German-Wings Copilot "one of us"?

On 3/27/2015 6:33 PM, Mike Schumann wrote:
snip

The problem is that the cockpit security precautions that were
implemented as a result of the post 9/11 security hysteria have now
created a new unanticipated vulnerability. In this new environment,
where every hijack event is going to be vigorously fought by the crew
and passengers, maybe armored cockpit doors are no longer a good idea.

I thought I read that the aircraft has a keypad outside the cockpit door
and, upon entry of the emergency override code, which the captain should
have known, the door would unlock for a short time after a specific delay.

--
Dan Marotta

On Saturday, March 28, 2015 at 11:20:25 AM UTC-4, Dan Marotta wrote:
On 3/27/2015 6:33 PM, Mike Schumann
wrote:


snip


The problem is that the cockpit security precautions
that were implemented as a result of the post 9/11 security
hysteria have now created a new unanticipated vulnerability. In
this new environment, where every hijack event is going to be
vigorously fought by the crew and passengers, maybe armored
cockpit doors are no longer a good idea.



I thought I read that the aircraft has a keypad outside the cockpit
door and, upon entry of the emergency override code, which the
captain should have known, the door would unlock for a short time
after a specific delay.




--

Dan Marotta

I believe, "yes & no". The person in the cockpit can do a "full lock-out" which appears to be the case this time.

On Saturday, March 28, 2015 at 4:41:36 PM UTC-5, Charlie M. (UH & 002 owner/pilot) wrote:
On Saturday, March 28, 2015 at 11:20:25 AM UTC-4, Dan Marotta wrote:
On 3/27/2015 6:33 PM, Mike Schumann
wrote:


snip


The problem is that the cockpit security precautions
that were implemented as a result of the post 9/11 security
hysteria have now created a new unanticipated vulnerability. In
this new environment, where every hijack event is going to be
vigorously fought by the crew and passengers, maybe armored
cockpit doors are no longer a good idea.



I thought I read that the aircraft has a keypad outside the cockpit
door and, upon entry of the emergency override code, which the
captain should have known, the door would unlock for a short time
after a specific delay.




--

Dan Marotta

I believe, "yes & no". The person in the cockpit can do a "full lock-out" which appears to be the case this time.

I don't fly a 'bus, but I understand the cockpit door switch is three position- Open, Auto (outside keypad works), and locked (meaning no one gets in unless let in).

Here in the U.S. post 9/11, when one of us steps out of the cockpit, a FA or jump seater must stay in the cockpit with the pilot remaining. In case of an inflight emergency the pilot flying can handle it and the other member of crew can either assist or let the other pilot back in. In the hindsight of this case that seems like a good policy.

On Saturday, March 28, 2015 at 3:22:45 PM UTC-7, richard wilkening wrote:
Here in the U.S. post 9/11, when one of us steps out of the cockpit, a FA or jump seater must stay in the cockpit with the pilot remaining. In case of an inflight emergency the pilot flying can handle it and the other member of crew can either assist or let the other pilot back in. In the hindsight of this case that seems like a good policy.

Of course, in the US, there is also a policy in place that allows pilots to bring firearms into the cockpit, so the presence of a second person may not make a whole lot of difference in this sort of case...

On Thursday, March 26, 2015 at 9:09:46 AM UTC-7, wrote:
I'm very much saddened to have just learned the Andreas Lubitz, the 28- old who deliberately seems to have flown the A 320 into the mountains started flying in a Glider Club (Montabaur). He was still a member and renewed his glider license in 2014 that he had since his teenage-years. If confirmed, this mass murderer is a stain on what we all believe is a brotherhood of ethical and morals-driven individuals. Using Occam's Razor, the explanation given by the French prosecutors this morning is highly likely.
I'm further troubled that this horrible act ended precisely on what the French call "Le Parcours", a much beloved mountain range that allows fast and long North-South glider flights along the French Alps. I had a wonderful glider vacation in Barcelonnette, a couple of km from the crash site. This is all very sad. It must multiply the pain of the survivors of those on board.

Herb

29 years of Airline Flying has taught me that the FAA and Congress over-react to these kinds of very troubling events. We now have a 1500hr plus an ATP rating before a pilot can be hired to fly Regionals or Major Airlines. This came about as a result of the Cogan Air crash in Buffalo, NY. Of course it didn't matter that BOTH pilots on that ill-fated flight had over 2000 hours each. I can only imagine what they will come up with, to prevent another Germanwings type crash. I'm guessing they will require that each cockpit must included an UZI carrying Security Guard who at least a GED and have the ability to shoot at close range. Seriously, the Germanwings First Officer should have never been near an airline cockpit. The same shrinks that examined him as part of his pre-employment are the same professions who are at this very moment trying to convince airline management that they should be part of an on-going evaluation of current airline pilots. Imagine airline management looking at this proposal and how they can use it to get rid of a pilot union officer who is constantly pushing back at an over-reaching and heavy handed management.

36 years of involvement in the psychiatric assessment of professionals whose work requires safety to the public (healthcare, legal, law enforcement, ATP, commercial, and private-rated pilots, air flight crew members, and those who work with WMD [weapons of mass destruction]) has taught me there is no perfect reaction to these events. The Colgan flight 3407 event occurred about 6 months after the FAA have noted concern regarding an apparent lack of a healthy safety culture sufficient to threaten to revoke Colgan's operating certificate. Despite their flight experience, the actions of both pilots involved sank to the level of their inadequate training. The resulting rules did NOT change the general requirement of 1,500 hours flight time for an ATP rating. The NTSB also expressed concerns about pilot fatigue and failure to maintain a sterile cockpit focus in a clearly critical flight environment. To date, I am not aware of medical data to indicate that Andreas Lubitz would NOT have been qualified, even in the US under FAR 67.107, at the time of hire. None of any "shink" involved could have recommended he not be hired.
(Remember, the slang root of "shrink" is "head shrinker" referring to attempts to reduce the head (ego) of those whose self-assessment is excessive and well-beyond reality). Those "shrinks" are already involved in the on-going evaluation of current airline pilots with identified mental health or substance abuse issues via FAR 67.107. Personally, I would prefer my pilot union officer to be focused on pushing back on any over-reaching and heavy-handed management effort to dilute air crew training requirements or meeting lawfully-enacted regulations and supporting both self- and peer-reporting of concerns about possible unstable mental health functioning.

On Sunday, March 29, 2015 at 11:57:46 AM UTC-7, Roy Clark, "B6" wrote:
36 years of involvement in the psychiatric assessment of professionals whose work requires safety to the public (healthcare, legal, law enforcement, ATP, commercial, and private-rated pilots, air flight crew members, and those who work with WMD [weapons of mass destruction]) has taught me there is no perfect reaction to these events. The Colgan flight 3407 event occurred about 6 months after the FAA have noted concern regarding an apparent lack of a healthy safety culture sufficient to threaten to revoke Colgan's operating certificate. Despite their flight experience, the actions of both pilots involved sank to the level of their inadequate training. The resulting rules did NOT change the general requirement of 1,500 hours flight time for an ATP rating. The NTSB also expressed concerns about pilot fatigue and failure to maintain a sterile cockpit focus in a clearly critical flight environment. To date, I am not aware of medical data to indicate that Andreas Lubitz would NOT have been qualified, even in the US under FAR 67.107, at the time of hire. None of any "shink" involved could have recommended he not be hired.
(Remember, the slang root of "shrink" is "head shrinker" referring to attempts to reduce the head (ego) of those whose self-assessment is excessive and well-beyond reality). Those "shrinks" are already involved in the on-going evaluation of current airline pilots with identified mental health or substance abuse issues via FAR 67.107. Personally, I would prefer my pilot union officer to be focused on pushing back on any over-reaching and heavy-handed management effort to dilute air crew training requirements or meeting lawfully-enacted regulations and supporting both self- and peer-reporting of concerns about possible unstable mental health functioning.

The requirement for the 1500 hour ATP is the same (you misunderstood my post) what HAS CHANGED is the requirement to HOLD AN ATP TO FLY FOR A REGIONAL OR MAJOR AIRLINE. This new requirement, which was a knee-jerk reaction to the COGAN AIR crash has capped off the pipeline for cheap labor. No longer can the regionals expect a constant flow of 250 hour CFI's to fill their cockpits and thus putting downward pressure on wages for these Regional FO's.
You mentioned self or peer reporting. Might I suggest that since this already exists in the airline world, that it starts with the Mental Health Professionals. It would go a long way in weeding out, oh let's call them "free spirits" who seem to flock to the profession. Pilots Unions have a "Professional Standards" Committee. It is very effective with dealing with unprofessional behavior. Screening Airline Pilots in an ongoing basis will not solve what happened to Germanwings. It's going to take a high-tech solution. Satellite based system to override the door locking systems. The system will need to require a system similar to how we operate our missile defense systems - two people with separate codes etc.

On Sunday, March 29, 2015 at 7:51:33 PM UTC-4, wrote:
On Sunday, March 29, 2015 at 11:57:46 AM UTC-7, Roy Clark, "B6" wrote:
36 years of involvement in the psychiatric assessment of professionals whose work requires safety to the public (healthcare, legal, law enforcement, ATP, commercial, and private-rated pilots, air flight crew members, and those who work with WMD [weapons of mass destruction]) has taught me there is no perfect reaction to these events. The Colgan flight 3407 event occurred about 6 months after the FAA have noted concern regarding an apparent lack of a healthy safety culture sufficient to threaten to revoke Colgan's operating certificate. Despite their flight experience, the actions of both pilots involved sank to the level of their inadequate training. The resulting rules did NOT change the general requirement of 1,500 hours flight time for an ATP rating. The NTSB also expressed concerns about pilot fatigue and failure to maintain a sterile cockpit focus in a clearly critical flight environment. To date, I am not aware of medical data to indicate that Andreas Lubitz would NOT have been qualified, even in the US under FAR 67.107, at the time of hire. None of any "shink" involved could have recommended he not be hired.
(Remember, the slang root of "shrink" is "head shrinker" referring to attempts to reduce the head (ego) of those whose self-assessment is excessive and well-beyond reality). Those "shrinks" are already involved in the on-going evaluation of current airline pilots with identified mental health or substance abuse issues via FAR 67.107. Personally, I would prefer my pilot union officer to be focused on pushing back on any over-reaching and heavy-handed management effort to dilute air crew training requirements or meeting lawfully-enacted regulations and supporting both self- and peer-reporting of concerns about possible unstable mental health functioning.

The requirement for the 1500 hour ATP is the same (you misunderstood my post) what HAS CHANGED is the requirement to HOLD AN ATP TO FLY FOR A REGIONAL OR MAJOR AIRLINE. This new requirement, which was a knee-jerk reaction to the COGAN AIR crash has capped off the pipeline for cheap labor. No longer can the regionals expect a constant flow of 250 hour CFI's to fill their cockpits and thus putting downward pressure on wages for these Regional FO's.
You mentioned self or peer reporting. Might I suggest that since this already exists in the airline world, that it starts with the Mental Health Professionals. It would go a long way in weeding out, oh let's call them "free spirits" who seem to flock to the profession. Pilots Unions have a "Professional Standards" Committee. It is very effective with dealing with unprofessional behavior. Screening Airline Pilots in an ongoing basis will not solve what happened to Germanwings. It's going to take a high-tech solution. Satellite based system to override the door locking systems. The system will need to require a system similar to how we operate our missile defense systems - two people with separate codes etc.

A high tech solution might just introduce new unanticipated threats into the system. One positive low tech step in the right direction is to eliminate the ability of a pilot to disable the keypad from unlocking the door.

As far as the 1,500 hour rule, that will certainly put pressure on the airlines to increase starting pay. However, these pay increases probably won't be enough to compensate for the increase training costs that the rule imposes on new pilots. The end result may well be that new pilots will tend to come from well off families who can pay the training. Other kids, who really have a passion and above average aptitude for flying will be further blocked from the profession. While the new pilots may have more hours, the actual airmanship skill level might significantly decrease. More unintended consequences that no one bothered to think thru.

A high tech solution might just introduce new unanticipated threats into the system. One positive low tech step in the right direction is to eliminate the ability of a pilot to disable the keypad from unlocking the door.

As far as the 1,500 hour rule, that will certainly put pressure on the airlines to increase starting pay. However, these pay increases probably won't be enough to compensate for the increase training costs that the rule imposes on new pilots. The end result may well be that new pilots will tend to come from well off families who can pay the training. Other kids, who really have a passion and above average aptitude for flying will be further blocked from the profession. While the new pilots may have more hours, the actual airmanship skill level might significantly decrease. More unintended consequences that no one bothered to think thru.

If the pilot is unable to lock out the door, then how do you keep the bad guys out of the cockpit? Remember, the who purpose of the "lock-out" capability is to defend against the terrorist who knows the "secret" code to open the door when it is locked. The "secret code" is different than the code that is used to go in or out.