What if we ignored N. Africa and the MTO?

On Mon, 1 Dec 2003 16:07:18 -0000, "Keith Willshaw"
wrote:


Because there is no way the invasion could have been successfully launched
in 1943.

I disagree.


The troops,

There were as many divisions available as they were used between June
6th 1944 and August 1st 1944 on the Normandy bridgehead.

landing craft

Allies had enough landing craft to perform Husky in summer 1943 and
Torch in autumn 1942. There were certainly enough craft to land the
five divisions of the first wave and immediate support.

and aircraft were simply not available

Allies had in ETO and MTO at least twice as much aircraft (without
counting strategic bombers) than Luftwaffe had in total. Throughout
1943, Luftwaffe was incapable of preventing Allied air, naval and
ground operations in the Mediterranean. In case of 1943 invasion,
Allied assets that couldn't have been used in the Mediterranean (Air
Defense of Great Britain) would have been utilised.

Some 5000 ships and landing craft, 600,000 tons of supplies and 200,000
vehicles had to be assembled

These were the forces needed to arrive to German border within three
months of D-day, but such requirement would not be necessary condition
for the success of 1943 invasion.

in addition to the armies and then there's the little matter of winning air superiority
over the landing beaches. Without the decimation of the Luftwaffe in late 1943 and
early 1944 and lacking long range escort fighters any attempted invasion
would have been exceptionally risky.

Luftwaffe was incapable of defeating Allied air forces in the
Mediterranean. By mid 1943, Allies had twice as much fighters
available as Luftwaffe had. Allied did not need long range escorts for
air superiority over La Manche and bridgehead.


As for the MTO it was simply not possible to isolate the German and
Italian armies and ignore them.

Operation Torch was not necessary. If it was skipped, Allies would
have had the resources to establish a second front in north-western
France in 1943.


Had they been able to seize the Suez canal and middle east

It's long way from El Agheila to Iraq.

they would have had access to virtually unlimited oil supplies from Iraq

The wells that would have been thoroughly wrecked by retreating
British. It would have taken at least six months to repair the
damages.

In addition, Italy lacked enough tankers to carry the oil.


As it was the forces captured when Tunisia fell were greater than
those captured at Stalingrad and not only was Italy knocked out of
the war but the Germans had to garrison that country as well
thus diverting troops who could have been used to defend
Northern France.

Italian troops were disarmed and sent to work in Germany thus freeing
Germans to man the garrison divisions deployed to replace Italian
divisions. Italians were more efficient working in German war economy
than in Italian one.


Drax

Subject: What if we ignored N. Africa and the MTO?
From: (Drazen Kramaric)
Date: 12/6/03 12:07 PM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:

and aircraft were simply not available

Allies had in ETO and MTO at least twice as much aircraft (without
counting strategic bombers) than Luftwaffe had in total. Throughout
1943, Luftwaffe was incapable of preventing Allied air, naval and
ground operations in the Mediterranean. In case of 1943 invasion,
Allied assets that couldn't have been used in the Mediterranean (Air
Defense of Great Britain) would have been utilised.

Some 5000 ships and landing craft, 600,000 tons of supplies and 200,000
vehicles had to be assembled

These were the forces needed to arrive to German border within three
months of D-day, but such requirement would not be necessary condition
for the success of 1943 invasion.

in addition to the armies and then there's the little matter of winning air
superiority
over the landing beaches. Without the decimation of the Luftwaffe in late
1943 and
early 1944 and lacking long range escort fighters any attempted invasion
would have been exceptionally risky.

Luftwaffe was incapable of defeating Allied air forces in the
Mediterranean. By mid 1943, Allies had twice as much fighters
available as Luftwaffe had. Allied did not need long range escorts for
air superiority over La Manche and bridgehead.


As for the MTO it was simply not possible to isolate the German and
Italian armies and ignore them.

Operation Torch was not necessary. If it was skipped, Allies would
have had the resources to establish a second front in north-western
France in 1943.


And Monte's entire 8th Army would have been in England and could have been
used in an invasion along with the supporting RAF aircraft The invasion a year
earlier was very possible had the MTO and African campaigns not taken place..

Regards,


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Throwing the inexperienced US Army on some West-European
beach,

In 1944, the army might be more experienced, but the troops were not.
The Americans put new troops onto the beach at Omaha, rather than
moving combat-experienced men from Italy or some such place.

all the best -- Dan Ford
email:

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

In message , Paul F Austin
writes
"ArtKramr" wrote
What then? The war in central Europe (ETO) could have gotten our full
resouces, D Day would have been a year earlier and the war would have
been
over a lot sooner, German troops in No. Africa and the MTO would have
simply
been isolated and would died on the vine. Why not?

Mainly because we would have been handed our heads, trying to invade in
mid-1943. The short reason would be that the Sovs wouldn't have whittled
down the Wehrmacht enough at that point to make a Western Front possible.
Also the Brits wouldn't go. Churchill and the Imperial General Staff were
scared stiff of a direct confrontation with the Wehrmacht based on their
experience in 1940.

And at Dieppe in 1942; that experimental raid, while a bloody tactical
failure, probably saved a great many lives in showing just how difficult
opposed amphibious operations really were and what equipment and
training was needed to have a chance at success. Merely throwing brave
troops at the beach and hoping for the best was proved to be a recipe
for disaster.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

"Drazen Kramaric" wrote in message
...
On Mon, 1 Dec 2003 16:07:18 -0000, "Keith Willshaw"
wrote:


Because there is no way the invasion could have been successfully
launched
in 1943.

I disagree.


The troops,

There were as many divisions available as they were used between June
6th 1944 and August 1st 1944 on the Normandy bridgehead.


There werent as many available for the follow up
waves however.

landing craft

Allies had enough landing craft to perform Husky in summer 1943 and
Torch in autumn 1942. There were certainly enough craft to land the
five divisions of the first wave and immediate support.


But not the follow up forces

and aircraft were simply not available

Allies had in ETO and MTO at least twice as much aircraft (without
counting strategic bombers) than Luftwaffe had in total. Throughout
1943, Luftwaffe was incapable of preventing Allied air, naval and
ground operations in the Mediterranean. In case of 1943 invasion,
Allied assets that couldn't have been used in the Mediterranean (Air
Defense of Great Britain) would have been utilised.


The Luftwaffed most certainly did cause casualties in Italy in 1943



Some 5000 ships and landing craft, 600,000 tons of supplies and 200,000
vehicles had to be assembled

These were the forces needed to arrive to German border within three
months of D-day, but such requirement would not be necessary condition
for the success of 1943 invasion.


That depends on what you mean by success. Sitting in an enclave
under artillery attack isnt typically considered a success

in addition to the armies and then there's the little matter of winning
air superiority
over the landing beaches. Without the decimation of the Luftwaffe in late
1943 and
early 1944 and lacking long range escort fighters any attempted invasion
would have been exceptionally risky.

Luftwaffe was incapable of defeating Allied air forces in the
Mediterranean. By mid 1943, Allies had twice as much fighters
available as Luftwaffe had. Allied did not need long range escorts for
air superiority over La Manche and bridgehead.


But they did to defeat the German air force in the West
which was much stronger than taht in the med.



As for the MTO it was simply not possible to isolate the German and
Italian armies and ignore them.

Operation Torch was not necessary. If it was skipped, Allies would
have had the resources to establish a second front in north-western
France in 1943.


But not to advance into Germany and win the war which
is the point.


Had they been able to seize the Suez canal and middle east

It's long way from El Agheila to Iraq.


Its a long way fro El Agheila to El Alamein but they managed that

they would have had access to virtually unlimited oil supplies from Iraq

The wells that would have been thoroughly wrecked by retreating
British. It would have taken at least six months to repair the
damages.


Which gives them lots of oil in 1944

In addition, Italy lacked enough tankers to carry the oil.


As it was the forces captured when Tunisia fell were greater than
those captured at Stalingrad and not only was Italy knocked out of
the war but the Germans had to garrison that country as well
thus diverting troops who could have been used to defend
Northern France.

Italian troops were disarmed and sent to work in Germany thus freeing
Germans to man the garrison divisions deployed to replace Italian
divisions. Italians were more efficient working in German war economy
than in Italian one.


How many German workers do you think were suitable to
provide army replacements in 1943 ?

Keith

"ArtKramr" wrote in message
...



And Monte's entire 8th Army would have been in England and could have
been
used in an invasion along with the supporting RAF aircraft The invasion a
year
earlier was very possible had the MTO and African campaigns not taken
place..



No the 8th army was stopping the German sweeping through Egypt
and Palestine at the time.

Do you think it would have been a good idea to allow them
to take the Suez Canal, Egypy and Tel Aviv ?

Keith

"Cub Driver" wrote in message
...

Throwing the inexperienced US Army on some West-European
beach,

In 1944, the army might be more experienced, but the troops were not.
The Americans put new troops onto the beach at Omaha, rather than
moving combat-experienced men from Italy or some such place.


The US divisions that landed at Omaha were from the 1st Infantry
Division which HAD taken part in the Torch invasions and
fought in North Africa and Sicily

Keith

Keith Willshaw wrote:

"Cub Driver" wrote in message
...

Throwing the inexperienced US Army on some West-European
beach,

In 1944, the army might be more experienced, but the troops were not.
The Americans put new troops onto the beach at Omaha, rather than
moving combat-experienced men from Italy or some such place.


The US divisions that landed at Omaha were from the 1st Infantry
Division which HAD taken part in the Torch invasions and
fought in North Africa and Sicily

It was two RLTs from the 1st ID along with an RLT from the 29th ID (plus
the Rangers) who landed in the first wave. Here's General Bradley's
comments on his choice of the 1st ID, from his book "A Soldier's Story":

"When Overlord was expanded to include Utah Beach, we paired the 4th
Infantry with the 29th as the second assault division. But although both
divisions had undergone extensive amphibious training, neither had as yet
come under fire. Rather than chance a landing with two inexperienced
divisions, I looked around for a veteran division to include in the lineup.

"In all of England there was only one experienced assault division. Once
more the Big Red One was to carry the heavy end of our stick . . . .

"Although I disliked subjecting the 1st to still another landing [Guy:
their third], I felt that as a commander I had no other choice. My job was
to get ashore, establish a lodgement, and destroy the German. In the
accomplishment of that mission there was little room for the niceties of
justice. I felt compelled to employ the best troops I had, to minimize the
risks and hoist the odds in our favor in any way that I could. As a
result, the division that deserved compassion as a reward for its previous
ordeal now became the inevitable choice for our most difficult job.
Whatever the injustice, it is better that war heap its burdens unfairly
than that victory be jeopardized in an effort to equalize the ordeal."
[pp. 236-237]

and then

"In planning the assault, originally we had counted upon a thin crust of
two static divisions between Caen and Cherbourg. Rommel was known to have
concentrated his better reserves behind the beach. Among them was the
352nd Division which had been assembled at St. Lo.

"Just before boarding the Augusta in Plymouth harbor, Dickson [Guy:
Bradley's G-2] learned that the 352nd had been moved from St. Lo. to the
assault beaches for a defense exercise. He promptly forwarded this
information to V Corps and the 1st Division but was unable to give it to
the troops already 'sealed' aboard their craft.

"Had a less experienced division than the 1st Infantry stumbled into this
crack resistance, it might easily have been thrown back into the Channel.
Unjust though it was, my choice of the 1st to spearhead the invasion
probably saved us Omaha Beach and a catastrophe on the landing." [ibid,
pg. 272]

As to there being more than enough landing craft in 1943, the problem would
have been the distribution by type. The invasion beaches in Normandy had
unusually shallow slopes, IIRR in the region of 1:150 or more. Without
large numbers of LSTs (which IIRR only entered service at the end of 1942
or in mid-1943, I forget which), LCTs, LSUs and similar shallow draft
beaching craft, the rate of unloading would have been much slowed by the
need to unload deep draft ships offshore and lighter their loads in. The
buildup would have been even more prolonged than it was, especially given
that air superiority would not have been achieved yet. We probably could
have gotten ashore, but we wouldn't have had the huge advantage in
logistics over the Germans that we had in the Med from late '42 on, or in
the ETO in 1944.

Considering the early American experiences in North Africa, where the
Germans treated the inexperienced U.S. troops and their commanders several
very painful lessons, I'd say the odds of success would be rather poor in
1943, given how difficult it still was in 1944 despite a considerable
improvement in the allies favor, in both the balance of forces and the
strategic situation. Attempting a landing in 1942 would have just been
Dieppe on a larger scale.

OTOH, the Atlantic Wall would have been almost non-existent in 1943, and
the Sherman wouldn't have been so badly outclassed by as many of the German
tanks as it was in 1944. Even so, C2 and training were a long way from the
1944 standard.

Guy

"Keith Willshaw" wrote in message
...

"Cub Driver" wrote in message
...

Throwing the inexperienced US Army on some West-European
beach,

In 1944, the army might be more experienced, but the troops were not.
The Americans put new troops onto the beach at Omaha, rather than
moving combat-experienced men from Italy or some such place.


The US divisions that landed at Omaha were from the 1st Infantry
Division which HAD taken part in the Torch invasions and
fought in North Africa and Sicily

Only partly correct, Keith. The 116th RCT from the 29th Inf Div was also in
the first wave, along with the 1st ID's 16th RCT. Immediately following were
the 115th RCT from the 29th and the 18RCT from the 1st. This was indeed the
29th ID's baptism of fire during WWII.

Brooks


Keith

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
. ..
Keith Willshaw wrote:

"Cub Driver" wrote in message
...

Throwing the inexperienced US Army on some West-European
beach,

In 1944, the army might be more experienced, but the troops were not.
The Americans put new troops onto the beach at Omaha, rather than
moving combat-experienced men from Italy or some such place.


The US divisions that landed at Omaha were from the 1st Infantry
Division which HAD taken part in the Torch invasions and
fought in North Africa and Sicily

It was two RLTs from the 1st ID along with an RLT from the 29th ID (plus
the Rangers) who landed in the first wave. Here's General Bradley's
comments on his choice of the 1st ID, from his book "A Soldier's Story":

I don't think so, Guy; the spearhead was only *two* RCT's, the 16th from the
1st ID and the 116th from the 29th ID. The schedule had the next two RCT's
(18th from 1st ID and 115th from the 29th) following at about H+3. And when
you read the accounts of what happened that morning on the beach, it is
quite apparent that there was not a danged bit of difference between the
performance of the previously unblooded 29th troops and those veterans (what
there was of them--ISTR the Big Red One already had picked up its share of
green replacements since its previous efforts). Furthermore, while it is
true that the these lead elements were all under the command of the 1st ID
HQ, that entity had darned little to do with what happened that morning, and
in fact it was IIRC the 29th ID's ADC, BG Norm Cota, who was instrumental in
getting the stagnated effort moving off the beach proper and up the
Vierville Draw?

snip

"Had a less experienced division than the 1st Infantry stumbled into this
crack resistance, it might easily have been thrown back into the Channel.
Unjust though it was, my choice of the 1st to spearhead the invasion
probably saved us Omaha Beach and a catastrophe on the landing." [ibid,
pg. 272]

As much as I respect and admire Bradley, the fact is that the above is
after-the-fact window dressing. In fact the performance of the 29th ID
troops and their leaders on the beach and as they seized the beachhead was
as much, if not more, responsible for the success gained at Omaha as was the
efforts of their 1st ID counterparts. The proof is in the pudding, as they
say, and the pudding demonstrated that the 29th was indeed just as capable
as the 1st ID was on 6 June 1944.

snip further stuff I don't disagree with

Brooks