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#51
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Keith Willshaw wrote:
In fact the RN expected both officers and enlisted men to show rather more initiative than was common for the period. Come to that there was a greater degree of social mobility than was normal as well. James Cook , the son of a farm laborer joined the RN in 1755 as an ordinary seaman. Within 4 years he had been promoted to Master and by 1763 he had been commissioned and given his own command. I just read a biography of John Paul Jones and in the book somewhere, it mentions the issue of "social mobility" in the RN and England in general. I've already forgotten the explicit time periods mentioned, but it appears that the ability to be a "self made man" waxed and waned over several periods in British society (and the RN). There were relatively greater possibilities for self improvement despite birth, during the mid 1700s than during the later 1700's, when birth reclaimed the ability to dictate a person's future potential, above self. Social rigidity in British society wasn't a constant, dictated by birth at this time, as I had formerly thought. SMH |
#52
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![]() ArtKramr wrote: Want some more examples? Arthur Kramer Art, Your 'examples' are in no way specific to the military. The convoluted examples you give can be applied to any professional group, be they airline crews, medical staff, police officers, fire-fighters, air traffic controllers, or even snow removal crews. There is nothing special about the application of common sense to team work, especially when the lack therof can result in loss of life. Dave |
#53
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While commanders do need to be confident, not every leadership style
fits every historic situation, or every type of unit commanded. One classic on leadership is John Keegan's _The Mask of Command_. Alexander the Great and Ulysses S. Grant were superb commanders for their responsibilities, but it would have been disastrous if they were switched. Alexander's armies needed a visible heroic warrior literally leading them, while the grand strategy Grant executed required what Keegan calls "unheroic" leadership in attrition warfare. The commander of a combat wing has to give the impression that he won't issue an order he wouldn't try to carry out himself -- and will also know what specific things where a subordinate knows the techniques better than the Head Honcho in Charge. A field hospital commander has to have a different personality, especially when making triage or other resource decisions to let a wounded man die. A very different kind of leadership is going to be needed in a highly technical combat support or combat service support unit, be it tactical transport or electronic warfare. |
#54
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![]() "Stephen Harding" wrote in message ... Keith Willshaw wrote: In fact the RN expected both officers and enlisted men to show rather more initiative than was common for the period. Come to that there was a greater degree of social mobility than was normal as well. James Cook , the son of a farm laborer joined the RN in 1755 as an ordinary seaman. Within 4 years he had been promoted to Master and by 1763 he had been commissioned and given his own command. I just read a biography of John Paul Jones and in the book somewhere, it mentions the issue of "social mobility" in the RN and England in general. I've already forgotten the explicit time periods mentioned, but it appears that the ability to be a "self made man" waxed and waned over several periods in British society (and the RN). There were relatively greater possibilities for self improvement despite birth, during the mid 1700s than during the later 1700's, when birth reclaimed the ability to dictate a person's future potential, above self. The problem in the late 1700's was the paranoia induced by the French Revolution and the terror. A quite irrational fear of the mob was the inevitable result. A secondary cause was the long period of warfare with the French that also resulted. Keith |
#55
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In message , ArtKramr
writes Here are some more caveats from my training. When you issue and order to a subordinate there are only three answers allowed. They a 1. YES SIR 2. NO SIR 3. NO EXCUSE SIR I can see why that would work for your situation. That regime would be moderately disastrous for the officer training I went through, however. The overriding rule was "What would my CO want me to do if he was here?" The classic example given (apologies for discourse...) 2Lt Rupert Smugly-Smoothly-Shaven is OC of 1 Platoon, A Company, Royal Berkshires. He is briefed at the company O-group about the battlegroup plan, the company's role within it and what his orders are. Specificially, the Berks have been tasked to seize the bridge across the River Etsway. A Company will provide fire support for a battlegroup attack, with B and C companies assaulting the bridge and exploiting to secure the far bank. A Company's plan is to seize the two hills on this side of the Etsway, which flank the road to the bridge and overlook the crossing. Intel believes that the enemy has established a platoon on Hill Two to provide observation and fire, but Hill One is unoccupied. Therefore 1 Platoon will occupy Hill Two and provide fire support for the rest of A Company, who will clear the position; A Company will then support the rest of the Berks in the attack on the bridge. All straightforward and clear so far, right? However, when 2Lt Smugly-Smoothly-Shaven arrives at the ground in question, he finds things very different. Firstly, his radios are being jammed, and he can't raise even company HQ. Secondly, there was a four-man OP on Hill Two, though one was killed and the others driven off after a brisk firefight. Thirdly, Hill One appears to be abandoned and unoccupied, and while defensive positions on the far side of the bridge are visible they appear to be recently abandoned. Lastly, a team of a dozen enemy sappers are busy wiring the bridge with explosives and preparing for a rapid retreat. What do you do? Your orders are clear and direct: hold Hill Two, wait for the rest of A Company to move up and take Hill One, then cover the battlegroup's attack on the bridge. Will you disobey orders? But is that what your commander would want if he knew what you knew? Nobody will praise you for dogmatically obeying your orders if the overall objective - to seize that bridge intact - is failed. If you obey your orders to the letter you'll watch that bridge - the objective of the entire operation - be destroyed under your nose by a dozen men. Because Rupert knows what his overall mission is (to seize that bridge intact!) he can ask "What would my CO tell me to do if he could see what I see now?" and hopefully decide to lead 1 Platoon in a snap attack on the bridge, driving off the sappers before they complete their demolitions and hoping to be relieved before an enemy counterattack. Remember that I wasn't in the Air Force. I was in the Army Air Corps, emphasis on ARMY and went through a full schedule of combat infantry training as well as flight school and as an officer as well.. Good thing too because during the Battle of the Bulge we were all issued M-1 Carbines and thrown into the line along with the XXX Corps. And I never ever heard any long discussions involving diverse opinions on what we should do. Orders were issued and were followed without question. We knew what we should do and we did it. Did you know what your unit was meant to achieve, or were you just told just "sit in this hole and cover these arcs and shoot anyone in feldgrau not waving a white flag"? Seriously - we've worked hard to get to "mission command", which is where on the one hand you have your orders but on the other you know what you're meant to be achieving and what the Big Picture (typically two levels up) is. You don't rewrite your orders but you _do_ understand that the real world changes faster than your CO can keep giving you updates. Again, the key phrase: "if my commander was here with me now, what would he want me to do?" And remember we won that war so maybe we knew something back then that the military has forgotten since. We've been fairly successful over here since 1945. -- When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite. W S Churchill Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk |
#56
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Sounds like CRM at work here...
It would have been, but we weren't in the cockpit, we were in the mission planning room following our pre-mission brief. However, you are correct, CRM works the same way. Perhaps if they had CRM during WWII we wouldn't have lost more men in flight training then we did in battle. Sounds like Art would be a CRM nightmare if you ask me. BUFDRVR "Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips everyone on Bear Creek" |
#57
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Subject: An Officer.......
From: "Paul J. Adam" Date: 2/25/04 1:43 PM Pacific Standard Time Message-id: Nobody will praise you for dogmatically obeying your orders if the overall objective - to seize that bridge intact - is failed. If you obey your orders to the letter you'll watch that bridge - the objectiv Let me give you a true life example of what actually happened. I tis the first time I actually went ballistic when an order wouldn't be followed instantly and to the letter. We were comng out to Willie the Wolf. Usually Willie is loaded and ready; ful; bomb load, tanks topped off, ammo belts full and strung etc. But this time the bomb truck was late and they were still loading bombs as we pulled up. They had the last bomb (of 8) hooked on the winch and were about to haul it up into the bomb bays. I noticed tha it had a badly bent vane on it. I said. " hold it sargeant. don't load that bomb. It is defective". The Sargeant said, "SIr, I know its bent but not too baldy it;ll be ok". I said, " get thaa bomb out of here, get bacl to the Bomb dump and bring us a replacement in good condition NOW". The Sargeant said," its a long way back and as wehave been working all night. My men are tired, this bomb will be ok". He was confrontational with an attiutufe. No way were we going into the skies over the Ruhr Valley with a bomb that would be useless. I blew. "get, get you ass back and bring me a good bomb or I'll have your ass in the stockade". A bit of fear rose in his eyes and he said "Yes sir on my way" He came back later with 4 bombs to gsve me a choice. I chose one. He loaded and that was the end of the story. We ;flew the mission. The hits were good. Moral of the story?. Take no **** from any one ever. When you know your job, demand that it be carried out to the letter. NOW. Two things I hate: 1.Disobedience 2. Weak officers Arthur Kramer 344th BG 494th BS England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany Visit my WW II B-26 website at: http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer |
#58
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![]() "Paul J. Adam" wrote in message news ![]() In message , ArtKramr writes Here are some more caveats from my training. When you issue and order to a subordinate there are only three answers allowed. They a 1. YES SIR 2. NO SIR 3. NO EXCUSE SIR I can see why that would work for your situation. That regime would be moderately disastrous for the officer training I went through, however. The overriding rule was "What would my CO want me to do if he was here?" The classic example given (apologies for discourse...) snip good example Because Rupert knows what his overall mission is (to seize that bridge intact!) he can ask "What would my CO tell me to do if he could see what I see now?" and hopefully decide to lead 1 Platoon in a snap attack on the bridge, driving off the sappers before they complete their demolitions and hoping to be relieved before an enemy counterattack. Excellent example of why the commander has to explain his intent, and its overriding importance compared to the actual ordered tasks, Paul. Art won't admit it, but even during his day the "orders are orders" mentality was generally eschewed (by good leaders) in favor of meeting the more important intent behind the orders. Your example is a little bit remindful of a case where US units did push forward to seize a bridge that they were no specifically directed to gain...a little place called Remagen mught stir even Art's faded memories. Remember that I wasn't in the Air Force. I was in the Army Air Corps, emphasis on ARMY and went through a full schedule of combat infantry training as well as flight school and as an officer as well.. Good thing too because during the Battle of the Bulge we were all issued M-1 Carbines and thrown into the line along with the XXX Corps. And I never ever heard any long discussions involving diverse opinions on what we should do. Orders were issued and were followed without question. We knew what we should do and we did it. Did you know what your unit was meant to achieve, or were you just told just "sit in this hole and cover these arcs and shoot anyone in feldgrau not waving a white flag"? Seriously - we've worked hard to get to "mission command", which is where on the one hand you have your orders but on the other you know what you're meant to be achieving and what the Big Picture (typically two levels up) is. You don't rewrite your orders but you _do_ understand that the real world changes faster than your CO can keep giving you updates. Again, the key phrase: "if my commander was here with me now, what would he want me to do?" And remember we won that war so maybe we knew something back then that the military has forgotten since. We've been fairly successful over here since 1945. The one doing the forgetting in this case is not the US (or UK) military establishments, that is quite obvious. Brooks |
#59
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