a good requirement and support team on the service side, to
support development and bring in a dose of realism. Without it, the
companies are often excessively conservative.

Disagree. Look at the X-32/X-35 competition and you can see where both were
willing to be quite daring (and obtaining mixed results) in their
approaches, in very different ways.


Politics and blatant 'pork' distibution can really mess up a program.
But I doubt that the lack of knowledge or the unfavourable attitude
of the general public have much of an impact. Anyway, the US public
is largely in favour of a very high defence budget.

Where were you in the nineties? The public's acceptance (and therefore that
of its elected officials) of a "very high defense budget" is susceptable to
almost whimsical change--go through a period where you are stretching out
each and every procurement program due to lack of funds, while at the same
time finding you are incapable of even sending your personnel to their
required service schools due to lack of funds, and you will become a
believer in that fact-of-life.

Brooks



--
Emmanuel Gustin
Emmanuel dot Gustin @t skynet dot be
Flying Guns Books and Site: http://users.skynet.be/Emmanuel.Gustin/

That would be nice, but it appears that *nobody* has that kind of cash
around; ISTR that earlier projected Eurofighter Typhoon production estimates
have been reduced over the years,

The Eurofighters order number (620) have been stable since about
1996, so far that is!!! Tranche 2 negotiations may yet hold some
surprises, but all governments have restated their commitment to the
full numbers.

Export numbers are anywhere between 18 and 78 extras...

If you reduce the Typhoons orders by the same percentages as the
F-22 then RAF could expect to receive less than 73 aircraft, rather
than the 232 their planning on.




Cheers
John Cook

Any spelling mistakes/grammatic errors are there purely to annoy. All
opinions are mine, not TAFE's however much they beg me for them.

Email Address :-
Spam trap - please remove (trousers) to email me
Eurofighter Website :- http://www.eurofighter-typhoon.co.uk

Tarver Engineering wrote:

"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
...
On Mon, 12 Apr 2004 17:36:33 +0100, ess (phil
hunt) wrote:


An air superiority system needs high thrust/weight ratio, high
manueverability, reasonable range, short response time etc. It also
needs a sensor suite that can find, sort and allocate weapons to the
enemy. Ideally it should have longer reach than the enemy platform and
possess sufficient stealth to allow first-look/first-shot.

The sensor suite for US operations is increasingly space based with Global
capability.

Only as long as the birdies above don't sustain interference
or attack. What then? You still need the traditional means
of reliably delivering the weapons to the target. Hotshot
fighter jocks could probably still succeed with a grease pencil
mark on the sight glass, and memorizing a set of direct bomb
tables... but must we resort to WW I tactics every time Ivan,
Mustafa, or Won Hung Lo geek out a way to scramble the RF?

A reliable airborn weapons platform with data link capability
is what is needed.

Sure. As long as you never transmit the good stuff in the clear
until you REALLY need it in a war. Wipe out the other guy within
the first ten days or so, and you're home free; after that, he'll
be turning your displays into masses of grass...

The USAF airplane procurement cycle is too slow and bogged down
with politics to produce tech advantages in individual manned
airborn equipments.

Not to mention the scads of college boys writing code
to do things they don't understand - and feel (erroneously)
that the GIs - from E-1s to generals - can never understand.
Libraries, libraries, libraries; if it doesn't work as spec'd
with existing, just add others to bog it down some more.
God help everyone if a condition exists which they haven't
planned to accomodate. (An absolute certainty!)
If you spend enough money, you'll either fix it or hide the
errors so well that the things will be sitting in DM before
anyone figures it out.

The expendature of $60 billion for space based sensor
systems as part of the missile defense (ABM) is the required
direction for Pentagon systems and the fighter mafia will only
miss the boat again in ignoring the facts. The F-22 being a
prime example of USAF not adjusting to USAF requirements in
acquisition. Military tech no longer exists in a
vacuum.

Once upon a time, John, there was a method where Airman Dukes
(who just tripped over the answer to a problem) could tell the
designers/programmers WHAT they did wrong, WHY it doesn't work,
and HOW he fixed it. (Been there, done that.) No longer.
That avenue is closed; the geeks don't dare admit error; and to
fix the problem would be a very costly admission indeed.
Military tech used to be walled off from the just curious by
classification alone; today, that SOB is hermetically sealed
deep underground, surrounded by tripwires, moats, mines, and
dead ends - all to designed to protect the core from infiltration
by those who know enough to make a difference - and simplify
the process. It's the vacuum of space...

John T., former WCS MSgt

Chad Irby wrote:

ess (phil hunt) wrote:

On Mon, 12 Apr 2004 08:58:55 -0600, Ed Rasimus
wrote:

No thanks. Air dominance and ground attack seem to work best with
dedicated air frames in a hi/lo mix

Wny? Why not standardise on one fighter?

A few months back, I was talking to a guy who was asking the "why not
one fighter plane" question (F-22 vs. F-35), until I pointed out that he
had a car *and* a pickup truck in his garage, with a motorcycle for
weekends...

Precisely. The Ferrari goes like hell, but makes a lousy
gravel-toter. Sometimes, you need LOTS of gravel.

Emmanuel Gustin wrote:


Somehow I have the feeling that the F/A-22 is also going to
be defensive in purpose and home-based in operation. With
a force of probably less than 200 operational aircraft, few
will be available for operations outside the 'homeland'.

Nope. If you do it right, you'd need only one squadron at
home, used for training. The rest could be used to bring
the nastiness to the bad guys - FAR from "the homeland".

"Dweezil Dwarftosser" wrote in message
...
Tarver Engineering wrote:

"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
...
On Mon, 12 Apr 2004 17:36:33 +0100, ess (phil
hunt) wrote:


An air superiority system needs high thrust/weight ratio, high
manueverability, reasonable range, short response time etc. It also
needs a sensor suite that can find, sort and allocate weapons to the
enemy. Ideally it should have longer reach than the enemy platform and
possess sufficient stealth to allow first-look/first-shot.

The sensor suite for US operations is increasingly space based with
Global
capability.

Only as long as the birdies above don't sustain interference
or attack. What then? You still need the traditional means
of reliably delivering the weapons to the target. Hotshot
fighter jocks could probably still succeed with a grease pencil
mark on the sight glass, and memorizing a set of direct bomb
tables... but must we resort to WW I tactics every time Ivan,
Mustafa, or Won Hung Lo geek out a way to scramble the RF?

If they start jamming communications it won't matter if the information is
space based, or comming from an AWACS. In order to make any kind of
comparison you would ahve to compare to what is done today.

A reliable airborn weapons platform with data link capability
is what is needed.

Sure. As long as you never transmit the good stuff in the clear
until you REALLY need it in a war. Wipe out the other guy within
the first ten days or so, and you're home free; after that, he'll
be turning your displays into masses of grass...

I don't believe there is much support in the system for the lone wolf
fighter pilot scenerio. There may be soem of that inside the F-22
community, but that space is not the rocking chair career booster it onece
was.

The USAF airplane procurement cycle is too slow and bogged down
with politics to produce tech advantages in individual manned
airborn equipments.

Not to mention the scads of college boys writing code
to do things they don't understand - and feel (erroneously)
that the GIs - from E-1s to generals - can never understand.
Libraries, libraries, libraries; if it doesn't work as spec'd
with existing, just add others to bog it down some more.

Yes, that kind of thing even comes to the fore in the commercial World.
Tremble spent a fortune trying to be in the aviation avionics business, only
to find that their softhead small GA pilots could not follow a
specification.

God help everyone if a condition exists which they haven't
planned to accomodate. (An absolute certainty!)
If you spend enough money, you'll either fix it or hide the
errors so well that the things will be sitting in DM before
anyone figures it out.

The Mars rover just went through what you describe, but they were
fortunately able to hack it back to life.

The expendature of $60 billion for space based sensor
systems as part of the missile defense (ABM) is the required
direction for Pentagon systems and the fighter mafia will only
miss the boat again in ignoring the facts. The F-22 being a
prime example of USAF not adjusting to USAF requirements in
acquisition. Military tech no longer exists in a
vacuum.

Once upon a time, John, there was a method where Airman Dukes
(who just tripped over the answer to a problem) could tell the
designers/programmers WHAT they did wrong, WHY it doesn't work,
and HOW he fixed it.

You might have thought so, but today engineers can barely speak to techs.
During my 6 months at BCAG while I was a systems engineer in cabin systems
we had an AT&T flightphone to integrate to a Collins SATCOM. The first
system had already been delivered to another Airline with a Honeywell Satcom
and it should have been a piece of cake for me to just run through the
integration testing and have the DER stamp off.

The first meeting my lead and I had with the chief tech at plant one he
brought up the fact that he had palced a chassis ground wire on the STB
(seat telephone box) to eliminate a shock hazard, as that was his liability
requirement for the testing to go forward. Olin even put a big warning
sticker on the box, but my lead could not understand what he was saying.
Further down the production like I added a chassis ground wire to the
airplane, which greatly upset my two DERs. Now the already released
airplane would have to be changed post release. The DERs expalined to me
that the integration testing was done without the ground and I pointed out
to them that the technician had told them twice right in front of me that
what they said was not true.

Later I discovered my lead was off to AT&T for his new job. Unfortunately
for him, all of AT&T's telephones were scrapped due to their "unsafe
install". I was out due to AT&T's anger, but AT&T was gone from every
airplane. For you see, a short look into the history of AT&T's STB and ZTB
boxes would have shown that the designs were stolen from me in the first
place by DPI Labs, then stolen from them by Global Wolfsburg and then stolen
from them by Olin. Once I had identified the "shock hazard" there was no
higher authority to argue the point with me.

(Been there, done that.) No longer.
That avenue is closed; the geeks don't dare admit error; and to
fix the problem would be a very costly admission indeed.

Sometimes there is a lot of money tied up in some geek's design and changing
it might have system global implications, or even scrap $millions in
equipments.

Military tech used to be walled off from the just curious by
classification alone; today, that SOB is hermetically sealed
deep underground, surrounded by tripwires, moats, mines, and
dead ends - all to designed to protect the core from infiltration
by those who know enough to make a difference - and simplify
the process. It's the vacuum of space...

So true, but in the case of the F-22 even other ivory tower engineers are
ignored.

ess (phil hunt) wrote in message ...
On Mon, 12 Apr 2004 13:55:05 +0200, Emmanuel Gustin wrote:

What is needed, clearly, is a revised approach to aircraft
development. SNIP:

No mierda, Dick Tracy.
One of Kelly's aids to success was that no one stuck their fingers in
his pies. He knew where he was going, herded his troops in the right
direction, overrode (mostly) the impediments (Viz. A11 security) and
got the job done in an outstanding manner. Now every swinging SOB
sticks his nose in the tent and stirs the pot - it's a wonder anything
gets done, and all the while Congress is both slowing things down with
investigations and continuing pressures to build something/anything
'in my district' and meanwhile the overhead keeps piling up day after
day, year after year, and it's all added to the cost of the airplane.
The 22 should have been in service test in 1990.
Walt BJ