US Army Cancels Comanche Helo

On Tue, 24 Feb 2004 23:34:46 +0000, ess (phil
hunt) wrote:

On Mon, 23 Feb 2004 17:26:04 -0500, Paul F Austin wrote:

"robert arndt" wrote

Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs.

This is the first big lessons learned to come out of Iraq War-2. Between the
Apaches getting put out of action by massed gunfire and the demonstrated
advantages of UAVs, the Army decided that Comanche was last-war's weapon.

That's my take on it too.


And they wasted a ton of money on it. I don't mind that the program
was canceled-- if they had a good reason to.

But consider this-- the LHX program first got started back in 1983--
before I was out of high school! Total up all the starts and stops,
half done systems, etc, and you probably have enough wasted money to
put helicopter engines on the New Jersey and get a REAL big CAS
platform.
Seriously, I think we long ago passed th epoint where delays in
getting actual hardware in service for hands on looks cost more than
the money to be saved by endless rounds of redesign.

In article , "Paul F
Austin" wrote:

"Kevin Brooks" wrote

"Paul F Austin" wrote in message



Of course it's not. It's not even "my idea". I'm under no illusion that I
or
anyone on this forum will "think up" a new paradigm that those blockheads
at
the Pentagon, yadayada... Real analysis doesn't happen on Usenet.
Although
why the Army restricts its thinking to rotorcraft is a good question.

Can we say "Key West Agreement"?

"Howard Berkowitz" wrote in message
...
In article , "Paul F
Austin" wrote:

"Kevin Brooks" wrote

"Paul F Austin" wrote in message



Of course it's not. It's not even "my idea". I'm under no illusion that
I
or
anyone on this forum will "think up" a new paradigm that those
blockheads
at
the Pentagon, yadayada... Real analysis doesn't happen on Usenet.
Although
why the Army restricts its thinking to rotorcraft is a good question.

Can we say "Key West Agreement"?

No ****? It's time to ****can the Key West Agreement. This business of
half-fast CAS for the Army and fast CAS for the Air Force is absurd. It's
past time to look at the mission requirements, decide who does the scope and
provide the right platform. The idea that the Air Force has the franchise on
fixed wing combat aircraft was an artifact of yesteryear. Right now, the Air
Force is doing it's patented "we'll do the CAS mission with very fast movers
that can also be used for other missions" by planning on replacing the
A-10 with the F-35.

In article , "Paul F
Austin" wrote:

"Howard Berkowitz" wrote in message
...
In article , "Paul F
Austin" wrote:

"Kevin Brooks" wrote

"Paul F Austin" wrote in message



Of course it's not. It's not even "my idea". I'm under no illusion
that
I
or
anyone on this forum will "think up" a new paradigm that those
blockheads
at
the Pentagon, yadayada... Real analysis doesn't happen on Usenet.
Although
why the Army restricts its thinking to rotorcraft is a good question.

Can we say "Key West Agreement"?

No ****? It's time to ****can the Key West Agreement. This business of
half-fast CAS for the Army and fast CAS for the Air Force is absurd. It's
past time to look at the mission requirements, decide who does the scope
and
provide the right platform. The idea that the Air Force has the franchise
on
fixed wing combat aircraft was an artifact of yesteryear. Right now, the
Air
Force is doing it's patented "we'll do the CAS mission with very fast
movers
that can also be used for other missions" by planning on replacing the
A-10 with the F-35.



Please don't assume I'm defending the thing! But it probably is the
reason for the rotorcraft emphasis.

If we look at roles and missions, there are cases where operational and
routine control could very reasonably differ. For example, long-range
air defense assets like Patriot and SM-2 could go, operationally, to the
service component with the best battlespace management capability. Might
be Air Force, might be Navy.

But logistic and maintenance support for the Patriot vehicles, given
commonality with other platforms, belongs in the Army.

"Paul F Austin" wrote in message
. ..

"Howard Berkowitz" wrote in message
...
In article , "Paul F
Austin" wrote:

"Kevin Brooks" wrote

"Paul F Austin" wrote in message



Of course it's not. It's not even "my idea". I'm under no illusion
that
I
or
anyone on this forum will "think up" a new paradigm that those
blockheads
at
the Pentagon, yadayada... Real analysis doesn't happen on Usenet.
Although
why the Army restricts its thinking to rotorcraft is a good question.

Can we say "Key West Agreement"?

No ****? It's time to ****can the Key West Agreement. This business of
half-fast CAS for the Army and fast CAS for the Air Force is absurd. It's
past time to look at the mission requirements, decide who does the scope
and
provide the right platform. The idea that the Air Force has the franchise
on
fixed wing combat aircraft was an artifact of yesteryear. Right now, the
Air
Force is doing it's patented "we'll do the CAS mission with very fast
movers
that can also be used for other missions" by planning on replacing the
A-10 with the F-35.

I once thought similarly to you on this issue, but not anymore. The concept
of jointness is much more palapable today than it was even five years ago,
for one thing. Second, the advent of economical and reliable PGM's means
that those fast movers (or for that matter the heavy movers like the Buff),
given decent info from the ground, can acheive darned good effects in the
CAS role. The Army does not need to compete for, or takeover from, the USAF
the CAS mission. What it *can* do is complement the USAF capabilities such
that the ground commander has the widest range of options available to him
to handle any contingencies he may face--which is why including the attack
helo in the mix for the foreseeable future is a wise move. Apparently the
Army agrees with that sentiment--they have no designs on taking over the
A-10 mission (which those nasty USAF types have the *audacity* to announce
now that they are enhancing by upgrading the A-10's which will remain in the
force until the F-35's can replace them, sometime in the next ten to fifteen
years), and have announced that they will indeed incorporate some of the
Commanche sensor and UAV control capabilites into the Block III Longbow
program. face it, paul--those attack helos are gonna be around for a
while..along with the new scout aircraft they are also going to buy.

Brooks

"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
...

"Paul F Austin" wrote in message
. ..

"Howard Berkowitz" wrote in message
...
In article , "Paul F
Austin" wrote:

"Kevin Brooks" wrote

"Paul F Austin" wrote in message



Of course it's not. It's not even "my idea". I'm under no illusion
that
I
or
anyone on this forum will "think up" a new paradigm that those
blockheads
at
the Pentagon, yadayada... Real analysis doesn't happen on Usenet.
Although
why the Army restricts its thinking to rotorcraft is a good
question.

Can we say "Key West Agreement"?

No ****? It's time to ****can the Key West Agreement. This business of
half-fast CAS for the Army and fast CAS for the Air Force is absurd.
It's
past time to look at the mission requirements, decide who does the scope
and
provide the right platform. The idea that the Air Force has the
franchise
on
fixed wing combat aircraft was an artifact of yesteryear. Right now, the
Air
Force is doing it's patented "we'll do the CAS mission with very fast
movers
that can also be used for other missions" by planning on replacing
the
A-10 with the F-35.

I once thought similarly to you on this issue, but not anymore. The
concept
of jointness is much more palapable today than it was even five years ago,
for one thing. Second, the advent of economical and reliable PGM's means
that those fast movers (or for that matter the heavy movers like the
Buff),
given decent info from the ground, can acheive darned good effects in the
CAS role. The Army does not need to compete for, or takeover from, the
USAF
the CAS mission. What it *can* do is complement the USAF capabilities such
that the ground commander has the widest range of options available to him
to handle any contingencies he may face--which is why including the attack
helo in the mix for the foreseeable future is a wise move. Apparently the
Army agrees with that sentiment--they have no designs on taking over the
A-10 mission (which those nasty USAF types have the *audacity* to announce
now that they are enhancing by upgrading the A-10's which will remain in
the
force until the F-35's can replace them, sometime in the next ten to
fifteen
years), and have announced that they will indeed incorporate some of the
Commanche sensor and UAV control capabilites into the Block III Longbow
program. face it, paul--those attack helos are gonna be around for a
while..along with the new scout aircraft they are also going to buy.

I don't know why, but I get suspicious when the AF says that their CAS
platform is going to be a supercruiser. Maybe it's just me... I hope AHs
remain survivable.

I don think it's interesting that (according to AvWeek) the Iraqi insurgents
are reserving the SA-16 and up for helos because they figure the Pk of any
MANPADS against a large transport is low.

In article ,
on Tue, 24 Feb 2004 23:44:54 +0000,
phil hunt ess attempted to say .....

On Mon, 23 Feb 2004 19:35:35 -0800, Hobo wrote:
In article ,
(robert arndt) wrote:

Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs.

Rob

Of course, it was the Germans who invented the uncompleted program.

At least they had a good excuse, like losing the war.

There would have been some interesting designs if WW2 had gone
into 1946 or 47.

They would have looked really cool sitting at the ends of the runways with
dry fuel tanks.



--
When dealing with propaganda terminology one sometimes always speaks in
variable absolutes. This is not to be mistaken for an unbiased slant.

"Tank Fixer" wrote in message
k.net...
In article ,
on Tue, 24 Feb 2004 23:44:54 +0000,
phil hunt ess attempted to say .....

On Mon, 23 Feb 2004 19:35:35 -0800, Hobo wrote:
In article ,
(robert arndt) wrote:

Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs.

Rob

Of course, it was the Germans who invented the uncompleted program.

At least they had a good excuse, like losing the war.

There would have been some interesting designs if WW2 had gone
into 1946 or 47.

They would have looked really cool sitting at the ends of the runways with
dry fuel tanks.

LOL! Good point!

Brooks

"Paul F Austin" wrote in message
.. .

I don't know why, but I get suspicious when the AF says that their CAS
platform is going to be a supercruiser. Maybe it's just me... I hope AHs
remain survivable.

The B-one has been doing CAS, Austin.

The nature of the technology has changed.

Kevin Brooks
I always thought the emphasis on radar stealth was off the mark.

Consider missions like the one at the start of Desert Storm, where
(iirc) Apaches sneaked in low at night and destroyed Iraqi early
warning radars. Obviously, radar stealth seems useful for such
missions.

So, a few stupid(?) questions: Am I wrong about radar
stealth being quite useful in addition to terrain masking?
Is using helos for such missions outdated? Are such deep
missions a marginal issue nowadays, or was it so already
back then? Or is it that the US is focusing its capability
on tackling third rate opponents with minimal own-losses,
rendering the issue of radar-based airdefences largely irrelevant?

without the benefit of the normal SEAD support from your own
arty assets is extremely risky."

More naive questions: Is artillery SEAD really seen as a
requirement for attack helo missions within the envelope
of enemy short-range airdefences? If so, what about operating
out of arty range? Or without having arty on theatre in the
first place (eg much of Afghanistan, esp early on)? And, finally,
if artillery is that effective for SEAD, wouldn't it also be
effective against the targets of the attack helos? Couldn't
smart AT-MP submunitions, or whatever, then do all the job
of the AH's, and more safely?

Moreover, while MLRS can saturate fairly large areas with
submunitions, and will probably ruin the day of any
manpad operator in the target area, one can't possibly
use arty to saturate all the potential locations of
air-defences. At least not with low-level ingress/eggress.
A guy with a manpad can hide easily - in the worst
case he'll be lurking just next to your base, like has
been the case in some Russian helo losses in Chechenya.

And what if the enemy has useful counter battery capability
that limits arty SEAD support? Use AH's to take it out, but...
g