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#51
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Interesting how standards vary. We train for 50 by 250 feet for
touchdown and stop. This is my personal standard before candidates are sent to the examiner. UH |
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#53
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Mark James Boyd Wrote:
"I've told people the difference between a 2-33 and an ASW-20 is simple. Just take all of the built in safety for the design and replace it with higher workload and higher required pilot proficiency for the same level of safety. As Bob K. is apt to say "it goes like stink." The downside is the naked edge of safety vs. performance." Okay...alright...I'm not trying to start a fight, but to claim that an ASW-20 is the "naked edge of safety" leads me to believe that some definitions are in order. I don't own an ASW-20 but I have flown one, and I have to say they fly VERY nicely. At no point was I left hanging on the brink of safety. I think that comment is mis-representative of the machine, to say the least. I guess my whole thought on this topic has not really changed from my first posting. This weekend I thought about the fact that the way we are all taught to fly, is mostly focused on "How-To" do the correct thing and that basis makes it pretty difficult to deal with what to do when things go awry. In many cases simple little snippets of information that you learn along the way that you rely on when all the normal stuff goes to hell...Comments about we ALWAYS do things this way or that way, generally lead to problems later. We simply cannot teach all the variable adversities that one may encounter, so we have to teach student to think and analyze and act to the best of their abilities. I had a truck driver once who came to work for me. My old truckdriver was moving up within the company, so we had him take the new hire on the route the first day to show him where to go...they borrowed my pickup truck instead of the delivery truck in an effort to save some time. The next day the new hire set out on his own and at 5 o'clock in the evening I got a call saying he had hit a bridge and that my delivery truck was badly broken...upon arriving I found my delivery truck torn into 4 or 5 major separated components after having been driven under a 7ft8 clearance train tressle ( the truck was 13ft 6" tall as opposed to the pickup truck which cleared easily the day before) When asked what in the hell he was thinking...you guessed it..."That's the way I was shown to go yesterday" Full steam ahead 45 miles an hour... Students can be like that, they take what is said far too literally sometimes and I think that's why I believe that we ought to concentrate more fully on addressing how they think. All too often, you see an instructor who settles into his plan ie...rope break in the same place...pattern always the same, you get to know fairly quickly what they want to see and it is then easy to comply with... sorta the same way the Designee's are...I'm sure we all remember the instructors two cents worth..." Okay when he asks you about this, remember to say this...and oh yeah...don't forget to clear those turns" I mean..there's the little "wink wink" that let's everyone in the loop know you're okay and ready to pass...There really wouldn't be much point to checkrides if instructors sent "maybe he'll be okay's" on to checkrides. We had a guy die at our airport last year. His own sailplane, nicer than anything on the field. Everyone was a little in awe I believe. He took a "familiarization flight" with one of our CFIG's in our Blanik, who said he did great. We have a little one way, mountain strip and he self launched and flew for 4 hours and when he came back, he was high and fast and screwed things up horribly. He then proceeded to flail around indecisively, until which time he stalled and spun in dying on impact. Everyone felt horrible,his logbook revealed he had hardly ANY experience with his ship but hundreds of hours in Blaniks. Nobody did anything wrong, but in the end, the real issue is how do we keep it from happening again. From my perspective, if I were an instructor, I'd be very keen on training a student the way I wanted them to fly, but then I think the last 4 or 5 hours would be spent on just doing things differently, and with an open mind, to see how they react. Induce stress and see how they react. Tha,t after all, is what I was referring to from my view on student training, making sure we teach them to think adequately. We have to teach pilots to think and analyze and act. With a decided eye towards maximizing their odds for survivability. That's probably a whole lot tougher than I am aware of. I'm not sure it's covered in the Practical Test Standards or Airmans Knowledge Tests. But it is perhaps the biggest reason to be dynamic in our training as opposed to static, which I believe to be a major difference from teaching JUST to the PTS...and JUST to pass the Exam... JUST...my humble opinion. I take my hat off to all you instructors who give tirelessly to this sport and please, I hope you take my comments as they are intended, which is constructive, not destructive. Respectfully, Steve. |
#54
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#55
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I train to consistently within 200 feet of ontended stopping
point for Sport Pilot and Private, and within 100 feet for commercial and CFI. I've found that by the time my students are consistently within this standard, they are coincidentally within 50 feet anyway. In a 2-33 or L-13 anyway ![]() In article . com, wrote: Interesting how standards vary. We train for 50 by 250 feet for touchdown and stop. This is my personal standard before candidates are sent to the examiner. UH -- ------------+ Mark J. Boyd |
#56
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Steve,
First of all, I read the accident report from the accident you mention. I personally concluded that the pilot was the only one who could have prevented this accident. www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/query.asp look up glider fatalities and I think you'll find it. Then I got involved in your response about the ASW-20 comment being mis-representative. So I researched the past 5 years of US glider fatalities. I had done this a year or two ago, and this time added some formality. 29 fatalities. 7 ridge 4 off-airport landings 4 spin on final 3 intentional aerobatics 3 did a PCC but not an assembly check 2 drugs 2 midair 1 rope break 1 on top of rotor clouds 1 fuel exhaustion takeoff eng fail 1 trim failure, killed the towpilot (all of these pigeonholes are arguable, of course). Of the ridge fatalities, the sailplane L/Ds were 57, 48, 48, 43, 43, 37, 36. Median L/D of 43. The only make/model to have two fatal incidents was the ASW-20. Only one non-glider rated occupant was killed. An acro ride in the ASK-21 with a midair less than 4 miles from the airport and within 2500 ft AGL killed both passenger and pilot. Only ONE of the 29 fatal accidents involved a glider with a Vne less than 120 knots. This was an SGS 1-26 that broke a shoulder strap on impact. Over 75% of the accidents involved a glider with an L/D over 33. The median L/D of the fatal gliders was 43, and was the ASW-20. From some best guessing and the reports, over 80% of the fatal accidents had PICs with over 100 hours in gliders. About half of the pilots were CFIs or ATPs with hundreds of hours, often in make/model. So I used the ASW-20 as my example. If I'd used the ASW-24E or ASW-27B or Jantar 42-2 or PIK-30 or SZD 55-1, I'm sure pilots would have come to defend these aircraft as well. My point is that if I had to guess the next fatality, it would be an experienced soaring pilot in a 43:1 ship low near a ridge in a gaggle. On Saturday I heard just this description from a pilot (who was in such a gaggle) and he mentioned he was keenly aware he had put himself in this position. Yes, he did so intentionally, and found it to be an exciting challenge. Is there something wrong with the FAA system? No. The low timers in their low and medium performance gliders are barely a blip on the accident reports. Most fatalities from my perspective are due to the "naked edge." Some experienced pilots choose to fly something with performance in challenging conditions. They've accepted risk to gain performance. Should we do something about this? I don't think there's anything to be done. Drugs, aerobatics, ridge soaring, gaggles, off-airport landings are all risks the pilots themselves are aware of, are trained and familiar with, and accept. Unaware passengers and people on the ground aren't being significantly harmed (1 fatality in 5 years? An acro ride?). From a public safety standpoint, I think the FAA has done its job. And I'll keep training pilots in the 2-33 and L-13 and 1-26 and PW-2. And some of them will move up to fast glass and practice to try to maintain a level of safety. Hey, man, that really is their own personal choice, as far as I'm concerned. In article , Steve Hill wrote: Mark James Boyd Wrote: "I've told people the difference between a 2-33 and an ASW-20 is simple. Just take all of the built in safety for the design and replace it with higher workload and higher required pilot proficiency for the same level of safety. As Bob K. is apt to say "it goes like stink." The downside is the naked edge of safety vs. performance." Okay...alright...I'm not trying to start a fight, but to claim that an ASW-20 is the "naked edge of safety" leads me to believe that some definitions are in order. I don't own an ASW-20 but I have flown one, and I have to say they fly VERY nicely. At no point was I left hanging on the brink of safety. I think that comment is mis-representative of the machine, to say the least. I guess my whole thought on this topic has not really changed from my first posting. This weekend I thought about the fact that the way we are all taught to fly, is mostly focused on "How-To" do the correct thing and that basis makes it pretty difficult to deal with what to do when things go awry. In many cases simple little snippets of information that you learn along the way that you rely on when all the normal stuff goes to hell...Comments about we ALWAYS do things this way or that way, generally lead to problems later. We simply cannot teach all the variable adversities that one may encounter, so we have to teach student to think and analyze and act to the best of their abilities. I had a truck driver once who came to work for me. My old truckdriver was moving up within the company, so we had him take the new hire on the route the first day to show him where to go...they borrowed my pickup truck instead of the delivery truck in an effort to save some time. The next day the new hire set out on his own and at 5 o'clock in the evening I got a call saying he had hit a bridge and that my delivery truck was badly broken...upon arriving I found my delivery truck torn into 4 or 5 major separated components after having been driven under a 7ft8 clearance train tressle ( the truck was 13ft 6" tall as opposed to the pickup truck which cleared easily the day before) When asked what in the hell he was thinking...you guessed it..."That's the way I was shown to go yesterday" Full steam ahead 45 miles an hour... Students can be like that, they take what is said far too literally sometimes and I think that's why I believe that we ought to concentrate more fully on addressing how they think. All too often, you see an instructor who settles into his plan ie...rope break in the same place...pattern always the same, you get to know fairly quickly what they want to see and it is then easy to comply with... sorta the same way the Designee's are...I'm sure we all remember the instructors two cents worth..." Okay when he asks you about this, remember to say this...and oh yeah...don't forget to clear those turns" I mean..there's the little "wink wink" that let's everyone in the loop know you're okay and ready to pass...There really wouldn't be much point to checkrides if instructors sent "maybe he'll be okay's" on to checkrides. We had a guy die at our airport last year. His own sailplane, nicer than anything on the field. Everyone was a little in awe I believe. He took a "familiarization flight" with one of our CFIG's in our Blanik, who said he did great. We have a little one way, mountain strip and he self launched and flew for 4 hours and when he came back, he was high and fast and screwed things up horribly. He then proceeded to flail around indecisively, until which time he stalled and spun in dying on impact. Everyone felt horrible,his logbook revealed he had hardly ANY experience with his ship but hundreds of hours in Blaniks. Nobody did anything wrong, but in the end, the real issue is how do we keep it from happening again. From my perspective, if I were an instructor, I'd be very keen on training a student the way I wanted them to fly, but then I think the last 4 or 5 hours would be spent on just doing things differently, and with an open mind, to see how they react. Induce stress and see how they react. Tha,t after all, is what I was referring to from my view on student training, making sure we teach them to think adequately. We have to teach pilots to think and analyze and act. With a decided eye towards maximizing their odds for survivability. That's probably a whole lot tougher than I am aware of. I'm not sure it's covered in the Practical Test Standards or Airmans Knowledge Tests. But it is perhaps the biggest reason to be dynamic in our training as opposed to static, which I believe to be a major difference from teaching JUST to the PTS...and JUST to pass the Exam... JUST...my humble opinion. I take my hat off to all you instructors who give tirelessly to this sport and please, I hope you take my comments as they are intended, which is constructive, not destructive. Respectfully, Steve. -- ------------+ Mark J. Boyd |
#57
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Mark,
Thanks for clarifying that you weren't mis-representing the ASW-20 itself as dangerous, or trading safety for performance...or increasing workload on the pilot in command, SPECIFICALLY on JUST the ASW-20...it sounds like you really meant...All High performance sailplanes and with that, I'd agree that as performance is gained, somewhere safety is given up. But I don't think it's at all safe to say that it's because of a sailplanes design, it's because of what people do with them. Those of us that choose high performing sailplanes, do accept increased risk...and almost everyone I know who pursues it, is aware of those risks and mentally works to mitigate as much or as many of the variables possible. If the complexity of the aircraft were really the issue, wouldn't in then mean that as aircraft continued to go up in sophistication levels or performance levels, then that as some point you'd simply die just by getting in or on one...?? Methinks the logic is fundamentally flawed. It's what happens in the cockpit with the pilot...not the craft. Your comment about predicting the next bad accident is well taken...sorta like saying the next catastrophic car crash next Friday, will be due to a 17 year old, his three best buddies and a case of Bud....on a long straight road, with a nasty curve at the end.... We also accept increased risk as a very function of our daily lives Mark, cars that zip along happily at 75 or 80...when things go bad...they go bad worse than if you were doing 45. We all know that. Oh well....not sure where this threads going anymore, but thanks for the clarification. Steve. |
#58
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hmmm ... less then one in four odds ...
but, isn't the more common denominator incompetence ... and lets define that as a failure of execution because of lack of training or currency or awareness or attention, etc. You can easily die in aviation doing some routine non-cutting-edge things ... and most of the people in your list did. * My point is that if I had to guess the next fatality, it would be * an experienced soaring pilot in a 43:1 ship low near a ridge * in a gaggle. * 7 Ridge in 29 fatalities. Mark James Boyd wrote: Steve, First of all, I read the accident report from the accident you mention. I personally concluded that the pilot was the only one who could have prevented this accident. www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/query.asp look up glider fatalities and I think you'll find it. Then I got involved in your response about the ASW-20 comment being mis-representative. So I researched the past 5 years of US glider fatalities. I had done this a year or two ago, and this time added some formality. 29 fatalities. 7 ridge 4 off-airport landings 4 spin on final 3 intentional aerobatics 3 did a PCC but not an assembly check 2 drugs 2 midair 1 rope break 1 on top of rotor clouds 1 fuel exhaustion takeoff eng fail 1 trim failure, killed the towpilot (all of these pigeonholes are arguable, of course). Of the ridge fatalities, the sailplane L/Ds were 57, 48, 48, 43, 43, 37, 36. Median L/D of 43. The only make/model to have two fatal incidents was the ASW-20. Only one non-glider rated occupant was killed. An acro ride in the ASK-21 with a midair less than 4 miles from the airport and within 2500 ft AGL killed both passenger and pilot. Only ONE of the 29 fatal accidents involved a glider with a Vne less than 120 knots. This was an SGS 1-26 that broke a shoulder strap on impact. Over 75% of the accidents involved a glider with an L/D over 33. The median L/D of the fatal gliders was 43, and was the ASW-20. From some best guessing and the reports, over 80% of the fatal accidents had PICs with over 100 hours in gliders. About half of the pilots were CFIs or ATPs with hundreds of hours, often in make/model. So I used the ASW-20 as my example. If I'd used the ASW-24E or ASW-27B or Jantar 42-2 or PIK-30 or SZD 55-1, I'm sure pilots would have come to defend these aircraft as well. My point is that if I had to guess the next fatality, it would be an experienced soaring pilot in a 43:1 ship low near a ridge in a gaggle. On Saturday I heard just this description from a pilot (who was in such a gaggle) and he mentioned he was keenly aware he had put himself in this position. Yes, he did so intentionally, and found it to be an exciting challenge. Is there something wrong with the FAA system? No. The low timers in their low and medium performance gliders are barely a blip on the accident reports. Most fatalities from my perspective are due to the "naked edge." Some experienced pilots choose to fly something with performance in challenging conditions. They've accepted risk to gain performance. Should we do something about this? I don't think there's anything to be done. Drugs, aerobatics, ridge soaring, gaggles, off-airport landings are all risks the pilots themselves are aware of, are trained and familiar with, and accept. Unaware passengers and people on the ground aren't being significantly harmed (1 fatality in 5 years? An acro ride?). From a public safety standpoint, I think the FAA has done its job. And I'll keep training pilots in the 2-33 and L-13 and 1-26 and PW-2. And some of them will move up to fast glass and practice to try to maintain a level of safety. Hey, man, that really is their own personal choice, as far as I'm concerned. In article , Steve Hill wrote: Mark James Boyd Wrote: "I've told people the difference between a 2-33 and an ASW-20 is simple. Just take all of the built in safety for the design and replace it with higher workload and higher required pilot proficiency for the same level of safety. As Bob K. is apt to say "it goes like stink." The downside is the naked edge of safety vs. performance." Okay...alright...I'm not trying to start a fight, but to claim that an ASW-20 is the "naked edge of safety" leads me to believe that some definitions are in order. I don't own an ASW-20 but I have flown one, and I have to say they fly VERY nicely. At no point was I left hanging on the brink of safety. I think that comment is mis-representative of the machine, to say the least. I guess my whole thought on this topic has not really changed from my first posting. This weekend I thought about the fact that the way we are all taught to fly, is mostly focused on "How-To" do the correct thing and that basis makes it pretty difficult to deal with what to do when things go awry. In many cases simple little snippets of information that you learn along the way that you rely on when all the normal stuff goes to hell...Comments about we ALWAYS do things this way or that way, generally lead to problems later. We simply cannot teach all the variable adversities that one may encounter, so we have to teach student to think and analyze and act to the best of their abilities. I had a truck driver once who came to work for me. My old truckdriver was moving up within the company, so we had him take the new hire on the route the first day to show him where to go...they borrowed my pickup truck instead of the delivery truck in an effort to save some time. The next day the new hire set out on his own and at 5 o'clock in the evening I got a call saying he had hit a bridge and that my delivery truck was badly broken...upon arriving I found my delivery truck torn into 4 or 5 major separated components after having been driven under a 7ft8 clearance train tressle ( the truck was 13ft 6" tall as opposed to the pickup truck which cleared easily the day before) When asked what in the hell he was thinking...you guessed it..."That's the way I was shown to go yesterday" Full steam ahead 45 miles an hour... Students can be like that, they take what is said far too literally sometimes and I think that's why I believe that we ought to concentrate more fully on addressing how they think. All too often, you see an instructor who settles into his plan ie...rope break in the same place...pattern always the same, you get to know fairly quickly what they want to see and it is then easy to comply with... sorta the same way the Designee's are...I'm sure we all remember the instructors two cents worth..." Okay when he asks you about this, remember to say this...and oh yeah...don't forget to clear those turns" I mean..there's the little "wink wink" that let's everyone in the loop know you're okay and ready to pass...There really wouldn't be much point to checkrides if instructors sent "maybe he'll be okay's" on to checkrides. We had a guy die at our airport last year. His own sailplane, nicer than anything on the field. Everyone was a little in awe I believe. He took a "familiarization flight" with one of our CFIG's in our Blanik, who said he did great. We have a little one way, mountain strip and he self launched and flew for 4 hours and when he came back, he was high and fast and screwed things up horribly. He then proceeded to flail around indecisively, until which time he stalled and spun in dying on impact. Everyone felt horrible,his logbook revealed he had hardly ANY experience with his ship but hundreds of hours in Blaniks. Nobody did anything wrong, but in the end, the real issue is how do we keep it from happening again. From my perspective, if I were an instructor, I'd be very keen on training a student the way I wanted them to fly, but then I think the last 4 or 5 hours would be spent on just doing things differently, and with an open mind, to see how they react. Induce stress and see how they react. Tha,t after all, is what I was referring to from my view on student training, making sure we teach them to think adequately. We have to teach pilots to think and analyze and act. With a decided eye towards maximizing their odds for survivability. That's probably a whole lot tougher than I am aware of. I'm not sure it's covered in the Practical Test Standards or Airmans Knowledge Tests. But it is perhaps the biggest reason to be dynamic in our training as opposed to static, which I believe to be a major difference from teaching JUST to the PTS...and JUST to pass the Exam... JUST...my humble opinion. I take my hat off to all you instructors who give tirelessly to this sport and please, I hope you take my comments as they are intended, which is constructive, not destructive. Respectfully, Steve. -- ------------+ Mark J. Boyd |
#60
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![]() Reply: In the area where we fly( northeast US) there are not many fields 250 meters long. We are training pilots to be able to land in the best portion of a field that may be only 400 to 500 feet long. Simply flying to level of the PTS standards does not cut it. Better skills and habits lead to higher margins in difficult situations. I admit to being very demanding in this area because it saves gliders and can save lives. UH UH what gliders do you train in and what do you believe the level of the PTS is, in regard to length of designated landing area? M Eiler |
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