russia vs. japan in 1941 [WAS: 50% of NAZI oil..]

"Christophe" wrote in message ...
According to the first line, we were talking about WW1 :
The French were involved rather heavily in WW1 you'll find

Je suis vraiment desolee que tu m'as malcompris!

'For sure, but not (with all respect) in the second'

Tout que j'ai dit est de la guerre deuxieme, pas la premiere.

J'espere bien que tu m'excuse pour tous mes faux en francais.

John


"John Mullen" a écrit dans le message news:
...
"Christophe Chazot" wrote in message
...

"John Mullen" a écrit dans le message news:
...
"Keith Willshaw" wrote in message
...
(snip)


The French were involved rather heavily in WW1 you'll find


(snip)

France only learned from WW1 that war was to be avoided (perfectly
sensible)
and that a defensive strategy would deter Germany (turned out not to be
true
as we know). Many in Britain made the same mistakes, but you were unlucky
enough to be before us in the firing line.

John


Yep. "Too few, too late" was also true for the french armies...

Christophe

Comments in no particular order:
1) From my readings I gained the information that the Japanese Army
wanted to go south (ie, not fight the Russians) and the Japanese navy
wanted to go north (ie, not fight the US and the UK.) The Army won.
(ASIR the minister of war was army.)
2) The 30-40 (ISTR?) Russian Army divisions facing the Japanese in
Siberia/Mongolia were released to the Western front after Sorge
informed the Stavka the Japanese were not going to attack Russia. This
really turned the tide after the attack on Moscow had failed and fresh
winter-hardened SovArmy troops attacked.
3) As I recall Yamamoto had said (more or less) "I can run wild for
six months - after that I can give no guarantee." His experience in
the US included a large amount of travel including the Texas oil
fields and the various manufacturing plants.
4) Had Hitler not begun exterminating the Ukrainians the Soviet Army
would have had a much tougher time. As it was the behind-the-lines
forces, regular and guerrilla, gave the road-bound German supply lines
fits. With the Ukrainian populace with him, as they were at the very
first few days, that wouldn't have been nearly so severe a problem.
The country 'ocean' would have been 'anti-fish', to paraphrase Mao.
Walt BJ
Walt BJ

Stuart Wilkes wrote:

Hm. One wonders how this purged Soviet Army managed to inflict over 3
times as many German KIA in the first seven weeks of Barbarossa as the
combined Franco-Anglo-Belgian-Dutch armies managed in the six-week
campaign in the West.

What were the numbers of soldiers involved in the two campaigns that
you are comparing. i.e:
Size of armies in the west and the casualties?
Size of the armies in Barbarossa and the casualties?

And the purges themselves had no impact on Western estimates of the
Soviet military. They derided it before the Purges, and the derided
it after the Purges.

The effect on the estimates is of course irrelevant. What matters is
the actual effect!

Tukhachevskii was discovered in the West to have
been a military genius only after he was safely dead.

How does the fact that Tukhachevskii was judged to have been a genius
matter? Moreover how does the timing of this recognition matter?
Just what does it matter whether he was safely dead or unsafely? alive?
Perhaps your phrasing sounds good, but what is it supposed to show?
--
Rpstyk

"Tarver Engineering" wrote:

:"Fred J. McCall" wrote in message
.. .
: Owe Jessen wrote:
:
: :Am 21 Oct 2003 16:09:53 -0700, schrieb (The
: :Black Monk) :
: :
: :Unfortunately, rather than statesmen Germany was led by madmen.
: :Hitler's racial theories prevented him from making Germany a leader of
: :Europe in the manner that America would later be. As Spengler
: :predicted in 1936, Hitler's sick reich didn't last 10 years.
: :
: :If Germany would have been lead by statesmen and not madmen it would
: :not have waged war, me thinks.
:
: And if Germany had been fairly treated by the victors of WWI, rather
: than robbed blind, and hadn't had such sensible options as Anshluss
: foreclosed, she might have been led by statesmen rather than madmen.
:
:I think the meth-amphetamines would have still done their paranoid
:schizoprenic work on the minds of the people. Adolph was a very charismatic
:man.

Then you should stop using the meth.

In article ,
Fred J. McCall writes:
Owe Jessen wrote:

:Am 21 Oct 2003 16:09:53 -0700, schrieb (The
:Black Monk) :
:
:Unfortunately, rather than statesmen Germany was led by madmen.
:Hitler's racial theories prevented him from making Germany a leader of
:Europe in the manner that America would later be. As Spengler
:predicted in 1936, Hitler's sick reich didn't last 10 years.
:
:If Germany would have been lead by statesmen and not madmen it would
:not have waged war, me thinks.

And if Germany had been fairly treated by the victors of WWI, rather
than robbed blind, and hadn't had such sensible options as Anshluss
foreclosed, she might have been led by statesmen rather than madmen.

I really don't think that that was the case. The near-simultaneous
collapse of the two phases of Imperial German society in late 1918 -
the defeat of the Army's Kaiserschlacht in France, and the collapse of
the Home Front or civilian ability to support the war, due to a
combination of lack of resources due to the British (and later,
Anglo-American) blockade of all German shipping, and the rise of the
various Communist and Anarchist rebellions in late 1918, left Germany
without a clear r sense that they had, in fact, lost the war. The
Front-Line veterans, and the Army General Staff (Who'd been running
the shpw by fair means or foul since just before the outbreak of the
First World War) felt that they'd been stabbed in the back by the
surrender by the REMFs in Berlin. As far as they were concerned, they
may of suffered some setbacks, but they hadn't lost. The Home Front
felt that they'd been let down by the Army, which surrendered after s
relatively small seris of setbacks. After all, the Army was still
deep within French terretory, wasn't it? This wasn't really true - the
Kaiser's Government had it right, and Germany had reached the point ot
total exhaustion - but we're dealing with emotions here, and not
fact. This general feeling that they hadn't really lost, and that if
they only tried a little harder next time, they'd win, pervaded most
aspects of German society in the 1920s and 1930s.

That was one of the motivations behind the "Unconditional Surrender"
demands of the Allies in the Second World War. They wanted the
Germans to be in no doubt that they'd lost, by losing in that manner,
it put out most of the smouldering embers, if you will, of resentment
that gave Hitler such a receptive audience.

That's not to say that Germany wasn't treated with excessive harshness
at Versailles. But when you balance the Treaty mandated reparations
against the forgiveness of those debts by the British and American
governments, and the loans and loan guarantees provided to teh Weimar
Republic, it's not really a serious issue.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

"Christophe Chazot" wrote in message
...

John

My apologies, I thought it was about 1914-18.

What happened to our army in 1939-40 had little to do with what was
achieved
in 1917-18...


Actually I suspect it did. The horror of WW1 was so strong in the generation
of 1940 that they were determined to avoid it happening again.

This is I think what lay behind the reluctance to take the offensive
against Germany in 1939 when their troops were busy in Poland.


Keith

"Christophe Chazot" wrote in

"John Mullen" a écrit
"Christophe" wrote

According to the first line, we were talking about WW1 :
The French were involved rather heavily in WW1 you'll find

Je suis vraiment desolee que tu m'as malcompris!

'For sure, but not (with all respect) in the second'

Tout que j'ai dit est de la guerre deuxieme, pas la premiere.

J'espere bien que tu m'excuse pour tous mes faux en francais.

My apologies, I thought it was about 1914-18.

What happened to our army in 1939-40 had little to do with what was
achieved in 1917-18...

I've always thought it had everything to do with it. World War I basically
destroyed the cream of a generation for France. After the horrors of the
first war, it was decided that sending their men off to die in the trenches
was stupid, and that they were better off just making things so difficult
on the enemy that an attack would never come. Unfortunately for the French,
the attack did come, but not where they had prepared for it, and due to
this France did not have the means avaible to respond properly.
In short, the French army got their butt kicked in WWII because they
were trying to avoild another WWI.

"Christophe" wrote in news:bn6dv5$pk9$1@news-
reader3.wanadoo.fr:


"Cub Driver" a écrit dans le message news:
...
(snip)
There must have been close to a million slave laborers (guest workers,
if you prefer) sent to Germany. I've seen newsreels of them returning,
still in their 1940 uniforms.

all the best -- Dan Ford
email: www.danford.net/letters.htm#9

Mmh... we were talking about WW1, not WW2.

No we wern't.

John said:
For sure, but not (with all respect) in the second.
With "the second" refering to the second world war. The focus of his
whole post was the 2nd war.

Do wich you responded:
Figures dont't really agree, you know. France sent 8,410,000 soldiers
to
the front. Out of them, 1,357,800 were killed and 3,595,000 wounded.
The
only country that suffered higher losses in this war was Russia.

These figures have nothing to do with WWII, yet you used them to try to
counteract the argument that the french didn't really fight in that war.

While you may have been talking about WWI, the person you were responding
to wasn't, and it was your responsibility to mention if you were planing
to switch the discussion back to a previous topic (not that the post
would have made much sense that way, as you appeared to be trying to
debunk John's claim that the french basiclly crumbled under the German
attack in 1940, and trying to do that by pointing to WWI is quite simply
stupid).

"Rostyslaw J. Lewyckyj" wrote in message ...
Stuart Wilkes wrote:

Hm. One wonders how this purged Soviet Army managed to inflict over 3
times as many German KIA in the first seven weeks of Barbarossa as the
combined Franco-Anglo-Belgian-Dutch armies managed in the six-week
campaign in the West.

What were the numbers of soldiers involved in the two campaigns that
you are comparing. i.e:

Suprisingly equal, Rostyk. I'm suprised you didn't know that.

Size of armies in the west and the casualties?

Well, the French Army alone suffered 1.9 million KIA and prisoners in
the campaign in the West, while the combined
Franco-Anglo-Belgian-Dutch armies inflicted ~27,000 KIA on the
Germans. In this case, the the Germans faced Anglo-French Armies
that were fully mobilized and alerted, their governments having
declared war on Nazi Germany nine months previous.

Size of the armies in Barbarossa and the casualties?

The Soviet Army suffered ~2 million KIA and prisoners at the hands of
the German-Italian-Finnish-Romanian-Hungarian Armies, during the first
9 weeks of Barbarossa, while inflicting ~83,000 KIA on the German Army
alone in the first 7 weeks of Barbarossa. In this case, the Germans
faced unprepared unalerted, peacetime-strength Rifle Divisions (~6000
men) far from their assigned battle positions, which is one of the
advantages you get when you do a sneak attack. Ask the Japanese (c.f.
Jap sneak attacks on Port Arthur, Pearl Harbor) about the general
tactical advantages of a sneak attack on unprepared enemies.

And the purges themselves had no impact on Western estimates of the
Soviet military. They derided it before the Purges, and the derided
it after the Purges.

The effect on the estimates is of course irrelevant.

Mr. Wilshaw brought them up to show that Western skepticism about
Soviet promises was warranted. My reply shows that they had little
actual effect on the West's perception of the Soviets.

What matters is the actual effect!

And by comparison to the performance of the advanced Western countries
the year before, it does not seem that the effect was particularly
great.

Tukhachevskii was discovered in the West to have
been a military genius only after he was safely dead.

How does the fact that Tukhachevskii was judged to have been a genius
matter?

It shows that the Purges had little effect on Western perceptions of
Soviet military effectiveness prior to WWII.

Moreover how does the timing of this recognition matter?
Just what does it matter whether he was safely dead or unsafely? alive?
Perhaps your phrasing sounds good, but what is it supposed to show?

That the Purges really had little actual effect on Western perceptions
of Soviet military effectiveness and reliability. The Soviets were
totally discounted as a factor, both before the Purges and after.

Stuart Wilkes

"Keith Willshaw" wrote in message ...
"Stuart Wilkes" wrote in message
om...
E. Barry Bruyea wrote in message
. ..
On 22 Oct 2003 02:44:52 -0700, (Stuart Wilkes)
wrote:


Indeed, the Western powers were concerned to keep the Baltic States
out of Soviet hands. However, in the Anglo-German negotiations of the
summer of 1939, the British offered to recognize Eastern Europe as a
German sphere of influence. Last time I checked, the Baltic States
are in Eastern Europe. So the Western powers were indeed resolved to
keep the Baltic States out of Soviet hands, in order to preserve them
for the Nazi variety.


What Anglo German negotiations ?

The ones described in Ambassador von Dirksen's cable from London to
Berlin of 24 July 1939:

"General ideas as to how a peaceful adjustment with Germany could be
undertaken seem to have crystallized... On the basis of political
appeasement, which in to ensure the principle of non-aggression and to
achieve a delimitation of political spheres of interest by means of a
comprehensive formula, a broad economic program is being worked out...
About these plans entertained by leading circles, State Advisor
Wohlthat, who, on British initiative, had long talks about them during
his stay in London last week, will be able to give more detailed
information. The problem that is puuzzling the sponsors of these
plans most is how to start the negotiations. Public opinion is so
inflamed, that if these plans of negotiations with Germany were to
bedcome public they would immediately be torpoedoed by Churchill and
others with the cry 'No second Munich!' or 'No return to appeasement!'

The persons engaged in drawing up a list of points for negotiation
therefore realize that the preparatory steps vis-a-vis Germany must be
shrouded in the utmost secrecy. Only when Germany's willingness to
negotiate has been ascertained, and at leaset unanimity regarding the
program, perhaps regarding certain general principles, has been
attained, will the British government feel strong enough to inform the
public of its intentions and of the steps it has already taken. If it
could in this way hold out the prospect of an Anglo-German adjustment,
it is convinced that the public would greet the news with the greatest
joy, and the obstructionists would be reduced to silence. So much is
expected from the realization of this plan that it is even considered
a most effective election cry, one which would assure the government
parties a victory in the autumn elections, and with it the retention
of power for another five years.

....In conclusion, I should like to point out that the German-Polish
problem has found a place in this tendency toward an adjustment with
Germany, inasmuch as it is believed that in the event of an
Anglo-German adjustment the solution of the Polish problem will be
easier, since a calmer atmosphere will facilitate the negotiations,
and the British interest in Poland will be diminished."

Zachary Shore "What Hitler Knew" Oxford University Press, 2003, pgs
117-118, citing Dirksen's report of 24 July 1939.

Unfortunately for these Anglo-German discussions, on 11 August this
cable was circulated to the German Embassy in Moscow, whose
communications were not secure...

From March onwards (when Germany seized the remains of
Czechoslovakia) there was a deterioration of relations which made everbody
understand the inevitability of war

Sure, once the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact put paid to the idea of
Anglo-German agreement:

"For all the other acts of brutality at home and aggression
without, Herr Hitler had been able to offer an excuse, inadequate
indeed,
but not fantastic. The need for order and discipline in Europe,
for strength at the centre to withstand the incessant infiltration of
false and revolutionary ideas - this is certainly no more than the
conventional excuse offered by every military dictator who has ever
suppressed the liberties of his own people or advanced the conquest
of his neighbors. Nevertheless, so long as the excuse was offered
with sincerity, and in Hitler's case the appearance of sincerity were
not lacking over a period of years, the world's judgement of the man
remained more favorable than its judgement of his actions. The faint
possibility of an ultimate settlement with Herr Hitler still, in these
circumstances, remained, however abominable his methods, however
deceitful his diplomacy, however intolerant he might show himself of
the rights of other European peoples, he still claimed to stand
ultimately for something which was a common European interest, and
which therefore could conceivably provide some day a basis for
understanding with other nations equally determined not to sacrifice
their traditional institutions and habits on the bloodstained altars
of the World Revolution.

The conclusion of the German-Soviet pact removed even this faint
possibility of an honorable peace."

Lord Lloyd of Dolobran "The British Case" Eyre & Spottiswoode Limited.
London, 1939, pgs 54-5, with a preface by Lord Halifax, the Foreign
Secretary.

And Lord Lloyd was no isolated right-wing crank. Within months of his
book being published, he was a member of Churchill's Cabinet, the
Secretary of State for Colonies.

In April Germany denounced the Anglo German Naval Agreement

The Germans alsocomplained about the negotiations
Britain was pursuing with the USSR complaining that
Britain and the Soviet Union were trying to encircle
Germany.

And the British offered to end those talks.

They need not have feared since it was the Soviets who scuppered
any chance of an alliance to oppose Germany when Molotov
first sharply criticized the British suggestions of a defensive alliance
against Germany and Italy and then rejected a series of drafts in
negotiations

Actually, it was the Soviet draft of 17 April 1939 that formed the
basis of the discussions, and as late as 19 August 1939, a mere week
before the planned start date for the German invasion of Poland, the
British delegation at the Moscow military staff talks had no authority
to commit to anything.

with the British and French governments and demanded guarantees for the
Baltic states,

Yes.

insurance against internal revolution,

Not quite. A change in a country's policy in favor of Nazi Germany,
such as that successfully engineered by HMG in the case of
Czechoslovakia. This was clearly a legitimate Soviet concern, since
it had clear, recent precedents.

and the right to send
Red Army troops into Poland in the event of a German invasion.

And this was considered nothing more than the minimum requirement of
the military situation, at least according to the (British) Deputy
Chiefs of Staff:

"We feel that this is no time for half measures and that every effort
should be made to persuade Poland and Roumania to agree to the use of
their territory by Russian forces. In our opinion it is only logical
that the Russians should be given every facility for rendering
assistance and putting their maximum weight into the scale on the
side of the anti-aggression powers. We consider it so important to
meet the Russians in this matter that, if necessary, the strongest
pressure should be exerted on Poland and Roumania to persuade them to
adopt a helpful attitude.

It is perfectly clear that without early and effective Russian
assistance, the Poles cannot hope to stand up to a German attack for
more than a limited time... The supply of arms and war material is
not enough. If the Russians are to collaborate in resisting German
aggression against Poland or Roumania they can only do so effectively
on Polish or Roumanian soil; and...if permission for this were
withheld till war breaks out, it would then be too late. The most the
Allies could then hope for would be to avenge Poland and Roumania and
perhaps restore their independence as a result of the defeat of
Germanyin a long war.

Without immediate and effective Russian assistance the longer that war
would be, and the less chance there would be of either Poland or
Roumania emerging at the end of it as independent states in anything
like their present form.

We suggest that it is now necessary to present this unpalatable truth
with absolute frankness to both the Poles and to the Roumanians. To
the Poles especially it ought to be pointed out that they have
obligations to us as well as we to them; and that it is unreasonable
for them to expect us blindly to implement our guarantee to them if,
at the same time, they will not co-operate in measures designed for a
common purpose.

The conclusion of a treaty with Russia appears to us to be the best
way of preventing a war. ... At the worst if the negotiations with
Russia break down, a Russo-German rapproachment may take place of
which the probable consequence will be that Russia and Germany
decide to share the spoils and concert in a new partition of the
Eastern European States."

Committee on Imperial Defense, Deputy Chiefs of Staff Subcommittee
meeting of August 16, 1939. Quoted in Sidney Aster "1939 The Making
of the Second World War" and Michael Carley "1939 - The Alliance that
Never Was and the Coming of World War II"

To summarize, the Deputy Chiefs of Staff considered that the OTL
policy of Neville Chamberlain and the Polish government on this point
would lead to a disasterous Soviet-German agreement, and a war, and
that "Without immediate and effective Russian assistance the longer
that war would be, and the less chance there would be of either Poland
or Roumania emerging at the end of it as independent states in
anything like their present form.".

The Deputy Chiefs of Staff were very clear that the position was
grave, that the Soviets were vital for resisting German aggression,
and that there was no time to be wasted in coming to agreement with
them. Unfortunately, Chamberlain preferred to pursue Anglo-German
agreement.

These demands were clearly impossible to accept and were almost
certainly intended to end all such talks as the USSR was already
secretly negotiating with Germany.

No, these Soviet proposals were nothing more than the minimum of what
was militarily necessary for successful resistance to Nazi Germany.
No wonder Chamberlain had no interest in them.

It was of course Stalin who offered Germany a free hand in Western
Europe while the USSR would have a free hand in the east and
split Poland between them.

Much better than letting Nazi Germany get it all.

Stuart Wilkes