In Memory of Dan Neuman

In Memory of Dan Neuman

While researching Dan Neuman's contact information for a friend who
wants to get current again, I learned of the news of Dan's last
flight. At the moment I am weeping over our tragic loss, but I feel
compelled to contribute something to his memory.

Dan returned me to flight status in 1996 after 17 years away from
aviation. It was his patient, thoughtful, and insightful tutelage
that enabled me to return to life in the third dimension. Later, in
1998, Dan trained me for my instrument rating. I recall well one IMC
flight to KVNY that February second.

Two dripping wet flight instructors burst into the Royal Aviation
office loudly remarking about their turbulent flight in the storm
going on overhead that afternoon. They were exuberantly remarking
about how bad the weather was, and how it had been nearly impossible
to remain in control of their little Cessna 152. Dan looked at me and
asked if I still wanted to fly our scheduled lesson. Not knowing any
better, I thought it was a good opportunity to get some more actual
IMC experience, so I said yes. We'd be flying the Archer with a
little heavier wing loading, so it should be a bit more stable. Dan
was game, and I trusted his judgment, so we got a SID and launched.

The ceiling was low, and there was a lot of convective activity, but
we managed to bounce along in the gray-black clag through KLAX Class
B. The KLAX approach controller sounded like a non-stop auctioneer
without waiting for pilot acknowledgements to his calls. His
intensity added to the tumult we were all experiencing.

I was fighting to keep within 30 degrees of our assigned heading as
the turbulence tossed us back and forth. It was the roughest flight I
had ever experienced, and I was clammy with perspiration from trying
to retain control. Dan was cool, and let me keep at it without
interfering.

Things finally settled down a bit as we were cleared for the KVNY
Runway 34L ILS approach. There was a pretty good cross wind component
and it was still very gusty. We broke out of the ceiling lined up
with the runway centerline, and as I was about to touch down, a gust
nearly blew us off the western edge. Dan was calm and cool. Thanks
to his courage and confidence, I now knew what to expect when I had to
face real-weather IFR conditions. That sort of preparation is
priceless.

Dan was a real prince. He never bragged, or behaved boisterously like
some arrogant pilots. He maintained his cool, professional, cordial
demeanor, and I've always tried to emulate his thoughtful prudence as
a pilot. He's with me on every flight; still today I hear his terse,
calm instructions as I ply the skies. Dan "The Man" Neuman may no
longer walk the Earth, but he lives in the hearts and minds of the
hundreds of airmen he trained.

Dan said it well:


THOUGHT FOR THE DAY (month - year etc.?)

Whenever we talk about a pilot who has been killed in a flying
accident, we should all keep one thing in mind. He called upon
the sum of all his knowledge and made a judgment. He believed in
it so strongly that he knowingly bet his life on it. -- that his
judgment was faulty is a tragedy, not stupidity. -- Every
instructor, supervisor and contemporary who ever spoke to him, had
an opportunity to influence his judgment, so a little bit of all
of us goes with every pilot we lose.



http://www.memorypost.com/post.php?id=334
Dan Neuman "Dan the Man"

http://www.memorypost.com/gallery.ph...4&imageid=1409

http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?e...23X01882&key=1
http://www.orangecoastcollege.edu/NR.../0/1130new.pdf

("Larry Dighera" wrote)
In Memory of Dan Neuman

While researching Dan Neuman's contact information for a friend who wants
to get current again, I learned of the news of Dan's last flight. At the
moment I am weeping over our tragic loss, but I feel compelled to
contribute something to his memory.

http://www.memorypost.com/post.php?id=334
Dan Neuman "Dan the Man"

http://www.memorypost.com/gallery.php?id=334&imageid=1409

http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20051123X01882&key=1


Nice write up, Larry.


Montblack

On Tue, 9 Jan 2007 19:18:41 -0600, "Montblack"
wrote in
:

("Larry Dighera" wrote)
In Memory of Dan Neuman

While researching Dan Neuman's contact information for a friend who wants
to get current again, I learned of the news of Dan's last flight. At the
moment I am weeping over our tragic loss, but I feel compelled to
contribute something to his memory.

http://www.memorypost.com/post.php?id=334
Dan Neuman "Dan the Man"

http://www.memorypost.com/gallery.php?id=334&imageid=1409

http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20051123X01882&key=1


Nice write up, Larry.


Montblack


Thanks.

Dan was one in a million.

My flight instructor, Dan Neuman, was at the controls of a turbo
charged C-210 over the Pacific off the coast of Dana Point between LA
and San Diego when engine power was apparently stopped. Apparently
the auto pilot continued to maintain altitude until the airspeed
bled-off and the aircraft spun-in killing Dan and the three Baja 1000
race participants.

Although it appears that there was fuel to the engine, the throttle
was found in the closed position, and the propeller damage seems
consistent with it being stopped at the time of impact. The mystery
to me is why would an experienced pilot shutdown the engine and not
attempt to ditch, rather than spinning-in? With the exception of the
stopped engine this seems somewhat consistent with pilot
incapacitation.

Do you agree with my analysis of the facts provided in the NTSB
report?

Are there any readers with the medical knowledge necessary to
interpret the autopsy findings, and see if they are consistent with a
hart attack?

Thanks.



The NTSB Factual report is now on-line:

http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief2.asp?...FA043& akey=1


LAX06FA043
HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On November 19, 2005, at 1403 Pacific standard time, a Cessna T210N,
N546BC, impacted the Pacific Ocean and sank about 3 miles south of
Dana Point, California, following a departure from controlled cruise
flight. T.R. Builder Corp. of Newport Beach, California, operated the
airplane under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91 as a personal flight.
The airline transport pilot and his three passengers were fatally
injured, and the airplane was destroyed. Visual meteorological
conditions prevailed and a flight plan was not filed. The flight
departed the Brown Field Municipal Airport in San Diego, California,
at 1335 and was destined for the John Wayne Airport in Santa Ana,
California.

The airplane was not receiving air traffic control services at the
time of the accident; however, radar data was obtained from the FAA's
Continuous Data Recording (CDR) using the Camp Pendleton Air
Surveillance Radar (ASR-9). The flight was utilizing a transponder
beacon code of 1200. Using the radar data and wind information
provided by the NTSB's weather group, a NTSB vehicle performance
specialist conducted an aircraft performance study, which revealed the
following information:

The airplane was in level, cruise flight at 3,500 feet mean sea level
(msl) and at a calculated airspeed of about 120 knots when at 1359:47,
the airspeed began to decrease. The airplane maintained an altitude of
3,500 feet as the calculated airspeed decreased. About 1401:19, the
calculated airspeed had decreased to approximately 60 knots when the
altitude information showed the airplane depart from level flight,
reaching a maximum descent rate of about 7,000 feet per minute down to
an altitude of 2,000 feet msl.

There were no distress calls heard over the local radio frequencies or
any reports from the pilot after departing the San Diego area.

A witness located on a sailboat approximately 2 miles offshore
indicated he looked up and observed an airplane in a nose low attitude
spiraling toward the ocean in a corkscrew manner. He believed the
airplane was conducting aerobatic maneuvers, but watched for about 10
seconds before realizing it was not going to pull out before impacting
the ocean. The airplane impacted the water in the nose low attitude
about 100 yards from the boat. The witness and other boat crewmembers
boarded a smaller motorized boat and traveled to the impact point. The
largest piece of debris located was a door from the cockpit/cabin
area. When asked if the airplane was intact as it descended toward the
ocean, the witness said he believed it was (mentioning he noticed the
tail and the wings). The witness added that he did not hear any engine
noise associated with the airplane.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The 51-year-old pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with
single- and multi-engine airplane ratings, and a commercial pilot
certificate with single-engine sea and glider ratings. He also held a
flight instructor certificate for single-engine, multi-engine, and
instrument airplanes. His second-class medical certificate was issued
on April 9, 2004, with no limitations.

According to the pilot's last medical certificate application he
accumulated a total flight time of 11,000 hours. Review of his latest
logbook revealed he logged 409.5 hours since the medical certificate,
the majority of which were logged in the accident airplane and a
Cessna 310. The last flight recorded in the logbook was on June 27,
2005. The pilot's family provided copies of a calendar he used to
record flight time before he transferred the time to the logbook. From
July 2005, until November 15, 2005, the pilot posted 124.9 hours
mostly in the accident airplane. On March 28, 2005, the pilot
satisfactorily completed a flight review as per FAR Part 61.56.

Friends and family of the pilot provided a 72-hour history of his
activities prior to the accident. The information provided indicated
that on November 16 at 1630, the pilot arrived at the Orange Coast
College to teach ground school. His class lasted from 1800 until 2200.
He arrived home at 2230 and went to bed at 2300. On November 17, the
pilot awoke at 0600 and left for the John Wayne Airport at 0630. At
1630, he finished work and his last flight for the day. After
completing some paperwork he arrived home at 1800 and went to bed at
2230. On the 18th of November, the pilot awoke at 0615 and departed
for the John Wayne Airport at 0845. He was to fly the accident
airplane to Mexico where he was to monitor off-road races in the San
Felipe area of Baja California. He cleared Mexican customs at 1030 and
tracked a race between 1145 and 1900. About 1900, the pilot refueled
the airplane and continued tracking the race between 1945 and 0030 on
the 19th. At 0045 on the 19th, he finished flying in San Felipe and
went to bed at an unknown time. At 0900 on the 19th, he began
preparing the accident airplane for the return trip to John Wayne. At
1300, he arrived at the U.S. customs facility at the Brown Field
Municipal Airport in San Diego, California, and departed at 1335 for
the last leg of the flight.

According to his family, he did not report any physical problems in
the days leading to the accident.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The accident airplane (serial number 2103663) was equipped with a
six-cylinder Continental TSIO-520-R9 engine (serial number 294346-R).
Review of the aircraft maintenance records revealed that the airplane
underwent its last annual inspection on October 21, 2005, at an
airframe and engine total time of 4,801.0 and 642.1 hours,
respectively. The total time of the airplane at the time of the
accident was 4839.4 hours. The engine underwent a factory rebuild and
was zero-timed about 680 hours prior to the accident.

The airplane had undergone a number of modifications, one of which
included the installation of a Robinson STOL (Short TakeOff and
Landing) kit. According to the STOL kit Supplemental Type Certificate
(STC) holder, installation of the equipment and modification of the
aircraft does not result in a reduction of stall speed. The system is
only intended to increase controllability at slower airspeeds.
According to the STC holder, the stall speeds remain the same as
published in the pilot operating handbook (POH)/information manual.
According to the T210N information manual the stall speed at 4,000
pounds, with the most rearward center of gravity, flaps retracted, and
power off, is 67 knots calibrated (68 knots indicated).

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

At 1353, the weather observation facility located at the John Wayne
Airport reported the wind as variable at 4 knots, visibility 10
statute miles, with clear skies, temperature 28 degrees Celsius, dew
point -03 degrees Celsius, and an altimeter setting of 30.00 inches of
mercury.

Witnesses reported the weather as clear skies and calm wind in the
vicinity of the accident site around the time of the accident.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

Witnesses to the accident marked the location where it impacted water
as 33 degrees 24.6 minutes north latitude and 117 degrees 40.9 minutes
west longitude. Recovery of the wreckage took place on November 22,
2005. The airplane remained intact via its primary structure and/or
control cables. The lower side of the fuselage and engine sustained
significant impact damage from the bottom side up and aft. The wings
were cut from the fuselage to facilitate transport. The airplane was
then taken to Aircraft Recovery Services in Palmdale, California,
where it was examined on December 8, 2005, by the NTSB
investigator-in-charge, two FAA inspectors from the Long Beach Flight
Standards District Office (FSDO), an investigator from Cessna Aircraft
Company, and an investigator from Teledyne Continental Motors.

The engine remained attached to the firewall, but the left-side engine
mounts were fractured and separated. The right-side engine mounts were
attached to the engine, but were fractured as well. The engine was
intact and the propeller was attached to the propeller flange. The
three-bladed propeller exhibited impact damage on two blades, but the
third blade appeared undamaged. The spinner exhibited impact damage on
half of its circumference, opposite the side of the undamaged blade.

The top spark plugs were removed and the propeller was rotated
manually. Thumb compression and valve train continuity was confirmed
on all six cylinders and crankshaft continuity was confirmed from the
propeller aft to the accessory section. Borescope examination of the
cylinders and valves revealed no anomalies. The turbocharger remained
attached to the exhaust, but the compressor wheel did not initially
rotate due to salt-water submersion. After the turbocharger was
removed and the turbine wheel was rotated, the compressor wheel was
freed and continuity was established by the free and symmetric
rotation of the turbine and compressor wheels. Neither the
turbocharger compressor nor the turbine displayed axial or radial play
at the time of the inspection.

The throttle body and fuel control unit remained attached to the
engine. The throttle plate was found in the idle position and the
throttle lever exhibited impact damage at the cable-attach point. The
throttle and mixture levers rotated freely when manually manipulated.

The fuel pump was intact, attached to the engine, and the fuel lines
visually appeared uncompromised. The fuel pump was removed from the
engine and the presence of (100LL) fuel was detected. The drive
coupling was intact, undamaged, and exhibited normal operational
signatures. The fuel pump was rotated via the engine drive gear and
the drive coupling installed. The pump expelled fuel at that time from
the engine supply line.

The fuel manifold valve was intact and remained attached to the
engine. The valve was safety-wired and secured by a lead seal. The
safety-wire was cut and the valve was disassembled. The valve body,
screen, diaphragm and valve assembly, and main spring did not display
any anomalies. The fuel screen was unobstructed and undamaged.

With the exception of the cables that were cut to facilitate
transport, control continuity was confirmed from the cockpit to the
rudder, elevator, elevator trim, and ailerons. The cockpit/cabin floor
was crushed and displaced upward and the engine firewall was displaced
up and aft. The right rudder pedals were deflected with the right
rudder in the forward position.

The elevator trim actuator measured 1.4 inches, which according to
Cessna, equated to a 7-degree tab down setting. The flap selector
handle was in the 10-degree flap setting; however, measurement of the
flap actuator revealed 4.1 inches of jackscrew was showing, which
equated to a flaps retracted position. The landing gear handle was
found in the down position; however, the main landing gear down lock
actuators each measured 1.5 inches, which was the equivalent to a
landing gear retracted position. In addition, the landing gear down
lock hooks were not damaged.

Examination of the elevator revealed that the trailing edges of the
left and right sides could be rotationally displaced in relation to
each other. The maximum displacement measured was a quarter of an inch
either side of the neutral position. A hole was drilled into each
elevator and a borescope was utilized to examine the rivets that
attached the torque tube to the elevators' inboard ribs. The machined
head of the rivets were present on the inboard (visual) side of the
ribs, but some of the bucked ends of the rivets, located on the
outboard (or internal) portion of the ribs, were missing.

The forward inboard portions of the left and right elevator airfoils,
including torque tubes and control horn, were removed from the larger
elevator assembly and were shipped to the NTSB materials laboratory in
Washington, D.C., for further examination.

The S-Tec Autopilot system was also removed from the wreckage and
shipped to the NTSB's South Central Regional (SCR) Office in
Arlington, Texas, for further examination/testing at the
manufacturer's facility.

TESTS AND RESEARCH

Elevator Examination

The outboard ends of each torque tube were connected to the inboard
ribs of each elevator with six solid rivets. The rivets were solid
aluminum, 3/16-inch diameter, universal heads, with the bucked heads
positioned outboard. Although the elevators could be moved somewhat
relative to the torque tubes, they remained firmly attached to each
other by heavy gauge sheet metal structure within the torque tubes and
elevators.

Internal inspection of the elevator airfoils found four fractured
rivets on the left side and five fractured on the right side. The
rivets were fractured through the shanks and only one of the fractured
manufactured head was recovered. Two intact rivets were found on the
left side and one on the right side. A second rivet head was found in
place on the right side but the shank was fractured.

The elevators were removed from the torque tubes after the upset tails
of the intact rivets were cut along with the rivets securing the
internal structure to the torque tubes. The fractured rivets clearly
showed overstress shearing features and deformation consistent with
rotation of both elevators about the torque tubes. The indicated
directions were as if the trailing edge of each elevator was rotated
upward, relative to stationary torque tubes. In addition, the sheet
metal holes at the fractured rivets were deformed and elongated
consistent with the indicated rotation. The sheet metal around the
intact rivets showed scuffing and damage in a more vertical direction
and included deformation and cracking.

The inboard ends of this structure in both elevators were distorted
resulting in twisting along the torque tube axis. The twisting was
approximately equal on both sides and in the same directions. The
indicated twisting direction was the same for the shearing of the
rivets, consistent with upward movement of the elevator trailing
edges.

When separated, the faying surfaces of the left side elevator were
locally darkened with deposits consistent with fretting and small
amounts of relative movements between surfaces. In contrast, the right
side faying surfaces were relatively clean showing little or no
fretting. The faying surfaces on both elevators did show scuffing and
abrasions indicative of larger scale relative movements consistent
with movements after the rivets were sheared.

S-Tec Autopilot Examination

The following S-Tec components were examined at the manufacturer's
facility in Mineral Wells, Texas on March 28, 2006, under the
supervision of an air safety investigator from the NTSB's SCR office:

S-Tec 55X Controller
PN: 01192-0-11 TF
SN: 0502-7784

S-Tec Turn Coordinator
PN: 6405-28L
SN: 0504-16429G

Roll Servo
PN: 0106-R9
SN: 0505-19212 CEFGJ

Pitch Servo
PN: 0108-P4
SN: 0505-14125 CDEFG

Trim Servo
PN: 0106-T9
SN: 0505-19213 CEFGJ

The S-Tec technician first attempted to functionally test the 55X
controller unit by applying power; however, the initial readings were
not conducive to adding additional power due to the possibility of
causing internal damage. The controller was disassembled and corrosion
was noted on all boards, the bezel, and respective pins. On the bottom
board, which controls the servos, the technician reported that a
33-guage (measured) wire was soldered across the 10-volt fuse, which
was not typical to their design. The wire appeared to be in good
condition. A resistance reading of 4 to 5 ohms was obtained across the
wire. A decision was made to clean the boards and attempt to once
again apply power with the 33-guage-wire in place.

The technician reported that when the top cover of the unit was
removed, it was noted that the S-Tec Inspector Seal, which was placed
on the unit prior to shipping, had been breached. This seal was placed
on the top cover and is strategically placed over one of the cover
attachment screws and down the side of the unit. It appeared that the
section of label over the screw had been depressed by a screwdriver
and was pushed down into the screw housing. S-Tec personnel opined
that the 33-gauge wire would not have contributed to any problems with
the autopilot system since current was able to traverse the wire.

The technician cleaned the boards with acetone and blown air to remove
as much corrosion and silt as possible; however, only a partial amount
of debris could be successfully removed. The unit was reassembled and
power was applied with the unit being able to complete basic start-up
functions. The technician began additional tests, but the results were
erratic and inconclusive (according to the technician, likely due to
corrosion) and testing was stopped.

The turn coordinator was placed on a bench, but only the operative
flag was able to sway. The cover of the unit was removed and the
internal components were intact but severely corroded and/or rusted.
The gyro was locked and could not be rotated. No further testing could
be conducted.

The roll servo cover was removed. The cap stand and solenoid armature
moved freely, but the motor exhibited a lot of rust and corrosion.
Examination of the internal components revealed they were intact. The
technician attempted to apply power, but the motor was inoperative and
the test was concluded.

The pitch servo cover was removed and the retaining nut, which is held
in via a cotter pin, for the clutch was intact. All internal
components were intact but the motor exhibited rust and corrosion. The
cap stand was manually rotated, but when power was applied the motor
was inoperative. No further testing could be conducted.

The trim servo cover was removed and the cap stand and solenoid
armature were locked. The motor exhibited rust and corrosion. All
internal components were intact. Due to the rust and corrosion damage
the unit could not be tested.

Examination of the internal components revealed no mechanical
anomalies that would have contributed to the accident event.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

Toxicological tests for carbon monoxide, cyanide, ethanol and drugs
were conducted on the pilot. None of the aforementioned items were
detected in the samples provided.

An autopsy was performed by the Orange County Sheriff-Coroner
department. According to the autopsy report, under the section titled
"Cardiovascular System, the heart weighed 510-grams, and "The left
anterior descending coronary artery reveals up to 40% atherosclerotic
luminal stenosis. The proximal left circumflex coronary artery reveals
up to 60% atherosclerotic luminal stenosis. The proximal right
coronary artery... reveals up to 80% atherosclerotic luminal stenosis.
The endocardium is smooth and glistening. A 2.0-cm area of
well-developed fibrosis is noted within the myocardium of the left
lateral ventricular wall. The remainder of the myocardium is brown-red
and uniform...The left ventricular wall is concentrically
hypertrophied and measures up to 2.0 cm at the free wall. There is
marked reduction in size of the left ventricular lumen. The right
ventricular wall measures up to 0.5 cm in thickness. The valves are
unremarkable..."

A microscopic examination of the heart revealed that "A section of
left ventricle demonstrates dense interstitial/myocardial fibrosis
with compensatory myocyte hypertrophy..."

Examination of the pilot's FAA medical records revealed that during
his April 2004 medical examination, the pilot responded "NO" when
asked if he currently used any medications for heart or vascular
trouble and for high or low blood pressure. The blood pressure
recorded during that examination was 140/84.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The wreckage was released to the owner's representative on June 19,
2006.



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He had some degree of coronary artery disease ("hardening of the
arteries")and thickening of the left ventricular wall, but the
microscopic examination does not disclose evidence of acute myocardial
infarction (heart attack). There is described an area of myocardial
fibrosis (scarring), which could result from an old infarction or other
causes. He did not have the most healthy of hearts, but the autopsy
report (as you quoted) doesn't prove a cause of medical incapacitation.

Larry Dighera wrote:


Are there any readers with the medical knowledge necessary to
interpret the autopsy findings, and see if they are consistent with a
hart attack?

On Wed, 23 May 2007 10:36:58 -0600, RomeoMike
wrote in
:

There is described an area of myocardial
fibrosis (scarring), which could result from an old infarction or other
causes. He did not have the most healthy of hearts, but the autopsy
report (as you quoted) doesn't prove a cause of medical incapacitation.

That was my interpretation also.

I would suppose that there would be specific markers for myocardial
infarction evident in the blood if he had suffered a heart attack, but
I have no idea if they would be detectable by the time (absent from
the NTSB report) the autopsy was performed.

Actually, hypothetically speaking, one could have an MI and die quickly
and not have the blood markers be positive because they take time
(hours) to diagnostically elevate after the infarction.

Larry Dighera wrote:


I would suppose that there would be specific markers for myocardial
infarction evident in the blood if he had suffered a heart attack, but
I have no idea if they would be detectable by the time (absent from
the NTSB report) the autopsy was performed.

On Wed, 23 May 2007 12:39:37 -0600, RomeoMike
wrote in
:

Actually, hypothetically speaking, one could have an MI and die quickly
and not have the blood markers be positive because they take time
(hours) to diagnostically elevate after the infarction.

That sounds reasonable. Thanks.