asymetric warfare

In article MPG.1a519da6af0338a89897c2@news,
Bernardz wrote:

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oplan-5027.htm

States that "North Korea has about 500 long-range artillery tubes within
range of Seoul...is within range of the 170mm Koksan gun and two hundred
240mm multiple-rocket launchers...The proximity of these long-range
systems to the Demilitarized Zone threatens all of Seoul with
devastating attacks."

Such an attack might result in a 100,000 dead in Seoul in the first day.

....if nobody bothers with counterbattery fire, or drops a bunch of high
explosives in the area of the artillery to make them stop shooting.

We *know* where these cannons are going to be firing from. Wh know
where their hardened shelters are. We know where their radar defenses
are.

If the North doesn't start with a completely unprovoked surprise attack,
they've got a good chance of getting erased very quickly.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

"Damo" wrote:

:
:" :If they can be mass-produced for $10,000 each, then a $1 bn
: rocurement -- and the sort of countries we're talking about
: :typically sign bigger weapons contracts than that -- would buy
: :100,000 missiles.
:
: I think you need to go look at this again. Hell, why not assume they
: cost $1 each and can be made by kindergardeners?
:
:A civilian is making a cruise missile in his garage in New Zealand for less
:then 5000 dollars.

I'll believe it when he gets it done, it has a usable warhead
fraction, and it works after being bounced around on roads (and off)
in the back of a truck for six months. And if it passes that, then
we'll talk about flight profiles, RCS, accuracy under GPS-jammed
conditions, etc.

Get back to me.

--
"Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute."
-- Charles Pinckney

pervect wrote:

:On Mon, 22 Dec 2003 08:45:07 GMT, (Derek
:Lyons) wrote:
:
(George William Herbert) wrote:
:
:This is all pretty easy to jam, since the frequencies are
:all known beforehand, but that general *approach* is very
:hard to penetrate with traffic analysis.
:
:note: This is more-or-less how the SSBN comm system works in fact.
:
:It's hard to penetrate with traffic analysis, yes. However a station
:transmitting 24/7 is a station that's easily located, and a station
:that will eat a gross of ordinance at H hour + .01 second.
:
:So everyobody goes on red alert as soon as the primary station stops
:broadcasting, and the targetting information has to be sent by the
:second backup station.

Then we're back to traffic analysis. If they stay up, they get
killed. If they don't stay up, coming up tells you something is going
on. No way around that.

--
"We come into the world and take our chances.
Fate is just the weight of circumstances.
That's the way that Lady Luck dances.
Roll the bones...."
-- "Roll The Bones", Rush

Bernardz wrote:

:In article ,
says...
: Bernardz wrote:
:
: :Say I built heaps of multiple-rocket launchers built an improved WW2, V1
: :jet to hit a city say at 200 miles and then targeted them at an US ally
: :cities.
: :
: :Aiming would be pretty trivial, most modern cities are pretty big anyway
: :and so what if a a lot miss? Its not like they cost me much anyway each
: :missile.
: :
: :My missiles shot down are a lot cheaper then the anti missiles the US
: :uses anyway.
: :
: :The make sure that this US ally is aware of your capability. That might
: :keep the US out of the conflict.
:
: You've got to build them somewhere.
:
:I presume that they would be built long before the conflict started.

So kill the factories and wait 5 years. Most of them won't work.

: They have to launch from
: somewhere. Both of those 'somewheres' can be targeted and obliterated
: in pretty short order.
:
:We could not do it in Iraq. Mobile launchers are very difficult to take
ut.

For onesy-twosy launches this is true, but that's not really what's
being talked about here, is it?

: :This strategy seems to work for the North Koreans.
:
: Well, no. What works for the North Koreans is a bunch of artillery
: and a huge army sitting poised to attack South Korea, whose capital is
: right up there by the border.
:
:Its a bit of both. In the event of a conflict the army gives the North
:Koreans time to attack Seoul by long range artillery and rocket
:launchers. Most of their artillery is short and medium range artillery
:built to hit the DMZ and the area south of it, it cannot reach Seoul.

Well, no, it's not "a bit of both" and I note that you clipped the
original statement.

:Jane's International Defense Review however states that
:
:North Korean long range artillery can deliver 1,5kT of high explosives
:in Seoul within one hour using 28,152 artillery rounds and rockets.
:
:1,5kT/hour mean 36kT/day, which is something like 2 Nagasaki-size atom
:bombs a day.
:
:http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oplan-5027.htm
:
:States that "North Korea has about 500 long-range artillery tubes within
:range of Seoul...is within range of the 170mm Koksan gun and two hundred
:240mm multiple-rocket launchers...The proximity of these long-range
:systems to the Demilitarized Zone threatens all of Seoul with
:devastating attacks."
:
:Such an attack might result in a 100,000 dead in Seoul in the first day.

It's not just the dead. It obliterates the largest city in the South
and creates a lot of refugees, who then interfere with the movement of
troops north.

: IRBMs and nuclear warheads help, too.
:
:Agreed. Particularly as they maybe able to hit Japan.

They are most definitely able to hit Japan, since they've fired OVER
Japan in tests. They MAY be able to hit LA.

--
"Rule Number One for Slayers - Don't die."
-- Buffy, the Vampire Slayer

"peter" wrote in message ...
I think almost everyone is missing the point about assymetric warfare. All
the comments are based on US/NATO type equipment standards, and military
objectives. The whole point of assymetric warfare is that you don't follow
the standards, you go for what you can achieve where you can achieve it with
what you can get. 9/11 was a classic example.

If some one out there is planning on using cruise missiles for example, he
wont build them to Tomahawk standards, he wont select tomahawk like targets
and so on.

Assymetric warfare is about doing the unexpected, with the unexpected by
surprise, that negates the defences and allows success.

If you haven't got the budget of the US, you dont try to emulate them and
expect to win, you have to think out of 'our' box.



Brings to mind the VC etc. use of 122mm and 240mm rockets as short
range boosters for oil drums, etc. filled with explosives. The new
variant is the Improvised Explosive Device, in this case the delivery
system comes to you in the form of patrols. Just saw a refernce to
600,000 tons of explosives in Iraq:
"There is approximately 600,000 tons of ordnance out on the ground
throughout the country," said Army Maj. Adam Boyd, of the 1138th Mine,
Explosive and Ordnance Information Coordination Center, "and the enemy
is getting smarter every single day on how to use it."

ess (phil hunt) writes:

On Sun, 21 Dec 2003 23:41:35 GMT, Fred J. McCall
:co-ordination = radio

In which case we're going to KNOW when you're spooling up to shoot and
you'll be dead before everybody gets rolled out and ready.

Have you never heard of encryption, or are you trolling?


Communications networks which are concieved by people who use the word
"encryption" more often than they use the phrase "key distribution",
are almost guaranteed to be transparent to any capable opponent. If
they care, the NSA will be *running* the key distribution system for
such networks, the nominal owners having naively imagined they solved
the whole problem when they downloaded their copy of PGP.


--
*John Schilling * "Anything worth doing, *
*Member:AIAA,NRA,ACLU,SAS,LP * is worth doing for money" *
*Chief Scientist & General Partner * -13th Rule of Acquisition *
*White Elephant Research, LLC * "There is no substitute *
* for success" *
*661-951-9107 or 661-275-6795 * -58th Rule of Acquisition *

On Sun, 21 Dec 2003 21:00:20 +0000, phil hunt wrote:
On Sat, 20 Dec 2003 12:34:10 -0800, pervect wrote:
On Sat, 20 Dec 2003 18:15:56 +0000, ess (phil
hunt) wrote:
If you don't go to spread-spectrum, your radio links will probably be
jammed. (Solution - go to spread spectrum).

Indeed.

Then you need to use relatively high frequencies, and your
radio navigation system will be line-of-sight only.

This then means you need lots of closely-spaced transmitters,
especially if you want to be able to navigate while flying
at low altitude.

I'd still rate a radio location system using spread spectrum
transmitters as rather vulnerable, because the transmitters have to
remain in a fixed location for the system to work, and would be prime
targets.

What if most of the transimtters are turned off most of the time? If
there are fake transmitters, there to soak up hits, and (hopefully)
entice enemy aircraft to put themselves in danger?

Then your radio navigation system has gotten a lot more
complicated. You can't just set up transmitters at arbitrary
locations broadcasting at arbitrary times -- to work, a radio
navigation system needs known transmitters at precisely known
locations.

Say 80 percent of your transmitters are turned off at any one
time. Then you need five times as many transmitters in total,
so that you can get complete coverage in the area where you want
to navigate with only 20 percent of them.

If you set up fake transmitters to attract attention away from
the real ones, you also need to somehow avoid spoofing your own
weapons. It would kind of suck if all of your HLCCMs flew off
to the wrong place because they were navigating using signals
from a fake transmitter.


ljd

"Damo" wrote:
A civilian is making a cruise missile in his garage in New Zealand for less
then 5000 dollars.

No, he's built, but not flown one prototype thats pretty much an
engine and crude guidance.

I dont have the web site but from memory it has a range
of 500k (?), accurate to about 10m (uses GPS which of course is not secure
in a war zone) and sends live TV feed back to base.

It's range, accuracy, and performance are unknown, the prototype has
never actually flown. The systems have never been integrated. (And
the author of the page is an enthusiastic player of his own music.)

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
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Enhanced HTML Version:
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Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
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discussion.

In article ,
phil hunt wrote:
On 19 Dec 2003 15:38:09 GMT, Bertil Jonell wrote:
In article ,
phil hunt wrote:
I've worked as a programmer for
defense contractors (and for other large organisations), and believe
me, there is a *lot* of waste and inefficiency. If the software was
written right, it could probably be done with several orders of
magnitude more efficiency.

What competing method is there except for Open Source?

Open source -- or rather, using some of the ideas from how OSS
projects are btypically run -- is certainly useful.

The reason for my question is that I don't think Open Source is
very applicable the type of 'sharp edge' military systems you are
talking about here.
It is very applicable to making programs that help you make sure
that every regiment gets the correct number of socks and ammo, but not to
making program that handles guidance and target discrimination routines.
Especially not if you expect your capabilities to remain anything
like secret.

(Email: , but first subtract 275 and reverse

-bertil-
--
"It can be shown that for any nutty theory, beyond-the-fringe political view or
strange religion there exists a proponent on the Net. The proof is left as an
exercise for your kill-file."

pervect wrote:

On Mon, 22 Dec 2003 08:45:07 GMT, (Derek
Lyons) wrote:

(George William Herbert) wrote:

This is all pretty easy to jam, since the frequencies are
all known beforehand, but that general *approach* is very
hard to penetrate with traffic analysis.

note: This is more-or-less how the SSBN comm system works in fact.

It's hard to penetrate with traffic analysis, yes. However a station
transmitting 24/7 is a station that's easily located, and a station
that will eat a gross of ordinance at H hour + .01 second.

So everyobody goes on red alert as soon as the primary station stops
broadcasting, and the targetting information has to be sent by the
second backup station.

And then the secondary system gets targeted PDQ...

To anticipate some objections, yes, if you get all the backup
stations, you will prevent the sending of the targeting information
(as well as any other sort of C&C activity).

You and Phil, and to a lesser extent George, who should know better,
don't seem to realize that killing the enemy C&C is how the US fights
wars today. The days of grinding towards the Capital worrying only
about the front line and hoping a golden bullet takes out the Leader
are dead and gone. This is 2003 not 1943.

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.