Brazil 737-Embraer Crash

I won't lower myself to read the New York Times daily Jihad.


"news.charter.net" wrote in message
...
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/03/bu...ewanted=2&_r=1

"karl gruber" wrote in message
...
YOU........don't know that!



"James Robinson" wrote in message
. ..
Kevin Clarke wrote:

Then of course I am really scratching my head about 2 TCAS "failures"
or
at least TCAS being ignored. Sad.

TCAS only works with both transponders working. One was not working.

Larry Dighera schrieb:

following up. But it did contain this nugget:
....
... three other
Brazilian officers told me they had been informed that both planes
were at the same altitude.

They were, obviously. I don't need three officers to know *this*.

Stefan

James Robinson writes:

TCAS only works with both transponders working. One was not working.

Are you sure? Even a TCAS-II system installed on a machine with an
inoperative transponder should still provide traffic alerting, no?

[...] "A Mode S transponder is required to be installed and
operational for TCAS II to be operational. If the Mode S transponder
fails, the TCAS Performance Monitor will detect this failure and
automatically place TCAS into Standby." [...]

How unfortunate that it can't just downgrade to TCAS-I or even plain
traffic alerting. No wonder big planes have multiple transponders.


- FChE

Larry Dighera wrote:

James Robinson wrote:

(Frank Ch. Eigler) wrote:

James Robinson writes:

TCAS only works with both transponders working. One was not
working.

Are you sure? Even a TCAS-II system installed on a machine with an
inoperative transponder should still provide traffic alerting, no?

Not as I understand it. Here are some quotes from an ARINC
description of TCAS-II:

"A Mode S transponder is required to be
installed and operational for TCAS II to be
operational. If the Mode S transponder fails,
the TCAS Performance Monitor will detect
this failure and automatically place TCAS
into Standby."

The Mode S requirement is suspect, as I have had jet aircraft indicate
that they could see me on their TCAS units while the transponder
installed in the aircraft I was operating was not even squawking Mode
C, but it was squawking.

I think you are reading that incorrectly. The full functionality of
TCAS-II requires that both aircraft have Mode S transponders, since the
RA is worked out using the Mode S data channel. TCAS will "see" other
aircraft that are using mode C transponders, but with reduced
functionality if "Alt" isn't selected. (TA instead of RA, for example)

What the quoted paragraph is saying is that if the transponder on your
TCAS-II equipped aircraft is detected as having failed, and that can
include one of the two antennas, then the system will automatically drop
into standby, and will therefore not be able to either squawk or transmit
the necessary interrogations for system functionality.

"TCAS does not alter or diminish the pilot’s
basic authority and responsibility to ensure
safe flight. Because TCAS does not respond
to aircraft that are not transponder-equipped
or aircraft with a transponder failure, TCAS
alone does not ensure safe separation in
every case."

That statement does not support your assertion, that both aircraft
must have transponders operating for TCAS to provide avoidance
information.

I would guess, that if the transponder in a TCAS equipped aircraft
were turned off, the TCAS unit in that aircraft would still provide
information about other transponder equipped (and squawking) aircraft
in the area, but that wouldn't do those aircraft with operational
transponders any good unless the pilot receiving the TCAS information
took evasive action.

You have to take the two paragraphs together. As I understand it,
"standby" means that the transponders will not be squawking. That also
means that the interrogations necessary for the functionality of the
system won't transmit either. The system does not seem to have a passive
mode that simply listens.

James Robinson wrote in message ...
Larry Dighera wrote:

James Robinson wrote:

(Frank Ch. Eigler) wrote:

James Robinson writes:

TCAS only works with both transponders working. One was not
working.

Are you sure? Even a TCAS-II system installed on a machine with an
inoperative transponder should still provide traffic alerting, no?

Not as I understand it. Here are some quotes from an ARINC
description of TCAS-II:

"A Mode S transponder is required to be
installed and operational for TCAS II to be
operational. If the Mode S transponder fails,
the TCAS Performance Monitor will detect
this failure and automatically place TCAS
into Standby."

The Mode S requirement is suspect, as I have had jet aircraft indicate
that they could see me on their TCAS units while the transponder
installed in the aircraft I was operating was not even squawking Mode
C, but it was squawking.

I think you are reading that incorrectly. The full functionality of
TCAS-II requires that both aircraft have Mode S transponders, since the
RA is worked out using the Mode S data channel. TCAS will "see" other
aircraft that are using mode C transponders, but with reduced
functionality if "Alt" isn't selected. (TA instead of RA, for example)

What the quoted paragraph is saying is that if the transponder on your
TCAS-II equipped aircraft is detected as having failed, and that can
include one of the two antennas, then the system will automatically drop
into standby, and will therefore not be able to either squawk or transmit
the necessary interrogations for system functionality.

"TCAS does not alter or diminish the pilot’s
basic authority and responsibility to ensure
safe flight. Because TCAS does not respond
to aircraft that are not transponder-equipped
or aircraft with a transponder failure, TCAS
alone does not ensure safe separation in
every case."

That statement does not support your assertion, that both aircraft
must have transponders operating for TCAS to provide avoidance
information.

I would guess, that if the transponder in a TCAS equipped aircraft
were turned off, the TCAS unit in that aircraft would still provide
information about other transponder equipped (and squawking) aircraft
in the area, but that wouldn't do those aircraft with operational
transponders any good unless the pilot receiving the TCAS information
took evasive action.

You have to take the two paragraphs together. As I understand it,
"standby" means that the transponders will not be squawking. That also
means that the interrogations necessary for the functionality of the
system won't transmit either. The system does not seem to have a passive
mode that simply listens.

That's too bad...sounds like a G1000 that reboots with one bad input.

- Rick

Dave S wrote:

Matt Whiting wrote:
I did read today that they are holding the American pilots hostage
until they investigate further.

How does detaining them in the course of a criminal investigation
constitute holding them hostage?

Pulling your passport without filing charges is taking one hostage in my
book.

Matt

James Robinson wrote:

Emily wrote:


Dave S wrote:

How does detaining them in the course of a criminal investigation
constitute holding them hostage?

Because the Brazilian government has zero reason to suspect criminal
action on their part.

Let's not forget that the 737 crew could have caused the accident, but
not one's even thinking of that option.


First, they are not being detained. The government is holding their
passports so they can't leave the country. The US would probably do the
same if a foreign national was involved in an such a major incident under
suspicious circumstances.

They aren't being detained, but they can't leave. Do you know what
detain means?

Matt

Matt Whiting wrote:

James Robinson wrote:

First, they are not being detained. The government is holding their
passports so they can't leave the country. The US would probably do
the same if a foreign national was involved in an such a major
incident under suspicious circumstances.

They aren't being detained, but they can't leave. Do you know what
detain means?

Slight legal distinction. Michael Jackson wasn't considered as detained
when he was awaiting trial, but he did have to surrender his passport.

In this case, the pilots aren't in the slammer in Sao Paulo, and are free
to travel around Brazil, but cannot leave the country. I consider detained
as being in the custody of the police.

In article ,
Larry Dighera wrote:

He was speculating on what happened, but this is what he said:
Both planes were, inexplicably, at the same altitude in the same
space in the sky. The southeast-bound 737 pilots spotted our
Legacy 600, which was flying northwest to Manaus, and made a
frantic evasive bank. The 737 wing, swooping into the space
between our wing and the high tail, clipped us twice, and the
bigger plane then went into its death spiral.

Was this byline Joe Sharkey? He was a pax on the Legacy.
Having viewed the image of the damage to the Legacy, one wonders how the
737 could have been so badly damaged as to be unflyable.

James Robinson wrote:

Matt Whiting wrote:


James Robinson wrote:


First, they are not being detained. The government is holding their
passports so they can't leave the country. The US would probably do
the same if a foreign national was involved in an such a major
incident under suspicious circumstances.

They aren't being detained, but they can't leave. Do you know what
detain means?


Slight legal distinction. Michael Jackson wasn't considered as detained
when he was awaiting trial, but he did have to surrender his passport.

In this case, the pilots aren't in the slammer in Sao Paulo, and are free
to travel around Brazil, but cannot leave the country. I consider detained
as being in the custody of the police.

I didn't see "custody of the police" in the dictionary definition.

Matt