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What is missile defense? An expensive fraud Bush needs Poland as a future nuclear battlefield
In message , bulba
writes On Sun, 8 Aug 2004 14:25:30 +0100, "Paul J. Adam" wrote: If it's a silly analogy, why did you suggest it? And why are you now complaining? No, I mean that there are no such silly people to believe that F-22 is absolutely perfect fighter airplane, because you obviously can envision something even better and more expensive. Sorry, no - there is nothing better than the F-22. Been shouted repeatedly in rec.aviation.military. And obviously there are no such silly people - except this marketroid who has written somewhere that this airplane would be able to single-handedly shoot down one thousand MiG-21s. No, that was the study of the F-15 versus the MiG-21 done by Lt.Col Larry Welch (USAF) over thirty years ago: the peak exchange rate was 955 MiG-21s downed per Eagle lost, according to the models of the day. (the Eagle was equipped with the notional AIM-82 dogfight missile in that case, but AIM-9X is considerably more capable) Isn't the F-22 meant to be better than the aircraft it's replacing? technology is not per se the reason to drop this weapon altogether, like existence of flares is not the reason thought by anyone by the heavily stoned to stop using the IR guided AA missile at all. What countermeasures do you put on your fast jets to protect them against the LePage Glue Gun? It's a potential threat: you can't *prove* than an enemy isn't busy developing it as we speak. Yet the aircraft of the United States would be *helpless* against this weapon! On the other hand, there are a *lot* of IR-guided weapons out there, and a great many of them remain vulnerable to flares and disco lights even before you get into more interesting countermeasures. There's a credible SA-7 threat because the weapons exist, have proliferated, and are being fired at us. So, given a choice between defending against the improvements in IR-guided weapons, or developing countermeasures against the fiendish LePage Glue Gun, which has the higher priority? The real-world threat, or the notional future problem? Same with NMD - just because technology isn't perfect doesn't mean it's unnecessary or useless. Neither is it necessary or effective. The argument is riddled with contradictions, as you yourself are demonstrating. Meanwhile, the US has confidence in the security of its borders, because illegal immigrants can't enter, ships have their cargoes properly inspected before entering port, aircraft are screened before being allowed to overfly the US, and no merchant ship can get into SS-N-2 range of the US coast without having been carefully checked out first. 1. You won't have 10 or 20 nuclear explosions airbursted by merchant ship or aircraft overflying in disguise. Firstly, says who? Al-Qaeda have demonstrated the ability to stage four near-simultaneous hijacks, why is it beyond their wit to position a dozen rustbucket merchantmen? Secondly, NMD won't stop 10 or 20 launches, remember? 2. Even if point 1 were necessary, that still leaves space undefended - what's the point of arming the facade of the house with all kinds of alarm systems and locks if the doors in the back of the house don't even have locks? If access to the back is "cross the deep ravine, swim the raging river, and climb the Cliffs of Despair" while access to the front is "walk in off the street", then perhaps the priority for security is the front. I'll address the issue of cruise missiles, but regarding "sneaky attack" this is only the way to run the terrorist act. Nt that _warfare_: there is no formulation of demands, no conditions made openly, no mutually assured destruction, no indefinite time of waiting on the weapon and it still having _threat potential_. And nuclear blackmail with a handful of ICBMs from narrow threat arcs (all that NMD can cope with) is more effective how, precisely? This is not the way _foreign policy_ can be implemented. "Sneak attack" is only the way for a terrorist act, which however terrible in cost of lives, isn't large scale warfare or viable tool of blackmail and forcing the country into some policy or away from it. And, again, threatening nuclear blackmail with a small number of untested weapons is more effective how? Note that the old Styx is a simple cruise missile, widely proliferated and copied, readily available, and with the payload to carry half a ton of nastiness into a city centre. Airbursting it would be trivial, granted the ability to build or adapt a nuclear weapon. It's cheap, available, deniable... and completely immune to NMD. SS-N-2: range: 80 km. Subsonic. And readily adapted to launch from the ubiquitous shipping container. How thoroughly is a typical Panamanian-registered freighter inspected while fifty kilometres off the US coast and - apparently - bound for Buenos Aires? 1. Regarding "immunity to NMD": do you expect river gunship to be useful on the desert? No, just as I don't expect NMD to be effective against single ICBM launches in narrow threat arcs. Pretty trivial to circumvent: either don't use an ICBM, or launch from outside coverage (and let's not get into penetration aids, themselves hardly new technology) What's the point of trying to apply weapon where it doesn't apply? Indeed. If a hostile nation has a nuclear weapon, NMD doesn't stop them delivering it. If a terrorist group acquires a nuclear weapon, NMD *certainly* does nothing to stop them delivering it. So what was the point again? 2. Cruise missiles CAN be stopped where US has defensive capability: on the sea, in the vicinity of coasts of US. How many SAM batteries do you have assigned to the task? It's been quite a while since the Nike days. Even if the current radar network is not up to task, it's not impossible and not even very difficult for US to do so in principle. But you're not doing it and have no plans to do it. Something to do with shortage of funds, because NMD is expensive... whoops. 3. Cruise missiles have short range and relatively long time to target - anyway a lot longer than ballistic missile for a mile of range. Any significant attack on US would require either submarine closing to the US shores very closely or launching the missiles from the longer range. In both cases the attack is stoppable and very risky for the attacker. Or, again, launch from cargo ships. Mix that in with aircraft-carried weapons and ship-carried weapons as suicides, maybe truck bombs coming in from Mexico, and you've got a delightful cocktail of confusion, and (other than the nuclear weapons themselves) all within al-Qaeda's demonstrated capabilities. Now, remind me how NMD helps with any of this other than siphoning off funding. Then it's bloody useless, isn't it? Of course not. Compare the number of vehicle-borne IEDs sent against US targets, to the numbers of ICBMs launched at US targets. Where's the actual, real-world threat that is killing your people today? It's designed to meet a threat that doesn't exist yet, and does nothing against the much more effective, credible and likely forms of attack. Hm. I used to think those missiles NK has launched and that have flown well past Japan are real. Any of them demonstrated the range to reach the US? Or those medium-range missiles India has developed - are they real or just figment of my imagination? Ditto. (And then there's accuracy at that range, to say nothing of reliability) Don't forget Japan, either. Those other "more effective, credible and likely" forms of attack are not at all more effective, credible and likely. Cheaper, more proven, more reliable in terms of keeping the package working, much harder for the US to detect and trace to originator. They're a lot less effective (range, speed, having the weapon available available all the time on your own territory you control), credible (making 10 synchronized and successful nuclear explosions from sneaky attacks from ships and smuggled bombs is precisely what I would call incredible and very difficult and very unlikely to succeed, therefore incredible) Why? Al-Qaeda have demonstrated just this sort of capability already. and unlikely (what's the point of engaging in crazy schemes that can be used only once if you can rely on proven and more reliable technology). You mean, technology that doesn't exist and hasn't been tested? (NK or Indian ICBMs able to reliably hit the US) Systems like NMD and the experience and the technology are not built in six months. That requires decades of experience. It is statistically very probable the threat that NMD is designed to address will appear. It is not the question of "if" but "when". Meanwhile, the dastardly enemy will not use improvised attacks, because they're less effective than ICBMs. Al-Qaeda will reject idiot schemes like "hijack some airliners and fly them into buildings" because it's impossible to co-ordinate and execute such attacks. No illegal cargoes are smuggled into the US, and your borders - air, land and sea - are airtight. They're not? But at least, if anyone gets a deathwish and decides to heave an ICBM at you, there's a chance to stop it. Assuming everything works. And they've tested how many weapons? And Pakistan and India tested how many weapons? Your government doesn't seem too worried: Pakistan's a trusted ally, remember? (North Korea may well be playing nuclear games, but building NMD is about the least effective defence against any NK warheads you could manage) Why should NMD be ineffective against missiles from NK? Where are they being fired from? (Hint - remember that shipload of tactical ballistic missiles being shipped to Yemen? The North Koreans will sell for hard cash) No. A North Korean nuclear warhead would be a threat. So they're close to it - Israelis probably did not test their warheads, Well, actually... The problem comes from assuming that the only way Kim Jong-Il would use it would be to developing a workable intercontinental missile, mate his scarce (and unproven) nuclear warhead to it, and fire it in the general direction of the US hoping to hit something important. On top of that, you have also to assume that NMD is the only possible counter to the weapon. You don't build NMD to counter just NK, Limited arcs, remember? just like you don't build seven aircraft carriers for single purpose of holding Germany in check for the next 3.5 years and after that all the hell may break loose. Aircraft carriers are extremely powerful and flexible tools. NMD is a one-trick pony. Any system that requires the likely enemy to be stupid, is not well planned. By this token it is stupid on the part of enemies to equip their airplanes with flares, because two-color IR seekers in more advanced AA missiles can distinguish between a flare and a real target. Why? Are you assuming that you'll only be fired on by "more advanced" missiles? There are a *lot* of old IR threat weapons out there still using mechanically-scanned lead-sulphide seekers, and many of them will still work when fired. Besides, it's worth remembering that the AIM-9M required some hasty adjustments to its CCM logic after Desert Storm: turned out that its flare-rejection logic worked well against Western countermeasures, but rather less well against those used by Iraq. (Five misses of eleven fired) How many weapons have they fired at anyone? And what's their expected reliability rate? Worse and worse - it's so bad in Russia that it is becoming a real threat. I don't have the data, but it's been so bad there that this journalist who was trying to write on the issue was killed by a bomb. He was supposed to meet with this retired RVSN colonel who's making public fuss about state of RVSN in Russia. The bomb was supposed to kill them both, but the colonel got late a few minutes and the reporter has opened that briefcase that was lying there by himself, so only he died. The missiles, despite official explanations, neither in US nor in Russia have not had their targets deprogrammed - missiles are just switched into another mode, but if something goes wrong or the command in Russia doesn't switch the missiles into another mode in emergency situation, the missiles will recall their usual targets in America. Besides, NMD's not aimed at Russia, remember? Do keep up. Do keep up in checking reality: Russian missiles are in fact still aimed towards America and the possibility of erratic, unauthorized launch is increasing every day. And NMD is still not positioned to defend against a Russian threat, therefore the Russian threat is irrelevant to the current NMD deployment. Besides you do not know if the NMD will not be necessary in future to guard US against Russia, because politics will change again. Obviously, whoever's planning the system either expects Alaska to be mobile or doesn't anticipate a threat from Russia. Not so much in ICBMs these days. NOT YET. And because it doesn't need to. And penetration-aid technologies have been around for, what, thirty years? Still, I've heard Russians make a whole new world of difference in their work on Topol missiles. Have they stopped blowing up in flight yet? So, NMD is actually meant to be able to stop a rogue Russian strike? I think this is one of the quiet goals of the system, yes. Then it's really, really badly designed for the job. Not very likely - they could easily overwhelm it even if NMD worked perfectly. So, not much use, is it? Overwhelmed by a single launch? I thought your criterion was "10 or 20 nuclear explosions". That's maybe three Russian ICBMs, but then aren't you saying their technology is racing ahead? NMD's in the wrong place, too vulnerable to countermeasures and too easily saturated, to protect against that threat. -- He thinks too much: such men are dangerous. Julius Caesar I:2 Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk |
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On Mon, 9 Aug 2004 19:15:54 +0100, "Paul J. Adam"
wrote: technology is not per se the reason to drop this weapon altogether, like existence of flares is not the reason thought by anyone by the heavily stoned to stop using the IR guided AA missile at all. What countermeasures do you put on your fast jets to protect them against the LePage Glue Gun? It's a potential threat: you can't *prove* than an enemy isn't busy developing it as we speak. Yet the aircraft of the United States would be *helpless* against this weapon! I meant NMD. Yes, the threats are developing - in the form of missiles like NK or degrading Russian missiles. On the other hand, there are a *lot* of IR-guided weapons out there, and a great many of them remain vulnerable to flares and disco lights even before you get into more interesting countermeasures. There's a credible SA-7 threat because the weapons exist, have proliferated, and are being fired at us. So, given a choice between defending against the improvements in IR-guided weapons, or developing countermeasures against the fiendish LePage Glue Gun, which has the higher priority? The real-world threat, or the notional future problem? The real world threat of having space undefended has to have quite high priority, as F-22 is no countermeasure against a Long March missile. Same with NMD - just because technology isn't perfect doesn't mean it's unnecessary or useless. Neither is it necessary or effective. It is necessary - for the n-th time, are the NK and Indian and Chinese missiles figment of my imagination and are degrading Russian missiles nonexistent either? It has also been demonstrated to be effective: 5 successes out of 7 tests for mere test kill vehicles is being quite effective. So yes, it is both necessary and effective. The argument is riddled with contradictions, as you yourself are demonstrating. It isn't riddled with any contradictions, you're just been engaging in silly stretching facts, making wildest analogies like that stupid "glue gun" and evading whatever reasoning led to conclusion you didn't like. Meanwhile, the US has confidence in the security of its borders, because illegal immigrants can't enter, ships have their cargoes properly inspected before entering port, aircraft are screened before being allowed to overfly the US, and no merchant ship can get into SS-N-2 range of the US coast without having been carefully checked out first. 1. You won't have 10 or 20 nuclear explosions airbursted by merchant ship or aircraft overflying in disguise. Firstly, says who? Al-Qaeda have demonstrated the ability to stage four near-simultaneous hijacks, why is it beyond their wit to position a dozen rustbucket merchantmen? About airplanes: not anymore. About ships: below, as cruise missiles would have to be used. Secondly, NMD won't stop 10 or 20 launches, remember? Sure it will. Not according to contemporary politics, err, official specs. Systems tend to get expanded, upgraded, replaced, used in other ways than specified, etc. 2. Even if point 1 were necessary, that still leaves space undefended - what's the point of arming the facade of the house with all kinds of alarm systems and locks if the doors in the back of the house don't even have locks? If access to the back is "cross the deep ravine, swim the raging river, and climb the Cliffs of Despair" while access to the front is "walk in off the street", then perhaps the priority for security is the front. Now you're indulging in nonsense: ICBM technology is proven and available and relatively easy to get. Not drastically more difficult to get than that of cruise missile technology. And definitely easier to get than the sea-skimming, low-level miniature advanced "stealth" cruise missile. Yes, getting "to the back of the house" woudl be quite easy, that is the point. I'll address the issue of cruise missiles, but regarding "sneaky attack" this is only the way to run the terrorist act. Nt that _warfare_: there is no formulation of demands, no conditions made openly, no mutually assured destruction, no indefinite time of waiting on the weapon and it still having _threat potential_. And nuclear blackmail with a handful of ICBMs from narrow threat arcs (all that NMD can cope with) is more effective how, precisely? Do you understand what is necessary to make foreign policy at all? Or is making war just means making some terrorist acts to you? This is not the way _foreign policy_ can be implemented. "Sneak attack" is only the way for a terrorist act, which however terrible in cost of lives, isn't large scale warfare or viable tool of blackmail and forcing the country into some policy or away from it. And, again, threatening nuclear blackmail with a small number of untested weapons is more effective how? It's a foreign policy, silly. Smth that Israel, for instance, tends to have. Note that the old Styx is a simple cruise missile, widely proliferated and copied, readily available, and with the payload to carry half a ton of nastiness into a city centre. Airbursting it would be trivial, granted the ability to build or adapt a nuclear weapon. It's cheap, available, deniable... and completely immune to NMD. SS-N-2: range: 80 km. Subsonic. And readily adapted to launch from the ubiquitous shipping container. How thoroughly is a typical Panamanian-registered freighter inspected while fifty kilometres off the US coast and - apparently - bound for Buenos Aires? There's nothing esp. difficult for US in penetrating that area with radar coverage and detecting the launch. Now I do not know the actual state of radar coverage of coastal USA. But there's nothing esp. difficult for US to do so, not with contemporary technology. You argue as if sea and air of USA has been pretty much undefended against hostile aircrafts and cruise missiles. 1. Regarding "immunity to NMD": do you expect river gunship to be useful on the desert? No, just as I don't expect NMD to be effective against single ICBM launches in narrow threat arcs. Today, maybe not - in 10 years, it is quite probable it will. Again, by your line of thinking a defense should not be developed just because the enemy can think of some ways of circumventing that. Again just like thinking "hell let's not develop AA missiles further bc somebody has demonstrated this trivial flare to be useful against in deceiving first generation IR missile". Pretty trivial to circumvent: either don't use an ICBM, or launch from outside coverage (and let's not get into penetration aids, themselves hardly new technology) If enemy doesn't use ICBM, they obviously have to use some other means of delivery - typical military aircrafts are out, "sneak attack" useless in terms of policymaking, cruise missile hard and probably even more expensive than simple ICBM and stoppable. What's the point of trying to apply weapon where it doesn't apply? Indeed. If a hostile nation has a nuclear weapon, NMD doesn't stop them delivering it. In what ways? Smuggling, or cruise missile or typical ballistic missile? If a terrorist group acquires a nuclear weapon, NMD *certainly* does nothing to stop them delivering it. That depends, if that terrorist group is for instance Iran. Even Hussein managed to develop home-grown tactical missiles. So what was the point again? The same you evade: rogue nation, large faction holding some country like Afghanistan, regime like North Korea, single erratic Russian launch. 2. Cruise missiles CAN be stopped where US has defensive capability: on the sea, in the vicinity of coasts of US. How many SAM batteries do you have assigned to the task? It's been quite a while since the Nike days. That needs to be done with or without NMD in place. If US isn't improving its traditional air defense, it is asking for trouble. Even if the current radar network is not up to task, it's not impossible and not even very difficult for US to do so in principle. But you're not doing it and have no plans to do it. Something to do with shortage of funds, because NMD is expensive... whoops. Oh get real. $100 bln to build the system vs annual Pentagon budget, IIRC, being about $450 bln in 1990s. Yes, it is some draining of the budget. But not in economy as big as American economy is! 3. Cruise missiles have short range and relatively long time to target - anyway a lot longer than ballistic missile for a mile of range. Any significant attack on US would require either submarine closing to the US shores very closely or launching the missiles from the longer range. In both cases the attack is stoppable and very risky for the attacker. Or, again, launch from cargo ships. Mix that in with aircraft-carried weapons and ship-carried weapons as suicides, maybe truck bombs coming in from Mexico, and you've got a delightful cocktail of confusion, and (other than the nuclear weapons themselves) all within al-Qaeda's demonstrated capabilities. OK, that's a recipe for terrorist act - not to mention that it's viability is reduced given the American navy and air defense that should be upgraded anyway. But not for _policy making_, or _long term threat or deterrence_. Now, remind me how NMD helps with any of this other than siphoning off funding. Again, trying to use fighter against ICBM is just as unreasonable as trying to use NMD against traditional bomber. You're getting really silly. Then it's bloody useless, isn't it? Of course not. Compare the number of vehicle-borne IEDs sent against US targets, to the numbers of ICBMs launched at US targets. Where's the actual, real-world threat that is killing your people today? In the existence of viable threats that have NOT YET materialized but have damn good chance of doing so and the clear trends leading to them. Want to bet until it's too late? It's designed to meet a threat that doesn't exist yet, and does nothing against the much more effective, credible and likely forms of attack. Hm. I used to think those missiles NK has launched and that have flown well past Japan are real. Any of them demonstrated the range to reach the US? Any of them being fundamentally difficult to improve? And remember the terrible mess NK is in. If they can achieve this, what of more capable adversary? Or those medium-range missiles India has developed - are they real or just figment of my imagination? Ditto. (And then there's accuracy at that range, to say nothing of reliability) CEP for Indian missile is below 1 km, pretty much all you need to scorch a city. Don't forget Japan, either. Those other "more effective, credible and likely" forms of attack are not at all more effective, credible and likely. Cheaper, more proven, more reliable in terms of keeping the package working, much harder for the US to detect and trace to originator. And all of those being essentially one, hit-and-run attacks, not something you can make foreign policy with. I.e. not viable, international body. They're a lot less effective (range, speed, having the weapon available available all the time on your own territory you control), credible (making 10 synchronized and successful nuclear explosions from sneaky attacks from ships and smuggled bombs is precisely what I would call incredible and very difficult and very unlikely to succeed, therefore incredible) Why? Al-Qaeda have demonstrated just this sort of capability already. Once. What are the chances of doing that again? Is that how Al Qaeda can make foreign policy? and unlikely (what's the point of engaging in crazy schemes that can be used only once if you can rely on proven and more reliable technology). You mean, technology that doesn't exist and hasn't been tested? (NK or Indian ICBMs able to reliably hit the US) Are you dense or don't want to see the obvious thing? Have Soviet missiles been unable to reach continental US? Or is there something inherently impossible in Chinese or Indians or North Koreans for them to build and upgrade their existing missiles so they did have the range? Are they developing means of delivery and nuclear warheads or no? Are they constantly improving them or no? Has the number of states, including the rogue ones, that has had the nuclear technology as well as ballistic technology available increased or not? Systems like NMD and the experience and the technology are not built in six months. That requires decades of experience. It is statistically very probable the threat that NMD is designed to address will appear. It is not the question of "if" but "when". Meanwhile, the dastardly enemy will not use improvised attacks, because they're less effective than ICBMs. Al-Qaeda will reject idiot schemes like "hijack some airliners and fly them into buildings" because it's impossible to co-ordinate and execute such attacks. No illegal cargoes are smuggled into the US, and your borders - air, land and sea - are airtight. All of those need to be protected with or without NMD in place. Not building NMD does nothing to protect the sea, land and atmospheric borders. They're not? But at least, if anyone gets a deathwish and decides to heave an ICBM at you, there's a chance to stop it. Assuming everything works. No, once somone decides to make _foreign policy_ with ICBM, they'll be able to do so. Which is what Iran is going to do soon in order to inflict pressure on Europe to re-evaluate its stance on immigration of Muslims into EU. And they've tested how many weapons? And Pakistan and India tested how many weapons? Your government doesn't seem too worried: Pakistan's a trusted ally, remember? And what if that changes, obviously? Hell, we don't need fighter airplanes cause all the countries having them are our trusted allies - this seems to be your silly line of thinking. (North Korea may well be playing nuclear games, but building NMD is about the least effective defence against any NK warheads you could manage) Why should NMD be ineffective against missiles from NK? Where are they being fired from? (Hint - remember that shipload of tactical ballistic missiles being shipped to Yemen? The North Koreans will sell for hard cash) There's nothing inherently impossible for US to place the launch sites on some Pacific Island or on some island belonging to Japan. No. A North Korean nuclear warhead would be a threat. So they're close to it - Israelis probably did not test their warheads, Well, actually... They did? Interesting. Or maybe they used tested US design? The problem comes from assuming that the only way Kim Jong-Il would use it would be to developing a workable intercontinental missile, mate his scarce (and unproven) nuclear warhead to it, and fire it in the general direction of the US hoping to hit something important. On top of that, you have also to assume that NMD is the only possible counter to the weapon. You don't build NMD to counter just NK, Limited arcs, remember? Oh for chrissakes, this is current limited system. What makes you think it would stay in current shape for the next 5 centuries. just like you don't build seven aircraft carriers for single purpose of holding Germany in check for the next 3.5 years and after that all the hell may break loose. Aircraft carriers are extremely powerful and flexible tools. NMD is a one-trick pony. Nonsense. Any system that requires the likely enemy to be stupid, is not well planned. By this token it is stupid on the part of enemies to equip their airplanes with flares, because two-color IR seekers in more advanced AA missiles can distinguish between a flare and a real target. Why? Are you assuming that you'll only be fired on by "more advanced" missiles? There are a *lot* of old IR threat weapons out there still using mechanically-scanned lead-sulphide seekers, and many of them will still work when fired. Which is precisely my point: just because some weapons can "get through" defensive technology, this is not a good argument against developing defensive technology. Besides, it's worth remembering that the AIM-9M required some hasty adjustments to its CCM logic after Desert Storm: turned out that its flare-rejection logic worked well against Western countermeasures, but rather less well against those used by Iraq. (Five misses of eleven fired) Which demonstrates well again that had somebody decided to fool NMD systems with some countermeasures, the effectiveness of the countermeasures until tested in practice (not very realistic option) would not be certain either. How many weapons have they fired at anyone? And what's their expected reliability rate? Worse and worse - it's so bad in Russia that it is becoming a real threat. I don't have the data, but it's been so bad there that this journalist who was trying to write on the issue was killed by a bomb. He was supposed to meet with this retired RVSN colonel who's making public fuss about state of RVSN in Russia. The bomb was supposed to kill them both, but the colonel got late a few minutes and the reporter has opened that briefcase that was lying there by himself, so only he died. The missiles, despite official explanations, neither in US nor in Russia have not had their targets deprogrammed - missiles are just switched into another mode, but if something goes wrong or the command in Russia doesn't switch the missiles into another mode in emergency situation, the missiles will recall their usual targets in America. Besides, NMD's not aimed at Russia, remember? Do keep up. Do keep up in checking reality: Russian missiles are in fact still aimed towards America and the possibility of erratic, unauthorized launch is increasing every day. And NMD is still not positioned to defend against a Russian threat, therefore the Russian threat is irrelevant to the current NMD deployment. Who knows if NMD will be positioned in a few years against Russian _deliberate_ threat? Systems tend to change in development. They somehow tend to acquire characteristics they didn't have before, you know. Even if it is officially not said, or smth different is said, I frankly don't believe any of that nonsense. The defensive system, even in its infancy, is too useful, if only as a tool in politics, not to be employed against potentially the most dangerous adversary. Still, I've heard Russians make a whole new world of difference in their work on Topol missiles. Have they stopped blowing up in flight yet? Wanna bet if all of them will blow up in flight before any falls on your head? So, NMD is actually meant to be able to stop a rogue Russian strike? I think this is one of the quiet goals of the system, yes. Then it's really, really badly designed for the job. Then it really, really should be redesigned to meet that job, not that the whole system should be dropped altogether. We lost a submarine. Hell, I told you building any and all submarines was a stupid idea. Let's stop using them at all. Not very likely - they could easily overwhelm it even if NMD worked perfectly. So, not much use, is it? Overwhelmed by a single launch? I thought your criterion was "10 or 20 nuclear explosions". When dealing with small rogue nation, not one erratic launch by Russians. That's maybe three Russian ICBMs, but then aren't you saying their technology is racing ahead? NMD's in the wrong place, too vulnerable to countermeasures and too easily saturated, to protect against that threat. Then it should be improved, not dropped altogether. |
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