NTSB final report on Hendrick crash

PDF from NTSB http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2006/AAB0601.pdf

Jim Macklin wrote:
PDF from NTSB http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2006/AAB0601.pdf



No surprise there.

"Jim Macklin" wrote in message
...
PDF from NTSB http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2006/AAB0601.pdf

One potential "External Pressure" on this flight that many people may not be
aware of is that Ricky Henderson (the team owner's son who died on that
flight) was slated to work as a spotter for one of the Hendrick cars. By
rule, you can not grid your car if your spotter is not in position on the
roof of the grandstand.

IIRC, the Cup race that day had a 1pm Green Flag so that suggests to me they
were running late. Even with a helo standing by at MTV to ferry everyone
from the airport to the track, they'd have been cutting it close.

Doesn't excuse the way in which the crew botched the approach, but it might
(IMO) suggest perhaps some "Get There-itis."

Just $0.02 worth from someone who works on the NASCAR tour.

Jay Beckman
PP-ASEL
Chandler, AZ
Technician, NASCAR on FOX / NBC / TNT

Part of being professional is how you handle those
pressures. I don't know why the crew did what they did and
when they suspected they had a problem. But a climb and a
turn away from obstacles is always a good first step in
getting another chance.
Did the crew assume it was simple and skip the approach
briefing, what were they doing with the GPS? How much
experience did the crew have together and how much in THAT
airplane?

The RMI [ADF], DME and LOC should have been setup as primary
and the GPS was not approved for an approach mode and should
not have been programmed for an approach.

Not trying to slam any pilot, trying to understand why
pilots make mistakes so I don't make the same kind of error.


"Jay Beckman" wrote in message
...
| "Jim Macklin" wrote
in message
| ...
| PDF from NTSB
http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2006/AAB0601.pdf
|
| One potential "External Pressure" on this flight that many
people may not be
| aware of is that Ricky Henderson (the team owner's son who
died on that
| flight) was slated to work as a spotter for one of the
Hendrick cars. By
| rule, you can not grid your car if your spotter is not in
position on the
| roof of the grandstand.
|
| IIRC, the Cup race that day had a 1pm Green Flag so that
suggests to me they
| were running late. Even with a helo standing by at MTV to
ferry everyone
| from the airport to the track, they'd have been cutting it
close.
|
| Doesn't excuse the way in which the crew botched the
approach, but it might
| (IMO) suggest perhaps some "Get There-itis."
|
| Just $0.02 worth from someone who works on the NASCAR
tour.
|
| Jay Beckman
| PP-ASEL
| Chandler, AZ
| Technician, NASCAR on FOX / NBC / TNT
|
|

Jim Macklin wrote:

Part of being professional is how you handle those
pressures. I don't know why the crew did what they did and
when they suspected they had a problem. But a climb and a
turn away from obstacles is always a good first step in
getting another chance.
Did the crew assume it was simple and skip the approach
briefing, what were they doing with the GPS? How much
experience did the crew have together and how much in THAT
airplane?

The RMI [ADF], DME and LOC should have been setup as primary
and the GPS was not approved for an approach mode and should
not have been programmed for an approach.

Not trying to slam any pilot, trying to understand why
pilots make mistakes so I don't make the same kind of error.

When you really have to get there and the weather is like it was that
day, you select an airport with a precision approach and plan the ground
logistics accordingly. I recall someone familar with all the NASCAR
issues in play that day said KDAN would have been a good choice, with a
bit of planning when they were preparing to depart.

The implication is that the plan to fly to this airport, in that
weather, with that aircraft flown by those pilots, was a bad decision.
Everything seems fine to me. That situation seems to me to be exactly
why race teams use GA.

Two competent, proficient, experienced pilots just botched it. There
are a lot things to learn from it and avoid having it happen again.

Of all GA users, one might guess that NASCAR race teams understand the
balance between pursuing goals, risk taking, and safety. Nothing is
100% - you simply keep trying to get there.

Sam Spade wrote:

When you really have to get there and the weather is like it was that
day, you select an airport with a precision approach and plan the ground
logistics accordingly. I recall someone familar with all the NASCAR
issues in play that day said KDAN would have been a good choice, with a
bit of planning when they were preparing to depart.

Maule Driver wrote:

The implication is that the plan to fly to this airport, in that
weather, with that aircraft flown by those pilots, was a bad decision.
Everything seems fine to me. That situation seems to me to be exactly
why race teams use GA.

For a personal flight it wouldn't be a bad decision at all given the
marginal weather. For a "must arrive" situation it was bad planning.

Two competent, proficient, experienced pilots just botched it. There
are a lot things to learn from it and avoid having it happen again.

I don't know what the lesson to be learned is, other than they were
certainly not competent and proficient that day.

I've been watching this stuff for a long time, and these kinds of errant
blunders happen over and over. That's why airliners have TAWS these
days, which was an outgrowth of GPWS, whicn in turn came about because
of an air carrier errant blunder.


Of all GA users, one might guess that NASCAR race teams understand the
balance between pursuing goals, risk taking, and safety. Nothing is
100% - you simply keep trying to get there.