Who's At Fault in UAV/Part91 MAC?

Larry,

The Predator is equipped with a modified Honeywell ETCAS TPA-81A. The
system responds to Mode 1, 2, 3, 4, A, C, and S. Forward surveillance
has been extended to 360 degrees.

In addition, Predator is data-linked to airborne and ground commands for
control and observation.

Predator is piloted by a ground controller who is assisted by up to six
(6) mission specialist. Each specialists is responsible for the
sensor/system he/she is operating to complete the mission (optical, IR,
armament, etc.). The pilot ground controller is dedicated to flying the
airplane. Some controllers are certified pilots and all controllers
have spent many hours in a simulator.

There are more eyeballs on a Predator and its proximity to everything
than any GA aircraft.

Mike $$$ (PA28)

"Larry Dighera" wrote in message


Frankly, I'd give much better odds to having an in-flight fire or
engine failure than a MAC with a remotely piloted aircraft.

How did you arrive at that point of view. Do you have any data to
support it?

No, I don't. Those are *my* odds I'm offering.

Giving odds or taking chances is an inappropriate approach to air
safety.

BS. You take chances stepping into the shower. You take chances crossing
the street. You take chances driving to the airport. You take chances
leaving the ground in an aircraft. It's what you do to minimize those
chances that counts and nothing I've seen in your articles UAV's leads
me to believe that they're necessarily a significant safety issue. Once you
show me *evidence* of lackadaisical attention to safety by the owners and
operators of those very expensive bits of hardware, then I'll join your
rally. Until then, this is my last post on the issue. It's already gotten
far more attention than it deserves at this stage.

The "Big Sky" is a total myth. Any rational system that relies upon
chance to insure air safety is doomed to failure. I hope you're not
an FAA employee.

hmm... For the record, no, I'm not an FAA employee. However, the "myth" of
the big sky is shattered everytime I go up VFR. For all the VFR flight I've
done, the only time I have ever gotten close to another craft
unintentionally was near an airport. See and avoid? Perhaps, but I don't
recall ever maneuvering to avoid another aircraft during VFR cruise. Also
for the record, you inferred a reliance on chance for safety. I implied no
such thing. Until proven otherwise, I will stand by my assertion that there
are far fewer airplanes in operation (i.e., "Big Sky") in the border areas
under consideration for UAV use, though.

You questioned my use of the term 'reduced vision standards'.

Yes, I did.

That
lead me to believe that you felt that UAV operators would be held to
the same (not reduced) vision standards as certificated airmen.

I can't help that.

If
your questioning of my use of the term 'reduced vision standards' did
not imply your belief that they UAV operators would be held to the
same standards as certificated airmen, what were you implying?

I was implying that you have no idea what are the capabilities of these
UAV's you're trying to get us all stirred up about. Nothing more.

The military has not disclosed to me all the capabilities of their
UAVs. :-) However, unless there is high-resolutin, color, binocular
vision in all quadrants, the UAV operators visual capability to see
and avoid will be substandard to that required of a certificated
airman.

That may be, but there are ways to compensate. Again, you haven't
demonstrated that the proposed operation of these UAV's will significantly
degrade aviation safety. Come back when you have something more solid than
"omigod they're putting unmanned aircraft in the skies!"

Your apparent lack of concern for air safety and reliance on chance
(Big Sky)for aircraft separation betrays your shallow understanding of
the issue.

It's interesting that you think I have any less concern for aviation safety
than anybody else - much less rely on chance for separation. Larry, you're
demonstrating a serious ignorance here.

So you feel that a _biased_ (as opposed to _impartial_) governmental
investigative organization does not warrant reform? Comon' man,
think!

Now you're trying to change the subject. If you want to talk about
revamping the NTSB, start another thread. This one's dead.

--
John T
http://tknowlogy.com/TknoFlyer
http://www.pocketgear.com/products_s...veloperid=4415
____________________

Do the "team of 7" work for less money than a pilot and a
spotter?

You are assuming that the two-man crew of the Cessna is supported by
no one?

This is the government! That can't be right!

all the best -- Dan Ford
email: (put Cubdriver in subject line)

The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com
The Piper Cub Forum www.pipercubforum.com
Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org

On Sat, 24 Apr 2004 05:38:37 GMT, "John T" wrote in
Message-Id: om:

"Larry Dighera" wrote in message


Giving odds or taking chances is an inappropriate approach to air
safety.

BS. You take chances stepping into the shower. You take chances crossing
the street. You take chances driving to the airport. You take chances
leaving the ground in an aircraft. It's what you do to minimize those
chances that counts

Fortunately, the chances you cite are not criteria for NAS design.

In engineering a workable NAS I would prefer that the designers employ
methodologies that _insure_ separation of air traffic, not merely
reduce the _chances_ of a MAC. Anything less is irresponsible
negligence.

If reliance on the Big Sky theory were adequate for separating
aircraft, we wouldn't need ATC.

and nothing I've seen in your articles UAV's leads
me to believe that they're necessarily a significant safety issue. Once you
show me *evidence* of lackadaisical attention to safety by the owners and
operators of those very expensive bits of hardware, then I'll join your
rally.

I'm happy to have you aboard. :-) Here is the information you
request:

http://www.aetc.randolph.af.mil/se2/...305/runway.htm
GROUND CREW’S INATTENTION
LEADS TO UNMANNED AIRCRAFT CRASH

LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, Va. (ACCNS) — Investigators determined
that pilot error caused an Air Force RQ-1 Predator aircraft to
crash Oct. 25, nine miles west of Indian Springs Air Force
Auxiliary Field, Nev.

The Predator, an unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, was destroyed
upon impact. The loss is estimated at $3.3 million. No one was
injured. The aircraft was assigned to the 11th Reconnaissance
Squadron at Nellis Air Force Base, Nev.

According to an Air Combat Command accident investigation report
released last month, the primary cause of the accident was the
ground crew’s inattention to the aircraft’s altitude.

While trying to enter the Indian Springs flight pattern, the
aircraft was flown over mountainous terrain, obstructing the
datalink and causing the ground crew to lose electronic contact
with the aircraft.

Following failed attempts to regain the link, the pilot executed
emergency procedures designed to safeguard the aircraft; however,
the aircraft impacted mountainous terrain 16 seconds later.


http://www.af.mil/news/Feb2001/n2001...shtmlOfficials

02/02/01
Officials release RQ-1L Predator RQ-1L Predator accident report
the accident resulted from operator error.

the pilot -- who flies the aircraft from a ground control station
-- inadvertently cleared the primary control module's random
access memory. As a result, the Predator lost its data link
connection with the ground control station.


http://www.globalsecurity.org/milita...0219-acc01.htm
releases RQ-1 accident report

In-Depth Coverage

Released: Feb. 19, 2003

LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, Va. (ACCNS) -- Air Force investigators
have determined that human error caused an RQ-1 Predator aircraft
to crash Sept. 17 at a classified forward-operating location in
Southwest Asia.

The Predator, which is an unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, was
destroyed upon impact. The loss is estimated at $3.2 million. No
one was injured in the accident. The aircraft was assigned to the
11th Reconnaissance Squadron at Nellis Air Force Base, Nev.

According to an Air Combat Command accident investigation report
released today, the primary cause of the accident was that the
pilot unintentionally flew the aircraft into a hazardous cloud.

The pilot lost communication with the aircraft several times, but
was able to re-establish communication twice. However, the
aircraft failed to respond to the pilot’s commands, indicating the
flight control computers were disabled by the hazardous weather
conditions


http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell...s/predator.htm
As of 31 October 2001 the Air Force had received a total of 68 air
vehicles, and had lost 19 due to mishaps or losses over enemy
territory, including four over enemy territory in Kosovo. A good
number of them were lost due to operator error, since it is hard
to land the UAV. The operator has the camera pointing out the
front of the plane, but he really has lost a lot of situational
awareness that a normal pilot would have of where the ground is
and where the attitude of his aircraft is.

The CIA has a small number of the armed drones. Newer versions of
the Predator, at $4.5 million each, are being produced at a rate
of about two aircraft a month.


http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_ho.../19962521.html
Thursday, October 31, 2002
Las Vegas Review-Journal

May 17 crash of unmanned spy plane blamed on human error

Investigators have blamed the May 17 crash of an unmanned Predator
spy plane in Southwest Asia on human error, saying one of the
plane's tail control mechanisms had been improperly assembled by
the manufacturer, according to an Air Force statement Wednesday.

The remote-controlled RQ-1 Predator was assigned to Nellis Air
Force Base's 15th Reconnaissance Squadron in Indian Springs.

The plane, which had been deployed as part of the 386th
Expeditionary Group, went down "near a classified forward
operating location" in Southwest Asia, said the statement from Air
Combat Command headquarters at Langley Air Force Base, Va.

The loss of the plane made by General Atomics of San Diego is
valued at $3.3 million, the statement said.

Air Force investigators determined that incorrect assembly of the
"right tail plane control servo" was the sole cause of the
accident, the statement said.

A spokesman for Air Combat Command said Air Force officials are
still probing Friday's crash of a Predator during a training
mission near Indian Springs. That plane was assigned to Nellis'
11th Reconnaissance Squadron.


http://www2.acc.af.mil/accnews/aug01/01267.html
Released: Aug. 16, 2001

RQ-1 Predator accident report released

The RQ-1 Predator is a medium-altitude, long-endurance unmanned
aerial vehicle system. The Predator is a system, not just an
aircraft. The fully operational system consists of four air
vehicles (with sensors), a ground control station, a Predator
primary satellite link communication suite and 55 people.
(Courtesy photo)

LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, Va. (ACCNS) -- Officials investigating the
March 30 crash of an RQ-1L Predator unmanned aerial vehicle have
determined the accident resulted from operator error.

According to the Accident Investigation Board report released
today by Air Combat Command, the Predator experienced an icing
problem and the pilot was unable to maintain control of the
aircraft.

The Predator, which belonged to the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron
at Nellis AFB, Nev., was supporting the Kosovo Stabilization
Force. There were no injuries or fatalities. The Predator was
destroyed upon impact.

According to the report, the pilot recognized the icing problem,
but failed to immediately execute critical checklist steps for
pitot static system failure. The pitot static system uses air and
static pressure to determine the aircraft’s altitude and airspeed.
There is also substantial evidence that nonuse of the pitot static
heating system was a substantially contributing factor in this
mishap.

http://www2.acc.af.mil/accnews/dec99/990383.html
Released: December 23, 1999

RQ-1 Predator accident report released

LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, VA. (ACCNS) -- Officials investigating the
April 18 crash of an RQ-1 Predator unmanned aerial vehicle near
Tuzla Air Base, Bosnia, have determined the accident resulted from
a combination of mechanical and human factors.

The Predator, which belonged to the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron
at Nellis Air Force Base, Nev., was returning from a
reconnaissance mission over Kosovo in support of Operation Allied
Force. It was destroyed upon impact.

According to the Accident Investigation Board report released Dec.
22 by Air Combat Command, the Predator experienced a fuel problem
during its descent into Tuzla. Upon entering instrument
meteorological conditions and experiencing aircraft icing, the
Predator lost engine power.

The two Predator pilots, who control the aircraft from a ground
station, executed critical action procedures but were unable to
land the aircraft safely. It crashed in a wooded area four miles
south of Tuzla AB.

According to the report, the pilots' attention became too focused
on flying the Predator in icing and weather conditions they had
rarely encountered. The report also cites lack of communication
between the two pilots during the flight emergency as a cause of
the accident.

For more information, please contact the Air Combat Command Public
Affairs office at (757) 764-5994 or e-mail .


http://www2.acc.af.mil/accnews/apr01/01127.html
Released: April 13, 2001

Predator accident report released

LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, Va. (ACCNS) -- An RQ-1K Predator unmanned
aerial vehicle crashed Oct. 23 in Kosovo as a result of mechanical
failure, according to accident investigators.

The Predator is an unmanned reconnaissance aircraft used to survey
battlefields and return video footage and radar data. The accident
happened about 180 miles southeast of Tuzla Air Base, Bosnia,
where the aircraft was based. The Predator was part of an
Operation Joint Forge reconnaissance mission over Kosovo and was
assigned to the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron, Nellis Air Force
Base, Nev.

According to Air Combat Command's Accident Investigation Board
report released Thursday, the accident resulted from mechanical
failure in the UAV's propeller control system. Investigators found
substantial evidence indicating errors during maintenance on the
propeller control system on Sept. 28 played a critical role in the
accident. Evidence showed that certain components of the propeller
assembly were not adequately lubricated; in addition, a key bolt
was stripped and had not been tightened properly. These errors
likely led to the accident, according to the lead investigator.


Until then, this is my last post on the issue.

I suppose that means you'll be continuing to post to this thread. :-)

It's already gotten far more attention than it deserves at this stage.

At what stage do you feel public scrutiny of UAV operation in civil
airspace would be appropriate? Oh I forgot. You want to see NTSB
reports before you consider the hazard posed by UAV operation in civil
airspace. Brilliant! :-)

The "Big Sky" is a total myth. Any rational system that relies upon
chance to insure air safety is doomed to failure. I hope you're not
an FAA employee.

hmm... For the record, no, I'm not an FAA employee. However, the "myth" of
the big sky is shattered everytime I go up VFR. For all the VFR flight I've
done, the only time I have ever gotten close to another craft
unintentionally was near an airport.

There are several airports very near the US/Mexico boarder.

See and avoid? Perhaps, but I don't
recall ever maneuvering to avoid another aircraft during VFR cruise.

I suppose encountering conflicting air traffic is more likely in
congested airspace, however I've often had traffic in close proximity
over the Mojave Desert. The sky is getting smaller all the time as
the military grabs more and airline traffic increases require
increasing the size of class, B, C, & D areas.

Also for the record, you inferred a reliance on chance for safety. I implied no
such thing.

Citing the Big Sky theory as your separation methodology of choice for
UAV operation seems to contradict your denial of reliance on chance
for air safety.

Until proven otherwise, I will stand by my assertion that there
are far fewer airplanes in operation (i.e., "Big Sky") in the border areas
under consideration for UAV use, though.

How does the number of aircraft operating in a given area justify
chance as the chosen method of separating them?

You questioned my use of the term 'reduced vision standards'.

Yes, I did.

That
lead me to believe that you felt that UAV operators would be held to
the same (not reduced) vision standards as certificated airmen.

I can't help that.

If
your questioning of my use of the term 'reduced vision standards' did
not imply your belief that they UAV operators would be held to the
same standards as certificated airmen, what were you implying?

I was implying that you have no idea what are the capabilities of these
UAV's you're trying to get us all stirred up about. Nothing more.

No idea? They are unmanned. I believe that a pilot is certified to
meet vision standards that are impossible to meet with synthetic
vision.

The military has not disclosed to me all the capabilities of their
UAVs. :-) However, unless there is high-resolutin, color, binocular
vision in all quadrants, the UAV operators' visual capability to see
and avoid will be substandard to that required of a certificated
airman.

That may be, but there are ways to compensate.

Please don't withhold your description of those "ways to compensate."
I am most interested to know to which 'ways' you allude.

Again, you haven't
demonstrated that the proposed operation of these UAV's will significantly
degrade aviation safety. Come back when you have something more solid than
"omigod they're putting unmanned aircraft in the skies!"

See the citations of numerous UAV operator error crashes I provided
above. These mishaps enumerate operator inattention, improper
operator commands, loss of control due to data link failure as a
result of flying into a cloud, operator loss of situational awareness,
operator failure to recognize pitot static system failure, incorrect
assembly of control servo, operator lack of experience in IMC, lack of
lubrication and improper assembly...

Your apparent lack of concern for air safety and reliance on chance
(Big Sky)for aircraft separation betrays your shallow understanding of
the issue.

It's interesting that you think I have any less concern for aviation safety
than anybody else - much less rely on chance for separation. Larry, you're
demonstrating a serious ignorance here.

I'm just reading what you wrote. If you meant something else, you
should have said something else.

So you feel that a _biased_ (as opposed to _impartial_) governmental
investigative organization does not warrant reform? Comon' man,
think!

Now you're trying to change the subject. If you want to talk about
revamping the NTSB, start another thread. This one's dead.

It was you who first mentioned the NTSB not me:

Message-ID: om
As for your subject line question, I'd wait for an NTSB ruling
before passing judgment on that.

But I suppose you forgot what you said a day and a half ago.

On Fri, 23 Apr 2004 19:40:48 -0500, (Mike Money)
wrote in Message-Id: :

Larry,

The Predator is equipped with a modified Honeywell ETCAS TPA-81A. The
system responds to Mode 1, 2, 3, 4, A, C, and S. Forward surveillance
has been extended to 360 degrees.

http://www.honeywelltcas.com/etcas_tpa81a.htm
System Operation
ETCAS provides two modes of operation. The basic mode is ACAS II
which is the same as TCAS II with Change 7.0 software and is RVSM
compatible. In addition to the standard TCAS functions of
situational awareness, traffic alert and resolution advisories,
the Honeywell ETCAS provides a formation mode. This formation mode
allows aircraft operators to locate, identify, rendezvous with and
maintain flight formation with aircraft equipped with a variety of
identification systems, including Identification Friend and
Fo(IFF), Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4, Mode A, Mode C and Modes S
transponder equipped private, commercial and military aircraft.

In order for UAV operators to rely upon the Honeywell ETCAS for
aircraft separation, _all_ aircraft would have to be transponder
equipped, and FARs would have to be changed to mandate transponder use
at all times while airborne. So while TCAS is definitely part of the
solution to aircraft separation, it would not separate UAVs from
aircraft without electrical systems, nor those operating in airspace
where transponder operation is not mandated by regulation.

In addition, Predator is data-linked to airborne and ground commands for
control and observation.

I'd like to know more about that.

Predator is piloted by a ground controller who is assisted by up to six
(6) mission specialist. Each specialists is responsible for the
sensor/system he/she is operating to complete the mission (optical, IR,
armament, etc.). The pilot ground controller is dedicated to flying the
airplane. Some controllers are certified pilots and all controllers
have spent many hours in a simulator.

How will the flying public feel about sharing the sky with
uncertificated UAV operators with lots of sim time? Shall we now
permit gamers with lots of MS Flight Simulator time to ply the
nation's skies? Yikes!

There are more eyeballs on a Predator and its proximity to everything
than any GA aircraft.

Mike $$$ (PA28)

What is the aggregate cost for all those eyeballs?

What is the cost of two man Cessna 182 patrol?

Are there any eyeballs aboard the UAV that meet the vision
requirements of a certificated airman: 20/20 binocular color vision?

Before the government starts operating UAVs among the flying public,
they need to insure UAVs will meet the same or better criteria they
currently demand of airman. Anything less is criminal negligence.

"John T" wrote in message
ws.com...

However, the "myth" of
the big sky is shattered everytime I go up VFR. For all the VFR flight
I've
done, the only time I have ever gotten close to another craft
unintentionally was near an airport. See and avoid? Perhaps, but I don't
recall ever maneuvering to avoid another aircraft during VFR cruise.

Fly up here in the NY Metro area for a few years and see how you feel then.
Around here you are *always* close to another airport.

"Cub Driver" wrote in message
news

Do the "team of 7" work for less money than a pilot and a
spotter?

You are assuming that the two-man crew of the Cessna is supported by
no one?

This is the government! That can't be right!


Oh yeah. For a moment I foolishly thought it would be run as a business.

On Fri, 23 Apr 2004 16:09:19 GMT, "Tony Cox" wrote in
Message-Id: et:

"Larry Dighera" wrote in message
.. .

Aircraft operation in the NAS by an uncertificated "pilot" would seem
to violate FARs.

I suppose that depends on how you define "Aircraft"
and "pilot"...


Ummm..

Pilot: A person who holds the appropriate category, class, and type
rating, if appropriate, for the conduct of the flight.

Aircraft: A device that is used or intended to be used for flight in
the air.


It's my understanding that it takes a team of about 7 to operate a
UAV. Perhaps that level of redundancy might mitigate the concerns you
raise. However, 7 border patrol officers on the ground might be more
effective in preventing illegal entries.

Now I don't understand the logic. What does a UAV provide
that a 182 doesn't? Is it significantly cheaper to keep in the air?
Do the "team of 7" work for less money than a pilot and a
spotter? Now that's scary....

Exactly. There have to be undisclosed reasons for deploying UAVs.

I do understand the use of UAV in hazardous areas, where there
is enemy fire and/or risk of a pilot being captured. But why go to
all the extra trouble just to police the border?

Perhaps the DHS is using the UAV for border patrol duty scenario as a
more publicly acceptable vehicle to introduce UAV surveillance nation
wide, because UAV use doesn't seem to make economic nor safety sense
for domestic peacetime operation.

"Larry Dighera" wrote in message
...
On Fri, 23 Apr 2004 16:09:19 GMT, "Tony Cox" wrote in
Message-Id: et:

I suppose that depends on how you define "Aircraft"
and "pilot"...


Ummm..

Pilot: A person who holds the appropriate category, class, and type
rating, if appropriate, for the conduct of the flight.

Aircraft: A device that is used or intended to be used for flight in
the air.

I was being "Clintonesque". These definitions from the FAR's? I
couldn't find them on a quick scan.

Fortunately, the chances you cite are not criteria for NAS design.

In engineering a workable NAS I would prefer that the designers employ
methodologies that _insure_ separation of air traffic, not merely
reduce the _chances_ of a MAC. Anything less is irresponsible
negligence.

In any system, there's always a small probability that a catastrophe will
occur. Aircraft certification rules and separation standards acknowledge this
and are established to keep the risk acceptably low. For example, for lateral
separation of two aircraft traveling at the same flight level on parallel
routes, the Target Level of Safety (TLS) set by ICAO (with FAA participation)
is 5 x 10^-9 per flight hour. That is, loss of lateral separation should
lead to no more than one accident every 200 million flight hours. The TLS is
not zero. Some people don't like to accept this, but it's just not realistic
to insist on zero risk.

Barry