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#21
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Sorry, the Comanche mess was the Army's fault. They never funded it
fully, never froze the requirement, and allowed the thing to consume the entire aviation budget. Workfare for the primes? Who's fault was that? (See what I mean about Weldon?) Boeing and Sikorsky never fought the Army to keep the thing on a low burner. The Army insisted it needed the Comanche up to shortly before the cancellation. Can you blame the guys on the program for living in the Twilight Zone? By all accounts the Comanche air vehicles flew as advertised. The program just never had the money to integrate the air vehicle with the all-important MEP. Waiting to cancel the thing just when the factory was starting up was the Army's doing. US101 and VH-92 off-the-shelf? Trouble is, all that is left is NOT stuffing in the special avionics, EMI protection, etc. They so gold-plated the requirement that both aircraft had to grow to carry all the people and systems. Navy assistant secretary White said both aircraft needed rotor and drivetrain improvements to meet VXX objective requirements. That means the EH101 gets a new rotor system, a new transmission and probably FBW controls paid for by the US taxpayer. Fixes the Italians and the Brits needed but couldn't afford will get done on our dime. That version then gets marketed out of Italy (and the US) to meet future requirements. China on the S-92? They saw a potentially big market, but I think the PRC is more risk then reward. HW |
#22
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But in the case of the US101 and VH92, both
aircraft are already supposedly developed Note the emphasis I placed on "supposedly". The improvements you spoke of have been in the works for both aircraft for years. They were added by each company to their proposals to offer the best possible performance. Based on what I have read, the 101 improvements are much further along than the S-92. This was probably a factor in the selection. All DOD aircraft programs in my experience are over sold, under funded and unrealistically scheduled. The Commanche if anything was better off than most. Look at the A-12. This Navy replacement for the A-6 was scheduled to go from contract award to first flight of a "Production" aircraft in less than 42 months! When it was cancelled three airfcraft were 10 months away from completion. It was the first major program to die from fallout of the demise of the USSR. The Commanche just took longer. The Navy learned its lesson after the A-12 cancelation, and made sure that the F-18E/F requirements were defined, no technology developement was required and schedule was realistic. If they had not, there would currently be a lot of aircraft carriers without any attack capability. The Army is now doing the same with the ARH and LUH programs. They cannot afford to make another mistake like the Commanche program management did. OH-58's attrition in the Iraq and Afganistan won't allow it. Advanced UAVs capable of performing the required missions are a decade away at least. I predict who ever wins the ARH program, it will be sucessful. We cannot afford it not to be. I respect your support of Sikorsky. But if it had been a competion between the V-22 and a US101 final assembled by Sikorsky, would you still feel the same way? |
#23
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Yep, probably. The EH101 is a bad investment on multiple fronts, and
somehow the rules of the game were twisted to arrive at this decision. The EH101 was grounded during the competition due to a material related mishap, and the Navy just blew past that like it was no big deal. Something ain't right here. My original point was the EH101 was desgined and certificated under rules written in 1978. That means it lacks the longitudinal crash strength built into a helicopter designed and built today under later certification standards. Strengthening the US101 cabin to modern crashworthiness standards will add cost, risk, and weight. Likewise, matching the birdstrike, turbine burst, and lightning protection of a modern aircraft will require redesign - again cost and risk. With the US101, Presidents for the next 30 years will continue to ride above aircraft fuel cells - again, if you had your druthers in a modern helicopter, you'd isolate the fuel system from the passenger cabin. Again, if you're looking for the safest aircraft to carry the President, something ain't right here. Add to that risk the whole question of outsourcing VH work offshore. Presidential helo work was always subject to the highest security requirements and performed by cleared US citizens. Now the Navy is willing to piece out big chunks of the thing to Italy and the UK like it's no big deal. The EH101 has three engines 'cause it needs 'em. That means higher operating and support costs for the life of the aircraft. Is this the best value for the taxpayers? I suspect after delays and overruns, the US101 will probably serve fine in the meticulous maintenance environment of HMX-1. That doesn't mean it was a smart buy. And if there's an accident, it may be a very stupid one. My Comanche comments were based on the fact that the Army validated, re-validated, and re-re-validated the requirement for more than a decade after the end of the Cold War. The failure was in the procurement system, not in the people who built the helicopter. The Air Force had the bucks to build four and fly four ATF prototypes to see what it wanted (and they may have screwed that up too.). The Army had to stop flying the one Comanche it had after 300 hours 'cause the program ran out of money. Go figure. Let's see if ARH stays on target. HW |
#24
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Helowriter wrote: Sorry, the Comanche mess was the Army's fault. They never funded it fully, never froze the requirement, and allowed the thing to consume the entire aviation budget. Agreed....a creeping goal line for years doesn't help! |
#25
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What killed the Comanche was its mission disapeared. Stealth
technology does not protect against primitive line of site weapons. Even if the spec had been frozen five years ago and the aircraft had been fielded, it's final flyaway cost would have made it's use impractical in the war on terror. Even the future of the F-35 is now questionable. CTR |
#26
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What killed the Comanche was its mission disapeared. Stealth
technology does not protect against primitive line of site weapons. Even if the spec had been frozen five years ago and the aircraft had been fielded, it's final flyaway cost would have made it's use impractical in the war on terror. Even the future of the F-35 is now questionable. CTR |
#27
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What killed the Comanche was its mission disapeared. Stealth
technology does not protect against primitive line of site weapons. Even if the spec had been frozen five years ago and the aircraft had been fielded, it's final flyaway cost would have made it's use impractical in the war on terror. Even the future of the F-35 is now questionable. CTR |
#28
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The mission - armed reconaissance - is still there.
The enemy right now is an insurgency with handheld weapons. Don't assume all future wars will throw Army Aviation against enemies armed only with MANPADS and RPGs. Apaches were closed out of Kosovo in part by radar-directed threats, and RF MANPADS in the future are not out of the question. A decade from now, helicopters may face integrated air defenses -- probably not the massed Soviet threat, but mobile RF and IR threats that justify signature reduction. The Comanche flyaway cost is another story - and that's a program management failure. Stretching development while reducing numbers increases unit price. That's where freezing a requirement and starting a line helps. The Army could have relaxed its LO requirements on the Comanche and saved a bit. But that very highly integrated Mission Equipment Package meant you didn't save much by just leaving things off. That in itself may be a real lesson for future systems designers. All of this brings us back to the original topic - the Presidential Helicopter. What's so nutty about this is that Lockheed Martin didn't win with the best Mission Equipment Package. The Navy just chose the biggest box for whatever the systems will be. In the process, they ignored 10+ years of helicopter safety advances. Given the mission, that is truly nuts. HW |
#29
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HW,
Maybe we should start a new topic heading. Why can't the mission of armed reconaissance be performed by a UAV? The Army killed DARPA's UCAR, but their concept is the future. Even if the Brass refuses to accept it. I agree the all the technology is not there currenty, but in 10+ years... Take care, CTR |
#30
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Okay, new topic. Armed reconaissance.
HW |
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