Angry

I've been voting since 1968 and have voted in every
election, from school board to Presidential. I have never
known positively that any of my ballots or votes was
actually counted. The candidates I voted for won a lot of
the time, but not always.

How does anybody know their vote was ever counted
accurately, whether a paper ballot with an X in the box, a
punch card or some electrical machine...all can be rigged,
spoiled, stuffed or otherwise invalidated.

Unless we give up the secret ballot, voter fraud will always
be possible and the possible happens.

Being a poll worker, like jury duty, is an essential public
service.



--
The people think the Constitution protects their rights;
But government sees it as an obstacle to be overcome.
some support
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/secondamendment2.htm
See http://www.fija.org/ more about your rights and duties.


"Neil Gould" wrote in message
. com...
| Recently, Larry Dighera posted:
|
| On Fri, 30 Dec 2005 11:35:36 GMT, "Neil Gould"
| wrote in
| ::
|
| What method would you employ to assure that the
receipts are not
| forgeries?
|
| The same method that assures that paper ballots aren't
forgeries. If
| you go back a few messages, I suggested that *two*
receipts would be
| printed & verified by the voter; one would be given to
the polling
| official, just as paper ballots are handled now. Then,
at least one
| machine selected at random from each precinct would
have its
| electronic tally audited against the receipt. In the
case of a
| discrepancy, a 100% audit would be performed at that
precinct.
|
|
| That's a reasoned solution. Why do you feel it
necessary to *add* a
| receipt to be given to the voter? What would be the
advantage of
| electronic voting over the current *one* ballot system?
|
| After thinking about it, there probably is no advantage to
two printed
| receipts. I know I wouldn't care to have one.
|
| Personally, I think it's going to be nearly impossible
to insure an
| accurate electronic vote tally much as it was in the
| paper-vote/voting-machine era. But here's an idea:
|
| All voting methods have "issues", but I was only trying to
suggest a
| solution to a system that introduces a lot of new issues,
and could be
| very easily "rigged". The fact is, I'm not being paid to
figure this out,
| but many people are. What are *their* solutions to this
problem?
|
| Provide a real-time running total of each ballot
choice on the
| voter's display screen, so that s/he can confirm
their vote
| incremented accurately. The real-time vote tally
could be
| continuously monitored by representatives of each
party/candidate?
| If a dispute should arise, the sealed camera that
monitored the
| running tally could be consulted. Under no
circumstances should
| anyone other than the voter be able to modify the
running tally;
| their must be no way for administrator intervention
to modify the
| running tally.
|
| I don't see much value in knowing how my vote tallied with
previous votes,
| and as others pointed out, that tally is likely to be
changing so rapidly
| it would be unreadable anyway.
|
| Everything occurs in real-time. The voter confirms his
own vote.
| There is no necessity to print anything.
|
| The idea of the printed receipt is to verify the accuracy
of the machine.
| If all you have is an on-screen display, there is no way
to insure that
| the data passed to the board of elections is a valid
representation of the
| actual votes, which I find to be an intolerable scenario.
Why others
| aren't bothered by it does puzzle me.
|
| Neil
|
|

The fact is, I'm not being paid to figure this out,
but many people are. What are *their* solutions to this problem?

That depends on who's paying them.

Jose
--
You can choose whom to befriend, but you cannot choose whom to love.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

On Sat, 31 Dec 2005 02:37:22 GMT, Jose
wrote:

How do you sample a counter with the total vote cast for a candidate?

You don't. You sample the votes to see if they agree. That is, you
compare the electronically reported tally of a set of voting machines
with the mechanical (paper?) ballots corresponding to that same set of
voting machines. It doesn't matter who is ahead or behind, just that
the paper and electronic ones match.

If they don't match, something's wrong.


Yah, it means they are a different deomgraphic. Those casting paper
ballots are most likely different. I'd be surprised to see a strong
correlation between the two.


Roger


Jose
Roger

"Roger" wrote in message
...
Yah, it means they are a different deomgraphic. Those casting paper
ballots are most likely different. I'd be surprised to see a strong
correlation between the two.

You are not paying attention.

*Everyone* gets a paper ballot. They get it when they complete their
electronic ballot, which they use to verify their vote was recorded
correctly before the turn the paper ballot back into the elections staff.
Those paper ballots are then used later to audit the electronic ballot.

There's no demographic difference. Everyone who votes is handled the same
way.

On Sat, 31 Dec 2005 17:41:58 -0800, "Peter Duniho"
wrote:

"Roger" wrote in message
.. .
Yah, it means they are a different deomgraphic. Those casting paper
ballots are most likely different. I'd be surprised to see a strong
correlation between the two.

You are not paying attention.

*Everyone* gets a paper ballot. They get it when they complete their
electronic ballot, which they use to verify their vote was recorded
correctly before the turn the paper ballot back into the elections staff.
Those paper ballots are then used later to audit the electronic ballot.


Yah mean we gotta teach 'em how to use the machine, how to use the
paper ballott, and get them to do the same thing on both? So far we
aren't batting very well on just one.

There's no demographic difference. Everyone who votes is handled the same
way.

That gives them two places to screw up and a thrid one to complain
about:-))

Roger


Roger

"Roger" wrote in message
...
Yah mean we gotta teach 'em how to use the machine, how to use the
paper ballott, and get them to do the same thing on both? So far we
aren't batting very well on just one.

Well, there is that. Those in favor of electronic voting machines claim
they are easier, and would eliminate hanging chads (etc.) Are those people
right? I don't know. It's certainly true that better idiots always come
along to defeat idiot-proof devices. You have a point.

That gives them two places to screw up and a thrid one to complain
about:-))

Yup. Personally, I never found the whole "fill in the circle" thing all
that difficult. But there certainly have been some fiascos related to that
ballot type, as well as others (like the "punch the hole" type).

Maybe we just need a whole new type of fiasco, 'cause people are getting
bored with the old kind?

Pete

If they don't match, something's wrong.

Yah, it means they are a different deomgraphic.

No, the paper receipts would be from the SAME MACHINE as the electronic
tally. They would be duplicates. They MUST match, or there is
something wrong.

I was not (and nobody was) suggesting that we compare one polling place
with another to assure validity. That would be absurd.

Jose
--
You can choose whom to befriend, but you cannot choose whom to love.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

Yah mean we gotta teach 'em how to use the machine, how to use the
paper ballott, and get them to do the same thing on both?

No, you teach them how to use the electronic machine, which prints a
paper ballot with their choices already filled in. They verify this,
put it in the chute, and exit.

Jose
--
You can choose whom to befriend, but you cannot choose whom to love.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

"Larry Dighera" wrote in message
...
On Fri, 30 Dec 2005 11:35:36 GMT, "Neil Gould"
wrote in
::

Recently, Larry Dighera posted:

On Thu, 29 Dec 2005 18:10:26 GMT, "Neil Gould"
wrote in
: :

Why couldn't receipts be counted by hand? As a method of
verification, the task isn't all that large. Still, if the receipts
followed a standard layout, they could be counted by machine quite
easily.

What method would you employ to assure that the receipts are not
forgeries?

The same method that assures that paper ballots aren't forgeries. If you
go back a few messages, I suggested that *two* receipts would be printed &
verified by the voter; one would be given to the polling official, just as
paper ballots are handled now. Then, at least one machine selected at
random from each precinct would have its electronic tally audited against
the receipt. In the case of a discrepancy, a 100% audit would be performed
at that precinct.

Neil


That's a reasoned solution. Why do you feel it necessary to *add* a
receipt to be given to the voter? What would be the advantage of
electronic voting over the current *one* ballot system?

Personally, I think it's going to be nearly impossible to insure an
accurate electronic vote tally much as it was in the
paper-vote/voting-machine era. But here's an idea:

Provide a real-time running total of each ballot choice on the
voter's display screen, so that s/he can confirm their vote
incremented accurately. The real-time vote tally could be
continuously monitored by representatives of each party/candidate?
If a dispute should arise, the sealed camera that monitored the
running tally could be consulted. Under no circumstances should
anyone other than the voter be able to modify the running tally;
their must be no way for administrator intervention to modify the
running tally.

Everything occurs in real-time. The voter confirms his own vote.
There is no necessity to print anything. Of course, there's the issue
of how to Handel the situation when/if the voter sees his vote affect
the tally erroneously.

This is crazy, as the value of each vote changes over the time of the poll.
Why should a later voter be able to affect the poll more than an earlier
voter just because the know the running tally.

Have a simple paper ballot and count all the votes at the end of polling.

"sfb" wrote in message news:GLXsf.9909$Q73.913@trnddc03...
If the rationalize is the computer program makes mistakes then you must
accept that either the electronic vote or the paper receipt could be
wrong. There is no guarantee that the paper receipt is correct since the
very same computer program that drives the electronic totals is printing
the paper receipt.

Anytime the screen vote and the paper receipt do not agree, you have to
give the voter a chance to fix it or call for an election judge. If you
don't, then which vote is valid.

Counting by hand is impossible. The three re-count counties in Florida in
2000 cast 1.6 million votes. All you need is one hand counter to sneeze
and you start all over.

Counting by hand is possible, it just requires some good organisation and
competence.
The UK votes with paper ballots and by about 4am Friday after the polls have
closed at 10m Thursday most of the seats in parliament have been declared.
The outlying constituencies in the Scottish Islands declare by lunch time on
the Friday. By 3pm Friday the outgoing government has resigned and the new
government is appointed. The ballot involves 26 million votes across 650
constitutencies in the general election and as many again in the various
local elections that take place on the same day. Recounts are common when
the margin is down to a few hundred votes.

There has been stiff competition amongst constituencies to be first to
declare. Sunderland South has repeated its performance in the last three
elections and in 2005 declared the incumbent re-elected as MP with a
majority of 11,059 at approximately 10.45pm