Wide-ranging Safety Discussion...?

I might be wrong, but my sense is that now in this soaring season, and
considering *only* quantity of gliders "substantially damaged" or worse, few
semi-regular, US-based, RAS readers would not agree this U.S. season is -
statistical pedantry aside - already distinctly worse-than-recent-years.

Non-midair ship-damage-inflicted hasn't apparently (if still-TBD in some
cases) been limited to uncurrent, inexperienced (total, or in-type) pilots,
or, been an exclusive function of 'bad luck' associated with off-field landings.

Some fundamental questions:
- why aren't we pilots as a group more considerate of our expensive equipment?
- why intentionally shave margins thin in the absence of a compelling reason
to do so...and awareness we ARE doing so?
- have any readers/contributors had (near) incidents in which neither
time-in-type (absence of) or currency (lack of) or 'obvious outside factors'
were factors, and if so, what *were* contributing factors?

Perhaps a wide-ranging, open, discussion of 'the whole safety thing' might be
worthwhile, both here and within our clubs. All pilots (presumably) believe
themselves sufficiently safe as to be unlikely to be PIC in anything other
than a 'pure bad luck' related accident/incident. There may be a few readers
who've even been involved in such.

But my personal 1st-hand experience, combined with a long-standing interest in
learning from the gaffes/unluckiness of other pilots, leads to the personal
conclusion the majority of crunches are NOT 'pure bad luck.' The good news
(considering only my personal experiences) is I've not been a repeat offender,
insofar as 'primary contributors' are concerned. Nonetheless, for me, pushing
weather limits has been one obvious potential "Gotcha!" (Duh!) Big surprise,
given the nature of sport soaring. That said, none of my 3 scratch-n-dent
inducing incidents had weather as a contributor...well, other than, in 2 of
the 3, by inducing soarability, I mean.

For better or worse, I early-on in my PIC-ing concluded I'd be much
happier/safer avoiding crunches, incidents, etc., than trying to explain or
justify how they happened, point being that I actively THOUGHT ABOUT the
possibility I COULD be involved in such. I think the belief not only helped
power/fine-tune my "situational awareness" radar, but favorably influenced all
my future piloting, gliderporting, driving, bicycling, urban pedestrianing,
etc. experiences. Personal safety culture, if you will. And no, I don't
consider my outlook an inoculation against personal lapses of
attention...though I do believe my outlook distinctly decreases the chances
I'll be involved in a self-inflicted incident or accident. (So far, so good!)

What do others think?

Bob W.

On a local level the miserable start to the year has certainly impacted our behaviors. I've been communicating to my club the recent incidents and the reminders to keep your head out of the cockpit and maximize situational awareness. This goes for on the ground as well and keeping an eye out for each other.

Another item to try to facilitate is open discussion of anything that seems unsafe. Anyone that has ever watched a low and slow approach and not said something to the pilot is not helping develop a safe culture. You don't have to beat a person up, but make sure they understand the risks they are taking.

A core group of XC pilots from our region have been working out improved standards for position reporting as well. We are trying to lead by example, but are also learning about what is most effective and important as we go. We fly along pretty well defined energy lines and this increases the head-to-head chances on a good convergence day.

Personally speaking, we have people at the grass roots level trying to make a difference. How fast and far that spreads remains to be seen.

The most poisonous attitude that I fear are the people resistant to change. They can resist for the sake of resistance and meanwhile poison the environment for everyone. Adoption of Flarm or Transponders or Radio usage or safety practices can all be very detrimentally affected by a loud naysayer, even when the arguments lack validity.

Everyone just needs to keep trying and start with focusing on your own behaviors. Your personal safety culture as you pointed out.

The most poisonous attitude that I fear are the people resistant to change. *They can resist for the sake of resistance and meanwhile poison the environment for everyone. *Adoption of Flarm or Transponders or Radio usage or safety practices can all be very detrimentally affected by a loud naysayer, even when the arguments lack validity.

Everyone just needs to keep trying and start with focusing on your own behaviors. *Your personal safety culture as you pointed out.


No kiddin'!

The safety of the sport of soaring for any particular pilot is only as
safe as he/she chooses to make his/her next flight.

On Monday, June 25, 2012 12:11:59 PM UTC-4, BobW wrote:
... I actively THOUGHT ABOUT the
possibility I COULD be involved in such. I think the belief not only helped
power/fine-tune my "situational awareness" radar, but favorably influenced all
my future piloting, gliderporting, driving, bicycling, urban pedestrianing,
etc. experiences. Personal safety culture, if you will.

Right. How many glider pilots slip and fall to their death while getting out of the bathtub? You only need one fatal event to die unnaturally. I'm like you. Doing a sport like flying that could so obviously kill me has increased my own sense of mortality and encouraged me to be more careful with the more manageable hazards ... for example, jaywalking. I'm in mortal peril for a few hours a week, but for the remaining hours of the week I'm less likely to die than I was before I took up soaring. So maybe flying has reduced my overall chances of premature termination??

That said, a minority of people are "safety minded". We'd like to think that all pilots are safety minded, but I'm pretty sure that the pilot population spans a broad spectrum of attitudes. I'd accept without evidence that all pilots educate themselves and make an effort to follow relatively safe procedures and fly safely, but I doubt that they all do it to the same objective standard. Some people take much bigger risks relative to skill. Do we accept that some pilots are dangerous to themselves and others? How does a dangerous pilot know that he is dangerous? How does he become less dangerous? Of course, I'm a dangerous pilot... the question for me is how,when, and what can I do about it.

Morgan,

What a Great Start to an important discussion! Thanks for contributing, and
Even More Thanks for your cogent, specific, examples of useful behavioral
change!!!

Hoping only to encourage others to contribute their thoughts - whether in
general agreement, skeptical or contrary - I've provided my personal feedback
below...
= = = = = =

On 6/25/2012 12:52 PM, Morgan wrote:
On a local level the miserable start to the year has certainly impacted our
behaviors. I've been communicating to my club the recent incidents and the
reminders to keep your head out of the cockpit and maximize situational
awareness. This goes for on the ground as well and keeping an eye out for
each other.

Being 100% unfamiliar with you/your club, allow me to suggest to readers
(especially those newer to the sport) that what you're doing is a Great Way to
begin cultural change, if indeed anyone thinks cultural change might be a good
thing. Personal involvement.
- - - - - -

Another item to try to facilitate is open discussion of anything that seems
unsafe. Anyone that has ever watched a low and slow approach and not said
something to the pilot is not helping develop a safe culture. You don't
have to beat a person up, but make sure they understand the risks they are
taking.

"Spot On," and, "Great Example!" Is there a club in the U.S. that on any given
weekend doesn't have at least one 'uninformedly dodgy low approach' for Joe
Observer to witness/learn something from/discuss? Two keys assisting healthy
discussion are (IMHO): 1) 'being sensitive' to the offending pilot's ego; and
2) the commitment to assume some personal responsibility for - step by tiny
step - improving one's club's pilots' "collective judgments."
- - - - - -


A core group of XC pilots from our region have been working out improved
standards for position reporting as well. We are trying to lead by
example, but are also learning about what is most effective and important
as we go. We fly along pretty well defined energy lines and this increases
the head-to-head chances on a good convergence day.

"How cool is that?!?" I mean trying to improve something as arguably amorphous
as effective position reporting. Don't anyone imagine only mountainous areas
or areas with known convergence lines might benefit from 'improved position
reporting' as an idea. A long-standing XC camp in the Texas panhandle
encourages participants to do the same thing, especially when flying up-n-down
the primary road retrieval route.

I've long thought ANY position reporting boils down simply to, "Here I am (and
by implication, don't hit me)."

For example, "Zuni 3, 10.7, climbing 2 SW of Hooker," or "Z3 10.7, NE-bound, 5
NE of Hooker, south of the highway."

Functionally, that's "all" FLARM tries to accomplish, despite its 'processor
enhanced smarts.'

On voice frequencies, arguably anything not fundamentally a part of "Here I
am," ought not to be transmitted. Why not? It's superfluous, whether the
receiver is a retrieve crew tagging along, or Joe Pilot is so enthralled with
his situation he 'wants to share his joy.' Given the fact any voice frequency
is a limited resource, sharing 'on the ground, later' is 'better.'

Nor should the transmission be 'locationally ambiguous.' Leave out locational
information at the risk of initiating an (avoidable, with thought beforehand)
radio exchange from someone needful of what was left out. Practice will
rapidly improve one's transmissions...
- - - - - -

Personally speaking, we have people at the grass roots level trying to make
a difference. How fast and far that spreads remains to be seen.

"Cool!" to the first sentence, and "Roger that!" to the second. Effecting
human behavioral change isn't something easily/instantly accomplished. Time is
always an impartial judge, even if we'd sometimes rather it wasn't...
- - - - - -

The most poisonous attitude that I fear are the people resistant to change.
They can resist for the sake of resistance and meanwhile poison the
environment for everyone. Adoption of Flarm or Transponders or Radio usage
or safety practices can all be very detrimentally affected by a loud
naysayer, even when the arguments lack validity.

Thanks for helping validate my own thinking. I've no problem 'agreeing to
disagree' but I DO find it problematic in soaring when people take actions
most objective observers would agree is detrimental to the sport as a whole.
Soaring is a sufficiently marginal activity (in societal terms) that every
participant should actively seek to avoid actions with potential for further
marginalization of it.
- - - - - -


Everyone just needs to keep trying and start with focusing on your own
behaviors. Your personal safety culture as you pointed out.

Control what you can control. Seek to influence what you can't control.
Who'd'a ever thunk simple parenting skills might also carry over into soaring? :-)

Bob W.

I am in agreement with everything said so far. Thanks for starting this and other safety threads. For me, as a 100/hr glider pilot, these RAS safety discussions have really given me extra incentive to dig deeper and come up with creative solutions that work for me. (hopefully!) I have also become more involved in watching out for others in our club and speaking up when necessary.

The following is probably more specific than this threads direction, but I believe in sharing real world examples of safety ideas, so here are some thing I’ve been doing.

I make my own checklists for the seated portion of my flight, for each glider type I fly. I think there are idiosyncrasies about various gliders that one really needs to be reminded of via their custom checklist. These custom checklists start with and include all of the factory items in factory order, with usually a few additions.

During tow, I use my closed fist against the airbrake to guard it from popping open, I give the release a slap to put it in the front of my mind. I talk continually on tow till 400 feet. I announce where I will land, and current IAS. In the pattern for landing I continually announce IAS and coordination and clearing of turns.

Lastly, I took the following advice for currency/emergency practice from a power aircraft article I once read. I made a spreadsheet for keeping track of Condor simulator emergency practice. Condor doesn't have much emergency features built in, but some of the gliders spin and are difficult to get out of the spin with full water and aft CG setting. For aerotow emergency practice, I set a huge crosswind to the point where I will have to release on ground roll 1 out of 2 tries. With repetition, I get wired to release rather than expecting a successful tow. Also, I can become used to seeing the wave off (followed by release and downwind landing) by setting aerotow to 200agl. I use my paper checklist and announce just like real world. Other columns in the spreadsheet include incipient spin, established spin, landing with no airbrakes, high winds in the pattern, downwind landing, and rope break at various altitudes. What Condor simulator is very good at is repetition with maneuvers that are often too dangerous to practice in real world. Also good for coordination if you have rudder pedals as I do.

… Aaron

On Monday, June 25, 2012 12:06:23 PM UTC-7, Bill D wrote:
The most poisonous attitude that I fear are the people resistant to change. *They can resist for the sake of resistance and meanwhile poison the environment for everyone. *Adoption of Flarm or Transponders or Radio usage or safety practices can all be very detrimentally affected by a loud naysayer, even when the arguments lack validity.

Everyone just needs to keep trying and start with focusing on your own behaviors. *Your personal safety culture as you pointed out.


No kiddin'!

The safety of the sport of soaring for any particular pilot is only as
safe as he/she chooses to make his/her next flight.

Apparently it is not working this way. Otherwise accidents would have happened only to unsafe pilots, but the statistics is showing otherwise. Problem is that most pilots are not aware that they are doing something unsafe. Most pilots are not aware of the many different ways they can kill themselves, since we do not have an effective system to learn from accidents and incidents and figure out ways to prevent them from happening again, as oppose to commercial aviation which constantly learn from every accident as much as possible and implement lessons, resulting in contiguous improved safety. Our safet record not only not improving, but getting worse. Last year was a record year for fatalities, and this year we would have already broke this record if not for some amazing luck. And it is only the beginning of the season. Almost every fatality I heard of since I started flying many years ago had no useful information or conclusion other than speculation on RAS and the typical useless NTSB report. Those who knows the details, and those who survives the crashes, usually prefer to keep the details for themselves. Until we manage to implement such a system, pilots will continue killing themselves without realizing they are not as safe as they choose to be.

Ramy

On Jun 25, 6:38*pm, Ramy wrote:
On Monday, June 25, 2012 12:06:23 PM UTC-7, Bill D wrote:
The most poisonous attitude that I fear are the people resistant to change. *They can resist for the sake of resistance and meanwhile poison the environment for everyone. *Adoption of Flarm or Transponders or Radio usage or safety practices can all be very detrimentally affected by a loud naysayer, even when the arguments lack validity.

Everyone just needs to keep trying and start with focusing on your own behaviors. *Your personal safety culture as you pointed out.

No kiddin'!

The safety of the sport of soaring for any particular pilot is only as
safe as he/she chooses to make his/her next flight.

Apparently it is not working this way. Otherwise accidents would have happened only to unsafe pilots, but the statistics is showing otherwise. Problem is that most pilots are not aware that they are doing something unsafe. Most pilots are not aware of the many different ways they can kill themselves, since we do not have an effective system to learn from accidents and incidents and figure out ways to prevent them from happening again, as oppose to commercial aviation which constantly learn from every accident as much as possible and implement lessons, resulting in contiguous improved safety. Our safet record not only not improving, but getting worse. Last year was a record year for fatalities, and this year we would have already broke this record if not for some amazing luck. And it is only the beginning of the season. *Almost every fatality I heard of since I started flying many years ago had no useful information or conclusion other than speculation on RAS and the typical useless NTSB report. Those who knows the details, and those who survives the crashes, usually prefer to keep the details for themselves. Until we manage to implement such a system, pilots will continue killing themselves without realizing they are not as safe as they choose to be.

Ramy

It works like this.
Fact: There was a crash.
Uninformed speculation: The pilot was 'safe' so there must be an
outside cause.

I've discussed this with Greg Feith, a retired NTSB investigator
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greg_Feith). Feith says we're naturally
uncomfortable with pilot error since "they were one of us". NTSB
reports aren't useless just because they fail to list evidence the
pilot was at fault - the investigation stops when it's obvious the
cause was pilot error but the final report will stop short of calling
a recently departed pilot an idiot.

Never miss a chance to attend one of Feith's seminars. It's a
sobering, chilling experience but you will be a safer pilot because of
it. There are few accidents where the pilot was not at least a
contributing factor.

There are no secret new accident causes. It's an informative exercise
to download a couple of years of NTSB glider accident reports and
tabulate them in Excel - something I do every year. Almost every one
will be pilot error - usually gross error. Were these 'safe' pilots?
It would be a stretch to say they were. It only gets complicated if
you try to re-interpret the facts to show the pilot was somehow not
responsible. "Occam's razor" applies.

On Monday, June 25, 2012 8:38:39 PM UTC-7, Bill D wrote:
On Jun 25, 6:38*pm, Ramy wrote:
On Monday, June 25, 2012 12:06:23 PM UTC-7, Bill D wrote:
The most poisonous attitude that I fear are the people resistant to change. *They can resist for the sake of resistance and meanwhile poison the environment for everyone. *Adoption of Flarm or Transponders or Radio usage or safety practices can all be very detrimentally affected by a loud naysayer, even when the arguments lack validity.

Everyone just needs to keep trying and start with focusing on your own behaviors. *Your personal safety culture as you pointed out.

No kiddin'!

The safety of the sport of soaring for any particular pilot is only as
safe as he/she chooses to make his/her next flight.

Apparently it is not working this way. Otherwise accidents would have happened only to unsafe pilots, but the statistics is showing otherwise. Problem is that most pilots are not aware that they are doing something unsafe.. Most pilots are not aware of the many different ways they can kill themselves, since we do not have an effective system to learn from accidents and incidents and figure out ways to prevent them from happening again, as oppose to commercial aviation which constantly learn from every accident as much as possible and implement lessons, resulting in contiguous improved safety. Our safet record not only not improving, but getting worse. Last year was a record year for fatalities, and this year we would have already broke this record if not for some amazing luck. And it is only the beginning of the season. *Almost every fatality I heard of since I started flying many years ago had no useful information or conclusion other than speculation on RAS and the typical useless NTSB report. Those who knows the details, and those who survives the crashes, usually prefer to keep the details for themselves. Until we manage to implement such a system, pilots will continue killing themselves without realizing they are not as safe as they choose to be..

Ramy

It works like this.
Fact: There was a crash.
Uninformed speculation: The pilot was 'safe' so there must be an
outside cause.

I've discussed this with Greg Feith, a retired NTSB investigator
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greg_Feith). Feith says we're naturally
uncomfortable with pilot error since "they were one of us". NTSB
reports aren't useless just because they fail to list evidence the
pilot was at fault - the investigation stops when it's obvious the
cause was pilot error but the final report will stop short of calling
a recently departed pilot an idiot.

Never miss a chance to attend one of Feith's seminars. It's a
sobering, chilling experience but you will be a safer pilot because of
it. There are few accidents where the pilot was not at least a
contributing factor.

There are no secret new accident causes. It's an informative exercise
to download a couple of years of NTSB glider accident reports and
tabulate them in Excel - something I do every year. Almost every one
will be pilot error - usually gross error. Were these 'safe' pilots?
It would be a stretch to say they were. It only gets complicated if
you try to re-interpret the facts to show the pilot was somehow not
responsible. "Occam's razor" applies.

I guess it all depends what falls under 'pilot error'. I agree that just about every accident you can blame the pilot, even if his rudder cable broke for example, after all, he didnt check his rudder cable before the flight. But how many of us are perfect? Same goes to a recent fatal accident where the pilot tried to bail out too low, probably due to some sort of mechanical failure. And a recent mid air, where none of the pilots saw each other until impact. The NTSB will,of course, determine it was pilots failure to see each other. Case closed . But is it? It's been demonstrated over and over that our eyes are not able to detect collision threat on time. So I wouldn't consider those as true pilot errors, but as bad luck or outside cause, which happened to safe pilots. And yes, we do find new ways to kill ourselves.. The recent Texas tragedy may reveal one. I know of other pilots who took a toddler for a flight. I am sure those who heard about this accident will think twice and hard before doing it again, and maybe, just maybe, another life will be saved thanks to sharing and speculating about the cause of this accident.

Ramy

I couple of years ago I have written an article about safety in
soaring (www.tango-whisky.com/safety.html) which has spread a little
bit throughout Europe.
Somebody said that every pilot has to decide for himself how safe he
is or wants to be, and I think this is absolutely correct. The key for
this decision is situational awareness - if you don't have it and you
don't exercise it every single minute of a flight, you are an accident
waiting to happen.