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![]() "Drazen Kramaric" wrote in message ... On Sun, 22 Feb 2004 23:31:15 -0000, "Jim Doyle" wrote: Churchill made the only decision he could under the circumstances, would you not make the same call? No. It was the unison opinion of the experts, i.e. British admirals that such attack was not necessary. Churchill was but an amateur who just presided over the naval fiasco in Norway but managed to see his boss kicked out of office and take his place. Attack against Mers-el-Kebir was a political action, performed in the worst tradition of the Perfidious Albion against an ally who was on the ropes. For full nine months, Britain was unable to field more than nine divisions, none of them armoured. The best British fighters have been kept out of the front. Wisely as the events of the Battle of Britain showed British bombers pursued their own strategy while the front was crumbling Incorrect, they were subservient to the tactical requirements dictated by the army and paid the price in the destruction of the Battle and Blenheim squadrons in futile attacks on tactical targets defended by Bf-109's and light flak. Bomber command didnt come in to existence until 1942. In 1940 the 10 bomber squadrons in France (the Advanced Air Strike Force) and the Blenheims of no. 2 Group were tasked with providing tactical support to the army. Meanwhile the 'heavies' (Hampdens, Wellingtons and Whitleys), their flight no longer restricted by the neutral air spaces over the Netherlands and Belgium, were required to disrupt communications and transportation directly behind the German front. This turned out to be impossible in the absence of escort fighters but some squadrons took 85% casualties trying. and Royal Navy failed to stop Kriegsmarine from enabling a naval invasion of Norway. How they could have stopped the forces crossing from Denmark I dont know, perhaps you'd care to provide a winning strategy ? And such Britain decided to show to America how tough it was by attacking France, of all nations. There was a very real fear that those units would end up in German hands. You are however correct that there was a political dimension. One of the reasons voiced in the US congress for not supplying Britain with weapons was the fear that they, along with the RN would end up in German hands. Churchill's actions tended to defuse this fear. It was definitely not a Churchill's finest hour and he got every single French sailor killed at Oran on his conscience. It seems to me that the French Admiral in charge had a good share of the blame, he could have agreed to internment in a neutral port but decided this would offend against 'The Glory of France'. The French ships in Alexandria were demilitarised without a shot being fired. Keith |
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On Wed, 24 Mar 2004 23:19:47 -0000, "Keith Willshaw"
wrote: The best British fighters have been kept out of the front. Wisely as the events of the Battle of Britain showed. Loss of France was a heavy blow to the Allied cause. Much misery could have been prevented had Allies stopped Germans in 1940. Luftwaffe suffered seriously during the Battle of France and who knows how much additional effort could have snatched the air superiority from Germans, a superiority that was essential to German success. British bombers pursued their own strategy while the front was crumbling Meanwhile the 'heavies' (Hampdens, Wellingtons and Whitleys), their flight no longer restricted by the neutral air spaces over the Netherlands and Belgium, were required to disrupt communications and transportation directly behind the German front. This turned out to be impossible in the absence of escort fighters but some squadrons took 85% casualties trying. Where were the fighters? Sitting in Britain? How they could have stopped the forces crossing from Denmark I dont know, Royal Navy could have stopped everything else and secured the steady flow of men and material into central and northern Norway. Throughout the campaign, Germans used no more than two corps of land troops with initial attacks performed with regimental sized battle groups. It seems to me that the French Admiral in charge had a good share of the blame, he could have agreed to internment in a neutral port but decided this would offend against 'The Glory of France'. Let's see, there's French admiral, commanding French ships in North African port under French control and for some reason he should have succumbed to the demand of British admiral? Gensaoul was no idiot and he understood that his ships with reduced crews could not prevent British seizure the moment they sailed from the port. The French ships in Alexandria were demilitarised without a shot being fired. Apples and oranges. The shot wasn't fired, but British were the only ones with the pointed guns against their allies. Again, nothing to be proud of. Drax remove JAMRZIMSPAM for reply |
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