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#32
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![]() "Matt Wiser" wrote in message news:412b51f9$1@bg2.... "Kevin Brooks" wrote: "Matt Wiser" wrote in message news:412a26b3$1@bg2.... It took a double-whammy of the A-bomb and Ivan crossing into Manchuria and Korea to end the war. The A-bomb alone might not have been enough. Anything that prevents OLYMPIC and CORONET from having to be executed had to be done. Period. The Japanese Cabinet was meeting to discuss Hiroshima and the Soviet invasion when word reached them of the Nagasaki strike. Next day Hirohito decides that enough is enough. 14 Aug is the attempted putsch that fails and the Surrender announcement comes on the 15th. Next probable nuclear strike date was on 18 Aug with Kokura as the primary. Bomb #3 was about to leave Los Alamos on 10 Aug when a hold order arrived. Two bombs and a million and a half Russians in the space of four days forced Japan's surrender. End of story and of war. Overly simplistic, at least those last two sentences. A hell of a lot more than that went into the Japanese surrender equation. The tightening sea blockade, effective inshore mining by B-29's, the creeping effects of the B-29 raids against industrial and urban areas, the gaining of bases at Iwo Jima and Okinawa that now moved even more landbased airpower into range of Kyushu and Honshu, the isolation of large troop garrisons in far-flung and by then bypassed areas, the fact that they no longer had any navy to speak of outside kamikaze attack light combatants being horded, along with their remaining aircraft, to counter the feared invasion of Kyushu, and of course that feared homeland invasion itself (and the fact that the more reasonable Japanese leaders by then realized that "Ketsu-Go" was invariably doomed to failure when that invasion did come)...all of these factors contributed to the Japanese surrender. The first atomic bomb was an attention getter, the Soviet invasion was the closure of their forlorn negotiated surrender hopes, and the second bomb was the final closer. Brooks snip And there was no way that the Kyushu invasion (OLYMPIC) could have been repelled That is what I meant when I said that their more competent leaders realized that Ketsu-Go was not a winning option; Ketsu-Go was their defensive plan for the home islands that had succeeded the previous Sho-Go. : Most Japanese defenses were on the beaches and inland in range of NGFS, and a suggestion that the defense of Okinawa and Luzon be emulated was rejected-the plan was defend on the beaches and in strength inland, but True, but you must remember that their strategy was to try and neutralize the NGFS and CAS superiority the US would have enjoyed by making it a close-in "knife fight" that would have limited the usefullness of each of those fire support systems. They were hamstrung, though, by their lack of engineer units with which to prepare adequate defenses. once the beach defenses are broken, the Japanese coastal divisions have had it, The Japanese had already recognized that allowing the US to gain a beachhed *anywhere* typically resulted in a rapid buildup of combat power that their forces could not subsequently cope with, which is why they depended upon first trying to hammer the invasion fleet with kamikaze attacks from the air, the surface of the sea, and under the sea, and then engaging the spearhead forces in close combat. Their best hope was that they could make the cost so bloody to the allies that we would decide it was not worth the effort--not a very likely outcome. But it would have likely been plenty bloody for both sides. and the attempts to move reserves from South-Central Kyushu to counterattack (Ariake Bay, where XI Corps with 1st Cav, 43rd and Americal Divisions would have landed was considered by the Japanese to be the main battle area in Kyushu) would have been exposed to air attack and have had very poor roads on which to move anyway. The Japanese staff did a pretty good job in terms of identifying the likely invasion sites and arraying forces accordingly. And you are right, their CATK forces would have been hard pressed to do their job; their plans called for them to arrive and launch directly into battle from march order, so those that *did* survive the inevitable pounding from allied air interdiction efforts would have found themselves being fed into the gristmill in a piecemeal fashion, not a good thing (for them). Mostly grunts with little heavy equipment anyhow and what armor they had would have suffered from air and naval gunfire before even getting to the battle. Best case for Kyushu is 30 days, more likely 45-50 days before Southern Kyushu is relatively secure and the base-building gets underway for to support CORONET. I'd be careful about overestimating the value of WWII long range NGFS; history shows that it was often of limited value (the most valuable NGFS in numerous operations was that provided by the tin cans operating up-close-and-personal). Time and again we pounded the hell out of Japanese defenses with NGFS, only to have to tangle with them when they emerged from their bunkers and hidey-holes. Brooks Posted via www.My-Newsgroups.com - web to news gateway for usenet access! |
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#34
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![]() "WaltBJ" wrote in message om... Every time this subject comes up I am both amazed and appalled at the revisionist/PC thinking based on fragmentary knowledge of the situation existing then. The US had just been thorugh the Peleliu, Iwo Jma, Phillipines and Okinawa campaigns and the casualties were horrendous. Now we were going to invade the Japanese Home Islands and we could reliably expect the fighting to be grimly intense. I strongly recommend y'all find books on the above campaigns and read through them and then look up the plans to invade Kyushu and then the Tokyo beaches. Especially study the Japanese planned counteractions - they had deduced where the landings were to take place. Not very difficult - there's not that many choices. The Combined Japanese Air Forces had held back 5,000 air-lanes for Kamikaze use! Note that the Services of Supply had ordered 400,000 Purple Hearts for the two invasions. Also note that President Truman had been in combat in WW1. ISTR he was a field artillery battery CO - not a staff officer. He knew plenty about battle casualties from real personal knowledge. So, with the atomic bomb handy, would you-all have the guts (and gall) to sened your troops into battle knowing that the casualties would be horrendous, far greater than Iwo or Okinawa? And you would have to recycle ETO infantry combat vets to replace the fully expected losses - guys that had already 'seen the elephant'? Face it - the US was running low on front line troops - Now - would I have given the order? Damn right I would - given the choice between killing the enemy and saving my own troops or doing a grim trade-off of my guys for theirs - I'd nuke and re-nuke them until they quit. They fro damn sure earned it. Unlike most of you-all I've lost enough very close friends in combat, men I've trusted my life to. Now stop all your maunderings until you've done some study of the situation - as it existed back then! As for collateral damage - the Russkies did a pretty good job on Warsaw and points west, culminating in Berlin. Massive artillery barrages take a little longer than nuking the places but the result was pretty much the same except the area of destruction is larger. Walt BJ Great post in "politically correct" today world. We can't judge wartime happenings on basis what we think is nice or not nice today. From the wars in Bible antagonistic sides had done ALL they can to put enemy down. It is wrong and sad - but it is just true. Any of fighting sides in ww2 had used nukes for sure if they had one. And president or field commander who sents million or more of his soldiers to death for reason he just don't wants to use full potential of weaponry available would end up in court. For sure things are different in Iraq or Vietnam or Afganistan - but those are more police operations, not real war when life and fate of both side is on vague. |
#35
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Kevin Brooks wrote:
Great, but unfortuantely now a bit outdated... What is outdated? , since we know the reason Stalin was not overtly impressed by the mention of the bomb (not really a "brief", now was it?) Who said "brief"? -- Regards, Venik Visit my site: http://www.aeronautics.ru If you need to e-mail me, please use the following subject line: ?Subject=Newsgr0ups_resp0 nse |
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BUFDRVR wrote:
Which hardy means he briefed Stalin on the results of the Mahatten Project as you insinuated. Don't assume what wasn't said. -- Regards, Venik Visit my site: http://www.aeronautics.ru If you need to e-mail me, please use the following subject line: ?Subject=Newsgr0ups_resp0 nse |
#37
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Keith Willshaw wrote:
Incorrect, the militarists in charge wanted to hold out for a deal that would leave them in control of Korea, Taiwan and Manchuria. Right, I suppose they wanted Alaska and Siberia as well. -- Regards, Venik Visit my site: http://www.aeronautics.ru If you need to e-mail me, please use the following subject line: ?Subject=Newsgr0ups_resp0 nse |
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Fred the Red Shirt wrote:
Not hard for me. Like, who was going to tell them? I am sure the Japanese high command was waiting by the phone all day Immediately following the Yalta conference, the Soviets initiated a massive mobilization of military and industrial capabilities in the Far East. The Soviet Pacific Fleet was reinforced with additional landing craft, fast attack boats and other ships - preparations that the Japanese could not have missed even if every last one of them was looking south. So, unless the Japanese thought that the massive Soviet military preparations in the Far East that immediately followed the Yalta conference were to throw he biggest May Day parade Vladivostok has ever seen, I am certain they had a fairly good chance of putting one and one together. Really, there've been volumes written on the subject, so, like, read a book, man, or something. Conventional wisdom has it that the Soviets were happy to receive the delegation to help mislead the Japanese into thinking that a Soviet attack was NOT imminent And it was not imminent. The declaration of war, however, was. By letting the Japanese know that the declaration of war was inevitable, the USSR would have gained leverage to force a negotiated surrender from Japan. Stalin had much to gain from such a deal as opposed to a full-scale invasion, which was planned by Vasilevsky on August 26-31 and was to be led by the 87th Infantry Corps. The reason they "shouldn't have" produced results was that Stalin had made a prior comitment to enter the war against Japan. Once again, you are confusing the declaration of war with the actual war. The Soviet preparations for a war with Japan were obvious and there was an obvious chronological link between these preparations and the Yalta conference. The fact that the USSR was going to attack Japan following the defeat of Germany was well-known since the Tehran conference, when Stalin said that the Soviet attack against Japan would be possible by increasing the Soviet forces in the Far East threefold, which can happen after the defeat of Germany. So, yes, Stalin's promise to attack Japan made at the Yalta conference was definitely the secret of Polichinelle. I am very interested in your source of information here. It is hard to imagine Le May not wanting to use any weapon against Japan It's a well-known fact that Arnold and LeMay did not favor using the A-bomb against Japan, believing that the war can be won by conventional bombing. It is also a well-known fact that LeMay actively opposed the use of the A-bomb, but carried out the orders imposed on him. LeMay himself wrote about this in his memoirs. He believed in 1945 as he believed in Do you people read or just watch PBS? Naturally, not all for the same reasons, but a number of other US commanders did not support the use of the A-bomb against Japan: Bradley, Strauss, King, Leahy, Arnold. And unlike most of them, Le May maintained his position even after the A-bomb was used, saying during a press conference on September 20, 1945: "The atomic bomb had nothing to do with the end of the war at all." They hide this information in books, which you should try to read from time to time to supplement your PBS education. and MacArthur (according to a biographical piece I saw recently on PBS) wanted to use nuclear weapons in Korea. I don't think we are talking about the same war... Again, can you show that the US gave Japan any guarantees as to the Emperor's safety befor they agreed to surender? Such a guarantee may have been in the formal terms of surrender, but the question is, was such a guarantee communicated to the Japanese befor the actual surrender negotiations? You must be joking. The question of the Emperor was the cornerstone of this whole diplomatic spectacle. I can imagine the scene on board the USS Missouri: Foreign Minister Shigemitsu and General Umezu are glancing over the surrender deal before signing. Shigemitsu: "I'll be damned, Yoshijiro, look: it says we can keep His Imperial Majesty after all." MacArthur: "Didn't you two clowns get the memo I sent out this morning?" Nonsense. While Truman may have given some consideration to what territory the Soviets might have gained had the war continued for another year or more there is no reason to believe he did not give more consideration to American, Chinese, and even Ja[panese casualties to be expected from a continuation of the war. Yes, he was a gentle and caring person this Truman. They say he even lost his appetite for a few days after nuking tens of thousands of civilians in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. -- Regards, Venik Visit my site: http://www.aeronautics.ru If you need to e-mail me, please use the following subject line: ?Subject=Newsgr0ups_resp0 nse |
#39
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![]() Venik wrote: Keith Willshaw wrote: Incorrect, the militarists in charge wanted to hold out for a deal that would leave them in control of Korea, Taiwan and Manchuria. Right, I suppose they wanted Alaska and Siberia as well. -- Regards, Venik Visit my site: http://www.aeronautics.ru If you need to e-mail me, please use the following subject line: ?Subject=Newsgr0ups_resp 0nse If they had won, yes. But they didn't. They lost. Period. And Several of the militarists got their necks stretched at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial in 1948. Posted via www.My-Newsgroups.com - web to news gateway for usenet access! |
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Matt Wiser wrote:
If they had won, yes. But they didn't. They lost. Period. And Several of the militarists got their necks stretched at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial in 1948. I am not sure what you were trying to say, but I liked it, so keep it up. -- Regards, Venik Visit my site: http://www.aeronautics.ru If you need to e-mail me, please use the following subject line: ?Subject=Newsgr0ups_resp0 nse |
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