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#181
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On Fri, 08 Aug 2003 09:40:56 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote: The Stirling has always been my personal favorite among the three for looks (other than the original top turret), and if I had my druthers they'd have stuck the proposed 110-foot wing on them and maybe shortened the gear. But there was no way that they could have been produced in adequate numbers. Still too heavy for my likings. Like you, I think the Halifax B.III was the best contender, with the Lancs second. More on LR Spits in my other response. and 9th AF, we might have been able to swap for P-47s which would at least allow us to escort to 375 miles or so by spring, even if we couldn't get the Spits we needed. The P-47s would probably be out: the RAF wanted them to replace Hurricanes for Tactical support in the Far East by mid-1944, but IIRC they didn't get significant deliveries until early 1945. The USAAF (quite rightly) had first call on lend-lease aircraft, and I can't see the RAF getting P-47s until the USAAF was happy with the numbers it had available. The Mustang was a different issue, given the importance of the British contribution to getting it and the Packard Merlin into production in the first place. [3 Group flying B-24s] 3 Gp. was only the initial contingent; most of the force would transition over eventually. I just don't think the numbers would be available for that in 1944. Again, the USAAF would have first call (alongside the USN and Churchill's personal transport/cigar ferry....). One, maybe two Groups might have been usable in the context of heavy attritional losses, but I can't see the RAF replacing the whole of the 2,000 Lancasters and Halifaxes Bomber Command had on strength by the end of 1944. Personally, I suspect 205 Group only really got them due to the fact that they'd lucked into enough to equip one squadron* before Pearl Harbour and the following ramping-up of USAAF lend-lease allocations. [* Not actually operating B-24s in December 1941, but able to mysteriously hold on to their initial allocation which actually made it out to Egypt in the spring of 1942 before the Halverson force and the 12th AF Libs arrived to suck up all the following B-24s that followed.] As an alternative, given these constraints, I suggest expanding 2 Group as a daylight bomber force. An option, although I'm not familiar with where they were based at the time, and whether their base infrastructure would support heavies. They had some in East Anglia, and could be allocated more. Just like 3 Group (and 8 Group), they were adjacent to USAAF bases, so the fuel pipeline and rail links would have been available. I think the B-25 is a contender he it had the range for shallow penetration raids to the Ruhr, reasonable defensive armament and a good bombload. I suggest phasing out the Boston in 2 Group and replacing it with the Mitchell, and using the six to eight squadrons in 2 Group for daylight strategic bombing. Further expansion could follow if the aircraft were available. I'd really like to see a good source on the Stirling, given my affection for it. Try "The Stirling Bomber", by M. J. F. Bowyer, Faber & Faber, London 1980. ISBN 0 571 11101 7. It's not as comprehensive as I'd like [most books aren't], but it's the best reference I've found for the Stirling. [snip gratuitous, sickening and totally uncalled-for agreement on other points] Gavin Bailey -- "...this level of misinformation suggests some Americans may be avoiding having an experience of cognitive dissonance." - 'Poll shows errors in beliefs on Iraq, 9/11' The Charlotte Observer, 20th June 2003 |
#182
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The Revolution Will Not Be Televised wrote:
On Fri, 8 Aug 2003 11:03:12 +0100, "Keith Willshaw" wrote [well, Guy did, the last quoted material is from Keith]: [long-range Spits for a daylight BC effort] You've arrived at pretty much the same conclusions we did, although we said either the Spit Mk. VIII or else the IX with the VIII's leading edge tanks as a start. Given that Mk VII/VIII production was underway at the end of 1942, there's no reason they couldn't have been made available with rear-fusleage tanks as the 1945 production IXs and XVIs we Fighter Command were actively against it due to C of G issues affecting manoeverability, but in this instance I think they would have been over-ruled if a decision was made at Air Staff level to pursue daylight strategic operations [just like they got the LR Mk IIs and had to use them to escort the Knapsack Blenheim raid in Ausgust 1941]. Frankly, even Mk Vs would have been useful with a 75-gallon rear tank and 90-gallon slipper tanks. This would have increased endurance over normal internal fuel capacity to a total of 250 gallons or about 300%. They would have been uncomfortably unstable on take-off, but the 8th AF overcame similar problems with the rear-fuselage tank for the P-51B (deleted by the RAF in their Mustang IIIs for the same manoeverability prejudice). This would have improved a little with the large chord Mk VIII tailplane. My contention here is that Fighter Command would still get the IXs as fast as they could be produced, while older Vc airframes were fitted with the rear fuselage tank, meaining no impact on Mk IX supplies in the short term. A similar process of getting the most out of older airframes can be seen in the conversion of stock Vbs to LF Vbs in the summer of 1943, so I don't think this is too implausible. I think you may be underestimating the difficulty re the Mk V. Quill, in His "Spitfi A Test Pilot's Story," devotes an entire chapter to "Longitudinal Stability and Increased Range." He describes the weight additions and Cg problems that led to the installation of bobweights on the Mk. Vs, as well as the first fitting of a 75 gallon tank to a Mk. IX (ML 186), which he flew from Salisbury Plain to the Moray Firth and back at low altitude and economical cruise -- this a/c had a bob-weight in the elevator system plus an enlarged horn balance. Quill writes that "the aeroplane was unstable to start with but as soon as I had used up the rear fuselage fuel the handling was back to normal . . ." While he and Joe Smith felt that some longitudinal instability at the start of the flight was acceptable (as with the Mustang), the margins seem to have been much smaller in the case of the Spit. The Mustang's stability was judged acceptable once the rear tank was down to somewhere between 25 and 50% (opinions differ), and if you want to extend the escort range it's the amount of fuel you can carry internally to fight and return on that determines escort radius, no matter how much fuel you hang externally to boost endurance. Talking about the development of the Mk. XIV into the Mk. XVIII, Quill writes that "the basic stability margins of this aircraft, with its more forward center of gravity due to its heavier engine, and with the latest standard of modified elevator and the larger vertical tail surfaces, were thought likely to be adequate to enable the aircraft to be cleared for long-range escort duties accepting some instability in the early stages. However, we had more difficulty than we anticipated in reaching an acceptable standard of handling with the rear tank in use and the war was over before it was possible to clear the aircraft with the rear tank in full operation." "The next and final stage in the longitudinal stability story was the incorporation of what came to be known as the 'Spiteful' tail. This had greatly enlarged (27 %) horizonta and vertical tail surfaces and was fitted to some Mk. 22s, all Mk. 24s, some Seafire 46s and all Seafire 47s and all Spitefuls and Seafangs." "It was a major production change and, had the pressures of war permitted its earlier introduction, for instance on the Mk. XIVs and Mk. XVIII, the Spitfire would have become a very fine long-range escort fighter. As it was, although the Seafire 47 and Spitfire 24 were both very long-range aeroplanes compared with the early marks of Spitfire, the fact is that throughout the period of Spitfire wartime operations problems of longitudinal stability imposed a severe limitation on its range." The two-stage Merlin was shorter and lighter than the Griffon, but was still about 6" longer (second stage supercharger case) and 200 lb. heavier than the single stage Merlins, and the Mk. Vs had already been suffering from overstess breakups due to too far aft Cg prior to the fitting of bobweights. I don't think Mk. Vs would have worked. The next stage would have been Mk VIIIs with the same rear-fuselage tank, with the leading-edge tankage helping to offset their higher fuel consumption to give a broadly similar endurance and range. I don't doubt that there wouldn't have been enough rear fuselage tanks to equip full production, but Fighter Command and the overseas commands would still get the shorter-range, umodified VIIIs and IXs. Speaking of which, the extra range would have been very popular in Australia, Burma and Italy. At any rate, overall production would not suffer, as only a minority of airframes could be fitted as rear fuselage tank production started, and this could be done to them while in storage at Maintenance Units after delivery from the factory. If Mk. VIII airframes were available we would have taken them as is, and asked for more. Even the unmodified Mk. VIII would get us to the Ruhr at least, probably a bit further. We told Supermarine to put more development effort into the rear tank, even if it held up the Mk. XIV. No need to - the supply of two-stage Griffons was the main bottleneck for Mk XIV production, and there would still be unmodified Mk VIII airframes available by the end of 1943 for conversion to Mk XIVs as the Griffons came along. Lots of Mk.VIIIs were what we needed, not the Mk. XIV, so we would have grabbed those airframes. The delay in the Mk. XIV would have been a question of development manpower available. They were still working out the bugs on the Mk. XIV at the time, and we would have told them to put that on the back burner and get tanks into the leading edges of Mk. IXs, convert over to Mk. VIII production, and/or devote much more effort to qualifying a rear fuselage tank. I suspect Boulton Paul would have ended up working with Supermarine for the internal tanks (just like they did in 1942 for the external Spitfire drop tanks), but I don't know what would have had to give way at either firm in 1943 to allow the increased internal tankage to be developed. I suspect F.21 development would have been held up at Supermarine, as the Mk VIII airframe (which was the basis of the Mk XIV) was already in series production. This just means the RAF don't get two squadrons worth of F.21s in spring 1945, after interminable airframe development work throughout most of 1944 delays them anyway. No great loss there, methinks. See comments above. We realised that Fighter Command was likely to scream over any slowdown in production of the Mk. IX in the run up to the Invasion, so figured this would need to be decided at Air Ministry/MAP or higher level. Absolutely. But this is worth dwelling on. A couple of wings of LR Spit Vcs operating out of Coltishall or Ludham escorting 8th missions *as they did historically* in the summer of 1943, alongside the 8th FC P-47s, and escorting deeper-penetration 2 Group B-25 raids would have proved their worth within a couple of months, and would have increased 8th AF effectiveness (allowing deeper B-24 penetrations due to an expanded escort force). Obviously, the LR Vcs would not be optimal, but even they could prove to be useful escorts, helping to supress bomber losses and having much greater opportunities for combat at their initiative than the rest of FC Spit units on Circus operations to the Pas de Calais. See my comments on Spit V Cg problems above. In 1943, with lots of Mk. IXs not able to do much, I think the effort needed to go there or into the Mk. VIII. The Spit V was just too inferior at B-17/24 heights, even assuming it could carry the fuel (better than nothing, I grant you, but I expect fighter squadron morale would have been the pits). As it was, RAF Spits (Vs and I suspect mostly IXs) were able to escort to Antwerp. Extending that to Emden, the Ruhr and much of France would have had a ripple effect, making more P-47 groups available to go deeper, and then use the P-38s and P-51s for TARCAP. The logic of upgrading and expanding the 12 Group LR Spit escort force would have been inescapable, even if the RAF were less wedded to demonstrating the potential of daylight strategic bombing than the USAAF was. The same dynamic as affected the RAF Mustang IIIs historically (doing anything particularly effective? No? Then escort 8th AF raids.). The critical factor is that an embronic LR escort force operating out of 12 Group would not neccessarily prejudice 11 Groups supplies of Spit IXs for any potential Battle of Britain Mk II which was their trump card for annihilating the needs of other commands for the best fighter currently in production at the strategic planning level. [At the Air Ministry, Air Staff Meeting for the Planning of Offensive Fighter Operations, 30th July 1943.] AOC 11 Group: "These Spits handle like dogs with the rear tanks full. Rate of climb is reduced, and they wallow about like pregnant cows. I will not ask my pilots to fight under this disadvantage." AOC 12 Group: "We wire the rear fuselage tank filler cap shut when on defensive operations. No disadvantage there. And our pilots empty their rear tanks first when on operations. We don't even need to fill them full for sweeps over eastern Holland and the German border, just enough to cover the climb and initial cruise to the enemy coast. No disadvantage there. And my long-range Spitfire squadrons are making more claims than most of AOC 11 Group's wings: perhaps this might be why all his best Squadron and Wing leaders are trying to transfer to those squadrons." AOC 11 Group: "That's all very well, but I will not suffer a reduction of Spitfire IX deliveries to benefit 12 Group's operations at the expense of the defence of the south-east of England and London." Vice-Chief of the Air Staff: "12 Group haven't received any Spitfire IXs at this point. AOC 12 Group is using converted Spitfire Vs." AOC 12 Group: "In view of our success, we would ask the CAS to release Spitfire VIIIs as they are produced from my M.U.s to convert in the same manner." Director Fighter Operations Overseas "What about our promised deliveries of VIIIs to Australia and Burma. They need the range just as much as AOC 12 Group?." AOC 12 Group: "Clearly other commands want the LR Spitfire as well. I suggest the VCAS recommends increased tankage production and the MAP is instructed accordingly." And that's what we planned to push for: Mk. VIIIs or Mk. IXs with VIII tanks, plus whatever extra fuel Supermarine could make work until the Mustangs were available in sufficient numbers. Ideally, we wanted the Mk. XVI a year earlier. As it was, since Arnold was already twisting Portal's arm to get him to give up the RAF's allocation of 300 Merlin-Mustangs for the immediate future so that they could be used by the 8th and 9th AF, we might have been able to swap for P-47s which would at least allow us to escort to 375 miles or so by spring, even if we couldn't get the Spits we needed. I don't think the British were willing to compromise over their allocations of Mustang IIIs, although they historically were willing to make cutbacks in their allocations in favour of the 8th AF when they were suffering heavy losses (e.g. 20-25% of their I.E. Mustang strength per month in spring 1944). That's what I'm talking about. In the fall of '43, Arnold got Portal to give up his Mustangs for a few months, in exchange for P-47s. But with an expanding force of longer-ranged Spits escorting from East Anglia to the Ruhr, the pressures would have been less. The P-38 and Mustang were still going to be required for deep-penetration missions, but the Spits could have provided a major and obvious benefit. Sure, we agree on this. This is worth dwelling on, as the real key to a successful RAF daylight bombing offensive was winning air superiority using escort fighters more than it lay in increasing the defensive capacity of the bombers themselves. I see the two as complimentary, but with a large enough force of "rear-tank" Spit Vs and then VIIIs, the RAF could have bombed the Ruhr successfully in daylight with their existing night bombers by 1944. They would have required heavier escorts, and probably could only have operated in tandem with deeper-penetration B-17 raids taking on the brunt of the resistance, but they would have been a practicable proposition, albeit with higher risks of disasterous losses on individual missions if the Luftwaffe got to them. On the plus side, their all-weather bombing capability on large-scale industrial and area targets was probably superior to the 8th AF at that point, and this would have increased the overall effectiveness of the bombing campaign as a whole. Just my opinion, though. Agrees with our reasoning exactly, with the reservations stated re the Mk. V. Guy |
#183
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In message , ArtKramr
writes You fly where you are told to fly. Nobody will ever ask you for "your definition" of anything. The operational analyst will, these days. (If he didn't splice some recording gear into your aircraft anyway) Got to get as much info on what works and what doesn't, as you can: there's a lot less margin for error these days. -- When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite. W S Churchill Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk |
#184
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Guy Alcala wrote in message .. .
Geoffrey Sinclair wrote: From Avro Lancaster by Harry Holmes. B I empty weight January 1942 29,580 pounds, fixed military load 4,120 pounds, so tare weight 33,700 pounds. Gross weight 60,000 pounds, 5,120 HP take off power. snip much good stuff He doesn't happen to list just what is included in the fixed military load, does he? Guns, radios, bombsights, O2, armor? No break down of fixed military load. After giving the tare weight (airframe plus fixed military load) comes the rest of the load, "Crew, removable military load, fuel and oil, bombs and carriers". Bomber Command War Diaries usually give the strength and losses of the attacking force by aircraft type, which gives overall percentages. Bomber Command War Losses gives you the details by individual aircraft. What level of detail is wanted? Loss rates of Merlin-engined Lancs, Hercules-engined same and Halifax IIIs on the same mission would be helpful. TIA, Well the war losses gives the loss by serial number, including summary tables in the appendix by mark, but not the sortie totals. The war diaries gives the basic types in a particular mission, Lancaster, Stirling, Halifax etc, but not the sortie totals by mark number. So overall it is a case of counting the numbers to give the losses by aircraft mark, and overall losses by aircraft design. The two references would show the losses on other operations on a given night, like minelaying, so these can be removed to give an overall percentage loss rate for a given target. Also if you want percentages then presumably you want to know the abort rates and the overall number and type of aircraft that were credited with attacking the target. I expect this will require trips to the PRO. There is the situation about Halifax mark numbers, marks I, II, V, merlin engines, the rest were hercules. The hercules versions had the extended wingtips, 1,275 square feet if wing area versus 1,250 square feet. During the mark II/V production run the mid upper turret was changed from 2 to 4 guns. The rectangular tail was introduced in mid 1943 and included modification of existing aircraft. Many of the earlier types had ended up operating at around the mark III weights, as a result squadrons started to take weight out of the aircraft, including turrets. Mark I series 1 (no mid upper turret, empty 34,000, max 55,000 pounds, 12,000 pound maximum bomb load, merlin X, service ceiling 22,000 feet) Mark I series 2 (series 2 and 3 empty 35,000, max 60,000 pounds) Mark I series 3 (series 3 had 1,220 HP engines versus 1,130 HP) Mark II series 1 (mid upper turret, empty 35,800, max 60,000 pounds, merlin XX, 1,220 HP) Mark II series 1 special (empty 35,000 pounds, no nose turret, 13,000 pound bomb load) Mark II series 1a, most with rectangular vertical tail, glazed nose, merlin 22, introduced the 4 gun mid upper turret. Mark V series 1, mark Vs were effectively mark II with dowty undercarriage. Mark V series 1 special (no nose and often mid upper turret, 36,000 and 61,500 pounds, service ceiling 22,000 feet) Mark V series 1a, rectangular vertical tail, glazed nose, service ceiling 21,000 feet. In January 1944 the merlin engined types were permanently suspended from operations against German targets, the mark III began arriving in squadrons in November 1943. So presumably what is wanted as a first look are the November 1943 to February 1944 losses. One point the RAAF history makes is it could make a big difference where you were in the bomber stream. The most famous incidence is at Peenemunde, only the last wave was intercepted. Mark III, extended wings, rectangular tail, glazed nose, 38,332 pounds empty, 65,000 pounds loaded, often with H2S fitted, service ceiling 20,000 feet, 13,000 pound bomb load Mark VII, mark III with different version of hercules engines, bomb load 12,000 pounds. Mark VI as per mark III but some cleared to 68,000 pounds, bomb load 12,000 pounds. One point is some of the merlin engined types were fitted with 4 bladed propellers, which added 1,000 feet to the service ceiling with better high altitude rate of climb, and helped on long endurance flights, seems to be mainly mark V aircraft. Most of the above from Halifax at War by Brian J Rapier, which is mainly stories of the men who flew the aircraft. Geoffrey Sinclair Remove the nb for email. |
#185
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In article ,
Dave Eadsforth writes: In article , Peter Stickney writes Sorry for the late reply - I've been busy at work, and we took advantage of the non-monsoon weather yesterday to effect a Vehicle Recovery Operation (Hauling my brother's 1932 Fird 1-1/2 ton out of the Hornet (both Yellowjecket and White-Faced - The White-Faced are Evil - they live in underground nests, which they defend vigorously with red-hot 18" Japanese Bayonets) and grapevine (Didn't know that grape vines can get 1" in diameter - stuff's as strong as a steel cable, too) Alder thicket (Those are the ones with 4" thorns), with the surrounding ground too soft to use the heavy trucks or teh dozer to pull. (At least we don't have Snakes, Venomous, Lethal, 47 variation, here in NH), Needless to say, you don't feel like posting much, after that. In article , Dave Eadsforth writes: Thanks, Dave. But I should have been more explicit. The Merlin engined Lancs are fiarly consistantly documented. The one that seems off is the Hercules powered Lancaster II. Beg your pardon, I should have been more attentive... There's been a lot of stuff published about it that doesn't make sense, and an accurate context for the numbers that do exist is hard to come by. Interesting bit about the "Lincoln-Type" landing gear, though. The numbers that you've posted also explain why some sources are off. They seem to be quoting the number for the modified aircraft. Yes, a study of AVRO production line management in 1945 could be interesting. Not a problem at all, and I'm glad to get the info you posted. Good info never hurts, even if it wasn't what you were originally looking for. -- Pete Stickney A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many bad measures. -- Daniel Webster |
#186
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Peter Stickney wrote:
snip Andm, for thh definitions of "Fixed" vs "Removable" Military load, I haven't found any explicit definitions, but I do happen to have the Erection adn Maintenance Manuals for the Night-fighter Mosquitos, and the CG computation tables list items considered to be "Removable" snip Mossie list At a guess, Removable Military Load is whatever can be pulled at an airfield without special equipment. The Fixed Military Load must be things like Armo(u)r Plate, and self-sealing fuel tanks, which would require that the airplane be taken apart to some extent to remove. Presumably just the hard to get to armor, as much of it is in plain sight and easily accessible (like the seat back in a Lanc, or the armor protecting the waist gunners in a B-17 or B-24). BTW, Amazon lists an outfit called Crecy Publications Ltd. in the UK, which supposedly has the reprints of the Stirling (1/III/IV, Halifax and Lanc I/III/X Pilot's notes; however no prices are given, and they are all unavailable. Going to Crecy's website none are listed, so does anyone know if they ever did publish them, or is this some vaporware? Guy |
#187
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In article , Guy Alcala
writes BTW, Amazon lists an outfit called Crecy Publications Ltd. in the UK, which supposedly has the reprints of the Stirling (1/III/IV, Halifax and Lanc I/III/X Pilot's notes; however no prices are given, and they are all unavailable. Going to Crecy's website none are listed, so does anyone know if they ever did publish them, or is this some vaporware? This thread has had an awful lot of weights listed for various types not all clear as to what they include. Does anybody know the original bomb/fuel load for the B.1 Lanc? I'm trying to find out how big the bomb load could have been for a full fuel load, and a fuel load for max bomb load (working on 14,000lbs). -- John |
#188
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John Halliwell wrote in message ...
In article , Guy Alcala writes BTW, Amazon lists an outfit called Crecy Publications Ltd. in the UK, which supposedly has the reprints of the Stirling (1/III/IV, Halifax and Lanc I/III/X Pilot's notes; however no prices are given, and they are all unavailable. Going to Crecy's website none are listed, so does anyone know if they ever did publish them, or is this some vaporware? This thread has had an awful lot of weights listed for various types not all clear as to what they include. Does anybody know the original bomb/fuel load for the B.1 Lanc? I'm trying to find out how big the bomb load could have been for a full fuel load, and a fuel load for max bomb load (working on 14,000lbs). Lancaster fuel tankage was 2,154 British gallons, the UK oil official history notes 315 gallons of 100 octane avgas weighed 2,240 pounds, other avgas grades were heavier, 300 gallons weighing 2,240 pounds. So a full fuel load was around 16,000 pounds. You could add 400 more gallons in overload tanks in the fuselage. The early Lancasters were cleared to 60,000 pounds of which 26,300 pounds was available for the "removable load", figure around 250 pounds per crew member, body, clothing, parachute, oxygen, the removable load probably included the machine guns as well as their ammunition. Geoffrey Sinclair Remove the nb for email. |
#189
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On Sat, 09 Aug 2003 07:52:50 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote: [snip unacceptable tirade of rational discourse] [3 Group flying B-24s] Remember, though, that the U.S. phased out B-24 production at 3 of the 5 factories making them (Douglas Tulsa, Convair Fort Worth, and North American in Dallas) during 1944, as Ford and Consolidated San Diego were able to produce sufficient numbers for U.S. requirements. Even so, according to Joe Baugher's website the RAF received 1,600 B-24H, J and Ls between Spring '44 and August '45, so there was clearly excess capacity available. OK, I can accept the increased B-24 availability in 1944, but what do we lose as a consequence, and what do we do in 1943 meanwhile? They had some in East Anglia, and could be allocated more. Just like 3 Group (and 8 Group), they were adjacent to USAAF bases, so the fuel pipeline and rail links would have been available. I was thinking more of runway/taxiway/ hardstand length and strength, as well as hangar size, bomb dumps, accomodations etc. All would likely need upgrading. They'd just re-allocate the bases to the relevant groups. Swap a grass strip for an asphalt one in another Group. I don't think it's a major issue. I think the B-25 is a contender he it had the range for shallow penetration raids to the Ruhr, reasonable defensive armament and a good bombload. I suggest phasing out the Boston in 2 Group and replacing it with the Mitchell, and using the six to eight squadrons in 2 Group for daylight strategic bombing. Further expansion could follow if the aircraft were available. Nah, same limitations of range and ceiling as the B-26s, with a smaller bombload. Really? I thought it had a better range and bombload, but I'm no expert. I saw it fulfilling a diversionary/supporting role, hitting airfields and less-heavily defended targets outside the major heavy Flak belts and giving the Luftwaffe controllers headaches trying to identify the main raiding force formations. In other words, doing for the B-24s in 3 Group what the 2nd Bomb Division B-24s did for the B-17s in the rest of the 8th AF historically at this point. Hell, the mediums were operating down below Stirling height (both the R-2600s in the B-25 and the R-2800s in the B-26 had single-stage two-speed supercharging, optimized for about 15,000 feet) which is okay for relatively lightly defended tactical targets but a really bad idea going after German industrial targets. If they wanted to go to Germany from England it had to be with heavies, or the unavailable in sufficient numbers Mossie. The tactical bombers had to face the Flak when operating over western Germany in 1945, and it was suvivable given adequate support and decent planning. And many of the tactical targets they did hit had substantive flak defence (albeit nowhere near 1943 Ruhr levels, let alone 1945 Politz levels). Even so, I wouldn't suggest using them as a deep-penetration strategic force. Well, if it would help get things back to normal around here, whenever one of us chooses to present and discuss factual data that contradicts hoary old myth and one-sided perceptions, the other could accuse him of belittling the accomplishments, bravery and/or importance of various aircrew nationalities/theaters/periods. At last, a contribution in this thread which reaches beyond rationality to advocate a return to the traditional and time-honoured mode of usenet discourse. How much civil discussion, analysis and argument can r.a.m. stand? ;-) Of course, the key difference between a USAAF daylight strategic bombing effort and an RAF one would be the greater efficiency of the latter. I mean, once we factor out all those ludicrous PX requirements for Coca-Cola, ice-cream and signed movie star's underwear, we should free up about 50% extra import capacity for bombs and replacement aircraft..... Gavin Bailey -- Another user rings. "I need more space" he says. "Well, why not move to Texas?", I ask. - The ******* Operator From Hell |
#190
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The most exciting takeoff was in a contest between an F-8F and, as I
remember it, an F-9F. They left the start at the same time and a couple of hundred feet later the F-8 went straight up. It was at a couple of thousand feet (maybe not quite that high) before the F-9 left the ground. "Guy Alcala" wrote in message . .. Cub Driver wrote: I shall have to re-play my tape of a UK airshow that Douglas Bader narrates and tells of his first flight in a jet it went something like "Well, there I sat in the cockpit ready for my first flight and braced myself.....and you know, the thing took off down the runway like an old lorry!" That sounds about right. The B-47 had the advantage of peacetime development, but its engines were so slow to spool up that the plane had to land under power with a parachute. Lacking the power, it would crash if it had to go around. While correct about the B-47, you're talking about two separate issues. The Meteor's (and all early jets) slow accel time on take-off had nothing to do with spool-up time, as they'd already be spooled up prior to takeoff, and everything to do with their relatively low power to weight ratios and low thrust at low speeds. I will now make way for Mr. Stickney, who I trust will be along any moment now to give his thrust vs. power lecture, much as it must irritate him to have to constantly repeat it ;-) Guy P.S. Say, Pete and Urban, this is the sort of thing that definitely belongs in the FAQ. That will save lots of typing (and teeth-gnashing) in future. |
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