NTSB final report on Hendrick crash

The implication is that the plan to fly to this airport, in that
weather, with that aircraft flown by those pilots, was a bad decision.
Everything seems fine to me. That situation seems to me to be exactly
why race teams use GA.

Two competent, proficient, experienced pilots just botched it. There
are a lot things to learn from it and avoid having it happen again.

Of all GA users, one might guess that NASCAR race teams understand the
balance between pursuing goals, risk taking, and safety. Nothing is
100% - you simply keep trying to get there.

Sam Spade wrote:

When you really have to get there and the weather is like it was that
day, you select an airport with a precision approach and plan the ground
logistics accordingly. I recall someone familar with all the NASCAR
issues in play that day said KDAN would have been a good choice, with a
bit of planning when they were preparing to depart.

Maule Driver wrote:

The implication is that the plan to fly to this airport, in that
weather, with that aircraft flown by those pilots, was a bad decision.
Everything seems fine to me. That situation seems to me to be exactly
why race teams use GA.

For a personal flight it wouldn't be a bad decision at all given the
marginal weather. For a "must arrive" situation it was bad planning.

Two competent, proficient, experienced pilots just botched it. There
are a lot things to learn from it and avoid having it happen again.

I don't know what the lesson to be learned is, other than they were
certainly not competent and proficient that day.

I've been watching this stuff for a long time, and these kinds of errant
blunders happen over and over. That's why airliners have TAWS these
days, which was an outgrowth of GPWS, whicn in turn came about because
of an air carrier errant blunder.


Of all GA users, one might guess that NASCAR race teams understand the
balance between pursuing goals, risk taking, and safety. Nothing is
100% - you simply keep trying to get there.

On 11/14/06 03:48, Matt Whiting wrote:
Dave S wrote:


The GPS is just not intuitive at all to use and takes way too much
set-up, cross-checking and effort in my opinion. It is amazing how
complicated they made these devices given how simple a typical ILS or
VOR approach is.



Agree 100%. Each vendor seems to have it's own way of doing things too,
making it hard to transition from one to the other. I suppose I'll get
used to them after a few years...


No disrespect intended.. but once you learn how to use one King.. you
can use em all.. the "switchology" is common across the entire product
line. Nav page 1 is the same across the entire line.. Nav page 5 is the
moving map.. Flight Plan 0 is the active flight plan, The VOR page,
Airport page, NDB pages.. they all have similar functions and data
across the entire product line.

That is why he said each vendor, not each model. Yes, all Kings are
much the same as are the few Garmin's I've used. I find the Garmin's a
little more intuitive than the King, but the King is certainly capable
as you say, just not as easy to learn.

As an example, conside the hold/OBS discussion. If I'm autosequencing
an approach and need to do a hold for approach entry, having a function
called "hold" seems intuitive to me. Or I can think of it as putting a
"hold" on the autosequence. However, calling that function OBS doesn't
make nearly as much intuitive sense. Small things like that separate
good human factors design from run-of-the-mill design as with King.

As another example, when I'm flying toward the IAF for a procedure,
which happens also to be the FAF (and sometimes even the MAHP, etc.)
the King always selects the fix that is latest in the procedure,
rather than the first one I would hit - and I have to manually change
it.

Yes ... I've read the manual and don't really need a technical explanation
as to *why* it does it this way - it simply doesn't make sense to me.
It is goofyness like this that make practice with the box so important
(because it is so counter-intuitive).

By the way, I can't take the unit home to practice (or even practice
in the plane while on the ramp) because these are club planes, and
they don't allow that. Also, there is no PC-based simulator (good
thinking B/K!).


Yes, when I was flying the King a lot, I got pretty used to it. The
trouble is how fast you forget all of the nuances. 6 months and I'm
nearly back to ground zero trying to remember whether the outer or inner
ring is needed or when to hit cursor, etc. Whereas, I can go awar from
a VOR or ILS system for 6 months and come back and fly one approach and
I'm pretty comfortable again.

It is a matter of degree, but I think the GPS systems could have been
much better designed.


Matt



--
Mark Hansen, PP-ASEL, Instrument Airplane
Cal Aggie Flying Farmers
Sacramento, CA

Sam Spade wrote:
Maule Driver wrote:

The implication is that the plan to fly to this airport, in that
weather, with that aircraft flown by those pilots, was a bad decision.
Everything seems fine to me. That situation seems to me to be exactly
why race teams use GA.

For a personal flight it wouldn't be a bad decision at all given the
marginal weather. For a "must arrive" situation it was bad planning.

Someone did suggest that there was some urgency to the flight (urgency
is relative, without urgency, no need to fly). But there's *no*
indication that there was any 'get there-itis' or "must arrive" pressure
involved was there? It appears they pushed on beyond the miss point
because they didn't realize they missed the miss.

Two competent, proficient, experienced pilots just botched it. There
are a lot things to learn from it and avoid having it happen again.

I don't know what the lesson to be learned is, other than they were
certainly not competent and proficient that day.
Huh? "How to use and not use a GPS' lessons seems to be written all
over it. But if you just want to knock the pilots, then nothing will be
learned. My personal conclusion and lesson is that you need to stick
with your primary navigation instruments and use the backup as backup.
But that's me.

I've been watching this stuff for a long time, and these kinds of errant
blunders happen over and over. That's why airliners have TAWS these
days, which was an outgrowth of GPWS, whicn in turn came about because
of an air carrier errant blunder.

And tomorrow we will be wondering why *anyone* would dare fly a trip
uncoupled from TO to landing or even consider flying in an aircraft with
out a autopilot capable of flying from startup to shutdown. This wasn't
an airline flight and yet they were well equipped and the operation
seemingly well managed.

In article ,
Robert Chambers wrote:

I bet you one of those AI's is suction driven. That's all you'd have in
the event of an electrical failure.

Nope; both primary AI's are painted on CRT screens anyway, and they're
powered by 115VAC, as I mentioned in an earlier post.

Electrical failure is covered by a third electric AI, which has an
independent rechargeable battery backup good for at least 30 minutes.

Maule Driver wrote:
..

Huh? "How to use and not use a GPS' lessons seems to be written all
over it. But if you just want to knock the pilots, then nothing will be
learned. My personal conclusion and lesson is that you need to stick
with your primary navigation instruments and use the backup as backup.
But that's me.


There are no new lessons to be learned from this accident. Because of
the lack of a CVR the NTSB is being speculative about the use of the GPS.

I've been running the flight in my mind. The crew knew they
were over the LOM as they turned outbound [established in
the hold] and if they had been thinking about the navigation
problem, known that they needed to fly 2-4 minutes outbound
for position. Then they would have been able to descend to
2600 when intercepting the LOC inbound. But they obviously
were flying some avionics and not thinking about their
position and timing. As a result they just did a 360 over
the LOM and then also ignored the RMI indications of the
ADF.

This points out my worry that modern avionics removes the
"thinking" process from piloting. When all we had was a VOR
and an ADF, pilots learned to make a moving map in their own
head. When that "map" worked, they were able to pass a
checkride. Now that the map is on the panel, if you lose
your place, there is a real problem detecting the error.

Also, the missed approach, particularly when a turn is
required, must be done anytime you have the slightest
uncertainty.


"Sam Spade" wrote in message
...
| Jim Macklin wrote:
| I will apologize if I offended you or some other
commuter
| pilot. But in my experience with commuter operations,
and
| pilots, the aircraft are usually only equipped with
basic
| avionics. Further, the operating profile doesn't
| necessarily apply to corporate 1,000 mile trips in a
King
| Air.
|
| But based on what you have said, it is even more of a
puzzle
| as to why and how did this accident happen.
|
| One possibility is that the ship's DME was inoperative,
thus confusion
| ensued about how to get that particular GPS installation
to pinch-hit as
| a DME.
|
| This is pure speculation on my part.
|
| What is not speculation on my part is how poorly equipped
this
| particular King Air was considering the high-value use to
which it was
| put. The owners simply cannot escape some moral
responsibility for the
| accident by not having added perhaps a Garmin 530 (or 500
if their
| conventional avionics were in good shape). And, with that
kind of money
| why not a TAWS?
|
| Shortly after the NTSB released the flight track I ran the
flight in
| both MFSF 2004 with the Reality XP Sandel TAWS and then
with my Garmin
| 296 in the simulator mode.
|
| With any type of readily available terrain warning system,
even "just" a
| Garmin 296/396/496, these pilots would have received ample
terrain warning.
|
| When flight operations get to the sophisticated level of
operating a
| twin-engine turboprop, things are bound to fall through
the cracks
| without some competent form of flight operations
management.

The King Air and 1900's don't use vacuum pump, the weak link
in most GA airplanes. They use P3 air to power a venturi to
get both pressure and vacuum.




"Beavis" wrote in message
...
| In article ,
| Scott Skylane wrote:
|
| Here's a cockpit shot of one of the 1900s he flew:
| http://www.airliners.net/open.file/0585758/L/
|
| On a completely unrelated note, I see there is a vacuum
suction gage on
| the instrument panel. What is this for? Apparently all
of the "gyro"
| instruments are electronic.
|
| Correct. There are four remote gyroscopes (two attitude
gyros, two
| heading gyros), all powered by 115-Volt AC power. The
really nice thing
| about that kind of system is that if one gyro dies, you
can route the
| signal from the working gyro to both screens, so each
pilot still has a
| full set of instruments. Pretty neat.
|
| There's also a standby attitude indicator, which has its
own internal
| battery backup. You can see it above and to the left of
the GPS in the
| picture linked above.
|
| Is this strictly for the de-ice boots?
|
| Deice boots, and the operation of the pressurization's
outflow valve.
| (Suction pulls it open; springs push it closed.) That
works fairly well
| for a plane that size; larger planes, like the 737, have
an
| electrically-operated outflow valve.

In the text of the NTSB report, the GPS display was located
on the center console and would have required looking 90
degrees and down for the pilots to see.



"Peter" wrote in message
...
|
| Sam Spade wrote:
|
| The KLN 90B gps has a small moving map in its panel
display. The NTSB
| report alluded to the standard practice was for a track
up orientation.
| Given that the moving map screen is fairly short
vertically, maybe half
| its width, in the track up presentation it may not have
been as obvious
| that they had overflown their waypoints...
|
| Of course, from an armchair quarterbacking perspective,
almost all of my
| inflight GPS experience has been behind King products,
the KLN 89B, -90B
| and KLX-135, and didn't seem to have a problem with the
display or
| depictions. The display was also not on the center
console between the
| pilots, facing up (as opposed to on the main panel).
|
| I work with this technology all the time, from the
current air carrier
| stuff down to the Garmin line. I find I am very
comfortable with the
| maps the Garmin 500 series have. I find less comfort
level with the
| Garmin 400 series (I prefer my handheld 296's map to the
400 series).
|
| I have flown a few times in a Cessna with a King 89 and
90. I find
| those moving maps to be virtually useless, and bad human
factors, at
| least for an occasional user of those devices.
|
| Interesting read... I have a KLN94 and a KMD550 MFD.
|
| I am UK based and here we have no full GPS approaches, and
there are
| just a few around the rest of Europe. However, most of the
| conventional approaches do have the "overlays" in the Jepp
database.
|
| I have not looked up the approach plate for the airport
under
| discussion here but it sounds like it was a conventional
approach and
| anything that was shown on their GPS would have been the
overlay of
| that conventional approach.
|
| As such I am suprised the GPS did anything much useful and
I am very
| suprised they were relying on it for any sort of waypoint
sequencing.
| The KLN94 still switches from 5nm FS to 1nm FS (within
30nm of the
| runway) even on an overlay, but it doesn't go on to the
0.3nm FS mode.
|
| Personally, when I fly conventional approaches (which as I
say is
| always when flying an IAP) I use the GPS moving map for
lateral
| guidance (especially to establish accurately on the FAT on
NDB
| approaches) and general situational awareness and have
never attempted
| to use it for any waypoint distances.
|
| I don't think this crew were viewing any sort of moving
map; if they
| were they would have noticed that they passed the runway.
However, the
| KLN90 moving map is awful, as is the KLN94 one, so I am
not suprised
| [if] they weren't watching it.
|
| On a slightly different tack, it's good to see that one is
able to
| dissect these accidents and learn from them without
getting jumped on.
| In another forum, this one
|
|
http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/sites/aai...06__g_bomg.cfm
|
| was posted, and when I suggested that the pilot probably
didn't look
| at his altimeter for 1-2 *minutes* while inexplicably not
using his
| autopilot (and descended into the sea) I got severely
jumped on for
| criticising these "low grade aircraft" commercial pilots
(who tend to
| work under poor conditions with zero job security).
|

Not clear (to me at least) is WHY they so clearly lost situational
awareness. Based on when they descended to MDA,and when and how they flew
the missed, they obviously thought they were someplace other than where they
were.
But why? Missing the fact that they autosequenced over the NDB might have
caused some confusion when flying the hold, but once inbound, both the GPS
(if they were using it) and the primary nav (presumedly tuned to the LOC
frequency) would both be showing dme to MAP. The gps would count down to
zero, the primary nav would go down to 1. How could either relying on a
potentially unreliable GPS OR missing the autosequencing have caused them to
to fly several miles PAST the MAP thinking that they had not yet reached it?
IIRC, they descended to MDA several miles PAST the MAP. They used the MAP as
the FAF, and seemed to fly a picture perfect approach thereafter. How could
misreading the GPS or NAV cause this??
"Dave S" wrote in message
news
The KLN 90B gps has a small moving map in its panel display. The NTSB
report alluded to the standard practice was for a track up orientation.
Given that the moving map screen is fairly short vertically, maybe half
its width, in the track up presentation it may not have been as obvious
that they had overflown their waypoints...

Of course, from an armchair quarterbacking perspective, almost all of my
inflight GPS experience has been behind King products, the KLN 89B, -90B
and KLX-135, and didn't seem to have a problem with the display or
depictions. The display was also not on the center console between the
pilots, facing up (as opposed to on the main panel).

Dave

Peter wrote:
"Jim Macklin" wrote


PDF from NTSB http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2006/AAB0601.pdf



Having read a fair few reports of aircraft flown by professional crew,
perhaps commercially, it amazes me how many do not have what one would
call a moving map GPS. Unless I am missing something obvious, this sort
of thing should not
happen if the pilot has a picture showing his position relative to the
rest of the place.