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#31
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In article , Guy Alcala
writes Dave Eadsforth wrote: In article , BUFDRVR writes Dave Eadsforth wrote: SNIP If someone could give me a thumbnail sketch of how a series of B17 Combat Wings usually approached a target, and what specific options for attack were possible between the IP and the RP I would be very grateful. Depends on the period, but typically the wings would be 2-5miles in trail of each other. At the IP, each wing would try and get the groups in trail, by the lead group making a regular turn and the flanking (high and low ) groups turning early or late. However, groups would stay at their same heights for bombing, which made reassembly into the wing formation after exiting the target easier. In practice, it often was difficult or impossible for the groups to get into trail, so you might have the groups actually approaching the target on convergent courses, sometimes simultaneously. This could cause problems if one group flew under another at bombs away - see the fairly numerous photos of B-17s or B-24s destroyed or damaged by being bombed by a/c of a higher group. For example, there's a widely published sequence showing a B-17 under another which releases its bombs, one of which removes the left horizontal stabilizer and elevator of the lower a/c, which then gradually departs controlled flight and is lost. I think I have seen it. Rather chilling... It could get even worse, when one or more _wings_ approached the target at the same time, usually because someone had missed turning at the proper IP, or else one of the formations had gone around again because they hadn't bombed the first time (which made the lead bombardier and the mission commander very unpopular with the other crews). Depending on the size of the target and the number of wings, following wings might have the same or a different aimpoint. Later in the war with more wings, the latter practice was more common, as it was found that smoke and fires from the earlier groups bombs often made it impossible for the later groups' bombardiers to spot the original aimpoint. Indeed, the 8th Operational Research section did a study which showed that group bombing accuracy directly correlated with where the group was in the sequence; the earlier a group bombed the target, the more accurately it bombed. See Stephen L. McFarland's book "America's Pursuit of Precision Bombing, 1910-1945," for everything you're ever likely to have wanted to know (and a lot more) about U.S. and other countries bombsight development and use, as well as accuracies achievable, production issues, factors such as the above which caused bombing errors, etc. If it is on Amazon or the like, I'll find it. Thanks! In 1944 and especially in 1945 when attacking smaller, less well-defended targets with smaller formations, it became common to once again bomb by squadrons instead of groups, precisely to avoid the sort of spillover wastage that larger bombing formations caused. Made sense... As to the technique of individual bombers aiming and bombing a target in a stream, AFAIK that was only practised by the RAF at night, from 1944 or so on (for precision attacks, that is). This appears to have been adopted because Churchill was worried about French civilian casualties from collateral damage if the transportation plan was adopted. However, it was found that Bomber Command (well, 5 Group anyway, usually led by 617 as target markers), was able to bomb marshalling yards accurately and keep the collateral damage down, by bombing individually instead of in formation. Using large formations would have caused too much spillover damage -- even with a 100% accurate MPI, the bomb coverage area of a big formation was so large that numerous bombs were bound to hit outside the target area. With individual bombers, even the occasional gross aiming error resulted in fewer bombs hitting civilian areas. Note that this technique was only considered possible in areas where the defenses were rather light, i.e. over France at night, because the bombers lacked mutual support for defense. It's also true that such a risk was considered politically necessary to avoid allied civilian causualties, whereas by 1944 (at least), none of the allied commanders cared all that much if collateral damage from spillover due to bombing in formation killed large numbers of German civilians. Guy That's a huge thumbnail, Guy - thanks very much for devoting the time to writing it. Archived and backed up already... Cheers, Dave -- Dave Eadsforth |
#32
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Guy Alcala wrote:
snip That reminds me, if you can you might want to find a copy of Martin Middlebrook's "The Schweinfurt-Regensburg Raid", as it describes the wing shift into bombing formation by groups in trail and group bombing accuracy, as well as many other tactical matters pertaining to mid-1943 era (and largely for the rest of the war) 8th Bomber Command missions. Guy |
#33
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Another excellent reference is "The Mighty Eighth War Manual" by Roger A.
Freeman. Jack G. Disclaimer: Yes Art, I am a veteran with no combat experience, but I do believe news groups exist more for the exchange of information than for sharing "experiences". "Guy Alcala" wrote in message . .. Guy Alcala wrote: snip That reminds me, if you can you might want to find a copy of Martin Middlebrook's "The Schweinfurt-Regensburg Raid", as it describes the wing shift into bombing formation by groups in trail and group bombing accuracy, as well as many other tactical matters pertaining to mid-1943 era (and largely for the rest of the war) 8th Bomber Command missions. Guy |
#34
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Subject: Fly tight for tight bomb patterns on the ground.
From: "Jack G" Date: 8/24/2004 4:18 PM Pacific Standard Time nother excellent reference is "The Mighty Eighth War Manual" by Roger A. Freeman. Jack G. Disclaimer: Yes Art, I am a veteran with no combat experience, but I do believe news groups exist more for the exchange of information than for sharing "experiences". With no experiences to share I see your point. No offense of course. Arthur Kramer 344th BG 494th BS England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany Visit my WW II B-26 website at: http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer |
#36
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Art,
There is nothing you can say about me personally that could possibly offend me - I just consider the source. What you say about not-combat veterans in general is offensive and is a very sad reflection you personally. Jack G. With no experiences to share I see your point. No offense of course. Arthur Kramer 344th BG 494th BS England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany Visit my WW II B-26 website at: http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer |
#37
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My mind boggles at the thought of a long string of B17s in single file
trail. Besides giving the flak a chance to shoot at each aircraft individually, and the lack of mutual bomber gun support versus the fighters, by the time the middle guys got there the target would be obscured by smoke and dust from the bombs ahead. By late 44 most B17/B24 bombing was executed by the lead bombardier, a man picked for skill, and the rest of the planes in the formation dropped their bombs when he dropped his. AMAF there was a radio system to trigger the rest of the planes when he pressed the pickle button, but I don't know how much it was used. FWIW I've seen bomb trails from Arc Light (B52)strikes in the jungles of VN - three parallel lines of craters, maybe half a mile to a mile long. The craters are not each a single line but sort of staggered slightly from side to side as the MERs left center and right stations kick the bombs left, down and right - slightly. As I remember the spacing between strings is like a couple hundred yards or so. Again, FWIW, a lot of those strings of craters were left by F4 formations dropping off Loran birds or the RBS (MSQ) station at NKP. That involved a lot of either close formation or night work holding a precise heading altitude and airspeed for what seemed like an hour meanwhile listening to the RHAW gear chirping (and now and then rattling) away. Bombing like that was like kissing an elderly aunt when I was a little kid. Walt BJ |
#38
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ArtKramr wrote:
The mystery is that with all we learned in WW II about formations and bomb patterns, as late as Nam the USAF was still droping in trails. sigh We bomb in trail (for the most part) today and do a great job. Trail formation has many benifits, not the least of which, it provides much needed flexability when engaged by SAMs. Your broad generalizations continue.... BUFDRVR "Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips everyone on Bear Creek" |
#39
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ArtKramr wrote:
The tighter the formation you fly the tighter the bomb pattern on the ground and the more damage you do to the enemy. If you're trying to wreck fresh bomb craters, the tighter the better. Cheers --mike http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer/stripes.htm Arthur Kramer 344th BG 494th BS England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany Visit my WW II B-26 website at: http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer |
#40
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When was the concept of fratricide among bombs first clearly articulated?
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